Full Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont __________________ NO. 09-25-00289-CV __________________ BRADLEY TUTTLE, Appellant V. SHELLY BLACK, Appellee __________________________________________________________________ On Appeal from the 457th District Court Montgomery County, Texas Trial Cause No. 25-03-04585 __________________________________________________________________ MEMORANDUM OPINION The trial court granted special exceptions, then dismissed the case when the Plaintiff, Bradley Tuttle, failed to amend or supplement his pleadings. Tuttle appealed. We affirm the trial court’s judgment. Background Trial Court Case Number 25-03-04585 commenced when Bradley Tuttle filed a “Motion to Deliver Eviden[t]iary Information of ‘Rights Violation by Public Officer’ to Grand Jury for Inquisition and Potential ‘Trial by Jury’ for Judicial 1 Redress of Grievance[,]” naming as the defendant “Shelly Black, Administrator, Montgomery County Court at Law 3[.]” Tuttle alleged Black blocked his attempt to communicate with Judge Amy Tucker concerning the “Right to Prosecute in Proper Person.”1 In the lawsuit he filed in the 457th District Court, Tuttle asked the trial court to “take judicial action and redress Plaintiff’s grievances[]” and demanded “that the evidentiary information provided within the Enclosure List shall be delivered to an empaneled grand jury for proper investigation and potential trial by jury; and that said process & procedure will follow the course of the common law[]” (emphasis omitted).2 A document filed with the petition is addressed to Black and states that in a telephone conversation with Tuttle, Black refused to share Judge Tucker’s email address “so that ‘a lawful notice’ could be relayed to Judge Tucker.” In the document 1 Tuttle did not have an active case before the County Court at Law Number 3 of Montgomery County. 2 In his pleading, Tuttle does not clearly identify what remedy he is seeking in his petition, other than for the trial court to present Tuttle’s “claim of harm” to a grand jury and for the trial court to hold a jury trial on any indictment returned by the grand jury. An action for damages is not available as a remedy for a violation of the Bill of Rights in the Texas Constitution. See City of Beaumont v. Bouillion, 896 S.W.2d 143, 144 (Tex. 1995) (no implied cause of action for damages for unconstitutional conduct under the free speech and free assembly clauses of the Texas Constitution). Notably, Tuttle did not ask the trial court to compel Black to perform the duties of her office by delivering the “Notice of the People’s Right to Bring Suit and Prosecute in Proper Person” and “Notice of the People’s Inviolate Right of ‘Trial by Jury’ regarding Deprivation of Life, Liberty, or Property” to Judge Tucker. 2 addressed to Black, Tuttle stated, “[Agent] has violated Affiant’s right of local self- government; failed to redress Affiant’s grievances by petition; and in doing so, has trespassed Affiant’s sovereign independence by imposing dependency, and breached the people’s Public Trust by unofficial acts including inaction.” In the same document, Tuttle states he mailed a hard copy of his “instructions” to Judge Tucker. Also attached to the petition are a “Notice” addressed to Judge Tucker and the other judges of the district courts and county courts at law of Montgomery County, signed by eight different people, including Tuttle, titled “Notice of the People’s Right to Bring Suit and Prosecute in Proper Person” and a “Notice” signed by four people, not including Tuttle, titled “Notice of the People’s Inviolate Right of ‘Trial by Jury’ regarding Deprivation of Life, Liberty, or Property[.]” Tuttle demanded that Black deliver the “Notices” to Judge Tucker and “email me an active email account that can be used in future communications between the People and Judge Tucker’s Court at Law 3.” Black filed an Answer and Special Exceptions, entering a general denial and pleading affirmative defenses of official immunity, governmental immunity, and limit of damages under the Tort Claims Act. Black excepted to Tuttle’s pleading, complaining that Tuttle failed to identify a cause of action, failed to allege facts establishing the elements of any cause of action, deprived her of fair notice of the allegations against her, and failed to allege facts suggesting the District Court has 3 subject matter jurisdiction because Tuttle did not allege facts sufficient to waive her various immunities. Black’s pleadings were signed by Assistant County Attorney Daniel Plake. 