Full Opinion

In the Court of Appeals Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana No. 06-26-00079-CV IN RE INSTITUTE IN BASIC LIFE PRINCIPLES, INC. Original Mandamus Proceeding Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ. Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin MEMORANDUM OPINION This is a mandamus proceeding regarding discovery in a civil case. The Real Parties in Interest (RPIs) sued their father and their older brother, as well as the Institute of Basic Life Principles, Inc. (IBLP), IBLP’s founder, William W. Gothard, Jr., and an IBLP affiliate, International A.L.E.R.T. Academy. RPIs allege that their father and older brother sexually abused them as children.1 RPIs allege that the remaining parties conspired with their father and older brother regarding that abuse. At the pleadings stage, IBLP and Gothard sought dismissal of the claims brought against them. IBLP and Gothard asserted that the claims infringed constitutional rights bearing on religious liberty. The trial court did not dismiss the case. That decision withstood appellate review, to a point. The reviewing court affirmed the trial court’s decision to allow the case to proceed. The reviewing court, though, recognized the importance of the religious liberty concerns and spoke to how the trial court should handle the case going forward. Following that appellate ruling, the trial court signed an order compelling IBLP to answer RPIs’ interrogatories and requests for production. IBLP, as the sole Relator here, argues that the order compelling discovery infringes IBLP’s constitutional rights. IBLP also urges that the order compelling discovery is overly broad. Established principles of jurisprudence caution against deciding constitutional issues when it is not necessary to do so. Because the discovery that the order compels is overbroad on 1 Though this is a civil matter, the record before us indicates there are related criminal proceeding(s). It is not necessary to the resolution of this mandamus petition to include the names of the RPIs, their father or their older brother. We therefore do not include them in this opinion. See TEX. CONST. art. I, § 30(a)(1); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.10(a)(3). 2 its face, we conditionally grant the petition and direct the trial court to vacate the order. I. Background The decision addressing RPIs’ pleadings sets out the nature of RPIs’ claims. In re Gothard, Nos. 12-23-00296-CV & 12-23-00307-CV, 2024 WL 739785, at *4 (Tex. App.—Tyler Feb. 22, 2024) (mem. op.), pet. denied, No. 24-0236, 2025 WL 1774463 (Tex. June 27, 2025). In sum, RPIs allege “a conspiracy to promote and conceal sexual assault.” Id. at *10. In order to avoid dismissal, RPIs represented that their claims would not infringe on religious liberty: “[I]n their response to the dismissal motions, RPIs acknowledged that while holding and publishing religious beliefs is constitutionally protected, their lawsuit alleges that Relators’ actions, not their beliefs, caused injury. And in their mandamus response, RPIs acknowledge that their claim is based on conduct rather than religious beliefs.” Id. Accordingly, at the pleadings stage, the Tyler court found, “[W]e cannot definitively say, based on the record before us, that this is a situation in which religious beliefs are so intertwined with a tort claim so as to unconstitutionally burden Relators’ rights and embroil the court in an assessment of those religious beliefs.” Id. The Tyler court held, “A court may exercise jurisdiction over a controversy if it can apply neutral principles of law that will not require inquiry into religious doctrine, interference with the free-exercise rights of believers, or meddling in church government.” Id. at *9 (emphasis added) (citing In re Lubbock, 624 S.W.3d 506, 513 (Tex. 2021) (orig. proceeding)). The Tyler court held, “[I]t appears RPIs’ civil conspiracy claim can be resolved without resort to inquiry into religious doctrine; thus, . . . RPIs’ civil conspiracy cause of action is not subject to dismissal at this juncture. Whether, absent reliance on religious 3 teachings, no civil conspiracy claim can be established, is a question for another day.” Id. at *11 (emphasis added). The Texas Supreme Court, as a whole, declined to review the decision of the Tyler court, but not without comment. Chief Justice Blacklock, joined by Justices Devine and Sullivan, would have granted review. Chief Justice Blacklock wrote, In addition to validly seeking justice for victims of sexual assault, the plaintiffs’ petition invalidly seeks to put on trial certain religious teachings about sex and family life, which the plaintiffs allege facilitated and encouraged their abuse. That must never happen in a Texas court. . . . .... [The plaintiffs’ allegations] boil down to the claim that the content of Gothard’s teachings about sex and family are evidence that Gothard and his ministry wanted young women like the plaintiffs to be abused. That allegation, if taken seriously, would impugn a material percentage of American religious leaders over the course of our history. Such an allegation cannot possibly be a basis for discovery and trial in a Texas courtroom. .... I would grant the petition for writ of mandamus and require repleading of the petition to avoid the impermissible entanglement with religious questions that will inevitably attend further litigation conducted on the basis of this petition. I therefore respectfully dissent from the Court’s denial of the petition, which should not be understood by the courts below as a license to ignore the severe constitutional implications of this lawsuit. In re Gothard, No. 24-0236, 2025 WL 1774463, at *1–3 (Tex. June 27, 2025) (orig. proceeding) (Blacklock, C.J., joined by Devine & Sullivan, JJ., dissenting). The trial court was asked to rule on interrogatories and requests for production such as the following examples (with words in all caps being words that were given defined meanings in the discovery instruments): 4 Request No. 1: All DOCUMENTS published by IBLP within the RELEVANT TIME PERIOD which relate to sexual assault, reports of sexual assault, sexual abuse, or sexual harasment [sic], modest dress for women, modest behavior for women, courtship, marriage, and procreation. .... Request No. 26: All DOCUMENTS which discuss, record, or reflect IBLP’s actions or policies regarding participating in any political campaign. .... Request No. 