Full Opinion

Opinion filed November 19, 2026 In The Eleventh Court of Appeals __________ No. 11-25-00047-CV __________ MARLANA BEASLEY AND TIA GLASCO, Appellants V. R2R AND D, LLC D/B/A SUPEROD, Appellee On Appeal from the 118th District Court Howard County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 55548 MEMORANDUM OPINION Appellants, Marlana Beasley and Tia Glasco, sued Appellee, R2R and D, LLC d/b/a Superod (Superod), for workplace discrimination, specifically alleging that they were subjected to a hostile work environment and retaliation for engaging in a protected activity. The trial court granted Superod’s motions for summary judgment and signed a final take-nothing judgment in its favor. In three issues, Appellants argue that the trial court erred in granting Superod’s motion for summary judgment on their hostile work environment and retaliation claims, and in failing to set aside a prior order on Superod’s motion for partial summary judgment after the presiding judge voluntarily recused himself. We conclude that genuine issues of material fact remain as to the challenged element of Appellants’ hostile work environment claim. Therefore, we affirm in part, and we reverse and remand in part. I. Factual and Procedural Background Appellants both worked for Superod as executive assistants under the supervision of Superod’s vice president, Dwain Fox. Superod terminated Beasley and offered reassignment to Glasco for their purported misuse of the company credit card. Glasco declined the reassignment. Following their separation from Superod, Appellants filed suit alleging that Fox subjected them to a sexually hostile work environment and that Superod terminated them in retaliation for reporting his behavior. Superod answered suit and then filed a combined motion for traditional and no-evidence summary judgment. In its motion, Superod argued that the summary judgment evidence conclusively established that the harassment suffered by Appellants was not severe or pervasive to constitute an actionable claim. Superod further argued that it had an anti-sexual harassment policy of which Appellants unreasonably failed to take advantage. Regarding the retaliation claim, Superod argued that Appellants did not engage in a protected activity prior to their termination. Finally, Superod maintained that it had a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for terminating Appellants. Superod relied on the following evidence: (1) Glasco’s deposition; (2) Beasley’s 2 deposition; (3) Superod employee Tamme Castaneda’s deposition; (4) Superod Human Resources Director Evelyn Fierro’s affidavit and statement; and (5) Superod’s employee handbook. Appellants filed a response relying largely on the same evidence as well as the deposition of Russ Rutledge, Superod’s president and owner. Appellants argued that Beasley’s report of general harassment and bullying to human resources prior to her termination was a protected activity and that Superod’s proffered reasons for the reassignment of Glasco and the termination of Beasley were pretext, asserting that the true reason for those actions was retaliation. Appellants also argued that the evidence of physical harassment and unwelcome comments by Fox satisfied the severe or pervasive standard for a hostile work environment claim and that because their harasser was their supervisor there was a basis to hold the employer liable. A. The Summary Judgment Evidence Appellants both worked as executive assistants for Superod under the supervision of Fox, who was a vice president and chief financial officer for the company. Fox reported directly to Superod’s president, Rutledge. Fox asked Beasley to have some drinks with him on more than one occasion. He also texted her: “Are you going to show me that Halloween costume with your nice boobs.” Glasco stated that Fox made indecent or offensive comments every time she wore a leopard print blouse. She stated that he frequently called her a wench. She described him as “creepy” and that he encroached on her personal space. At a Christmas work party in 2020 during office hours, Fox put his hand down Beasley’s dress and groped her breast as he walked around a conference table. He then walked toward Glasco, put his hand down her shirt, and grabbed her breast, as he pulled up a chair behind her. Fox then forcefully grabbed Glasco by the neck and 3 attempted to kiss her, while squeezing her breast. Later, when Glasco went to retrieve her purse and inform Fox—who was in his office—that she was leaving, he “popped up from his desk,” squeezed her breast again, and kissed her. During the party, Fox was asking Glasco and Beasley about their “parts,” their “breasts or different things,” and “talking about his hands on [Glasco’s] breasts.” Glasco sought out homeopathic treatment for stress and anxiety from working at Superod and she said that “[a] lot of it had to do with [Fox].” Glasco also started taking anti-anxiety medication. Beasley testified that she sought counseling to help with anxiety after the Christmas party. Fox admitted in his deposition to kissing Glasco, asking Beasley to meet for drinks, and asking for a picture of Beasley in a revealing Halloween costume. Beasley discussed Fox’s conduct with coworkers Shari Beall and Castaneda, who were executive assistants that reported to