Full Opinion

NUMBER 13-25-00504-CV COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG IN RE THE COMMITMENT OF JOSHUA J. WILDBERGER ON APPEAL FROM THE 379TH DISTRICT COURT OF BEXAR COUNTY, TEXAS MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Silva and Cron Memorandum Opinion by Justice Silva A jury found appellant Joshua J. Wildberger to be a sexually violent predator (SVP). See TEX. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE ch. 841 (SVP Act). The trial court signed a final judgment and an order of civil commitment. See id. § 841.081. By one issue, appellant argues that the evidence is legally insufficient to support the “behavior abnormality” element of the SVP Act. We affirm. I. BACKGROUND 1 Before the State sought to have appellant committed as an SVP, appellant had previously been convicted of three aggravated sexual assault of a child offenses, first- degree felonies, involving three different victims. 2 See TEX. PENAL CODE § 22.021 (a)(1)(B), (e). In August 2007, appellant pleaded nolo contendere to two counts of aggravated sexual assault of a child and was placed on deferred adjudication community supervision. However, in July 2008, the trial court revoked appellant from community supervision, adjudicated him guilty of both counts, and sentenced him to six years’ imprisonment for each count. In March 2017, appellant pleaded nolo contendere to aggravated sexual assault of a child and the trial court sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. A jury trial commenced in this case on July 29, 2025, the State presented testimony from Dr. Jason Dunham, a licensed forensic psychologist, and appellant. A. Dunham’s Testimony Dr. Dunham, a licensed forensic psychologist, testified that he had evaluated appellant and found that he suffered from a behavioral abnormality. Dunham stated he followed the standard methodology of experts who perform forensic evaluations and explained that he based his opinion upon review of 3,000 pages of documents, including 1 This appeal was transferred from the Fourth Court of Appeals in San Antonio pursuant to a docket-equalization order issued by the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE §§ 22.220(a) (delineating the jurisdiction of appellate courts), 73.001 (granting the supreme court the authority to transfer cases from one court of appeals to another at any time that there is “good cause” for the transfer). We are required to follow the precedent of the transferor court to the extent it differs from our own. See TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3. 2 We have assigned the pseudonyms “Amelia,” “Bella,” and “Chloe” to the complainants to protect their privacy. See TEX. CONST. art. 1, § (a)(1) (providing that a crime victim has “the right to be treated . . . respect for the victim’s dignity and privacy throughout the criminal justice process”). 2 those which pertained to appellant’s juvenile and adult criminal history, such as police reports, Child Protective Services (CPS) reports, victim statements, witness statements, and appellant’s own statements. Dunham also relied on a report of a previous behavioral abnormality evaluation of appellant by another psychologist, a two-hour interview Dunham had with appellant in April 2025, recorded prison telephone conversations and email exchanges between appellant and his fiancé, and appellant’s deposition testimony in May 2025. Dunham explained that when determining whether a person has a behavior abnormality, he looks for “risk factors,” or “factors that are associated with the future, whatever you’re trying to measure.” Dunham also looks for “protective factors” which “are statistically known to decrease what somebody’s level of risk is once its established.” Dunham also explained that he considers a person’s employment history, substance abuse history, relationship history, and sexual and nonsexual criminal history. When performing his evaluation, Dunham stated he wants to “establish what [a person’s] risk was at the time of the last offense that occurred and then look to see has it decreased enough over certain factors, could be anything from getting older to going through treatment or other things that . . . decrease risk, or it could increase if they have continued to get in trouble as well.” Dunham stated that some risk and protective factors are weighed more heavily than others. Dunham explained that sexual deviancy and antisocial orientation were the “two broad domains of risk,” or “red flags[,] for somebody who is more at risk for sexual reoffending.” Dunham defined sexual deviancy as “abnormal sexual behavior that’s not 3 accepted in society that typically is going to cause some kind of a problem if it comes to light.” He also explained that people with antisocial orientation are those “who violate the law and they kind of lack the concern for other people and they don’t follow the rules of our society.” Dunham stated that appellant had both