EEOC v. A & A Appliance

Appellate Case: 25-1451 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 Page: 1 FILED United States Court of Appeals PUBLISH Tenth Circuit UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS November 6, 2026 Christopher M. Wolpert FOR THE TENTH CIRCUIT Clerk of Court _________________________________ EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION, Plaintiff - Appellant, v. No. 25-1451 A & A APPLIANCE, INC., d/b/a Appliance Factory Outlet, Inc., d/b/a Appliance Factory Mattress Kingdom, Defendant - Appellee. _________________________________ Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Colorado (D.C. No. 1:23-CV-02456-DDD-CYC) _________________________________ Dara S. Smith, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of General Counsel (Catherine Eschbach, Christopher Lage, Jennifer S. Goldstein, and Gail S. Coleman with her on the briefs), Washington, D.C., for Plaintiff-Appellant. Janet M. Himmel, Fisher & Phillips LLP (Micah D. Dawson and Julianne C. Lomax, with her on the brief), Denver, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellee. _________________________________ Before MATHESON, McHUGH, and FEDERICO, Circuit Judges. _________________________________ McHUGH, Circuit Judge. _________________________________ Plaintiff-Appellant, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), claims that A&A Appliance, Inc. (“Appliance Factory”) violated the  Appellate Case: 25-1451 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 Page: 2 Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by failing to accommodate Karima Javanzad’s request for leave and by terminating her on the basis of her disability and in retaliation for requesting a reasonable accommodation. The district court granted summary judgment in Appliance Factory’s favor on all claims. Exercising jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, we reverse the district court’s grant of summary judgment and remand for further proceedings. I. BACKGROUND A. Factual History 1 Appliance Factory is a Colorado-based retailer that sells appliances, mattresses, and other household products. In February 2019, it hired Ms. Javanzad as a sales associate 2 at its store in Thornton, Colorado. Ms. Javanzad, who Appliance Factory described as “an excellent and productive employee,” worked at Appliance Factory until she was terminated on June 10, 2020. App. at 257. The following factual history describes the relevant background leading to Ms. Javanzad’s termination. 1 “Because this case arises from an appeal of summary judgment, we present the . . . factual background in the light most favorable to [the EEOC] as the non- moving party, unless contradicted by the record.” Jarvis v. Liggett, 179 F.4th 763, 769 n.3 (10th Cir. 2026) (quotation marks omitted). Appliance Factory sometimes refers to the sales associate position as “sales 2 manager” or “product specialist.” App. at 257. 2  Appellate Case: 25-1451 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 Page: 3 1. March 2020–April 2020: Ms. Javanzad’s Initial Leave Request On March 17, 2020, Ms. Javanzad emailed Appliance Factory’s Human Resources Specialist, Sherry Coudayre, 3 informing Ms. Coudayre that she could not return to work until after March 22 because her son was sick with pneumonia. On March 24, however, Ms. Javanzad advised Ms. Coudayre that she had also fallen sick and could not return to work as planned. When she first advised Ms. Coudayre of her illness, Ms. Javanzad expected to recover within a few days. But her illness continued to worsen, resulting in multiple trips to the emergency room. On March 26, Ms. Javanzad stated she was “really sick” with a cough and shortness of breath. Id. at 152. A few days later, Ms. Javanzad told Ms. Coudayre, “I have never been sick in my life like this last week and I’m still suffering. . . . I can’t breath[e] and feel like dying.” Id. at 151. She reported difficulty walking and breathing, as well as chest pain. Ms. Javanzad told Ms. Coudayre that her doctor suspected she had COVID-19 because she had “all the symptoms,” but the hospital did not have tests to confirm this suspicion. Id. Ms. Javanzad provided Ms. Coudayre with a note from her primary care provider confirming she had COVID-19 symptoms and advising that Ms. Javanzad stay home from work until ten days from the onset of her symptoms or until after her symptoms resolved. 3 At the time, Sherry Coudayre’s last name was Ewing. 