Rutledge. Beasley stated that although she made light of the situation to Castenada, she was scared and afraid after the Christmas party. Castaneda did not report anything further. Glasco testified she was disgusted by Fox’s actions, but she did not discuss Fox’s behavior with anyone at Superod. Castaneda testified that she did not report what Beasley had told her to anyone at Superod. In late June 2021, after rumors surfaced that Beasley and Glasco were misusing the company credit card, Rutledge authorized an audit, which was conducted by Tina Earls, a former employee of Superod. While the audit was ongoing, Beasley told the human resource director, Fierro, that she was being harassed and bullied, but she did not provide any details regarding Fox’s actions towards her. The audit resulted in findings that Glasco and Beasley misused the company credit card. Rutledge made the decision to terminate Beasley. Fox and 4 Fierro met with Beasley regarding the audit findings and told her she was terminated. Fox and Fierro met with Glasco as well, giving her the option of reassignment or resigning, and Glasco chose to resign. Fox stated in his deposition that he authorized Beasley to put certain personal charges on the company card. Superod’s Employee Policy Handbook contained an anti-harassment statement, which prohibited sexual harassment and provided a reporting mechanism for employees, which stated: Prohibited unlawful harassment includes . . . sexual harassment, [which is] defined as: • Unwanted sexual advances, or visual, verbal or physical conduct of a sexual nature; or • Any form of sexually offensive behavior including gender-based harassment of a person of the same sex as the harasser when . . . [s]uch conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with the employee’s work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive work environment. .... If you believe that this anti-harassment policy is being violated, either with respect to yourself or with respect to another employee, you are strongly encouraged to report that belief immediately, either: • to your supervisor (either in writing or personally), or • to your supervisor’s superior, if you believe your supervisor is violating this policy, or • to the CEO or Company President. Fierro and Rutledge both testified that Fierro never received any complaints of harassment from Beasley or Glasco regarding Fox. 5 B. Motion for Recusal The trial court signed an order granting Superod’s motion for summary judgment on Appellants’ hostile work environment and retaliation claims. Appellants subsequently filed a motion for recusal and to set aside the order on the basis that the Honorable Shane Seaton, the presiding judge of the 118th District Court, had represented Beasley’s ex-spouses in proceedings adverse to Beasley prior to taking the bench. Judge Seaton signed an order declining to recuse himself and referring the motion to the regional administrative judge. The regional administrative judge denied the motion to recuse because it was not verified and failed to state facts sufficient to justify recusal. Judge Seaton later voluntarily recused himself “to avoid the appearance of bias or impropriety.” A different trial court judge subsequently signed the final judgment. 1 This appeal ensued. II. Recusal We first address Appellants’ third issue, in which they argue that the trial court erred by not setting aside its prior order on Superod’s motion for summary judgment after a motion for recusal was filed. Although the motion to recuse was denied by the regional administrative judge, Judge Seaton ultimately voluntarily recused 1 The final judgment notes that Appellants initially filed a defamation claim, which they later non- suited. It also disposes of a possible quid pro quo sexual harassment claim, which Appellants do not contest on appeal. In addition, we note that Appellee cites summary judgment evidence filed after the disposal of the retaliation and hostile work environment claims that were not before the trial court when it issued its ruling and should not be considered on appeal. Blankinship v. Brown, 399 S.W.3d 303, 309 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied) (court of appeals considered only evidence that was before the trial court at the time it ruled on summary judgment motion, noting “this evidence was not before the trial court at the time it considered summary judgment. Accordingly, we may not consider the trial testimony in our summary judgment analysis”). Here, we do not consider any evidence that was not before the trial court when it ruled on Superod’s motion for partial summary judgment on the retaliation and hostile work environment claims. 6 himself, and he did not enter any orders following the filing of the motion for recusal. Therefore, we only address Appellants’ contention that Judge Seaton was required to vacate his prior rulings as a result of having voluntarily recused himself. Once a motion to recuse is filed, Rule 18a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a responding judge can take no further action other than signing an order of recusal or an order referring the motion to the regional presiding judge. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 18a(f)(2)(A); In re Marshall, 515 S.W.3d 420, 422 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, orig. proceeding). “If a judge fails to comply with the rules governing motions for recusal, all subsequent actions by the judge in that case are void.” In re Norman, 191 S.W.3d 858, 861 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2006, orig. proceeding). Fundamentally, the Rule is prospective in nature. Thus, “[w]hen a judge voluntarily recuses herself, the rule does not require that all prior orders must be set aside.” Urdiales v. Concord Techs. Delaware, Inc., 120 S.W.3d 400, 403 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2003, pet. denied); see Windsor v. Round, 591 S.W.3d 654, 671 (Tex. App.—Waco 2019) (concluding that reversal of prior orders was not required after trial judge signed a voluntary recusal order). Appellants cite no authority to the contrary. Therefore, we overrule Appellants’ third issue. III. Summary Judgment A. Standard of Review We review the trial court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Lujan v. Navistar, Inc., 555 S.W.3d 79, 84 (Tex. 2018) (citing Provident Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 215 (Tex. 2003)). After an adequate time for discovery, a party may move for summary judgment on the ground that there is no evidence of one or more essential elements 7 of a claim or defense on which an adverse party would have the burden of proof at trial. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(i). 2 We review a no-evidence motion for summary judgment under the same legal sufficiency standard as a directed verdict. Merriman v. XTO Energy, Inc., 407 S.W.3d 244, 248 (Tex. 2013). Under this standard, the nonmovant has the burden to produce more than a scintilla of evidence to support each challenged element of its claims. Id. Evidence is no more than a scintilla if it is “so weak as to do no more than create a mere surmise or suspicion” of a fact. King Ranch, Inc. v. Chapman, 118 S.W.3d 742, 751 (Tex. 2003) (quoting Kindred v. Con/Chem, Inc., 650 S.W.2d 61, 63 (Tex. 1983)). In reviewing a no- evidence summary judgment, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant and disregard all contrary evidence and inferences. Id. A party moving for traditional summary judgment bears the burden of proving that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. TEX. R. CIV. P. 166a(c); Nassar v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 508 S.W.3d 254, 257 (Tex. 2017). To be entitled to a traditional summary judgment, a defendant must conclusively negate at least one essential element of the cause of action being asserted or conclusively establish each element of an affirmative defense. Sci. Spectrum, Inc. v. Martinez, 941 S.W.2d 910, 911 (Tex. 1997). “Evidence is conclusive only if reasonable people could not differ in their conclusions.” City of Keller v. Wilson, 168 S.W.3d 802, 816 (Tex. 2005). If the movant initially establishes a right to summary judgment on the issues expressly 2 We note that the Texas Supreme Court has recently revised Rule 166a. Although the “rewrite is not intended to substantively change the law,” it has resulted in a renumbering of the provisions of the rule. See Final Approval of Amendments to Rule 166a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Misc. Docket No. 26-9012 (Tex. Feb. 27, 2026). The amendments to this rule only apply to motions for summary judgment filed on or after March 1, 2026. Because the motions for summary judgment in this case were filed prior to that date, we refer to the rule in effect at the time the motions were filed. See id. 8 presented in the motion, then the burden shifts to the nonmovant to present to the trial court any issues or evidence that would preclude summary judgment. See City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth., 589 S.W.2d 671, 678–79 (Tex. 1979). In reviewing a traditional summary judgment, we also consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, and we indulge every reasonable inference in the nonmovant’s favor, resolving any doubts against the movant. City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 824. B. Hostile Work Environment In their first issue, Appellants argue that they presented “more than a scintilla of evidence” of a sexually hostile work environment, which precluded summary judgment. Appellants point out that Fox was their supervisor and involved in their separation of employment, so there exists a basis for holding Superod liable for Fox’s actions. Superod responds that Fox’s conduct was not objectively and subjectively abusive enough to constitute a hostile work environment. Superod further argues that it proved an affirmative defense to liability by having an anti-harassment policy and that Appellants failed to take advantage of that policy. 