sexual deviance and antisocial orientation and explained that these factors were usually chronic and “don’t usually just go away, especially not at a younger age.” Dunham also stated that another risk factor associated with appellant was that he was a sexual offense recidivist: “[s]omebody who commits a sexual offense after having some type of punishment for a previous sexual offense.” Dunham explained that nonsexual arrests and convictions were relevant to whether appellant had a behavioral abnormality because they relate to his antisocial orientation. Dunham revealed that appellant had numerous nonsexual charges and convictions in his juvenile and adult criminal record. According to Dunham, juvenile criminal history was important because it is a “big risk factor” “[e]specially if somebody . . . starts off getting in trouble as a juvenile,” and that “[i]t also points to early onset of . . . illegal behavior, which starts that pattern.” Dunham testified that appellant was given nine months of juvenile probation at age sixteen for unlawfully carrying a weapon, a hunting knife. As an adult, appellant had committed other crimes, including aggravated assault of a public servant, evading arrest, possession of a controlled substance, unauthorized use of a motor vehicle, forgery of a financial instrument, failure to appear in court, and burglary of a coin-operated machine. Dunham acknowledged that not all of these crimes resulted in a conviction and some were dismissed “either as part 4 of a plea bargain for other cases or for another reason.” Nevertheless, Dunham stated appellant’s adult criminal history was so significant because “he had about eight different categories of criminal behavior by age 26 that kind of points to that antisocial orientation that is . . . a huge risk factor for reoffending sexually.” Dunham stated he interviewed appellant, and they discussed his sexual offenses. Dunham testified that appellant committed his first sexual offense on August 27, 2006 against Amelia, who was thirteen years old and attended middle school, and appellant was seventeen and attended high school. According to Dunham, Amelia stated she walked to appellant’s house after 11:30 at night and had been “anally raped” “by some unknown person” who took her phone. Amelia relayed this information to appellant and asked him to have sex with her after that to make her feel better, and they did so. Appellant encouraged Amelia to call the police and her brother. Amelia called her brother, told him that “she was raped on the way over [to appellant’s],” and was picked up by her parents after. Dunham indicated that Amelia stated she previously had sex with appellant “about ten times,” that it was “not forced,” and described being in a relationship with appellant. Dunham stated that though this incident did not involve force, it was “probably inappropriate” as appellant was “too old to be in that kind of relationship with a [thirteen]- year-old.” When asked if his opinion would change “if possibly they continued in a relationship for a short period of time after that date,” Dunham responded, “No, because he was not arrested right away. He was not in trouble for that offense until after his next offense.” According to Dunham, appellant’s age at the time of this first offense is a risk factor because it showed his “sexual deviancy at a younger age.” In addition, Dunham 5 stated the age difference between appellant and Amelia was a risk factor, as “[h]e seemed to have a liking for younger girls at around that time, and [Amelia] fit as one of them at age [thirteen],” and that appellant was “almost an adult . . . at that point.” Dunham also testified that appellant had sexually assaulted Bella, another thirteen- year-old girl, six months after he committed his first sexual assault. According to Dunham, Bella was a virgin and had left school during the middle of the day and walked to appellant’s house. Appellant was not in school at the time. Dunham stated that appellant had asked Bella to have sex “about five times.” According to Dunham, Bella “never said yes, but she never said no,” and appellant “started having sex with her.” Bella stated, “it hurt” and asked appellant to stop, and he did. Then appellant “tried again and she again said it hurt and asked him to stop, and then he did stop, and then she walked back to school.” Dunham indicated that, based on statements from appellant’s fifteen-year-old sister and Bella’s mother, it “seemed that [appellant] was on the radar . . . with the school as far as liking the younger girls.” Dunham further indicated that appellant told his sister that he and Bella “had sex eight times that same day,” and that his sister had reported him. In addition, Dunham stated that Bella had told her mother that she “didn’t necessarily want to have sex.” Dunham also stated that he thought Bella was less willing to have sex with appellant than Amelia. Dunham testified that Bella had described meeting