Full Opinion

Opinion filed August 31, 2026 In The Eleventh Court of Appeals __________ No. 11-25-00382-CV __________ NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASSOCIATION, Appellant V. FREDDY HICKS, III, Appellee On Appeal from the 266th District Court Erath County, Texas Trial Court Cause No. 25CVDC-00292 CONCURRING OPINION I write separately to express my frustration with the gamesmanship that appears to be present in this case. As per the internet, the first regular season game of the 2025–2026 season for the Tarleton State University’s Men’s Basketball Team occurred on November 3, 2025. Hicks did not file the underlying suit until October 30, 2025. The trial court signed a temporary restraining order on that date that permitted Hicks to play basketball. The temporary restraining order was set to expire on its own terms on November 13, 2025. That temporary restraining order was extended by agreement on three separate occasions until November 17, 2025, December 1, 2025, and December 3, 2025. The trial court heard Appellant’s request for a temporary injunction on December 3, 2025, and it issued its temporary injunction on December 8, 2025. The initial temporary injunction signed by the trial court left blank the date for the “full trial on the merits.” See TEX. R. CIV. P. 683 (“Every order granting a temporary injunction shall include an order setting the cause for trial on the merits with respect to the ultimate relief sought.”). The NCAA filed its notice of appeal of the temporary injunction on December 23, 2025. According to the NCAA’s supplemental notice of appeal, the trial court signed an amended temporary injunction on January 6, 2026. The amended temporary injunction set a trial date of March 26, 2026, a date that would have been two weeks after Tarleton’s last basketball game of the 2026 season. But the parties had no intention of proceeding to a full trial on the merits on March 26, 2026 (or perhaps ever) because some time in January 2026 they filed a joint motion to stay the trial pending the appeal of the temporary injunction which the trial court granted. The parties did so despite the fact that Rule 683 clearly provides that “[t]he appeal of a temporary injunction shall constitute no cause for delay of the trial.” I agree with my colleagues that, under Bienati v. Cloister Holdings, LLC, 691 S.W.3d 493 (Tex. 2024), the parties’ delay of the trial on the merits does not deprive us of jurisdiction to review the merits of the temporary injunction. But in doing so, I do not endorse the parties’ blatant disregard of Rule 683. This case presents important issues that potentially affect thousands of student athletes in this state. Rather than trying to get those substantial legal issues decided by an appellate court 2 on a scant record from a temporary injunction proceeding, the parties should have directed their efforts towards a trial on a fully developed record. JOHN M. BAILEY CHIEF JUSTICE August 31, 2026 Panel consists of: Bailey, C.J., Trotter, J., and Williams, J. 3