3  Appellate Case: 25-1451 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 Page: 4 Due to the length of Ms. Javanzad’s illness, Ms. Coudayre asked her to complete paperwork requesting leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”). Ms. Javanzad did so, and Appliance Factory granted her twelve weeks of leave, which was set to expire on June 8, 2020. Ms. Coudayre instructed Ms. Javanzad to check with her biweekly to provide updates on how she was feeling and when she could return to work. 2. April 2020–May 2020: Communications During Ms. Javanzad’s Leave On April 13, 2020, Ms. Javanzad emailed Ms. Coudayre, reporting that she felt “much better” and was ready to return to work. Id. at 175. She reported that her COVID-19 symptoms had cleared up, and her primary care physician provided a note confirming Ms. Javanzad could “return to full duty immediately with no restrictions.” Id. at 177. Ms. Coudayre asked Ms. Javanzad’s supervisor to arrange for her return, and Ms. Javanzad expressed her enthusiasm to get back to work. Three days later, Ms. Javanzad informed Ms. Coudayre that her “body got weak again” but that her doctor advised her this was a normal part of recovering from COVID-19. Id. at 276. Because Ms. Javanzad had not yet heard about arrangements for her return to work, she told Ms. Coudayre she “was thinking to wait [one] more week.” Id. On April 19, Ms. Javanzad emailed Ms. Coudayre again, stating, “I have some bad news. I think I have to stay on FMLA a few more weeks because I can’t find daycare due to school closures.” Id. at 178. Two days later, Ms. Javanzad informed Ms. Coudayre that she could return to work on May 11. Ms. Coudayre 4  Appellate Case: 25-1451 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 Page: 5 responded, “I have informed the necessary managers that you will be out until May 21st and returning May 22nd.” Id. at 188. On May 12, Ms. Javanzad sent another update to Ms. Coudayre. She wrote: I’m still not feeling well. Everyday I wake up thinking that I will get back to normal but I am still not well. My stomach has a problem after I encountered the virus. My doctor scheduled an endoscopy next week, maybe they can figure out what’s causing the pain. . . . I also want to know how long more do I have on the FMLA and if I used the whole 12 weeks can I extend it? Id. at 189. Ms. Coudayre replied, “You still have time remaining from the 12 weeks, so let’s see what happens with your doctor before we discuss any other steps.” Id. 3. June 2020: Communications Regarding Ms. Javanzad’s Return Date On the morning of June 1, Ms. Coudayre called and texted Ms. Javanzad, asking Ms. Javanzad to call her back about her FMLA leave. Ms. Javanzad texted Ms. Coudayre that evening and asked if she could talk but Ms. Coudayre did not respond. Later the same evening, Ms. Javanzad emailed Ms. Coudayre to inform her that her gastroenterologist had rescheduled her endoscopy to June 9 because the previous procedure was postponed due to COVID-19 restrictions. Ms. Javanzad attached a doctor’s note to her email. The note was dated May 13, and it stated: “It is my medical opinion that Karima Javanzad should remain out of work until her symptoms have improved and she has the results of her planned procedures.” Id. at 203. Ms. Javanzad’s doctor suspected that she had gastritis. Ms. Javanzad closed her June 1 email by asking Ms. Coudayre about her potential options if her FMLA leave expired and noting she “needed more time.” Id. at 202. 5  Appellate Case: 25-1451 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 Page: 6 The next morning, on June 2, Ms. Coudayre responded to Ms. Javanzad’s email. Ms. Coudayre stated, “I’m sorry we played phone tag yesterday. I do need to speak with you over the phone, so please call me today.” Id. She also texted Ms. Javanzad, “I saw your email but need to speak with you on the phone. Please call me today, thanks!” Id. at 204. At 11:41 A.M., Ms. Javanzad texted Ms. Coudayre and asked if she was available for a phone call. The evidence, viewed in Ms. Javanzad’s favor, indicates that Ms. Javanzad and Ms. Coudayre had a five-minute phone conversation starting at 12:03 P.M. 4 During the phone call, Ms. Javanzad asked Ms. Coudayre if she could extend her FMLA leave. She explained, “I’m going to have an endoscopy done, and I need more time. I’m not feeling good. I can’t breathe. I have difficulty speaking. That’s why I’m not able to speak. Can you please give me an answer . . . I want extra time.” Id. at 230. She also reported that she was having “stomach pain” and that she needed additional time to complete her endoscopy but would return to work after receiving the results. Id. at 234. Specifically, she told Ms. Coudayre that she “needed a few weeks.” Id. at 239. Ms. Javanzad testified that Ms. Coudayre “was quiet” in response and said she needed to talk to her boss. Id. at 231. 