appellant through his sister when she went over to their house, and that there had been a couple of twenty-year-olds there, but appellant “was kind of gravitating toward [Bella], more so than anybody else.” Dunham stated that this indicated to him that appellant was “focused on the younger one 6 at the time over there,” and that this was consistent with statements from different people in the investigative reports that “kind of described that . . . [appellant] likes the younger girls, he’s gravitating to the younger girls at that time.” Dunham also stated that the records he reviewed indicated that appellant’s father tried to keep appellant from sitting next to Bella when they went out to eat together and seemed “like he did not like that arrangement, that situation.” When Dunham asked appellant about this second sexual assault, appellant stated that he had consensual sex with Bella one time, and that “there was no force or anything like that.” According to Dunham, appellant stated in his deposition that he had asked Bella several times to have sex and she said yes several times. Dunham explained that “grooming” was “anything that is involved in setting up a sexual offense, so anything that you do to make a sex offense more likely to occur.” Dunham observed that it appeared appellant was grooming Bella “to either be his girlfriend or to have sex with her based on telling her that he loves her, and . . . talking hours at night and developing that relationship.” Dunham further added that this “wouldn’t necessarily be grooming except for the age discrepancy and her vulnerability to that.” Appellant was arrested, charged, and convicted for these two aggravated sexual assault of a child offenses against Amelia and Bella. Appellant was placed on deferred community supervision for both offenses. However, Dunham stated that appellant committed several violations of his probation, including committing burglary of a coin- operated machine, as well as “technical violations such as not showing up, not paying his fees, not submitting to drug testing,” and being noncompliant with sex offender treatment. Appellant’s probation was revoked, and he was sentenced to six years’ imprisonment. 7 Dunham explained that appellant had “four different criminal acts for which he’s arrested for or charged with by the time he’s not even fully [eighteen] years old,” which Dunham found significant, and demonstrated appellant’s “antisocial elements.” Dunham also discussed appellant’s third aggravated sexual assault of a child offense. On December 22, 2015, appellant sexually assaulted three-year-old Chloe when he was twenty-six years old, two years after he had finished serving his prison terms for his first two sexual assault offenses. Dunham explained that appellant’s third offense demonstrated another risk factor called “persistence after punishment, sex offenders who reoffend after being punished for a previous sex offense.” Dunham stated that this risk factor carried the greatest weight in his assessment. With respect to appellant’s third sexual assault, Dunham found it significant that appellant committed that offense within two years of leaving prison instead of a longer amount of time. According to Dunham, records demonstrated that appellant was in a relationship with Chloe’s mother, and that he had lived with her, Chloe, and Chloe’s grandmother. Chloe had informed her grandmother, CPS, hospital examiners and nurses that appellant licked her vagina “all the time.” Appellant pleaded guilty to this third offense and was sentenced to ten years’ imprisonment. When discussing this third offense with Dunham, appellant denied that anything sexual ever happened with Chloe and instead described how Chloe’s grandmother “didn’t like him” and had previously reported him for other things such as drugs, and was “out to get him removed from the house.” Dunham identified several other risk factors related to this third offense: 8 [Chloe’s] age, being age three, that’s clearly more deviant than [thirteen] years old, so it’s also an escalation in offending. I think it’s more devious and worse, to be frank. He’s offended while he was in a relationship with the mom, so he has access to sex inside the house, but he’s offended against the daughter. Offending after treatment. So he went to—after his first offenses, he’s on probation. He’s ordered to do sex offender treatment. And he did go to some of it. So he’s offended after prison, after treatment, while in a relationship. So those timing factors, definite prepubescence for a victim, and the pattern of behavior. Dunham also stated he listened to some recorded telephone conversations between appellant and his fiancé, the nature of which were “sexually explicit, border[line] pornographic,” “and it’s almost every call.” Dunham further explained that appellant was having these types of conversations “even knowing that this case is going on.” Dunham identified another risk factor from