Full Opinion

NUMBER 13-26-00164-CV COURT OF APPEALS THIRTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI – EDINBURG IN THE INTEREST OF V.L.G. AND J.M.A. JR., CHILDREN ON APPEAL FROM THE 444TH DISTRICT COURT OF CAMERON COUNTY, TEXAS MEMORANDUM OPINION Before Chief Justice Tijerina and Justices Silva and Cron Memorandum Opinion by Justice Cron Father appeals from an order terminating his parental rights to his children V.L.G. and J.M.A. Jr. He first contends that the evidence was legally and factually insufficient to support the trial court’s finding of a material and substantial change in circumstances under Texas Family Code section 161.004(a)(2). He also argues that the evidence was insufficient to support the jury’s termination findings under Texas Family Code subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E). We affirm. I. BACKGROUND On April 19, 2017, the children’s two-year-old half-sister K.C. died under suspicious circumstances. 1 Mother initially told first responders and police that she had been at home caring for K.C. and that K.C. had fallen down a flight of stairs inside the home. However, first responders noted that K.C. had both old and new bruising all over her body and that her injuries were inconsistent with Mother’s explanation. The Texas Department of Family and Protective Services removed the children and their half-brother I.C. from the parents’ home on an emergency basis shortly after K.C.’s death and initiated the underlying proceeding. At the time, V.L.G. was approximately seventeen months old, and J.M.A. was approximately four months old. 2 The trial court appointed the Department as the children’s temporary managing conservator while the police continued to investigate K.C.’s death. On April 6, 2018, before the investigation into K.C.’s death was complete, the trial court signed its “Final Order in Suit Affecting the Parent-Child Relationship,” which named the Department as the children’s permanent managing conservator and the parents as possessory conservators. Approximately three months later, Father was indicted for capital murder (Count I) and recklessly causing injury to a child (Count II). The medical examiner had determined that K.C. died from blunt force abdominal trauma and that the manner of her death was homicide. 1 K.C. was Mother’s child from a prior relationship. 2 The children’s guardian ad litem testified at trial that Mother was pregnant with J.M.A. at the time of K.C.’s death, but the record indicates that J.M.A. was born several months before K.C.’s death. 2 Father was arrested on July 3, 2018, and remained detained until his criminal trial in 2023. Mother was also charged with capital murder but reached a plea agreement with the State: she pleaded no contest to the reduced offense of injury to a child by omission and agreed to testify truthfully against Father, and in exchange, the State recommended that Mother receive a probated sentence. Father’s criminal trial occurred in October 2023, and Mother testified that Father had physically abused her and K.C. prior to K.C.’s death. She also testified that Father fabricated the story about K.C. falling down the stairs and left the scene before first responders arrived. The jury also heard testimony that prior to her death, K.C. suffered various injuries while in Father’s care, including a broken arm, broken ribs, and having her teeth knocked out. The children’s older half-brother I.C. testified that he observed Father hitting K.C. with a closed fist and kicking her in the ribs while wearing work boots. He also said Mother was aware of the abuse but never intervened. The medical examiner testified that K.C.’s liver had multiple deep lacerations that caused blood to pool in her abdominal cavity, ultimately resulting in her death. These injuries were inconsistent with a fall down the staircase, according to the medical examiner. The jury could not reach a verdict on Count I but found Father guilty on Count II. The jury also found Father was a repeat felony offender and sentenced him to sixty years in prison. This Court affirmed his conviction in the summer of 2025. Abundez v. State, No. 13-23-00499-CR, 2025 WL 2418389, at *1 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi– Edinburg Aug. 21, 2025, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication). In 2025, the Department filed an amended petition again seeking termination of 3 Father’s and Mother’s parental rights. The Department alleged that although there was a prior order denying termination of Father’s parental rights, termination was nevertheless appropriate under Texas Family Code section 161.004(b) because “the circumstances of the child, parent, sole managing conservator, possessory conservator, or other party affected by the order denying termination have materially and substantially changed since the date the order was rendered.” The Department also alleged that Father’s parental rights should be terminated because, among other reasons, he had been convicted of an offense for causing “the death or serious injury to a child.” See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(L). The trial court subsequently granted the Department’s motion to sever Father’s case from Mother’s, and Father’s case was assigned cause number 2025-DCL- 03750. 