1. Applicable Law The Texas Commission on Human Rights Act (TCHRA) “is modeled on Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, makes it unlawful for an employer to discriminate ‘against an individual in connection with compensation or the terms, conditions, or privileges of employment’ because of sex.” Fossil Group, Inc. v. Harris, 691 S.W.3d 874, 880 (Tex. 2024) (quoting TEX. LAB. CODE ANN. § 21.051(1) (West 2021)). Following federal caselaw, the Texas Supreme Court has recognized a cause of action for a hostile work environment, which comprises the 9 following elements: (1) an employee was subjected to unwelcome sexual harassment, (2) the employee was harassed because of his or her sex, (3) the harassment was so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of employment and create a hostile work environment, and (4) some basis exists for holding the employer liable.3 Id. at 880–81 (first citing Alamo Heights Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Clark, 544 S.W.3d 755, 771 (Tex. 2018); and then citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 21, (1993)). When an employee complains of sexual harassment by a supervisor, she does not need to establish the fourth element. See Donaldson v. Tex. Dep’t of Aging & Disability Servs., 495 S.W.3d 421, 445 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, pet. denied); Tex. Dep’t Crim. Just. v. Deslandes, No. 02-26-00298-CV, 2026 WL 2541901, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 27, 2026, no pet.) (mem. op.). In the context of employment discrimination, a supervisor is one who has the authority to effect a change in an employee’s terms or conditions of employment. Harris, 691 S.W.3d at 881 n.17; see Vance v. Ball State Univ., 570 U.S. 421, 434–35 (2013). “Unlike situations in which a plaintiff has brought a discrimination claim over an adverse employment action, a plaintiff alleging a hostile work environment is complaining about the harassment itself and the damages that he suffered as the result of the harassment.” Texas Dep’t of State Health Servs. v. Resendiz, 642 S.W.3d 163, 186 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2021, no pet.). There can be no legitimate employer justification for severe or pervasive sexual harassment. Id.; see also City of Houston v. Carter, No. 01-22-00453-CV, 2023 WL 3632788, at *11 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] May 25, 2023, no pet.) (mem. op.) (explaining that “unlike 3 The Labor Code now expressly prohibits sexual harassment, see LAB. §§ 21.141–.142 (West Supp. 2026), but those provisions do not apply to claims based on conduct occurring before September 1, 2021. See Act of May 14, 2021, 87th Leg., R.S., ch. 172, §§ 2–3, 2021 TEX. GEN. LAWS 378, 379. 10 discrimination claims involving an adverse employment action for which an employer must provide a nondiscriminatory reason for the action to avoid liability, with a sexual-harassment claim, the harassment itself is the discrimination”). The Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense allows an employer to avoid vicarious liability for a supervisor’s harassment “when the employer (1) exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly the harassing behavior and (2) the employee unreasonably failed to take advantage of any preventive or corrective opportunities provided by the employer or to avoid harm otherwise.” City of Waco v. Lopez, 259 S.W.3d 147, 151 n.3 (Tex. 2008) (first citing Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 765 (1998); and then citing Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 807 (1998)). The employer bears the burden of proving both prongs of the Faragher/Ellerth defense by a preponderance of the evidence. E.E.O.C. v. Boh Bros. Const. Co., 731 F.3d 444, 462 (5th Cir. 2013). The first element of this defense can be satisfied by showing that the employer has formulated an anti- harassment policy with a complaint procedure and that the policy has been communicated to employees. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808 (employer’s affirmative defense was foreclosed because employer “entirely failed to disseminate its [sexual harassment] policy”). “Both the harasser’s knowledge of the policy and the victim’s awareness of it (and of associated complaint procedures) are relevant to whether the company acted reasonably.” Pullen v. Caddo Par. Sch. Bd., 830 F.3d 205, 210 (5th Cir. 2016). 2. Severe or Pervasive? In its summary judgment motion, Superod only challenged the third element of Appellants’ hostile work environment claim—whether the harassment was so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of employment. See Clark, 544 S.W.3d 11 at 771. “The TCHRA contemplates discrimination affecting the ‘terms, conditions, or privileges of employment.’” Waffle House, Inc. v. Williams, 313 S.W.3d 796, 805 (Tex. 2010) (quoting LAB. § 21.051(1)). “Accordingly, sexual harassment is actionable ‘only if it is so severe or pervasive as to alter the conditions of [the victim’s] employment and create an abusive working environment.’” San Antonio Water Sys. v. Nicholas, 461 S.W.3d 131, 138 (Tex. 2015) (quoting Clark Cnty. Sch. Dist. v. Breeden, 532 U.S. 268, 270 (2001)). To determine whether a hostile work environment exists, we must consider all the circumstances, “including the ‘frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.’” Id. (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787–88). The complained-of conduct must be both objectively and subjectively hostile or abusive. Harris, 510 U.S. at 21–22. That is, in addition to the employee’s subjective belief, the work environment must be one “that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive.” Id. at 21. “Abusiveness requires extreme conduct and takes a middle path between making actionable conduct that is merely offensive and requiring the conduct to cause a