Jackson v. Cornwell

Appellate Case: 26-5083 Document: 15-1 Date Filed: 10/29/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS Appeals Tenth Circuit FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT _________________________________ October 29, 2026 Christopher M. Wolpert TAMAR JACKSON, Clerk of Court Plaintiff - Appellant, v. No. 26-5083 (D.C. No. 4:25-CV-00370-CVE-JFJ) MISTY CORNWELL; DERRICK (N.D. Okla.) YAZEL, Defendants - Appellees. _________________________________ ORDER AND JUDGMENT * _________________________________ Before PHILLIPS, KELLY, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. _________________________________ Tamar Jackson, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals the dismissal of his 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit alleging constitutional violations during his incarceration at the Northeast Oklahoma Community Correctional Center (NOCCC). 1 In his complaint, Jackson alleged that Derrick Yazel, the NOCCC’s After examining the briefs and appellate record, this panel has * determined unanimously that oral argument would not materially assist in the determination of this appeal. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); 10th Cir. R. 34.1(G). The case is therefore ordered submitted without oral argument. This order and judgment is not binding precedent, except under the doctrines of law of the case, res judicata, and collateral estoppel. It may be cited, however, for its persuasive value consistent with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1 and 10th Cir. R. 32.1. Because Jackson proceeds pro se, we liberally construe his filings, but 1 we do not serve as his advocate. Davis v. Clifford, 825 F.3d 1131, 1134 n.1 (10th Cir. 2016).  Appellate Case: 26-5083 Document: 15-1 Date Filed: 10/29/2026 Page: 2 warden, and Misty Cornwell, the warden’s assistant, denied him access to the courts and retaliated against him. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we affirm. 2 BACKGROUND This appeal stems from Jackson’s attempts to challenge his 2016 state- court conviction while incarcerated at the NOCCC. 3 In October 2024, Jackson sought post-conviction review out of time with an Oklahoma district court. In January 2025, that court denied his application. Jackson then tried to appeal the denial to the state appeals court, but he failed to file a required notice of appeal with the state district court by the deadline of February 10, 2025. So on April 7, 2025, the state appeals court declined jurisdiction and dismissed Jackson’s case. Jackson claims that he missed the notice deadline because he didn’t receive a copy of the state district court’s January order until February 25, 2025—after his notice of appeal was due. In his complaint in the instant matter, Jackson alleged that Yazel and Cornwell, in both their official and personal capacities, denied him access to the courts and retaliated against him. He alleged that Yazel was liable for these 2 Though the district court’s dismissal was without prejudice, we have appellate jurisdiction because the court’s order dismissed the entire action. See Amazon, Inc. v. Dirt Camp, Inc., 273 F.3d 1271, 1275 (10th Cir. 2001) (“Although a dismissal without prejudice is usually not a final decision, where the dismissal finally disposes of the case so that it is not subject to further proceedings in federal court, the dismissal is final and appealable.”). 3 Jackson has since been transferred to a different correctional facility. 2  Appellate Case: 26-5083 Document: 15-1 Date Filed: 10/29/2026 Page: 3 constitutional violations as Cornwell’s supervisor. Specifically, Jackson claimed that he intended to file a motion to show cause with the state appeals court explaining why he failed to file a timely notice of appeal. He had drafted the motion on his prison-issued tablet, and he planned to file it with the state appeals court by April 7, 2025, after typing it on a computer in the NOCCC’s law library. But the law library was closed from March 18, 2025, to April 14, 2025, except for a few hours on March 28 and April 4. Jackson was able to type some, but not all, of his motion during that time. And when he asked Cornwell for additional time in the library to finish his motion, she denied his request. So in Jackson’s view, his appeal was dismissed because of the law library closure, and his right to access the courts was violated. Jackson’s complaint also alleged that he was retaliated against for submitting a grievance. Jackson claimed that the day after he submitted a grievance about the law library closure, Cornwell let him go as the law library’s clerk and reduced his access to the library to two hours a week. The defendants moved to dismiss Jackson’s complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and the district court granted the motion and dismissed all of Jackson’s claims without prejudice. As to Jackson’s access-to- the-courts claim, the district court reasoned that Jackson had a reasonably adequate opportunity to handwrite and file his motion to show cause. He therefore failed to allege an actual injury, which that claim requires. And as to Jackson’s retaliation