4 Ms. Coudayre testified that she does not recall speaking to Ms. Javanzad on the phone on June 2, 2020. But Appliance Factory’s phone provider’s records indicate that Ms. Coudayre and Ms. Javanzad had a five-minute phone call starting at 12:03 P.M., Ms. Javanzad testified that she had a phone call with Ms. Coudayre in late May or early June, and Ms. Coudayre stated in Ms. Javanzad’s termination letter that she spoke to Ms. Javanzad on the phone about her FMLA “[o]n or about June 1, 2020.” App. at 212. 6  Appellate Case: 25-1451 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 Page: 7 On June 4 and 5, Ms. Coudayre called and texted Ms. Javanzad, asking again for a return call. Ms. Javanzad did not return Ms. Coudayre’s call, but she sent Ms. Coudayre an email on the morning of June 5. She stated, “I saw your missed call and I wasn’t able to respond because I have difficulty speaking. It happened yesterday and today again. Please let me know what I need to do and what my options are.” Id. at 217. Ms. Coudayre did not respond to Ms. Javanzad’s email because Ms. Coudayre and other Appliance Factory employees “insist[ed] on having a phone call.” Id. at 268–69. On June 8, the day Ms. Javanzad’s FMLA leave expired, Ms. Javanzad reached out to Ms. Coudayre again. She stated, “I haven’t heard from you regarding my options after FMLA ended. I am sorry I couldn’t speak to you over the phone because some days I have difficulty speaking.” Id. at 210. She then inquired about extending her leave. Specifically, she said, “I was also wondering if I can go on leave of absence since today is the last day for the FMLA. What’s the company’s policy on that?” Id. Ms. Coudayre responded the next day. She reminded Ms. Javanzad that Appliance Factory had expected her to return to work on June 8 and told Ms. Javanzad that the position was still available to her. Ms. Coudayre also stated, “If you are unable to return, I understand if you need to resign at this time. If you choose to resign, you are welcome to give me a call when you are able to return to work and we can discuss having you rejoin our team!” Id. Ms. Javanzad did not respond to Ms. Coudayre’s email. 7  Appellate Case: 25-1451 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 Page: 8 4. June 10, 2020: Ms. Javanzad’s Termination On June 10, Appliance Factory sent Ms. Javanzad a termination letter, signed by Ms. Coudayre. The letter stated, in relevant part: [Y]our medical condition (i.e., fear of exposure to COVID-19) triggering your FMLA leave commenced March 15, 2020. [Appliance Factory] provided you the requisite 12 weeks FMLA leave and [Appliance Factory] provided you an opportunity to extend that FMLA time for an additional four weeks if the triggering condition for FMLA was extended by your medical provider. You were informed your 12 weeks FMLA leave, unless extended, would expire on June 8, 2020. On or about June 1, 2020, you and I spoke about your FMLA and its requirement; you acknowledged that you were aware that your FMLA leave would expire June 7th and you would need to return to work . . . [on] June 8th unless your medical provider extended it for COVID-19 related reasons. Shortly thereafter, you requested an extension of FMLA, not for COVID-19 reasons, but for a gastrointestinal disorder unrelated to COVID- 19. [Appliance Factory] informed you that since you . . . would have used up your 12 weeks of FMLA by June 7th, [Appliance Factory] could not offer you additional FMLA time for your gastrointestinal disorder and that you would have to report to work June 8th. .... . . . Since[ ] your FMLA expired on June 7, 2020, [Appliance Factory] made your sales associate position available to you, and you have not returned to work nor contacted [Appliance Factory], [Appliance Factory] has no choice to terminate your employment. Id. at 212–13. 5. June 2020: Ms. Javanzad’s Ultimate Diagnosis and Treatment The results of Ms. Javanzad’s endoscopy confirmed her doctor’s prior suspicion that she had mild gastritis, and it “ruled out serious pathology” in Ms. Javanzad’s gastrointestinal system. Id. at 200. Ms. Javanzad also had follow-up biopsies that confirmed “cellular inflammation consistent with chronic active 8  Appellate Case: 25-1451 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 Page: 9 gastritis.” Id. at 263. After receiving these results, Ms. Javanzad’s doctor instructed her to take omeprazole twice daily—a medication Ms. Javanzad had previously been taking only intermittently. Once Ms. Javanzad began taking the medication as instructed, her symptoms started to