3 The trial court granted Black’s special exceptions and ordered Tuttle to amend or supplement his pleadings by June 6, 2025.4 In response to the trial court’s grant of special exceptions, Tuttle notified the trial court that dismissing the case would place a rule of civil procedure above an inviolate right. Tuttle demanded that the judge by affidavit “rebut, point by point, where you were granted such Constitutional Authority.” On July 12, 2025, the trial court dismissed the case for Tuttle’s failure to comply with the Court’s Order to provide Black with fair notice of the allegations against her. Within thirty days of the date of the judgment, Tuttle filed a demand to immediately impanel a jury for a “‘Trial by Jury’ Tribunal.” Tuttle stated Black’s original answer is inadequate because it was not sworn under penalty of perjury. 3 Tuttle’s lawsuit against Plake for his defense of Black in Trial Cause Number 25-06-10304 is the subject of Appeal Number 09-26-00319-CV, Tuttle v. Plake. 4 After the trial court sustained Black’s special exceptions, Tuttle filed “Notices” in which he stated that Plake must recuse because Plake, as a sworn government agent of the people of Texas breached his trust to Tuttle as One of the People by attacking Tuttle’s claims against Black. Tuttle also demanded a jury trial and admonished the trial court that its authorization of a Docket Control Order “is not within [the] scope of a common law action and must be removed.” Tuttle’s “Notices” address procedure, not the substance of his claims against Black. 4 Tuttle notified the trial court that “the cause of this suit is a sworn claim of harm of Affiant/Plaintiff’s inviolate right of Liberty; by a government trustee.” 5 Issues In his appeal brief, Tuttle challenges the trial court’s judgment with five issues: 1) Given the Texas Supreme Court acknowledges its TRCP was never passed by the Texas Legislature, did the trial court err when no law was declared during the course of the judicial proceeding? 2) In July, 2025 did the trial court err when it took personal jurisdiction over Plaintiff and dismissed his case without due process of law? 3) Is Plaintiff’s right of due process of law impervious to judicial discretion, obligating the court to proceed at the common law by delivering Plaintiff Tuttle’s “regular allegations” to a grand jury of inquiry, fulfilling the 1845 TX Const. SEC. 11 promise that “every person, for an injury done him in his lands, goods, person, or reputation, shall have remedy by due course of law[?]”[] 4) In Texas does the judicial court trustee have the power to turn a common law allegation into an accusation[] -- or is it the people’s grand jury of peers that wields the powers of inquiry and accusation by indictment? 5) After an indictment is returned to the trial court, does the trial by jury tribunal have the power to “say what the law is[?]” 5 Also within thirty days of the date of the judgment, Tuttle filed a Notice that Plake as a “voluntary, indentured servant under the Texas Constitution … bound in an existing legal relationship of servitude to the people of Texas, including Affiant/Plaintiff, one of the people; while at the same time turning his authority of office as County Attorney against the benefit of Affiant/Plaintiff, with no corresponding constitutional grant of power.” 5 Discussion In issue one, Tuttle argues the trial court deprived Tuttle of due process of law when it “failed to bring law to a judicial tribunal[.]” Tuttle contends the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, having been created by the Texas Supreme Court, “was not enacted by the Texas Legislature and is not law.” “The commonly understood meaning of ‘law’ includes judicial decisions and rules promulgated by the judiciary, such as rules of procedure and evidence.” In re City of Georgetown, 53 S.W.3d 328, 332 (Tex. 2001) (orig. proceeding). The Legislature delegated rulemaking authority to the Supreme Court almost ninety years ago. See Act of May 12, 1939, 46th Leg., R.S., ch. 25, § 1, 1939 Tex. Gen. Laws 201 (former Tex. Rev. Civ. Stat. art. 1731a). In 1985, people of Texas amended the Texas Constitution to vest the Supreme Court with the constitutional authority to promulgate rules of civil procedure. Tex. Const. art. 5, § 31(b) (“The Supreme Court shall promulgate rules of civil procedure for all courts