these conversations, sexual preoccupation, which Dunham believed appellant has had “since he was . . . a teenager.” Dunham also stated that appellant’s email conversations were also “very sexual,” and “probably about [eighty] percent of [them] were long, like, erotic stories.” However, Dunham stated that the sexually explicit tone had “slowed down” over the last several months. Dunham also indicated that appellant received provocative photos from his fiancé and “another female that he had a relationship with.” When asked whether it was important for offenders to admit fully what they have done wrong, Dunham responded, It’s not the denial of the offense that’s important. It’s more denial of being sexually deviant or denial of having a problem or denial that you need any help. That’s more the risk factor that I’m looking at, because denial is common and it’s not identified as a risk factor, but it—it might be important for treatment purposes, because you can’t deny an offense and progress in treatment, but as far as the risk factor that you’re looking at as somebody who doesn’t understand their risk, if they have a poor appraisal of their own risk, then that’s the risk factor. And if you’re denying it, then it’s hard to have 9 a good understanding of what your risk level is. Therefore, you’re not inclined to put the safeguards and tools in place to keep you from getting into temptation later. Dunham stated that appellant did not have any sexual misconduct infractions in prison, which Dunham found surprising given his sexual preoccupation. However, Dunham did not consider the lack of sexual misconduct infractions a protective factor because “that’s not something different than the first time he was in prison where he got out and he reoffended.” Dunham admitted that it was “good [appellant] doesn’t have them,” but the lack of infractions did not change his opinion. Dunham also stated that he found appellant’s institutional adjustment to be a neutral factor. Dunham conducted a Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R) test on appellant, which measures “how psychopathic somebody is.” According to Dunham, people who are psychopathic “truly don’t have a conscience,” and “will do things according to what they want to do and really don’t care about much other than perhaps [the] legal consequence.” Dunham explained that “psychopathy plus sexual deviance is highly correlated with future risk for sexual reoffending.” He also stated he had undergone extensive training to administer the PCL-R test. Dunham observed that appellant had the following psychopathic traits upon testing: “[a] need for stimulation/proneness to boredom, conning, manipulative behavior, lack of remorse or guilt, promiscuous sexual behavior, irresponsibility, revocation of a conditional release, and criminal versatility.” Appellant’s overall score on the PCL-R test was 24.2, which Dunham explained meant that appellant scored within a moderate range of psychopathy. Dunham did not opine that appellant was a psychopath, but stated appellant’s score was still significant, and helped Dunham 10 understand appellant’s “antisocial makeup.” Dunham also conducted a Static-99R actuarial test for measuring appellant’s risk level for being rearrested or reconvicted of a future sex offense. According to Dunham, appellant scored a five, meaning “compared to other sex offenders, he’s above average risk for being rearrested or reconvicted in the future.” Dunham explained that the Static- 99R “doesn’t encompass protective factors very well,” or encompass every risk factor, such as sexual preoccupation or offending after some sex offender treatment, both of which were risk factors for appellant. Dunham also testified that appellant had “poor dynamic factors,” and explained that “[d]ynamic means changing, so this is what somebody’s current, like, attitudes are, their beliefs, how they feel about their offending, . . . what’s going on currently with them now.” In this regard, Dunham mentioned that appellant denies he is sexually deviant and “doesn’t think he’s any risk.” Dunham also stated that appellant’s substance abuse was also a significant risk factor as appellant was using methamphetamine daily when he was not in prison, and had no substance abuse treatment at that time. Dunham clinically “ruled out . . . pedophilic disorder—sexually aroused to females, nonexclusive type” because appellant’s prior sexual assaults involving the thirteen-year- olds “wouldn’t count based on the age discrepancy,” and Dunham did not know “how long a duration or anything went on with [Chloe] or if he’s had arousal to other little girls as well.” Dunham explained that nonexclusive meant appellant “also has arousal to adults, so it’s not exclusive to children” and that he could not say “specifically that [appellant] has 11 pedophilia because that is going to need to be more than a one-time incident. It’s going to need more of an ingrained, usually, I think, six