improve. She “got better” within a few weeks. Id. at 244. B. Procedural History On December 15, 2020, Ms. Javanzad filed a charge of discrimination with the EEOC. After investigating, the EEOC filed a Complaint against Appliance Factory on Ms. Javanzad’s behalf, alleging that Appliance Factory violated the ADA by failing reasonably to accommodate Ms. Javanzad’s disability and by discharging her on the basis of her disability and in retaliation for requesting an accommodation. Appliance Factory moved for summary judgment, arguing that (1) the EEOC did not produce sufficient evidence that Ms. Javanzad had a qualifying disability; (2) Ms. Javanzad did not provide Appliance Factory with notice of her disability and resulting limitations; and (3) Ms. Javanzad did not request a plausibly reasonable accommodation because she requested “a wholly indeterminate extension of leave.” Id. at 69–80. The district court granted summary judgment in Appliance Factory’s favor on all claims. First, the district court rejected the EEOC’s failure to accommodate claim. It declined to decide whether Ms. Javanzad had a cognizable disability but concluded that the EEOC failed to present evidence that Ms. Javanzad requested a reasonable accommodation because she did not put Appliance Factory on notice of her disability 9  Appellate Case: 25-1451 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 Page: 10 and because her request for an indefinite leave of absence was not plausibly reasonable. The district court granted summary judgment to Appliance Factory on the EEOC’s disparate treatment and retaliation claims “for the same reasons.” Id. at 143. The EEOC timely filed a notice of appeal. It argues that the district court erred because a reasonable jury could find that (1) Ms. Javanzad notified Appliance Factory of her disability “when she communicated throughout her leave of absence about her ongoing illness, including her severe gastrointestinal pain, weakness, shortness of breath, and intermittent inability to speak or swallow,” and (2) Ms. Javanzad requested a plausibly reasonable accommodation under the ADA by asking for “a few weeks” of additional FMLA leave. See Appellant’s Br. at 2. II. STANDARD OF REVIEW “We review the district court’s summary judgment decision de novo, applying the same standards as the district court.” Snyder v. Beam Techs., Inc., 147 F.4th 1246, 1253 (10th Cir. 2025) (quotation marks omitted). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine factual dispute requires “more than a mere scintilla of evidence; to avoid summary judgment, the evidence must be such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Rocky Mountain Prestress, LLC v. Liberty Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 960 F.3d 1255, 1259 (10th Cir. 2020) (quotation marks and brackets omitted). When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, “we examine the evidence and draw reasonable inferences therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving 10  Appellate Case: 25-1451 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 Page: 11 party.” Snyder, 147 F.4th at 1253 (quotation marks omitted). But we conduct our de novo review “from the perspective of the district court at the time it made its ruling, ordinarily limiting our review to the materials adequately brought to the attention of the district court by the parties.” Adler v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 144 F.3d 664, 671 (10th Cir. 1998). III. SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL STANDARD The ADA makes it unlawful for an employer to “discriminate against a qualified individual on the basis of disability in regard to . . . the hiring, advancement, or discharge of employees.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). Disability discrimination under the ADA includes “not making reasonable accommodations to the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability unless the employer can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the operation of the business of the employer.” Punt v. Kelly Servs., 862 F.3d 1040, 1048 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (alterations omitted)). We apply a modified version of the familiar burden-shifting framework in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), to a failure to accommodate claim under the ADA. Lincoln v. BNSF Ry. Co., 900 F.3d 1166, 1204 (10th Cir. 2018). The first step of this framework requires the employee to show that “(1) she is disabled; (2) she is otherwise qualified; and (3) she requested a plausibly reasonable accommodation.” Punt, 862 F.3d at 1050 (internal quotation marks