claim, the district court observed that Jackson failed to 3  Appellate Case: 26-5083 Document: 15-1 Date Filed: 10/29/2026 Page: 4 allege sufficient facts to support his conclusory statement that he was retaliated against. Because Jackson failed to plausibly allege that his constitutional rights were violated, the district court dismissed Jackson’s supervisory-liability claim, too. And finally, the district court dismissed Jackson’s official-capacity claims because money damages are unavailable for such claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and any claims for injunctive relief were moot once Jackson was transferred to a different correctional facility. This appeal followed. STANDARD OF REVIEW The district court dismissed Jackson’s complaint without prejudice for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6) and 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii), a decision we review de novo. Kay v. Bemis, 500 F.3d 1214, 1217 (10th Cir. 2007). “We apply the same standard of review for dismissals under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) that we employ for [Rule] 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss for failure to state a claim.” Id. at 1217–18. This means that the complaint must allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). We accept Jackson’s well- pleaded factual allegations as true and view them in the light most favorable to him. Kay, 500 F.3d at 1217. But we must disregard mere “labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do.” Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555; see Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). 4  Appellate Case: 26-5083 Document: 15-1 Date Filed: 10/29/2026 Page: 5 DISCUSSION I. Access-to-the-Courts Claim On appeal, Jackson argues that the district court erred in dismissing his access-to-the-courts claim because, had he handwritten his motion as the court suggested, he would have exceeded the state court’s page limit for filings. In his view, his inability to access the law library to type his motion prevented him from advancing his state appeal and caused an actual injury. “[T]he fundamental constitutional right of access to the courts requires prison authorities to assist inmates in the preparation and filing of meaningful legal papers by providing prisoners with adequate law libraries or adequate assistance from persons trained in the law.” Bounds v. Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 828 (1977). But this constitutional obligation is satisfied so long as states provide inmates with “a reasonably adequate opportunity to present their legal claims.” Id. at 825. And an inmate alleging a violation of his right to access the courts “must show actual injury”—that is, he must demonstrate that his “efforts to pursue a legal claim” were hindered by the prison facility’s alleged shortcomings. Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 349, 351 (1996) (“Bounds did not create an abstract, freestanding right to a law library or legal assistance . . . .”). Though he insists otherwise, in essence Jackson’s argument is that he has a constitutional right to type his court filings. But “[a]ccess to the courts does not include a federally protected right . . . to have one’s pleadings typed.” Twyman v. Crisp, 584 F.2d 352, 358 (10th Cir. 1978). Pro se prisoners’ claims 5  Appellate Case: 26-5083 Document: 15-1 Date Filed: 10/29/2026 Page: 6 are not prejudiced by the filing of handwritten materials. Id. This is true even though handwriting instead of typing can make it more challenging to meet courts’ page limits. Just as there is no constitutional right to a typewriter or computer, there is also no constitutional right to make legal arguments in as many words as one pleases. “The right of access to the courts is neither absolute nor unconditional,” Sieverding v. Colo. Bar Ass’n, 469 F.3d 1340, 1343 (10th Cir. 2006) (cleaned up), and reasonable page limits do not frustrate meaningful access. Jackson doesn’t dispute that during the alleged library closure, he had access to Westlaw on his prison tablet, as well as paper and pens. Nor does he say that he was denied access to the mail system or that prison officials otherwise prevented him from submitting a handwritten motion. In short, Jackson could have handwritten his motion. Because Jackson has failed to allege that the law library’s closure caused him an actual injury, see Lewis, 518 U.S. at 351, the district court was correct to dismiss this claim. 4 II. Retaliation The district court concluded that Jackson’s allegations of retaliation were conclusory and insufficient to state a claim. The court observed that Jackson failed to allege “any facts to back up his belief[]” that Cornwell fired him from 4 Jackson also emphasizes that the law library’s closure violated Oklahoma Department of Corrections policy. But failing to follow jail policies is not itself a constitutional violation. See Davis v. Scherer, 468 U.S. 183, 194– 95 (1984). 