28: All DOCUMENTS which indicate, record, or reflect the total amount per year of gifts, grants, contributions, membership fees, donations, and revenues of any kind received by IBLP during the RELEVANT TIME PERIOD. .... Interrogatory No. 8: For each PERSON who has had any role in drafting or editing any [Advanced Training Institute (ATI)] related DOCUMENTS (including, without being limited to, all “Wisdom Booklets,” “Character Booklets,” biographies, training materials, study guides, workbooks, advertising, and promotional materials) and/or any DOCUMENTS published by IBLP (including, without being limited to, any DOCUMENTS promotion, used, or sold at any “Basic Seminar” or “Advanced Seminar”) state separately: a. the name and contact information (address, phone number(s), and email address(es)) of the PERSON; b. the dates during which the PERSON assisted in the drafting or editing of the referenced DOCUMENTS; and c. a description of the DOCUMENTS or types of DOCUMENTS which the PERSON assisted in drafting or editing. The trial court’s order compelling production states, in operative part, as follows: Institute in Basic Life Principles, Inc.’s (the “IBLP’s”) objections to the Definitions and Instructions in Plaintiffs’ Interrogatories are OVERRULED. IBLP’s objections to the Definitions and Instructions in Plaintiffs’ Requests for Production are OVERRULED. 5 IBLP’s objections to Interrogatory Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 8 in Plaintiffs’ Interrogatories are OVERRULED. IBLP is ORDERED to give complete answers to Interrogatory Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 8. IBLP’s objections to Requests Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, and 28 [of] Plaintiffs’ Requests for Production are OVERRULED. IBLP is ORDERED to produce all documents responsive to Requests Nos. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, and 28. The trial court’s order contains no discussion regarding religious liberty. II. Standard of Review “Mandamus relief is proper when the respondent ‘clearly abused its discretion’ and the relator has ‘no adequate remedy by appeal.’” In re Oncor Elec. Delivery Co., 716 S.W.3d 525, 530 (Tex. 2025) (orig. proceeding) (quoting In re Prudential Ins. Co. of Am., 148 S.W.3d 124, 135–36 (Tex. 2004) (orig. proceeding)). “Trial courts have ‘no “discretion” in determining what the law is or applying the law to the facts.’” In re UMTH Gen. Servs., L.P., 725 S.W.3d 424, 432 n.45 (Tex. 2025) (orig. proceeding) (quoting In re Prudential Ins., 148 S.W.3d at 135). “Although the scope of discovery is generally within the trial court’s discretion, ‘an order that compels overly broad discovery is an abuse of discretion for which mandamus is the proper remedy.’” In re UPS Ground Freight, Inc., 646 S.W.3d 828, 831–32 (Tex. 2022) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding) (quoting In re Deere & Co., 299 S.W.3d 819, 820 (Tex. 2009) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding)). III. Analysis “Judicial restraint cautions that when a case may be decided on a non-constitutional ground, we should rest our decision on that ground and not wade into ancillary constitutional 6 questions.” VanDevender v. Woods, 222 S.W.3d 430, 432 (Tex. 2007). For that reason, we decide the present discovery dispute on the basis that, under the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, the trial court did not conduct a proper analysis regarding the breadth of the discovery sought. For example, RPIs allege that the abuse began in approximately 1996, but the requests for production defined the “RELEVANT TIME PERIOD” as extending back to 1988. From the trial court’s order overruling every objection and compelling every contested request, it does not appear that the trial court applied any limitation on the discovery sought. That is an abuse of discretion. See In re UPS Ground Freight, Inc., 646 S.W.3d at 831– 32. Before remanding, we make additional observations. RPIs urge that the decisions at the pleadings stage constitute holdings that their claims, as pled, do not implicate religious liberty; they urge that they “decisively defeated” the motions to dismiss, and hence, the discovery sought is proper. As set forth above, the defeat was not decisive. In lieu of dismissing RPIs’ case, the Tyler court relied on representations by RPIs that, as the case developed, religious beliefs would not be put at issue. In re Gothard, 2024 WL 739785, *4, *9–11. The Texas Supreme Court, as a whole, declined to review the Tyler court’s approach. See In re Gothard, 2025 WL 1774463, at *1. But, for three Justices of the Texas Supreme Court, including the Chief Justice, that was not enough. See id. at *3 (Blacklock, C.J., joined by Devine & Sullivan, JJ., dissenting). They would have required RPIs to formally replead, lest RPIs and others perceive in this sequence of events “a license to ignore the severe constitutional implications of this lawsuit.” Id. The 7 bottom line is that the Texas Supreme Court left the Tyler court’s decision standing. See id. at *1. The Tyler court expected that the case could and would be handled in a way that does not raise constitutional concerns. See In re Gothard, 2024 WL 739785, at *10. So do we. We do not comment on what the outcome would be if the teachings of In re Gothard were applied to the discovery requests at hand. That is for the trial court to do in the first instance. A reviewing court can discuss the law applicable to the case and then remand with instructions that the trial court revisit the proper scope of discovery. See, e.g., In re Richardson Motorsports, Ltd., 690 S.W.3d 42, 55 n.10 (Tex. 2024) (orig. proceeding) (“[T]he trial court will be conducting further proceedings to determine the proper scope of production.”). Here, the Tyler court has already provided that legal discussion in In re Gothard. But, so far, on the record before us, it is apparent that the trial court has not applied the teachings of In re Gothard. IV. Conclusion We sustain IBLP’s overbreadth issue. We conditionally grant the petition for a writ of mandamus. We direct the trial court to vacate its May 27, 2026, order on RPIs’ motion to compel. The writ will be issued only if the trial court fails to comply within thirty days of the date of this opinion. We remand for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. Jeff Rambin Justice Date Submitted: August 28, 2026 Date Decided: August 31, 2026 8