omitted). “If the plaintiff makes a showing on all three elements, the burden shifts to 11  Appellate Case: 25-1451 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 Page: 12 the employer to present evidence either (1) conclusively rebutting one or more elements of plaintiff’s prima facie case or (2) establishing an affirmative defense.” Lincoln, 900 F.3d at 1204 (internal quotation marks omitted). IV. DISCUSSION The EEOC argues that the district court erred by concluding that the EEOC failed to establish a prima facie case under the ADA. First, it contends that it presented sufficient evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude that Ms. Javanzad had a qualifying disability. Second, it argues a reasonable jury could conclude that Ms. Javanzad provided Ms. Coudayre with enough information about her ongoing illness to put Appliance Factory on notice that she had a disability. Third, it asserts that a reasonable jury could find that Ms. Javanzad requested a plausibly reasonable accommodation when she asked Ms. Coudayre for additional leave after her FMLA leave expired. Although we decline to decide whether Ms. Javanzad created a genuine factual dispute as to whether she had a cognizable disability, 5 we agree with 5 The district court declined to decide whether Ms. Javanzad had a qualifying disability. “A disability within the meaning of the ADA is, inter alia, ‘a physical or mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major life activities’ of an individual.” Robertson v. Las Animas Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 500 F.3d 1185, 1193– 94 (10th Cir. 2007). The question of whether a person is substantially limited by an impairment depends on whether that individual is unable to perform major life activities “that the average person in the general population can perform” or if the individual is “significantly restricted as to the condition, manner or duration under which an individual can perform a particular major life activity as compared to . . . the average person in the general population.” Id. at 1194 (quotation marks and brackets omitted). Because the district court declined to decide whether Ms. Javanzad had a qualifying disability, it denied as moot the parties’ competing motions to exclude expert testimony that related “to the nature of Ms. Javanzad’s disability.” App. at 144–45. We generally decline to “consider an issue not passed upon below.” 12  Appellate Case: 25-1451 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 Page: 13 the EEOC’s second and third arguments and hold that a reasonable jury could find that Ms. Javanzad put Appliance Factory on notice of her disabling condition and that her request for additional leave was a plausibly reasonable accommodation request under the ADA. 6 A. Notice of Ms. Javanzad’s Disability The EEOC argues that “[a] reasonable jury could find that [Ms.] Javanzad notified Appliance Factory of her disability by telling [Ms.] Coudayre about her physical impairments and the limitations they caused.” Appellant’s Br. at 25. Appliance Factory, on the other hand, contends that Ms. Javanzad’s statements to Ms. Coudayre “reflect[ed] only general health issues of unknown severity or duration.” Appellee’s Br. at 24. We agree with the EEOC and conclude that a Ortega v. Grisham, 148 F.4th 1134, 1155 (10th Cir. 2025) (quoting Singleton v. Wulff, 428 U.S. 106, 119 (1976)). Especially given that we lack rulings or analysis on the parties’ motions to exclude expert testimony, we see no reason to depart from this general practice here. So, we remand the issue for the district court to consider in the first instance. 6 We follow the parties’ lead in centering our analysis around the EEOC’s failure to accommodate claim. We recognize, however, that the EEOC also brought ADA claims alleging disparate treatment and retaliation. The district court granted summary judgment on these claims “for the same reasons” that it granted summary judgment on the EEOC’s failure to accommodate claim. App. at 143. Indeed, the EEOC’s disparate treatment claim requires that Appliance Factory had notice of Ms. Javanzad’s disability. Edmonds-Radford v. Sw. Airlines Co., 17 F.4th 975, 990– 91 (10th Cir. 2021) (stating this requirement). And its claim that Appliance Factory retaliated against Ms. Javanzad for requesting a reasonable accommodation requires that she made “an adequate request for an accommodation sufficient to qualify as protected activity.” Foster v. Mountain Coal Co., LLC, 830 F.3d 1178, 1187 (10th Cir. 2016). Because these claims rise or fall together, it is not necessary to address each separately. But we reject Appliance Factory’s argument that the EEOC did not appeal its disparate treatment and retaliation claims. 