Full Opinion

Court of Appeals Tenth Appellate District of Texas 10-26-00173-CV In the Interest of K.W., M.W., T.R., T.R., and T.R., Children On appeal from the 474th District Court of McLennan County, Texas Judge Nikki Mundkowsky, presiding Trial Court Cause No. 2025-243-6 JUSTICE SMITH delivered the opinion of the Court. MEMORANDUM OPINION Following a bench trial, Mother appeals the order terminating her parental rights to her five children.1 In four issues, she challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the predicate grounds for termination and that termination was in the children’s best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (b)(1)(E), (b)(1)(N), (b)(2). We affirm. STANDARDS OF REVIEW The standards of review for legal and factual sufficiency in cases involving the termination of parental rights are well established and will not 1 The trial court also terminated the parental rights of T.R., T.R., and T.R.’s father, as well as K.W. and M.W.’s father. Neither father appealed. be repeated here. See In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 344-45 (Tex. 2009); In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 264-68 (Tex. 2002); see also In re J.F.-G., 612 S.W.3d 373, 381-82 (Tex. App.—Waco 2020), aff’d, 627 S.W.3d 304 (Tex. 2021). If multiple predicate violations are found by the factfinder, we will affirm based on any one finding because only one finding is necessary for termination of parental rights when there is also a finding that termination is in the children’s best interest. See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 232 (Tex. 2019). But if one of the predicate grounds is based on endangerment under Subsection D or E, we are required to fully address that ground, if presented on appeal, based on future collateral consequences of the finding. Id. at 234-37. We give due deference to the factfinder’s findings and must not substitute our judgment for that of the factfinder. See In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006). The factfinder is the sole judge of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight to give their testimony. Jordan v. Dossey, 325 S.W.3d 700, 713 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. denied). PREDICATE GROUNDS In her first, second, and third issues, Mother challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence supporting termination of her parental rights under Subsections D, E, and N. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 161.001(b)(1)(D), (b)(1)(E), (b)(1)(N). In the Interest of K.W., M.W., T.R., T.R., and T.R., Children Page 2 Termination under Subsection E requires proof of endangerment, which means to expose the children to loss or injury. Tex. Dept. of Human Servs. v. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d 531, 533 (Tex. 1987). The relevant inquiry in an analysis under Subsection E is whether sufficient evidence exists that the endangerment of the children’s well-being was the direct result of the parent’s conduct, including acts, omissions, or failures to act. In re E.M., 494 S.W.3d 209, 222 (Tex. App.—Waco 2015, pet. denied). It is not necessary that the parent’s conduct be directed at the children or that the children actually suffer injury. Boyd, 727 S.W.2d at 533. The specific danger to the children’s well- being may be inferred from parental misconduct alone. Id. Domestic violence, want of self-control, and propensity for violence may be considered as evidence of endangerment. In re E.M., 494 S.W.3d at 222. The basis for removal in this case was a domestic violence incident committed by one of the fathers against Mother in the home. The children were present during the incident and observed the abuse. Though Mother was undisputedly a victim of domestic abuse, she was also arrested during the pendency of this case for the offense of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon for “bumping” the father and his then-girlfriend with a vehicle.2 Further, the trial court could have credited the father’s testimony at the final hearing that Mother had 2 This charge was apparently still pending at the time of the final hearing. In the Interest of K.W., M.W., T.R., T.R., and T.R., Children Page 3 previously “laid her hands on [him]” over Mother’s conflicting testimony that she had not. Additionally, evidence of a parent’s drug use is relevant to our review under Subsection E when accompanied by “additional evidence that a factfinder could reasonably credit that demonstrates that illegal drug use presents a risk to the parent’s ‘ability to parent.’” In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 278 (Tex. 2024) (quoting In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d at 345). On March 18, 2025, Mother’s drug test yielded positive results for cocaine and marijuana. Her drug tests were clean for approximately two months before she tested positive again for cocaine. A few weeks later, Mother tested positive for amphetamines, methamphetamine, and cocaine, with the test results indicating an increase in her cocaine level from the prior test. Nine days later, Mother again tested positive for amphetamines, methamphetamine, and cocaine, with the results indicating another increase in her cocaine level. Mother provided two clean drug tests during July of 2025 before testing positive on July 31st for cocaine and oxycodone. Following multiple clean drug tests, Mother again tested positive on October 7, 2025, for amphetamines, methamphetamine, and cocaine. On appeal, Mother argues that her continued drug use cannot supply clear and convincing evidence of endangerment because she successfully In the Interest of K.W., M.W., T.R., T.R., and T.R., Children Page 4 completed an inpatient rehabilitation program following her last positive drug test. However, a parent's past endangering conduct may create an inference that the parent's past conduct may recur and further jeopardize the children’s present or future physical or emotional well-being. In re J.S.S., 594 S.W.3d 493, 505 (Tex. App.—Waco 2019, pet. denied). Even though Mother completed the inpatient rehabilitation program and provided a few clean drug tests after her release, she did not drug test for approximately four months leading up to the final hearing.3 A factfinder may reasonably infer that a parent’s failure to submit to drug testing indicates the parent is avoiding the test because she is using illegal substances. In re A.R.D., 694 S.W.3d 829, 840 (Tex. App.