Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana No. 06-26-00031-CV IN THE INTEREST OF B.B., A CHILD On Appeal from the County Court at Law Panola County, Texas Trial Court No. 2020-095 Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef MEMORANDUM OPINION In this modification of the parent-child relationship, Steven Broomfield and Lisa Broomfield appeal the trial court’s decision to remove them as B.B.’s1 joint-managing conservators in favor of appointing Mother as B.B.’s sole-managing conservator. The Broomfields, who are not the parents of B.B., argue that the trial court erred by (1) failing to resolve a motion to transfer venue before proceeding to final judgment and (2) appointing Mother sole-managing conservator of B.B. We find that the issue of mandatory transfer is mooted by a prior opinion of this Court finding that the trial court properly denied the motion to transfer. We further find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in Mother’s appointment as B.B.’s sole-managing conservator. Consequently, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. I. The Issue of Mandatory Transfer is Moot The venue issue raised by the Broomfields was the subject of a prior opinion of this Court. The Broomfields had moved to transfer this case from Panola County to Smith County based on Section 155.201 of the Texas Family Code, which requires transfer of a case to a county where the child has resided for more than six months. In re Broomfield, No. 06-26- 00023-CV, 2026 WL 730475, at *1 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Mar. 16, 2026, orig. proceeding) (mem. op.); see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 155.201 (Supp.). In our prior opinion, we noted that an original suit affecting the parent-child relationship had been filed in Panola County, that the final order entered by that court had restricted B.B.’s 1 To protect the child’s identity, we use initials for the minor child and pseudonyms for his family members. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8. 2 geographical location to Panola County or a contiguous county, and that the Broomfields had moved B.B. to Smith County in violation of court orders, which had since resulted in findings of contempt of court. In re Broomfield, 2026 WL 730475, at *1. As a result, we resolved the issue on the merits, holding that the trial court did not err by denying the Broomfields’ motion to transfer because they “engag[ed] in unjustifiable conduct in moving B.B.[] against court orders.” Id. (footnote omitted) (citation omitted). Thus, we concluded “that Smith County [wa]s not the proper county to which transfer must be made.” Id. at *2. Because we have already resolved this issue against the Broomfields, we overrule their first point of error as moot. II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by Appointing Mother as B.B.’s Sole- Managing Conservator A trial court may modify the provisions of a prior order “that provides the terms and conditions of conservatorship, or that provides for the possession of or access to a child if modification would be in the best interests of the child and” “the circumstances of the child, a conservator, or other party affected by the order have materially and substantially changed since . . . the date of the rendition of the order.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 156.101(a)(1)(A). In their last point of error, the Broomfields argue that “the trial court abused its discretion by appointing Mother sole[-]managing conservator on a record that did not support the necessary finding of present parental fitness.” This argument implicates the trial court’s best-interest finding. See In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d 804, 818–19 (Tex. 2020) (orig. proceeding) (“[W]e read any best-interest determination in which the court weighs a fit parent’s rights against a claim to 3 conservatorship or access by a nonparent to include a presumption that a fit parent acts in his or her child’s best interest.”). A. Standard of Review “We review a trial court’s decision regarding custody, control, and possession matters involving [a child] under an abuse of discretion standard.” In re B.F., No. 06-24-00100-CV, 2025 WL 2252577, at *5 (Tex. App.—Texarkana Aug. 7, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting In re D.W.J.B., 362 S.W.3d 777, 780 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2012, no pet.) (citing Gillespie v. Gillespie, 644 S.W.2d 449, 451 (Tex. 1982))). “A trial court abuses its discretion when its ruling is arbitrary, unreasonable, or without reference to any guiding rules or legal principles.” Id. (quoting In re D.W.J.B., 362 S.W.3d at 780 (citing K-Mart Corp. v. Honeycutt, 24 S.W.3d 357, 360 (Tex. 2000) (per curiam))). “Under the abuse-of-discretion standard, ‘legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence are relevant factors in assessing whether the trial court abused its discretion, but are not independent grounds of error.’” Id. (quoting In re M.O., No. 06-19-00004-CV, 2019 WL 2518470, at *5 (Tex. App.