tangible psychological injury.” Esparza v. Univ. of Tex. at El Paso, 471 S.W.3d 903, 913 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2015, no pet.) (citing Harris, 510 U.S. at 21). With respect to Glasco, the evidence shows that Fox would engage in conduct which she generally described as “creepy”—encroaching on her space, regularly making indecent or offensive comments, when she would wear leopard print clothing, and in calling her a wench. We must view this conduct in context with Fox’s more egregious behavior at the office Christmas party, where he reached down Glasco’s dress and groped her breast, forcefully grabbed her neck and attempted to 12 kiss her, and later grabbed her breast and kissed her as she went by his office to tell him she was leaving. “Undoubtedly, the deliberate and unwanted touching of [a plaintiff’s] intimate body parts can constitute severe sexual harassment.” Harvill v. Westward Communications, L.L.C., 433 F.3d 428, 436 (5th Cir. 2005) (“[D]irect contact with an intimate body part constitutes one of the most severe forms of sexual harassment.” quoting Worth v. Tyer, 276 F.3d 249, 268 (7th Cir. 2001)). When we consider the totality of the circumstances, Fox’s inappropriate comments coupled with direct contact with an intimate body part in a forceful manner, we conclude that there is evidence of an environment “that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive.” Harris, 510 U.S. at 21; see Wallace v. Performance Contractors, Inc., 57 F.4th 209, 222 (5th Cir. 2023) (concluding that a reasonable jury could find that the following conduct was objectively hostile: sending sexual texts, asking for a picture of plaintiff’s breasts, and asking to touch her breasts, stating that plaintiff was in her “sexual prime,” and nonconsensual massaging of plaintiff); Harvill, 433 F.3d at 435–36 (concluding that evidence created a genuine issue of material fact that there was a hostile work environment where the alleged harasser grabbed the plaintiff and kissed her on the cheek, touched her breasts “numerous times”, popped rubber bands at her breasts and patted her on the buttocks “numerous times,” and made comments about her sex life); Taylor–Rogers v. Robb & Stucky, Ltd., 82 Fed. Appx. 974, 975 (5th Cir. 2003) (same based on evidence that a co-employee rubbed up against plaintiff on a daily basis and had unbuttoned her blouse and touched her breast underneath her bra); see also Waldo v. Consumers Energy Co., 726 F.3d 802, 815– 16 (6th Cir. 2013) (concluding that evidence that employee was called a “b---h,” a “wench,” and a “d--e” contributed to a hostile work environment, among other 13 actions); Newtown v. Shell Oil Co., 52 F. Supp. 2d 366, 372 (D. Conn. 1999) (concluding that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether name calling, such as “wench” or “c--t” occurred with sufficient regularity to be viewed as pervasive). The evidence is of a similar nature with respect to Beasley. Fox asked her to meet him for drinks, texted a request to see a picture of her in a Halloween costume with the “nice boobs,” and asked her “about parts on [them], whether it be [their] breasts or different things.” And at the same office Christmas party, Fox put his hand down Beasley’s dress and grabbed her breast. It is difficult to assess this behavior separately from that which was directed at Glasco, as they both were witnesses to other’s harassment. When viewing the totality of the circumstances, the inappropriate texts, the solicitations, and the forceful touching of an intimate body part, we likewise conclude that there is evidence of “an environment that a reasonable person would find hostile or abusive.”4 Harris, 510 U.S. at 21; see also Deslandes, 2026 WL 2541901, at *5 (concluding there was a fact issue concerning whether plaintiff suffered severe or pervasive harassment where there was evidence of inappropriate daily comments and “repeated attempts to hug [her], touch [her] arms or back, and invad[e her] personal space created a constant sense of fear and discomfort in the workplace”); Rivas v. Estech Sys., Inc., No. 06-20-00058-CV, 2021 WL 2231262, at *5 (Tex. App.—Texarkana June 3, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) 4 In arguing otherwise, Superod relies primarily on Hockman v. Westward Communications, LLC, 407 F.3d 317, 329 (5th Cir. 2004), where the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that certain actions by a supervisor directed at a subordinate did not create a hostile work environment. However, Hockman has since been called into question by the Fifth Circuit for wrongfully requiring that the offending conduct be “severe and pervasive,” when the correct standard requires only that the conduct be “severe or pervasive.” Royal v. CCC & R Tres Arboles, L.L.C., 736 F.3d 396, 402–03 (5th Cir. 2013); Harvill, 433 F.3d at 435. We are persuaded by the Fifth Circuit’s more recent pronouncements. 14 (single, extreme incident sufficient to establish hostile work environment when plaintiff discovered supervisor’s hidden camera under her desk). Considering the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference in the nonmovant’s favor, and resolving any doubts against the movant, as we must, we conclude that there exists a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Appellants were subjected to harassment that was severe or pervasive. See City of Keller, 168 S.W.3d at 824. 