months at least in duration that you have these arousal or urges towards children.” However, Dunham explained that it was possible appellant had pedophilic disorder, that it was “important to communicate that,” and “ruling out the pedophilia clearly means there’s probably something that has happened or something that has been a problem that has to do with prepubescent child[ren].” The following exchange occurred: [The State]: Are [appellant’s] sexual offenses evidence that his emotional or volitional capacity has been affected? [Dunham]: Yes. [The State]: And is it still affected today? [Dunham]: Should be, yes, ma’am. [The State]: And can you explain that? [Dunham]: Because what somebody is aroused to, what their sexual—you know, if somebody is aroused to a child when they are 25, it shouldn’t change when they are 35. People don’t become— people don’t change their sexual orientation just because they have, you know, been in an institution or been in a prison or been somewhere else or just the 10 years passage of time. People don’t become heterosexual if they’re homosexual, and vice versa. So if somebody is aroused to children, they don’t just suddenly stop becoming aroused to children just because of the passage of time. And so there is no reason that why he should not still have that arousal if it was there when he was 25. [The State]: And is that what a chronic condition is describing essentially? 12 [Dunham]: Yes, ma’am. [The State]: Are his sexual offenses evidence that he is a menace to the health and safety of another person? [Dunham]: Yes, ma’am. [The State]: How so? [Dunham]: He’s already shown the ability to harm somebody, you know, put other people at risk. Dunham stated he diagnosed appellant with antisocial personality disorder, which he explained as a “personality where the person struggles with following the rules in society. They do things that are frowned upon either by arrests or just—just not typical norms of society. And it’s ingrained, its lifelong, starts usually early in adulthood and lasts throughout somebody’s life.” In this regard, Dunham stated he relied on the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Disorders (DSM), Fifth Edition to diagnose appellant, and that this diagnosis was “provisional” because said diagnosis requires evidence of conduct disorder by the age of fifteen. Dunham stated that appellant had conduct disorder, “the juvenile equivalent to antisocial personality disorder.” However, Dunham stated he did not know what was going on with appellant before he was fifteen. When asked if he saw any current evidence of antisocial personality disorder in appellant, Dunham stated that there was “a lot less,” but that appellant had a lot of disciplinary cases while in prison for tattooing. Dunham explained that having tattoos itself was not antisocial, but it was antisocial in the sense that it was against the rules. The following exchange occurred: [The State]: And . . . has this antisocial personality disorder affected his emotional and volitional capacity? 13 [Dunham]: Yes. [The State]: And does it still affect his emotional and volitional capacity today to the extent that he is a menace to the health and safety of others? [Dunham]: Yes, . . . same reason. There is no reason for it to change. What somebody’s personality is doesn't usually—it can lessen, it can change a little bit over time, but at his age you don’t usually see a decrease in the outward elements of it. [The State]: It can decrease over time, though? [Dunham]: Yes. Dunham found one protective factor regarding appellant, in that he had “a period of time while living free that he did not offend after he offended against [Chloe].” However, Dunham stated that this one protective factor was not enough to change his opinion that appellant suffers from a behavior abnormality. Another protective factor was that appellant had “better institutional adjustment,” meaning he had less disciplinary cases in prison compared to the last time he was imprisoned for his first two convictions. Dunham stated that appellant had “good support from his fianc[é],” but he did not view this as a significant risk reduction. Dunham also stated that appellant had a realistic release plan. Dunham noted that appellant had not had any sex offender treatment since his last offense, and the treatment he had before “was probably obsolete now to him, and I don’t think it was long enough to make much of a difference.” Dunham discussed sex offender treatment with appellant and asked him if he needed it and if he was willing to take it. According to Dunham, appellant responded that he did not believe he needed sex offender treatment but would be willing to take it “if that would make y’all feel better.” 