—Texarkana June 19, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op.)). “In our analysis, we determine ‘whether the trial court had sufficient evidence on which to exercise its discretion, and, if so, whether it erred in the exercise of that discretion.’” Id. (quoting In re M.O., 2019 WL 2518470, at *5). “Based on the evidence, we then determine whether the court’s decision was arbitrary or unreasonable.” Id. (quoting In re M.O., 2019 WL 2518470, at *5). During “our analysis, we must ‘recognize that “[t]he trial court is in the best position to observe the demeanor and personalities of the witnesses and can ‘feel’ the forces, powers, and 4 influences that cannot be discerned by merely reading the record.”’” Id. (alternation in original) (quoting In re M.O., 2019 WL 2518470, at *6 (quoting In re Marriage of Christensen, 570 S.W.3d 933, 937 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, no pet.))). “We will not find that the trial court abused its discretion ‘if there is some evidence of a probative and substantive character to support its decision.’” Id. (quoting In re M.O., 2019 WL 2518470, at *6). B. Procedural Background and Evidence at Trial Mother filed the underlying suit for modification of the trial court’s prior order that appointed the Broomfields as B.B.’s managing conservators and Mother as possessory conservator. The trial court’s prior order restricted B.B.’s primary residence to be within Panola County or a contiguous county. Mother filed a motion to modify the prior order based on the allegation that there was a material and substantial change in the parties’ circumstances when the Broomfields violated the prior order by moving B.B. to Smith County. During the pendency of the case, the trial court found the Broomfields had committed a total of thirty-six violations of valid court orders and held them in contempt of court. Not only had the Broomfields moved B.B. to Smith County, but they had also filed an original petition to terminate Mother’s parent-child relationship and for adoption of B.B. in Smith County. The trial court sentenced the Broomfields to sixty days’ confinement in the Panola County Jail for each violation to run concurrently but suspended the sentence in favor of allowing them “to serve [ten] days of that sentence upfront with the remaining [fifty] days probated for ten years under the supervision of the Panola County Community Supervision Department.” 5 During trial, the trial court took judicial notice of the file and previous testimony from pretrial proceedings. At trial, Mother testified that the trial court had found the Broomfields had committed multiple violations of court orders, including moving B.B. away from Mother and denying her court-ordered rights to visit B.B. Mother testified that the Broomfields continued to deny her visitation rights to five-year-old B.B. even after being found in contempt of court. Mother testified that the Broomfields had posted about this case on social media and that, in doing so, had harmed B.B.’s best interests. The social-media posts, some of which were extremely disparaging to Mother, were introduced into evidence. Mother said that the Broomfields’ actions had caused material and substantial changes and that she could not co- parent with them because of their lack of communication and that there had “been nothing but malicious and downright evil things said about [her] in every way humanly possible” by them. Mother admitted that she had previously been addicted to methamphetamine and THC when the prior order was pronounced and rendered in 2023 but was now sober from illegal substances. During cross-examination, Mother “[pled] the Fifth” when asked about marihuana.2 Even so, Mother testified that she had been steadily employed for over three years even though the Broomfields had tried to get her employer’s nursing license suspended. Mother also testified that she had been a member of Northside Christian Center for three years and had made all the necessary changes to reunite with B.B. 2 The Broomfields state in their brief that they “are not arguing that mari[h]uana use, standing alone, always renders a parent unfit.” See In re M.A., No. 11-26-00054-CV, 2026 WL 2339171, at *11 (Tex. App.—Eastland Aug. 13, 2026, no pet.). 6 Mother’s plan was for B.B. to live with her and for B.B. to go to school in the same district that her twelve-year-old son attended. Mother testified that she had many family members in Panola County and believed that it was in B.B.’s best interests to impose the same geographical restriction on B.B.’s residence, just as the prior order had done. She believed that her appointment as sole-managing conservator was in B.B.’s best interests. Mother testified that she tried to exercise her rights of possession and access to B.B. but that when she first tried, the Broomfields denied her access after making a Child Protective Services (CPS) allegation that Mother had slapped B.B. Even so, Mother testified that no allegation by the Broomfields had led to any restriction of her access to B.B. Mother testified that she took pictures of bruises she found on B.B. and that Lisa had admitted to CPS that she had used a switch on B.B.’s legs. The trial court appointed an amicus attorney to assist the trial court in protecting B.B.’s best interests. At trial, the amicus attorney testified that Mother had overcome her past drug addiction and had been sober for three years. The amicus attorney said, “What we want parents to do who have been involved with CPS and who are addicted to drugs is to get clean and sober and get stable and provide a good home for their child. And everything that I have seen, that’s what [Mother] has done.” Mother’s