3 Father’s termination trial commenced in September 2025. The children were nine and ten years old at the time. Their attorney ad litem told the jury in opening statements that her clients “understand what is happening,” “know who their father is,” “understand what happened to their little sister,” and “they want the parental rights of their father terminated” because they “want to remain with the family that they are with now.” The attorney ad litem explained that the children were “praying for this termination to happen” because they “desire” the “stability” provided by their foster parents. The jury received evidence about the circumstances of K.C.’s death and Father’s subsequent conviction, 4 but the testimony at trial largely focused on the children’s 3 The original cause number is 2017-DC-2648. 4 For instance, Father’s judgment of conviction and our memorandum opinion detailing the evidence against Father were admitted into evidence. 4 circumstances after removal. Emma Ruiz, a conservatorship worker for the Department, testified that the children were initially placed with their maternal grandparents for a couple of years, but the trial court removed them “due to corporal punishment that was going on in that home.” Ruiz said that the children had been living with their foster parents for approximately “two-and-a-half years” and were “doing really good in the home.” She explained that the children had become “very attached” to the foster family and that “they seem very happy to be in the home.” She also stated that the children had expressed their shared desire to remain with the foster family and that they referred to their foster parents as “mom” and “dad.” Ruiz agreed that the foster parents were meeting the children’s physical, emotional, and medical needs. At some point, the Department also considered placing the children with their paternal grandparents, but the Department concluded that the placement would be inappropriate because there was a concern that the paternal grandparents had helped conceal Father’s abuse of K.C. The Department additionally considered potential placements with other members of Father’s family, but all of those proved unsuitable for various reasons. It was Ruiz’s opinion that it was in the children’s best interest to have Father’s parental rights terminated. The children’s guardian ad litem, Valeria Garcia, testified that after the children were removed from the maternal grandparent’s home, they lived in a shelter for a month, and then with another foster family before their current placement. Garcia said that during this period when the children were transitioning “from home to home,” they began “acting out” and displaying “behavioral issues.” She said that changed when the children went to 5 live with their current foster family. Garcia described how the foster parents “gave them a life that they never had before,” one with “a sense of security, a sense of stability.” She said the foster family had provided the children with the “structure” and “attention they needed.” The children formed an “emotional connection” with their foster parents and were “doing fantastic” in their care. Garcia said that the children participate in sports, attend church, and enjoy spending time with “their friends from school.” She said that the foster mother is “a very proud parent to both of them” and regularly sends her pictures of the children, including one of V.L.G. dressed up for “a daddy-daughter dance” with her foster father. Garcia also said that the foster parents “love them as their own” and that the foster mother “worries for them as a mother should. She puts their needs first. She is very protective of them. She is just a great person.” Garcia, who had served as the children’s guardian ad litem for the past eight years, expressed her opinion that the “children need finality. They need to know that they’re going to stay where they call home.” She said the children “have moved on” and it was in their best interest to terminate Father’s parental rights and make the foster family the children’s “forever home.” Foster mother testified that the children began living with them on “December 21st of 2022.” She confirmed that the children call her and her husband “mom and dad.” She also said that they refer to her parents as “grandma and grandpa” and her biological son as “brother.” She considers the children part of “[her] family.” She testified that she established regular medical and dental care for the children and made sure the children attended court ordered counseling sessions. She also confirmed that the children had 6 expressed their desire to have Father’s parental rights terminated, explaining that “they’ve been scared to be removed for as long as they’ve been with me.” She elaborated that the children have been “traumatized” by the ongoing uncertainty: “They’ve been bouncing around from foster home to foster home forever. And they want to stay with us. They love us. We love them. And they’re just scared to be taken out.” She agreed that when the children were initially placed in her care, “they had some behavioral issues.” She said that the children “wouldn’t even allow anybody to get near them”, and V.L.G. “did not want any physical contact.” But after several months in their care, V.L.G. became affectionate and would sit on her lap asking for hugs and kisses. Foster mother further testified that she had to teach