14 Dunham also noted that appellant did not really say in his deposition whether he needs sex offender treatment or not but did say that “he doesn’t consider himself to be a risk.” Dunham explained this was concerning because of appellant’s history and “just not knowing that he’s at a level of risk and not willing to—or not wanting to address that.” Dunham indicated that sex offender treatment was not necessarily required for someone to not reoffend again but described it as the “number one protective factor” along with advanced age that are “weighted the heaviest.” When asked if appellant understood his level of risk to reoffend sexually, Dunham responded, “it doesn’t appear so based on his statements. Then again, . . . denying the third offense . . . I don’t know where he’s at as far as whether he needs help. Like, if that’s what he’s truly denying, truly believes that, then [he] probably doesn’t have the insight that he needs.” The following exchange occurred: [The State]: And in summary, when someone has a mixture of sexual deviance and antisociality, no history of meaningful sex offender treatment, a lack of understanding of why they sexually offended, and all of the other risk factors you discussed, what does that do to someone’s risk of reoffending sexually? [Dunham]: Just knowing that information, I’d say that’s a high risk right there. [The State]: And how does [appellant’s] history of sex offenses indicate to you that his emotional or volitional capacity has been affected? [Dunham]: Because he’s given in to his temptations and succumbed to those. [The State]: Do you believe his emotional or volitional capacity is still affected today? 15 [Dunham]: Yes. [The State]: Today do you believe [appellant] is a menace to the health and safety of another person? [Dunham]: Yes. [The State]: And why do you believe that [appellant] has a behavioral abnormality as he sits here today when the last time he sexually offended was almost 10 years ago? [Dunham]: Because I don’t see what significant change could have occurred other than him aging, going from 25 to 35. I don’t see . . . what else would break that pattern that would be significant to me. [The State]: And . . . what would you consider [appellant’s] risk of sexually reoffending to be as he sits here today? [Dunham]: It should be high. On cross-examination, Dunham revealed that he did not review a video recording of Chloe’s forensic interview by the Child Advocacy Center but had read the police report concerning that offense. When asked if he thought it might be important to review the recorded interview, Dunham replied, “No. He was convicted of it. He pled guilty to it. There is no reason to go and reinvestigate it.” When asked if he thought it would be important to review the recording to see what Chloe said or did not say in the interview, Dunham responded, “I didn’t feel it was important because I already had the summarization of what was reported. I also had [a] summarization from CPS and the [sexual assault nurse examiner], and they were all very consistent in what was reported.” The following exchange occurred concerning Dunham’s rule-out diagnosis of pedophilic disorder: 16 [Defense counsel]: And you testified that you came up with a rule- out diagnosis of pedophilic disorder? [Dunham]: Yes. [Defense counsel]: And to be clear, you are not saying that [appellant] has pedophilic disorder, are you? [Dunham]: Not exactly, no. [Defense counsel]: A rule-out condition is not an actual diagnosis, is it? [Dunham]: It’s a qualifier to a diagnosis. [Defense counsel]: Are there certain criteria that must be met in order for somebody to be diagnosed with this disorder? [Dunham]: Yes. [Defense counsel]: And [appellant] does not meet those criteria, correct? [Dunham]: Not based on what I know objectively, no. Dunham further stated that a rule-out pedophilic disorder was “not equivalent to any kind of risk.” Dunham also stated that appellant’s last disciplinary violation occurred in 2021, and it was “minor.” Dunham also testified that appellant had told him that he had used methamphetamine “right up until his last arrest, last time he was free. So ten years ago, I guess.” When asked if a person can have a methamphetamine use disorder and not have a behavioral abnormality, Dunham replied, “Yes.” When asked if it was possible for someone to have sexual deviance and not have a behavioral abnormality, Dunham stated, “Yes, it is.” Dunham also indicated that one 17 risk factor was “somebody who offends after going through sex offender treatment” and that appellant had described attending such treatment. The following exchange occurred: [Defense counsel]: And what has [appellant] done in the past year to show he continues to have issues regarding volitional or emotional capacity? [Dunham]: He has not done anything to not show it, so the assumption is that . . . this condition is there, it’s affecting him, and because he’s set aside for a while doesn’t mean that condition is gone. But there’s nothing to show that it’s not there or that it’s not controlled through, like, sex offender treatment or, you know, gaining some positive dynamic factors or reversing the negative factors. So