13  Appellate Case: 25-1451 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 Page: 14 reasonable jury could find that Ms. Javanzad put Appliance Factory on notice that she had a disability. 7 1. Legal Standard A failure to accommodate claim requires that the employer be on notice that the employee had a disability for which she needed accommodation. See Robertson v. Las Animas Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 500 F.3d 1185, 1196 (10th Cir. 2007); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (providing that disability discrimination includes failing to reasonably accommodate “the known physical or mental limitations of an otherwise qualified individual with a disability” (emphasis added)). Unless the employee’s disability is obvious, “the individual must inform [the] employer of the disability before the employer can be held liable under the ADA for failing to provide a reasonable accommodation.” Robertson, 500 F.3d at 1196. This duty on the employee is “dictated by common sense lest a disabled individual keep [her] disability a secret 7 We may decide whether Ms. Javanzad provided notice of her gastrointestinal impairment and its impact on her ability to work despite remanding the question of whether Ms. Javanzad was disabled under the ADA to the district court to consider the question in the first instance. See Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1173 (10th Cir. 1999) (noting “there [was] no dispute that [the employee] provided notice to [the employer] of his skin condition and how it limited his performance” without discussing whether the employee had a disability under the ADA); Albert v. Smith’s Food & Drug Ctrs., Inc., 356 F.3d 1242, 1250–52 (10th Cir. 2004) (focusing on whether the plaintiff’s asthmatic condition substantially limited her ability to breathe when determining if the plaintiff had a disability under the ADA, while centering the notice analysis on what the employer knew about how the plaintiff’s condition would require her to be accommodated at work); Hrdlicka v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 63 F.4th 555, 567–68 (6th Cir. 2023) (analyzing whether an employer had notice of “its obligations under the ADA” based on the plaintiff’s communications regarding her symptoms without considering whether the plaintiff was disabled under the ADA’s definition). 14  Appellate Case: 25-1451 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 Page: 15 and sue later for failure to accommodate.” Id. (quoting Beck v. Univ. of Wis. Bd. of Regents, 75 F.3d 1130, 1134 (7th Cir. 1996) (brackets omitted)). As our sister circuits have recognized, the ADA’s notice requirement is a context-specific inquiry. See Hrdlicka v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 63 F.4th 555, 567–68 (6th Cir. 2023); Taylor v. Phoenixville Sch. Dist., 184 F.3d 296, 313 (3d Cir. 1999). The inquiry turns on whether the employee provided “enough information that, under the circumstances, the employer can be fairly said to know” that the employee has a disability. Taylor, 184 F.3d at 313. “Relevant information could include, among other things, a diagnosis, a treatment plan, apparent severe symptoms, and physician- imposed work restrictions.” Hrdlicka, 63 F.4th at 567 (quoting Cady v. Remington Arms Co., 665 F. App’x 413, 417–18 (6th Cir. 2016) (unpublished)). 8 Accordingly, an employee need not provide the name of the disabling condition or the specific diagnosis to put an employer on notice of the employee’s disability. Taylor, 184 F. 3d at 314. Nor does the employee need to use the word “disabled.” Hrdlicka, 63 F.4th at 567. On the other hand, “[t]he ADA does not require clairvoyance” on an employer’s part. Smith v. Midland Brake, Inc., 180 F.3d 1154, 1171 (10th Cir. 1999) (quoting Miller v. Nat’l Cas. Co., 61 F.3d 627, 630 (8th Cir. 1995)). But once the employee “provide[s] enough information about his or her limitations and desires so 8 We cite unpublished cases for their persuasive value only and do not treat them as binding authority. See United States v. Ellis, 23 F.4th 1228, 1238 n.6 (10th Cir. 2022). 15  Appellate Case: 25-1451 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 Page: 16 as to suggest at least the possibility that reasonable accommodation may be found,” then “both parties have an obligation to proceed in a reasonably interactive manner” to determine if the employee could be reasonably accommodated. Id. at 1171–72; see also E.E.O.C. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 417 F.3d 789, 804 (7th Cir. 2005) (“Where notice is ambiguous as to the precise nature of the disability or desired accommodation, but it is sufficient to notify the employer that the employee may have a disability that requires accommodation, the employer must ask for clarification.”) 2. Analysis The EEOC has established a genuine factual dispute as to whether Ms. Javanzad put Appliance Factory on notice that she had a disability. We base this conclusion on four categories of evidence: (1) Ms. Javanzad’s emails and text messages with Ms. Coudayre regarding her symptoms; (2) the note from Ms. Javanzad’s doctor describing her work limitations; (3) the phone call between Ms. Javanzad and Ms. Coudayre on June 2, 2020; and (4) the statement in Ms. Javanzad’s termination letter acknowledging her “gastrointestinal disorder.” App. at 212. We describe each category in turn; then, we address two categories of evidence that the district court referenced to emphasize that they are either non- dispositive or irrelevant to the inquiry. a. Emails and Text Messages Ms. Javanzad’s emails and text messages to Ms. Coudayre during her FMLA leave support our conclusion that a reasonable jury could find that Appliance Factory 16  Appellate Case: 25-1451 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 Page: 17 knew that Ms. Javanzad had a disability. Specifically, a reasonable jury could find that Ms. Javanzad’s communications with Ms. Coudayre demonstrate that Appliance Factory knew Ms. Javanzad was suffering from an episodic condition that—when active—substantially impacted her ability to breathe, speak, and eat. See 42 U.S.C. § 12102(4)(D) (“An impairment that is episodic or in remission is a disability if it would substantially limit a major life activity when active.” (emphasis added)). In March 2020, Ms. Javanzad notified Appliance Factory that she was so sick she felt like she was “dying” and that she had gone to the emergency room four times. App. at 151. Although Ms. Javanzad later reported that she had recovered from her suspected COVID-19 infection, the evidence in the record suggests that her symptoms lingered. In April, she wrote Ms. Coudayre to tell her that her “body got weak again” and that her doctor said this was a “normal” part of “recovering from this illness.” Id. at 276. Then, in May, Ms. Javanzad told Ms. Coudayre, “I’m still not feeling well. Everyday I wake up thinking that I will get back to normal but I am still not well.” Id. at 189 (emphasis added). Beginning in May 2020, Ms. Javanzad continuously updated Ms. Coudayre regarding the gastrointestinal illness she was experiencing. She informed Ms. Coudayre that her “stomach [had] a problem after . . . encounter[ing] the virus” and that her doctor had scheduled an endoscopy to determine the cause of her stomach issues. Id. Multiple times in June, Ms. Javanzad informed Ms. Coudayre that she was having trouble breathing and that “some days” she had difficulty speaking. Id. at 210. 17  Appellate Case: 25-1451 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 Page: 18 Appliance Factory compares these communications to text messages the Sixth Circuit held were insufficient to put an employer on notice that the employee had a disability in Hrdlicka. There, the employee had sent text messages that “reference[d] only generalized ailments, such as [the employee’s] ‘head . . . really hurting,’ having a ‘fever and other symptoms,’ or simply being ‘sick.’” Hrdlicka, 63 F.4th at 567. These communications were insufficient to notify the employer of a disability because these “symptoms are consistent with many short-term, nondisabling ailments, including a common cold.” Id. The Sixth Circuit concluded that “[a]lthough these messages might have given [the employer] a general awareness of a health issue, that is not enough.” Id. Unlike the employee’s communications in Hrdlicka, Ms. Javanzad connected her various symptoms together, suggesting she had an ongoing illness, even if some of her symptoms were intermittent and inactive at times. 9 Although Ms. Javanzad was not diagnosed with a chronic condition—gastritis—until she received an endoscopy, Ms. Javanzad informed Ms. Coudayre that she was experiencing a series of connected symptoms and not various isolated ones by stating that she was “still” not feeling well, her body was weak “again,” and she could not speak “some days.” 9 The evidence does not fully support the EEOC’s statement that Appliance Factory “knew [Ms.] Javanzad endured intermittent flare-ups that were disabling when active” and “severe stomach pain lasting for months at a time, an intermittent struggle to breathe, and a repeated inability to speak or swallow [that] created substantial limitation on at least one major life activity.” Appellant’s Br. at 39. However, there is evidence from which the jury could find that Ms. Javanzad informed Appliance Factory of her “intermittent” and severe symptoms, including that at times she had difficulty talking and breathing. App. at 33, 230–34. 