3. Faragher/Ellerth Defense Superod also argues that it has proven the Faragher/Ellerth affirmative defense to vicarious liability. As stated above, the employer bears the burden of proving both prongs of the defense. Boh Bros., 731 F.3d at 462. As the summary judgment movant, this means Superod must have conclusively established each element of the defense. See First Sabrepoint Cap. Mgmt., L.P. v. Farmland Partners Inc., 712 S.W.3d 75, 84 (Tex. 2025). The first element can be satisfied by showing that the employer has formulated an anti-harassment policy with a complaint procedure and that the policy has been communicated to employees. See Faragher, 524 U.S. at 808. Here, Superod presented evidence of an unsigned employee handbook that contained an anti-sexual harassment policy. However, it presented no evidence that it disseminated or published the policy or that it trained employees regarding the policy. Nor did it present evidence that Appellants were aware of the policy. On this record, Superod did not conclusively establish that it exercised reasonable care to prevent and correct promptly the harassing behavior. See Wallace, 57 F.4th at 223 (“Simply put, this evidence indicates that Performance had a policy in theory but not one in practice.”); see also Street v. City of Bloomingdale, No. CV406-256, 2008 WL 11417782, at *6 15 (S.D. Ga. May 9, 2008) (“In this case, it is undisputed that the City had a sexual harassment policy. . . . However, because Defendants have offered no evidence of the method or manner of the Policy’s distribution, they have not shown that it was effectively published or disseminated.”). 4. Summary For the reasons stated above, based on this record, we conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on Appellants’ hostile work environment claim. See Lujan, 555 S.W.3d at 84. We sustain Appellants’ first issue. C. Retaliation In their second issue, Appellants argue that the trial court erred in granting Superod’s motion for summary judgment on their retaliation claim because Beasley engaged in a protected activity when she made a report to Fierro that she was being bullied and harassed and discussed Fox’s behavior with coworkers. Appellants also argue that Superod’s reasons for Beasley’s termination and Glasco’s reassignment were pretext for retaliation. Superod responds that there is no evidence that Appellants engaged in a protected activity or that Superod’s reasons for their employment decisions were pretextual. “Unlike a discrimination claim, a retaliation claim focuses on the employer’s response to an employee’s protected activity, such as making a discrimination complaint.” Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 763–64. “[A] remedy exists only when the evidence establishes that a materially adverse employment action resulted from the employee’s protected activities.” Id. at 764. “To establish a prima facie case of retaliation, an employee must show: (1) she engaged in an activity protected by the TCHRA, (2) she experienced a material adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link exists between the protected 16 activity and the adverse action.” Id. at 782. “An employee engages in a protected activity by, among other things, filing an internal complaint, opposing a discriminatory practice, or making a charge of discrimination with the EEOC.” Id. at 786. The employee’s internal complaint “must, at a minimum, alert the employer to the employee’s reasonable belief that unlawful discrimination is at issue.” Tex. Dept. of Transp. v. Lara, 625 S.W.3d 46, 59 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 786). Here, the record does not show that notice was given with substantive detail to company hierarchy. In this regard, “[c]omplaining only of ‘harassment,’ ‘hostile environment,’ ‘discrimination,’ or ‘bullying’ is not enough.” Alamo Heights, 544 S.W.3d at 786–87; see City of Dallas v. Rowe, No. 05-25- 01362-CV, 2026 WL 2519529, at *10 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 26, 2026, no pet. h.) (mem. op.) (“A vague assertion of discrimination will not invoke protection under the statute.”). Beasley communicated Fox’s conduct only to coworkers. There is no evidence that Glasco complained to anyone. The only possible complaint that can be imputed to Superod was Beasley’s vague report to Fierro of bullying and harassment. However, this report does not constitute a protected activity because it was “too broad” and did not alert Fox’s supervisors at Superod of unlawful discrimination. See Lara, 625 S.W.3d at 59. Because there is no evidence that Appellants engaged in a protected activity, the trial court did not err in granting Superod’s motion for summary judgment on Appellants’ retaliation claim. See Lujan, 555 S.W.3d at 84. We overrule Appellants’ second issue. IV. This Court’s Ruling We reverse the trial court’s judgment insofar as it granted Superod’s motion for summary judgment on Appellants’ hostile work environment claim, and we 17 remand this cause to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this court’s opinion. We affirm the judgment in all other respects. W. BRUCE WILLIAMS JUSTICE November 19, 2026 Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J. 18