it’s more of the what has he not done to show that it’s not there, if that sounded right. .... [Defense counsel]: Do you believe [appellant] currently has serious difficulty in controlling his behavior? [Dunham]: I believe so, in certain situations, yes. [Defense counsel]: And what are those certain situations? [Dunham]: Whenever he’s tempted to act out sexually. Dunham then clarified that denial of an offense is no longer identified as a risk factor by the most recent research and studies. On redirect, Dunham indicated that most offenders he has interviewed did not admit to having an interest or attraction to children. Dunham further indicated that because it was rare for someone to self-disclose their arousal to children, patterns and convictions were important to look at and consider. Dunham also stated that appellant’s 18 drop in disciplinary cases occurred about the time he was isolated and segregated in prison. When asked why substance abuse is a risk factor, Dunham explained that “people under the influence can make worse judgments. They can—their inhibitions can be lowered, disinhibited, and do things that they may not think that they are capable of doing or intend to do because they are under the influence.” B. Appellant’s testimony Appellant testified that he initially thought Amelia was sixteen years old because she told him so but that he continued his relationship with her after finding out she was thirteen years old and they continued to have sex. Regarding this offense, appellant admitted, among other things, that he had sex with Amelia after she stated she had been raped because he “wanted her to feel better,” that he was “very irresponsible” and “should have known better.” Appellant also admitted to sexually offending against Bella after Amelia’s parents forbade appellant and Amelia from seeing each other. Appellant stated that he attended sex offender treatment when he was placed on deferred adjudication probation but did not complete it. Appellant stated he was released from prison the first time on December 17, 2013, and that he quickly met his girlfriend and that she moved in with him. His girlfriend had three young children, including Chloe. Appellant admitted he moved himself out after the allegation was made concerning Chloe. Appellant denied that he had sexually offended against Chloe or that he was sexually attracted to her. However, appellant admitted he “signed no contest to a plea agreement.” Appellant admitted he was currently serving sentences for other convictions, 19 including some stemming from an incident on December 8, 2015, where he fled from officers attempting to initiate a traffic stop, crashed, and thereafter attempted to throw away methamphetamine he had possessed. Appellant admitted he was convicted for possession of a controlled substance. Appellant also admitted to subsequently being involved in a high-speed chase with police, where he again attempted to flee from police trying to initiate a traffic stop because he had drugs in the car. From this incident, appellant was convicted for evading arrest and aggravated assault on a peace officer, and sentenced to eight years’ imprisonment. Appellant stated he had been housed in administrative segregation since September 1, 2021. Appellant indicated he was not sexually attracted to children or teenagers. He also stated he was not preoccupied or obsessed with sex. Appellant testified that he was open to taking sex offender treatment because he was “willing to do anything to help better [him]self as a person” and that this was what he told Dunham. When asked if he thought he needed help understanding why he sexually offended, appellant replied, “No.” When asked if he ever had meaningful sex offender treatment, appellant responded, “Never had the opportunity, no.” When asked if he fully understood how to avoid sexually reoffending in the future, appellant replied, “Yes.” When asked how he would avoid sexually reoffending in the future, appellant responded, By being aware of anything that could be a trigger to you, . . . not putting yourself in situations or circumstances that could cause . . . somebody to even make a statement about you or anything like that. Like, I wouldn’t be alone with somebody by themselves. I would always make sure that if I went somewhere to—like, if I went to go meet my friend Crystelle, I would make sure that my fianc[é] was with me so that I was—I wasn’t always the same person there with them. 20 Appellant then explained that a trigger was a “temptation,” and he did not have any triggers or temptations to sexually reoffend. On cross-examination, appellant explained that, while in prison, he had taken many courses on Edovo, an online application that is “all about educational things.” In particular, appellant stated he took one Edovo course related to sex offending, entitled “How Do I Overcome Child Sexual Abuse.” He explained that this course helped him “see things from [child vi