the children “how to eat with a fork and a spoon” and “how to clean themselves because they didn’t know how.” She talked about the daily routine she and her husband had established with the children, the various things they do together before and after school each day. She testified that Mother had not had any visitation with the children in more than eighteen months and that the children had spoken to Father by phone only once or twice since they came to live with her. She recalled J.M.A. telling her on one occasion that he “didn’t want to take the call” because Father “wasn’t his dad.” Instead, he told her that “his daddy” had just arrived home from work. Finally, she said that if Father’s rights were terminated, she was prepared to continue caring for the children in a loving and stable environment “[f]orever.” At the time of trial, Father had just filed a petition for discretionary review with the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals concerning his conviction. On the advice of counsel, he elected not to testify. He did not offer any witnesses or evidence. Before the close of 7 evidence, the Department asked the trial court to take judicial notice of its live pleading, but it did not ask the trial court to take judicial notice of the April 6, 2018 final order or seek to admit it into evidence. The trial court submitted four grounds for termination to the jury, including both endangerment grounds and (L) grounds. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (L), (P). The jury found each ground was supported by clear and convincing evidence as to each child. The jury also found by clear and convincing evidence that it was in the children’s best interest to terminate Father’s parental rights. See id. § 161.001(b)(2). The trial court subsequently signed an order of termination that “incorporated” the jury’s findings. The order also included findings that were not based on questions presented to the jury, including the following: 6.1. The Court finds that some of the evidence considered in this trial related to events occurring before a prior order denying termination, and that such evidence was admissible pursuant to § 161.004, Texas Family Code. 6.2. The Court finds by clear and convincing evidence that the petition for termination in this case was filed after the date that an order denying termination of the parent-child relationship of [Father] was rendered, that the circumstances of the children, parent, sole managing conservator, possessory conservator, or other party affected by the prior order have materially and substantially changed since the prior order was rendered, and that, before the prior order was rendered, said parent committed an act listed under § 161.001, Texas Family Code. Father made no post-trial motions, and this accelerated appeal followed. II. PRESERVATION OF ERROR As a threshold matter, the Department contends that Father failed to preserve any of his sufficiency challenges because they are being raised for the first time on appeal. 8 We agree that Father did not take the necessary steps to preserve his challenges to the jury’s findings on endangerment grounds; however, because the trial court, not the jury, made the finding of a material and substantial change in circumstances, we conclude that Father may challenge that finding for the first time on appeal. Following a jury trial, a legal-sufficiency challenge must be preserved in the trial court in one of the following ways: (1) a motion for instructed verdict, (2) a motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict, (3) an objection to the submission of the issue to the jury, (4) a motion to disregard the jury’s answer to a vital fact issue, or (5) a motion for new trial. In re D.T., 625 S.W.3d 62, 75 n.8 (Tex. 2021). Likewise, a factual-sufficiency challenge to a jury finding must be preserved by raising the complaint in a motion for new trial. TEX. R. CIV. P. 324(b)(2); In re D.T., 625 S.W.3d at 75 n.8. Conversely, when a case is tried to the bench, “a complaint regarding the legal or factual sufficiency of the evidence . . . may be made for the first time on appeal in the complaining party’s brief.” TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(d). In a parental termination case, “an omitted [jury] finding may be supplied by an express finding of the trial court.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 273 (Tex. 2002) (trial court made express best-interest finding in termination order that was omitted from jury charge). In such a case, a parent may raise a legal or factual sufficiency challenge to the omitted jury finding for the first time on appeal. See id. at 273–74 (concluding the trial court’s best-interest finding did not constitute a due process violation because, among other reasons, the parents could have challenged the legal or factual sufficiency of the finding in the court of appeals but failed to do so). 9 In this case, the Department alleged in its live pleading that it could satisfy the statutory elements of section 161.004, including a material and substantial change in circumstances, and, therefore, it should be allowed to introduce the same evidence of Father’s violations of section 161.001 that the Department relied on at the previous termination hearing in 2018. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.004. The question of whether “the circumstances of the child, parent, sole managing conservator, possessory conservator, or other party affected by the order denying termination have materially and substantially changed since the date that the order [denying termination] was rendered” was not included in the jury charge. Id. § 161.004(a)(2). Nevertheless, the trial court made an express finding in the termination order that this element was satisfied by clear and convincing evidence. This was a necessary finding because the trial court also found “that some of the evidence considered in this trial related to events occurring before a prior order denying termination.” See id. § 161.004(b). Under these circumstances, we conclude that Father may raise his factual and legal sufficiency challenges to the trial court’s section 161.004(a)(2) finding for the first time on appeal. See In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 273–74. Father’s evidentiary challenges to the jury’s endangerment findings under subsections (D) and (E), however, were not preserved for appellate review. Just like any other civil jury trial, Father was required to first raise these challenges to the jury’s findings in the trial court as a precondition to appellate review. See In re D.T., 625 S.W.3d at 75 n.8; In re C.S., No. 13-13-00095-CV, 2013 WL 3895818, at *6 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg July 25, 2013, no pet.) (mem. op.). 10 Father does not dispute that he failed to preserve error in the trial court. Instead, he claims that “(D) and (E) findings are subject to mandatory appellate review under In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. 2019) [(per curiam)], when challenged on appeal.” Father’s reliance on N.G. is misplaced. To be sure, N.G. mandates appellate review of (D) and (E) grounds “even when another ground is sufficient for termination” because those grounds carry collateral consequences for the parent, and failure to review them would amount to a due process violation “[w]hen the parent has presented the issue on appeal.” Id. at 235. Crucially, though, the parent in that case was appealing from a termination order rendered after a bench trial, so there was no need to preserve error from the trial court’s findings because, unlike this case, they could be challenged for the first time on appeal. See In re N.G., 575 S.W.3d 370, 377 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2018, pet. granted), rev’d, 577 S.W.3d 230 (Tex. 2019) (finding evidence “sufficient to support the trial court’s finding” on (O) grounds); TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1(d). Naturally, then, the Supreme Court of Texas said nothing in N.G. about excusing parents from normal preservation requirements when challenging a jury’s findings on (D) and (E) grounds because error preservation was not a barrier to presenting the issue on appeal. See In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d at 234–37. Had the court intended to upend bedrock preservation requirements, we would expect it to have expressly said so. Moreover, in a subsequent opinion, the Supreme Court of Texas impliedly cast doubt on Father’s position. In D.T., the high court held “that a parent who responds in opposition to a government-initiated suit seeking termination of the parent-child relationship may assert a claim for ineffective assistance of counsel on appeal regardless 11 of whether the parent’s counsel was appointed or retained.” 625 S.W.3d at 73. One of the parent’s ineffective-assistance claims was that her trial “counsel did not file a motion for new trial and did not otherwise preserve a sufficiency challenge” to the jury’s findings. Id. at 75 & n.8. These included affirmative jury findings on (D) and (E) grounds. See In re D.T., 593 S.W.3d 437, 438–39 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, pet. granted), aff’d, 625 S.W.3d 62 (Tex. 2021). The D.T. Court ultimately concluded that the claim failed on the merits because the parent did not overcome the legal presumption that her counsel elected not to preserve a sufficiency challenge based on the strength of the evidence supporting the jury’s findings. In re D.T., 625 S.W.3d at 75. If, as Father suggests, there was no need to preserve error in the first instance under N.G., then it stands to reason that the D.T. Court would have rejected the claim outright, rather than accepting the parent’s premise as one that could plausibly support a claim of ineffective assistance. After all, to prevail on such a claim, the first step was demonstrating “that counsel’s performance was deficient.” Id. at 74 (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). Finally, several of our sister courts have considered the very argument presented by Father, and all agree that N.G. does not require appellate review of a jury’s findings on (D) or (E) grounds when the parent failed to preserve the alleged error in the trial court. See B.S. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., No. 03-22-00279-CV, 2022 WL 16842084, at *3 (Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 10, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re A.R.S., No. 05-21-00655-CV, 2022 WL 224812, at *2 n.1 (Tex. App.—Dallas Jan. 26, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re M.X.R., No. 04-20-00042-CV, 2020 WL 2736465, at *3 n.2 (Tex. App.