6  Appellate Case: 26-5083 Document: 15-1 Date Filed: 10/29/2026 Page: 7 his position as the NOCCC’s law clerk and reduced his access to the law library because he submitted a grievance. Jackson v. Cornwell, No. 25-CV-0370, 2026 WL 1622832, at *3 (N.D. Okla. June 5, 2026). On appeal, Jackson doesn’t challenge these conclusions. He identifies no error in the district court’s reasoning. Indeed, he appears to concede that his complaint’s allegations of retaliation were insufficient. He says that his claim was “underdeveloped,” Opening Br. at 6, and that he “did not sufficiently ‘plead facts from which [a] plausible inference’” of retaliation could be drawn, Reply Br. at 6 (citation omitted). “The first task of an appellant is to explain to us why the district court’s decision was wrong.” Nixon v. City & Cnty. of Denver, 784 F.3d 1364, 1366 (10th Cir. 2015). Because Jackson has not done that here, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of his retaliation claim. See id.; see also Reedy v. Werholtz, 660 F.3d 1270, 1274–75 (10th Cir. 2011) (declining to address a district court’s reasoning when the appellant’s opening brief does not challenge it); Rhodes v. Shannon, No. 23-8026, 2024 WL 79964, at *3–4 (10th Cir. Jan. 8, 2024) (unpublished) (“Because [the plaintiff] has failed to show any reversible error, we affirm the district court’s judgment.”). III. Supervisory-Liability and Official-Capacity Claims We next turn to Jackson’s supervisory-liability claim against Yazel, as well as his claims against both defendants in their official capacities. The district court dismissed the supervisory-liability claim because it concluded 7  Appellate Case: 26-5083 Document: 15-1 Date Filed: 10/29/2026 Page: 8 that Jackson failed to plausibly allege that Cornwell violated his constitutional rights by denying him access to the courts or retaliating against him. We agree. “[S]upervisors . . . can be liable under § 1983 for the actions of their subordinates only if one of those subordinates committed an underlying constitutional violation.” Burke v. Regalado, 935 F.3d 960, 1009–10 (10th Cir. 2019). And here, as explained above, Jackson’s constitutional claims are dismissed. 5 Jackson’s official-capacity claims also fail for this reason. See Starkey ex rel. A.B. v. Boulder Cnty. Soc. Servs., 569 F.3d 1244, 1246 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Because there was no underlying constitutional violation, [the plaintiffs’] claims against [the defendants] in their official capacities must also fail.”). Dismissal was therefore proper as to these claims, too. IV. Other Claims of Error Finally, we address two other claims of error Jackson raises in his appellate briefs. First, Jackson argues that the district court erred by either failing to invite him to amend his complaint sua sponte, or by neglecting to state in its order that amendment would be futile. We review for an abuse of discretion the district court’s failure to grant leave to amend. Hertz v. Luzenac Grp., 576 F.3d 1103, 1117 (10th Cir. 2009). 5 The defendants also contend that they are entitled to qualified immunity. But because we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Jackson’s claims on other grounds, we do not address this issue. See Moore v. City of Wynnewood, 57 F.3d 924, 931 (10th Cir. 1995). 8  Appellate Case: 26-5083 Document: 15-1 Date Filed: 10/29/2026 Page: 9 The district court did not abuse its discretion. Jackson did not request leave to amend in any post-judgment motion before the district court. Longyear v. Utah Bd. of Pardons & Parole, 68 F. App’x 878, 881 (10th Cir. 2003). Moreover, the opinion Jackson cites in support of his argument, Gee v. Pacheco, says that “ordinarily the dismissal of a pro se claim under Rule 12(b)(6) should be without prejudice.” 627 F.3d 1178, 1185–86 (10th Cir. 2010); accord Reynoldson v. Shillinger, 907 F.2d 124, 126 (10th Cir. 1990) (stating that “dismissal of [pro se pleadings] without prejudice is preferable”). And here, the district court dismissed Jackson’s claims without prejudice. If he wishes, Jackson may revise his complaint and attempt to bring these claims in the district court again. Thus, there is no reason to reverse on this ground. Second, Jackson insists that dismissal was improper because after preliminary screening of his complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the district court concluded that taken as true, Jackson’s complaint stated at least one plausible claim. This argument is misplaced. A district court often cannot determine during preliminary screening whether a complaint fails to state a claim. Cf. Buchheit v. Green, 705 F.3d 1157, 1161 (10th Cir. 2012) (“Dismissing a complaint without benefit of an adversarial presentation is often an uncertain and time-consuming task . . . .”). “Simply put, the fact that a district court does not dismiss a complaint under § 1915A does not mean that the complaint will 9  Appellate Case: 26-5083 Document: 15-1 Date Filed: 10/29/2026 Page: 10 necessarily withstand a defendant’s challenge to its plausibility under Rule 12(b)(6).” Garewal v. Sliz, 611 F. App’x 926, 931 (10th Cir. 2015). CONCLUSION For these reasons, we affirm the district court’s dismissal of Jackson’s complaint for failure to state a claim. Entered for the Court Gregory A. Phillips Circuit Judge 10