18  Appellate Case: 25-1451 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 Page: 19 App. at 189, 210, 276. She also explicitly connected her stomach illness to her previous COVID-19 symptoms, despite her previous statements that she had fully recovered from COVID-19. Id. at 189 (“My stomach has a problem after I encountered the virus.”). These were not the type of vague, generalized symptoms that the Sixth Circuit examined in Hrdlicka. A jury may ultimately not agree with Ms. Javanzad that she sufficiently informed Appliance Factory of her condition or that her communications to Ms. Coudayre adequately connected her various symptoms, but viewing the evidence in her favor, we conclude that these communications were sufficient to apprise Appliance Factory of Ms. Javanzad’s disability. b. Doctor’s Note Ms. Javanzad provided Ms. Coudayre with a note from her doctor in May 2020 that further suggests a reasonable jury could find that Appliance Factory knew Ms. Javanzad had a disabling condition causing her symptoms. In the note, the doctor stated: “It is my medical opinion that [Ms.] Javanzad should remain out of work until her symptoms have improved and she has the results of her [endoscopy].” Id. at 203. That Ms. Javanzad’s doctor believed she could not return to work until her symptoms resolved cuts against Appliance Factory’s argument that it thought Ms. Javanzad was simply “not feeling well.” Appellee’s Br. at 25. In similar circumstances, courts have acknowledged that “physician-imposed work restrictions” and “treatment plan[s]” are relevant when evaluating whether an employer is on notice of an employee’s disability. Hrdlicka, 63 F.4th at 567; see also 19  Appellate Case: 25-1451 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 Page: 20 Cady, 665 F. App’x at 418 (holding that “a jury could find [a plaintiff’s] complaints about his back, coupled with [the employer’s] knowledge of his surgeries, recent doctor’s visit, and MRI results, sufficient to put [the employer] on notice that he was disabled”). Coupled with Ms. Javanzad’s communications about her symptoms, a jury could find the doctor’s note relevant to Appliance Factory’s knowledge that Ms. Javanzad was disabled. c. Phone Call on June 2, 2020 Ms. Javanzad’s five-minute phone conversation with Ms. Coudayre on June 2, 2020, also supports our conclusion that a reasonable jury could find that Appliance Factory was on notice of Ms. Javanzad’s disability. Recall that, during the call, Ms. Javanzad told Ms. Coudayre, “I’m going to have an endoscopy done, and I need more time. I’m not feeling good. I can’t breathe. I have difficulty speaking. That’s why I’m not able to speak.” App. at 230. She also reported she was having “stomach pain.” Id. at 234. Ms. Javanzad told Ms. Coudayre that she needed additional time off work “to get the endoscopy done” and that she could return “a few weeks later.” Id. at 233. Like the evidence described above, the phone call provides evidence from which the jury could find that Ms. Javanzad’s stomach pain and her breathing and speaking issues were severe enough that they amounted to more than general, short- term health complaints, and that Ms. Javanzad provided sufficient notice to Appliance Factory that she had a disability. Cf. Nilles v. Givaudan Flavors Corp., 521 F. App’x 364, 369 (6th Cir. 2013) (unpublished) (holding that an employer’s knowledge of an employee’s short-term symptoms related to a respiratory infection 20  Appellate Case: 25-1451 Document: 51-1 Date Filed: 11/06/2026 Page: 21 and later dizziness and headaches “[did] not necessarily equate to knowledge of his disability” where the employee did not connect the two incidents or mention that he had an underlying condition connected to both short-term illnesses). Appliance Factory contends that the EEOC cannot rely on the June 2 phone call to establish Appliance Factory’s notice of Ms. Javanzad’s disability for two reasons: (1) the EEOC did not argue to the district court that the phone call was relevant to Appliance Factory’s notice of Ms. Javanzad’s disability; and (2) the EEOC’s argument that a phone call occurred on June 2 conflicts with the allegations in its Complaint. We disagree. First, the EEOC cited evidence of the June 2 phone call in its response to Appliance Factory’s motion for summary j