— 12 San Antonio May 27, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.); In re S.C., No. 02-18-00422-CV, 2019 WL 2455612, at * 4 n.2 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 13, 2019, pets. denied) (mem. op.). For the forgoing reasons, we conclude that Father failed to preserve his sufficiency challenges to the jury’s findings on (D) and (E) grounds. Accordingly, Father’s second issue is overruled, and we proceed to the merits of his first issue challenging the legal and factual sufficiency of the trial court’s section 161.004(a)(2) finding. III. MATERIAL & SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES Father contends that “[t]he record contains insufficient testimony about the prior denial of termination[,] making it impossible to determine the baseline against which such material and substantial change must be measured.” He claims that the Department failed to establish “when the prior order was rendered or what the circumstances were at that time.” The only thing that can be gleaned from the record, according to Father, is that his circumstances “remained constant” between the prior order denying termination and the order terminating his parental rights. He claims that “he remained incarcerated” and continued to have virtually no contact with the children during the relevant period. He also submits that the mere fact that the children are now older is insufficient “because children always grow older during protracted litigation.” A. Standard of Review & Applicable Law A parent has a constitutional right to the care, custody, and control of his children. In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 740 (Tex. 2022) (citing In re E.N.C., 384 S.W.3d 796, 802 (Tex. 2012)); In re C.J.C., 603 S.W.3d 804, 811 (Tex. 2020) (“The United States Supreme Court has long held that the Constitution ‘protects the fundamental right of parents to 13 make decisions concerning the care, custody, and control of their children.’” (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66 (2000))). Accordingly, in proceedings to terminate the parent-child relationship, the petitioner is required to prove by clear and convincing evidence one of the statutory termination grounds and that termination is in the children’s best interest. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(1), (2). Clear and convincing evidence is “the measure or degree of proof that will produce in the mind of the trier of fact a firm belief or conviction as to the truth of the allegations sought to be established.” Id. § 101.007. In parental termination cases, our legal and factual sufficiency standards honor this elevated burden of proof while respecting the factfinder’s role. In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d 624, 630 (Tex. 2018) (citing In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 264). “The distinction between legal and factual sufficiency lies in the extent to which disputed evidence contrary to a finding may be considered.” Id. In a legal sufficiency review, we “cannot ignore undisputed evidence contrary to the finding, but [we] must otherwise assume the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of the finding.” Id. at 630–31 (citing In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266). Thus, “[e]vidence is legally sufficient if, viewing all the evidence in the light most favorable to the fact-finding and considering undisputed contrary evidence, a reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or conviction that the finding was true.” Id. at 631 (citing In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266). Factual sufficiency, on the other hand, requires us to weigh disputed evidence contrary to the finding against all evidence favoring the finding. Id. We “must consider whether disputed evidence is such that a reasonable factfinder could not have resolved it in favor of the finding.” Id. (citing In re H.R.M., 209 S.W.3d 105, 108 (Tex. 2006)). 14 Therefore, “[e]vidence is factually insufficient if, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence a reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of a finding is so significant that the factfinder could not have formed a firm belief or conviction that the finding was true.” Id. (citing In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266). Described as a statutory exception to the doctrine of res judicata, In re K.G., 350 S.W.3d 338, 346 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2011, pet. denied), section 161.004 allows a trial court to terminate the parent-child relationship after rendition of an order that previously denied termination of the parent-child relationship if: (1) the petition is filed after the date the order denying termination was rendered; (2) the circumstances of a party affected by the order denying termination have materially and substantially changed since the date that the order was rendered; (3) the parent committed an act listed under section 161.001 before the date the order denying termination was rendered; and (4) termination is in the best interest of the child. TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.004(a). Additionally, the statute provides that “[a]t a hearing under this section, the court may consider evidence presented at a previous hearing in a suit for termination of the