not inconsistent with the laws of the state as may be necessary for the efficient and uniform administration of justice in the various courts.”). “The Texas Rules of Civil Procedure have the same force and effect as statutes.” Missouri Pac. R.R. Co. v. Cross, 501 S.W.2d 868, 872 (Tex. 1973). The Rules of Civil Procedure provide for a party to file special exceptions and a trial court to grant them. See Tex. R. Civ. P. 91. We overrule issue one. 6 We address Tuttle’s remaining issues together. We understand Tuttle’s argument in issues two through five to be (1) the trial court dismissed Tuttle’s case without due process of law, (2) due course of law required the district judge to present Tuttle’s complaint against Black to a grand jury, (3) a grand jury must indict Black before the trial court may assume jurisdiction over Tuttle’s lawsuit against Black, and (4) only a petit jury, not the trial judge, could decide if Black deprived Tuttle of his rights under the Texas Constitution. Regarding the trial court’s dismissal of his lawsuit against Black, Tuttle limits his complaint in issues two through five of his Appellant’s Brief to his contention that the trial court failed to adjudicate the lawsuit using the proper procedure. Tuttle cites no constitutional or statutory provision that grants to a district judge the authority to present a claim—civil or criminal, public or private—to a grand jury. The authority to present to a grand jury is within the purview of a different Article 5 department, the District Attorney. See generally Tex. Code. Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 2A.102(a) (“Each district attorney shall represent the state in all criminal cases in the district courts of the attorney’s district and in appeals from those cases.”); see also id. arts. 20A.102 (a District Judge is not one of the persons authorized to be present in the grand jury room while the grand jury is conducting proceedings); 20A.103 (“The attorney representing the state is entitled to appear before the grand jury and inform the grand jury of offenses subject to indictment at 7 any time except when the grand jury is discussing the propriety of finding an indictment or is voting on an indictment.”); 20A.104 (“No person may address the grand jury about a matter before the grand jury other than the attorney representing the state, a witness, or the accused or suspected person or the attorney for the accused or suspected person if approved by the attorney representing the state.”). Tuttle argues the trial court lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate Tuttle’s claim of a violation of his constitutional rights without first securing an indictment from a grand jury. “To issue a valid and binding judgment or order, a court must have both subject-matter jurisdiction over a case and personal jurisdiction over the party it purports to bind.” In re Guardianship of Fairley, 650 S.W.3d 372, 379 (Tex. 2022). Subject matter jurisdiction derives solely from the Texas Constitution and state statutes. Id. “Personal jurisdiction is composed of two elements: (1) the defendant must be amenable to the jurisdiction of the court, and (2) the plaintiff must validly invoke that jurisdiction by valid service of process on the defendant.” Id. at 379-80. The trial Court had subject-matter jurisdiction over Tuttle’s claimed violation of his constitutional rights. See Tex. Const. Art. 5, § 8 (“District Court jurisdiction consists of exclusive, appellate, and original jurisdiction of all actions, proceedings, and remedies, except in cases where exclusive, appellate, or original jurisdiction may be conferred by this Constitution or other law on some other court, tribunal, or administrative body.”). The trial court had personal jurisdiction over the lawsuit, 8 which the plaintiff involved by valid service of process on the defendant, who answered the plaintiff’s petition. See Fairley, 650 S.W.3d at 379. Due process required notice and a hearing, which Tuttle does not argue he failed to receive before the trial court dismissed the case. Tuttle has not shown that the trial court used the wrong procedure in adjudicating Tuttle’s lawsuit. We overrule issues two through five. Having overruled the issues presented in Appellant’s Brief, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. AFFIRMED. JAY WRIGHT Justice Submitted on August 18, 2026 Opinion Delivered August 27, 2026 Before Golemon, C.J., Wright and Chambers, JJ. 9