— Houston [14th Dist.] 2024, pet. denied). This inference is reasonably supported here, where Mother demonstrated a pattern of short-term sobriety followed by relapse. Further, Mother admitted to the Department that she used illegal substances when she was “overwhelmed[,]” and testified that she had not submitted to a recent drug test because she was “under a lot of stress.” Moreover, here, the Department’s representative testified that Mother had “kind of disappeared” since her last drug test. Mother testified that she had been misinformed by her family that the Department had already decided to request termination of her rights; however, she admitted that the 3 The record reflects that Mother was incarcerated for approximately one month during this period. In the Interest of K.W., M.W., T.R., T.R., and T.R., Children Page 5 Department later cleared up that confusion. She disengaged from communication with the Department, failed to resume her services, and was unable to visit the children because of her failure to drug test. See In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 281 (“Father’s failure to test coincided with his disengagement from communications, services, and the children themselves, posing a substantial risk to the children’s emotional well-being.”). Considering the evidence according to the appropriate standards, we hold that legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s determination that Mother endangered her children as contemplated by Subsection E. Because we find the evidence sufficient to uphold the termination of Mother’s parental rights under Subsection E, we need not address Subsection D or Subsection N. We overrule Mother’s first, second, and third issues. BEST INTEREST In her fourth issue, Mother asserts that evidence is factually and legally insufficient to support the trial court’s best-interest determination as to each child. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(2). We disagree. In determining the best interest of a child, a number of factors have been consistently considered which were set out in the Texas Supreme Court's opinion, Holley v. Adams, 544 S.W.2d 367, 371-72 (Tex. 1976). This list is not In the Interest of K.W., M.W., T.R., T.R., and T.R., Children Page 6 exhaustive, but simply identifies factors that have been or could be relevant in the best interest determination. Id. at 372. There is no requirement that all of these factors must be proved as a condition precedent to termination, and the lack of evidence about some factors does not preclude a factfinder from reasonably forming a strong conviction that termination is in the children's best interest. See In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 27 (Tex. 2002). Mother points out that while the three youngest children were not of suitable age to express their desires for placement, the two oldest children undisputedly wanted to live with Mother. She contends that the trial court should have given greater weight to her progress on her services and completion of the rehabilitation program. Mother also identifies as a factor against the trial court’s best-interest finding that the Department had not yet found a permanent or adoptive placement for the three youngest children. However, a parent’s failure to regularly visit her children after removal may support a finding that termination of the parent’s rights is in the children’s best interest. See In re K.A.M.J., No. 10-23-00413-CV, 2024 WL 1208746, at *3 (Tex. App. – Waco Mar. 21, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.). The failure to regularly visit one's child signals that the parent-child relationship is not an appropriate one and that the parent is unwilling or unable to meet her child's emotional and physical needs. Id. Here, Mother had no contact In the Interest of K.W., M.W., T.R., T.R., and T.R., Children Page 7 with her children for the final four months of the case. At the final hearing, counsel asked Mother why she did not submit to any recent drug tests despite claiming that she would pass them and knowing that visitation with her children could resume. Mother responded that she had been “having other stuff going on as well” and that she had been “under a lot of stress.” Though Mother cited transportation issues as another reason that she failed to drug test, she acknowledged that she did not seek available transportation assistance from the Department. Non-compliance with a family service plan supports an inference that there is an ongoing risk to the children’s well-being because such non- compliance indicates that the parent does not have the ability to motivate herself to seek out available resources needed now or in the future in order to promote the children’s well-being. In re C.K.T., No. 10-23-00288-CV, 2024 WL 860869, at *3 (Tex. App.—Waco Feb. 29, 2024, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Mother testified that she completed some, but not all of her services. Though she was incarcerated for one month during the case, Mother testified that she did not ask the Department about resuming services once she was released. The trial court could reasonably determine that Mother’s failure to fully participate in services jeopardized the children’s well-being and supported a finding that termination was in their best interest. In the Interest of K.W., M.W., T.R., T.R., and T.R., Children Page 8 Furthermore, a parent’s conduct that subjects her children to a life of uncertainty and instability endangers the physical and emotional well-being of the children. Jordan, 325 S.W.3d at 723. Such conduct may include failure to maintain stable housing and employment. In re A.D., No. 10-21-00330-CV, 2022 WL 1256949, at *12 (Tex. App.—Waco Apr. 27, 2022, pet. denied) (mem. op.). At the time of the final hearing, the Department could not confirm that Mother’s home was safe and suitable for the children and could not identify all of the individuals who might be residing in the home. Mother last gave the Department access to the home approximately eight months before the final hearing, but the Department had unsuccessfully attempted several scheduled as well as unannounced visits at the home since that time. Regarding employment, Mother provided employment verification in late 2025 but had not provided to the Department any employment verification in 2026. Mother had to participate in the final hearing by Zoom because, according to her, she had to attend orientation for a new job during the final hearing. Mother had not provided any documentation confirming this recent employment to the Department. We find that legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the trial court’s best-interest finding as to each child. We overrule Mother’s fourth issue. In the Interest of K.W., M.W., T.R., T.R., and T.R., Children Page 9 Conclusion Having overruled all of Mother’s issues on appeal, we affirm the order of the trial court. STEVE SMITH Justice OPINION DELIVERED and FILED: September 24, 2026 Before Chief Justice Johnson, Justice Smith, and Justice Harris Affirmed CV06 In the Interest of K.W., M.W., T.R., T.R., and T.R., Children Page 10