parent-child relationship of the parent with respect to the same child.” Id. § 161.004(b). Like termination under section 161.001, the elements under section 161.004 must be proven by clear and convincing evidence. In re A.L.H., 515 S.W.3d 60, 90 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2017, pet. denied). “There are no definite guidelines as to what constitutes a material and substantial change in circumstances to terminate parental rights under section 161.004.” In re F.M.E.A.F., 572 S.W.3d 716, 725 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2019, pet. denied) 15 (citation modified). In other words, every case is fact specific. In re A.L.E., 279 S.W.3d 424, 428 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, no pet.). B. Analysis Father contends that it was impossible to determine whether there was a material and substantial change in circumstances because there is no evidence in the record establishing the date the prior order denying termination was rendered. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.004(a)(2) (requiring a material and substantial change in circumstances “since the date that the order was rendered”). Although the clerk’s record contains a final order from April 2018, Father correctly notes that, unlike the Department’s live pleading, the trial court never took judicial notice of the order. See Interest of D.L.W.W., 617 S.W.3d 64, 92 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2020, no pet.) (“Similarly, the documents contained in the clerk’s record, of which the trial court did not take judicial notice, cannot be used to support the trial court’s termination of mother’s and father’s parental rights to A.M.M. The only evidence that can support the trial court’s order is the evidence admitted at trial.” (citing In re E.F., 591 S.W.3d 138, 142 n.4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2019, no pet.)); B.L.M. v. J.H.M., No. 03-14-00050-CV, 2014 WL 3562559, at *13 (Tex. App.—Austin July 17, 2014, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (“Accordingly, our evidence-sufficiency review is limited to the evidence admitted at the termination trial and properly noticed contents of the clerk’s record.”); cf. In re T.M.B., No. 13-24-00070-CV, 2025 WL 1073173, at *7 n.7 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg Apr. 10, 2025, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“In this case, the trial court did not formally take judicial notice of any records or testimony from the divorce trial. To the extent it did so informally, that was improper because they were not entered into 16 evidence in the modification proceedings. Accordingly, in our analysis, we will consider only evidence which was adduced at the March 23, 2023 hearing.” (citations omitted)). Even if we assume that termination under section 161.004 was improper, Father’s parental rights were also terminated based on violations of section 161.001(b)(1) that occurred after the 2018 order. “Termination of parental rights ‘can be achieved after a prior order denying termination of the parent-child relationship through either section 161.004 or section 161.001.’” In re J.M.T., 652 S.W.3d 525, 527 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2022, pet. denied) (quoting In re H.L.H., No. 10-16-00254-CV, 2018 WL 1321750, at *13 (Tex. App.—Waco Mar. 14, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op.)). Thus, when the Department seeks termination after a prior order denying termination, a trial court may terminate parental rights (1) under section 161.001, which requires clear and convincing evidence of acts or omissions having occurred since the prior denial of termination, or (2) under section 161.004, which requires clear and convincing evidence of an act or omission under section 161.001 that occurred prior to the denial and evidence of a material and substantial change since the prior denial of termination. Id. (citing In re N.A.V., No. 04-19-00646-CV, 2020 WL 1250830, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 17, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.)). Here, Father had not even been criminally charged for K.C.’s death at the time of the 2018 order, and consistent with the Department’s live pleading, the jury found by clear and convincing evidence that Father was convicted of injury to a child in 2023. See TEX. FAM. CODE § 161.001(b)(1)(L)(ix) (requiring clear and convincing evidence that a parent has “been convicted” of one of several criminal offenses, including injury to a child). Father has not challenged the jury’s termination finding on (L) grounds. Because only one predicate ground is necessary to affirm the order terminating his parental rights, any 17 alleged error with respect to termination of his parental rights under section 161.004 was harmless. See In re J.F.G., 500 S.W.3d 554, 559–60 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, no pet.) (explaining that because the unchallenged termination ground “can support the order of termination, it is unnecessary to review legal and factual sufficiency arguments as to the other grounds” (collecting cases)); TEX R. APP. P. 44.1(a)(1). Accordingly, Father’s first issue is overruled. IV. CONCLUSION The order terminating Father’s parental rights is affirmed. JENNY CRON Justice Delivered and filed on the 13th day of August, 2026. 18