visits with B.B. were appropriate according to the amicus attorney, who noted that B.B. had a relationship with Mother’s other children and Mother’s parents, who lived near Mother. As a result, the amicus attorney saw “absolutely no reason why [Mother] could not be named the sole[-]managing conservator of her child” and testified that it was “[not] appropriate for the Broomfields to continue in this case.” 7 Although duly notified to appear, the Broomfields did not testify at the final hearing. After hearing the evidence, the trial court entered its final order in the modification proceeding, which appointed Mother as B.B.’s sole-managing conservator. In doing so, the trial court specifically noted that the Broomfields had filed “numerous motions” that “had the result of [Mother] being denied justice and ha[d] caused potentially serious harm to a young child and his relationship with his mother.” The trial court found the Broomfields’ papering of the case “vexatious and manipulative,” and found that they (1) had “repeatedly and in blatant disregard for Court Orders continued a practice of depriving [Mother] of her rights to supervised access to her child”; (2) “made several allegations to CPS about [Mother], all of which CPS ha[d] declined to open a case on”; (3) “made allegations about [Mother’s] [e]mployer and ha[d], in fact, reported her to the medical board with the apparent intent of having her license stripped from her which would leave [Mother] jobless”; and (4) “continued to post about this case on social media with no regard for the [trial court’s] orders or the potential effect th[o]se posts could have on this child.” The trial court further stated, The actions the [Broomfields] have taken in this case make it evident that (1) they have no intention to follow the [trial court’s] [o]rders, (2) they do not believe that the law applies to them, (3) they have no respect for the law and (4) all of these actions on their part do not serve the best interests of the child. All of the aforementioned actions make it clear that it would be impossible for [Mother] to [c]o-parent with [the Broomfields]. Since the [o]rder designating [the Broomfields] as Non[-]Parent Joint Managing Conservators[,] their actions and relationship with both the child and [Mother] have substantially and materially changed. As a result of their own actions in this case the [trial court] has no other choice than to remove them as Non[-]Parent Joint Managing Conservators. 8 C. Analysis While the Broomfields focus on Mother, they do not address the basis of the trial court’s finding of material and substantial change—their own actions. The record establishes that the Broomfields continuously violated court orders by willfully refusing to allow Mother to exercise her court-ordered visitation rights. We find that the evidence amply supports the trial court’s finding of a material and substantial change in the parties’ circumstances. As for B.B.’s best interests, Mother’s and the amicus attorney’s testimony established that Mother’s drug addiction to illegal substances was rehabilitated and that Mother had been stable for three years. That testimony was uncontroverted at trial. By its order, the trial court impliedly found Mother to be a fit parent. Even so, the Broomfields argue that generalized improvement does not equal a fit parent, but the record shows they presented no evidence at trial to challenge Mother’s parental fitness. Accordingly, the presumption that Mother determines B.B.’s best interests based on her fundamental right as a fit parent stands. See In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d at 819. Further, the record shows, and the trial court had already determined by its prior order, that it was in B.B.’s best interests to remain in Panola County due to, among other things, his familial relationships. Instead of ensuring B.B.’s best interests, the Broomfields violated court orders by removing him to a noncontiguous county and then attempted to adopt him. The trial court had also determined that it was in B.B.’s best interests to visit with Mother, but the Broomfields thwarted those efforts as well, establishing that they were unwilling to consider B.B.’s best interests in front of their own. Simply put, ample evidence shows that the 9 Broomfields’ appointment as conservators of B.B. was no longer appropriate and was against B.B.’s best interests. Conversely, Mother testified that she would ensure B.B.’s best interests by, among other things, keeping him in Panola County so he could be with his siblings and other familial relations. Mother’s evidence showed that she loved B.B., had steady employment and a stable home, and was ready to provide for B.B.’s emotional and physical needs. Both Mother and the amicus attorney testified that it was in B.B.’s best interests to be returned to Mother and removed from the Broomfields. Again, that testimony was uncontroverted. We conclude that the trial court’s finding that Mother’s appointment as sole-managing conservator was in B.B.’s best interests was supported by legally and factually sufficient evidence. As a result, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion by appointing Mother as B.B.’s sole-managing conservator. IV. Conclusion We affirm the trial court’s judgment. Charles van Cleef Justice Date Submitted: September 3, 2026 Date Decided: September 14, 2026 10