Full Opinion

11/18/2026 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE August 11, 2026 Session VINIT SHARMA v. MOHIT MANKAD ET AL. Appeal from the Circuit Court for Monroe County No. V230459S J. Michael Sharp, Judge ___________________________________ No. E2025-01773-COA-R3-CV ___________________________________ This case involves allegations of defamation and false light stemming from a dispute between the parties over the management of a restaurant and related business interests. A jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The trial court denied the defendants’ motions for a new trial and entered judgment following a remittitur. On appeal, the defendants raise separate challenges to the pleadings, the admission of evidence, the verdict form, and the evidentiary basis for the jury’s verdict. We affirm. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed; Case Remanded KRISTI M. DAVIS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR., C.J., and JOHN W. MCCLARTY, P.J., E.S., joined. M. Edward Owens, Jr., Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Steven Dean Larimer. Julie D. Eisenhower and Mital D. Patel, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Mohit Mankad. Ameesh A. Kherani, Jacksboro, Tennessee, for the appellee, Vinit Sharma. OPINION BACKGROUND This appeal arises from a dispute among Vinit Sharma, Mohit Mankad, Steven Dean Larimer, and Ryan O’Farrell concerning the ownership and management of Iron Works Grille (“Iron Works”) in Tellico Plains, Tennessee, and related business entities including VSM Properties, LLC (“VSM”). Mr. Sharma initially met Mr. Larimer through a real estate transaction and later became involved with him and Mr. Mankad in the Iron Works venture beginning in 2022. Mr. Sharma served as manager until March 2023 when disputes arose, and Mr. Mankad and Mr. Larimer assumed operational responsibilities. The business relationship continued to deteriorate over management disagreements regarding financial transactions, including disagreement over whether the “Cascade Cabin” purchased in Mr. Sharma’s name belonged to him personally or to VSM and over the handling of business funds. Rumors began circulating about alleged thefts by Mr. Sharma: one concerning Mr. Sharma’s withdrawal of two cashier’s checks for litigation expenses and another arising from Mr. Mankad and Mr. Larimer’s assertion that Mr. Sharma wrongfully retained title to the Cascade Cabin. On November 9, 2023, several members executed a “Consent of the Members in Lieu of a Meeting” designating Mr. Mankad and Mr. Larimer as managers. On November 17, 2023, Mr. Sharma filed a complaint in the Monroe County Circuit Court (the “trial court”), alleging that Mr. Mankad, Mr. Larimer, and Mr. O’Farrell made false statements accusing him of theft and sexual harassment, causing reputational harm and emotional distress. Mr. O’Farrell served in a managerial supervisory role at Iron Works, and the complaint alleged that he communicated accusations regarding Mr. Sharma to law enforcement and others. The complaint stated in part that “[t]he Defendant, Ryan O’Farrell, further reaffirmed that the Defendants, Mohit Mankad and Steve Larimer, had conveyed to individuals, statements indicating that [Mr. Sharma] has committed theft as well as sexually harassed female workers.” On January 2, 2024, each defendant filed an answer in opposition. Mr. Larimer and Mr. Mankad also moved to dismiss under Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6). Mr. Mankad never set his motion to dismiss for hearing, which would later become a point of dispute. The matter was tried before a jury and lasted four days, beginning on August 5, 2025. We address the relevant testimony. The first witness at trial was Officer Kaity Watson of the Tellico Plains Police Department, who testified regarding her response to Iron Works on November 1, 2023, following an altercation between Mr. Sharma and Mr. O’Farrell. She stated that Mr. O’Farrell reported allegations of sexual harassment by Mr. Sharma although she acknowledged that no corroborating evidence was found at that time. She testified further that during a later January 8, 2025 disturbance call, Mr. Mankad stated that Mr. Sharma had “a history of sexually harassing employees.” Officer Watson testified that she again found no evidence substantiating the sexual harassment allegations during the January 8, 2025 call. Former Iron Works employee Chelsie Morgan—formerly Chelsie Tallent— testified that Mr. Larimer and Mr. O’Farrell told her that Mr. Sharma was “sleeping with” Summer Morgan, the restaurant office assistant, and that this alleged affair was the reason for Summer Morgan’s departure from Iron Works and her subsequent divorce. Ms. Morgan stated that she never witnessed any inappropriate conduct by Mr. Sharma; never observed any relationship between Mr. Sharma and Summer Morgan; and never -2- heard such allegations from anyone else. She also authenticated a June 6, 2024 email that she sent to Mr. Larimer and Mr. Mankad following her termination in which she wrote that management had asked employees to make “wrongful statements” about Mr. Sharma. She testified further that both Mr. Mankad and Mr. Larimer asked staff to “say things,” if the need ever arose, regarding Mr. Sharma engaging in sexual harassment and theft. Asked if she felt intimidated by Mr. Mankad or Mr. Larimer, Ms. Morgan said that she did not. Former employee Jennifer Wooten—formerly Jennifer Keller—testified that management personnel told her that Mr. Sharma had stolen restaurant funds and sexually harassed employees. On cross‑examination, she stated that she could not recall exactly who made those statements. She did not believe that Mr. Mankad made the statements, but she said that it might have been Mr. Larimer. However, she was uncertain. Former employee Stephanie Beaver also testified about rumors in the workplace. She said that she often heard talk that Mr. Sharma was involved in an inappropriate relationship with Summer Morgan and recalled Mr. Larimer repeating the rumor as a joke. She added that she never witnessed any improper conduct and never heard such statements directly from Mr. Mankad. Dr. Moez Premji testified next regarding Mr. Sharma’s reported anxiety, depression, and referral for counseling. Dr. Premji, an internal medicine physician, treated Mr. Sharma in December 2023. However, Mr. Sharma did not report to Dr. Premji that he was suffering from emotional distress, depression, or anxiety until April 2025. Dr. Premji testified that Mr. Sharma screened at zero for depression during an evaluation. Nevertheless, Mr. Sharma told Dr. Premji that he had been experiencing “a lot of social stress” over the prior year and that the stress had begun “affecting his activities of daily living and his functionality.” Dr. Premji prescribed Mr. Sharma an antidepressant and referred him for psychological counseling. Dr. Premji testified that Mr. Sharma did not describe in detail what caused his stress, identifying only “social” and “business related” pressures, and that Mr. Sharma did not disclose the specific source of his symptoms. Although LifeStance Health records were referenced at trial, the records introduced concerned Mr. Sharma’s wife, and the trial court sustained defense counsel’s hearsay objection to any testimony by Dr. Premji based on those materials. Investor Jigar Patel testified next that after hearing accusations of theft from Mr. Mankad during investor meetings and through group emails, he declined to invest approximately $400,000 in a project associated with Mr. Sharma. Pankaj Sharma, an investor who knew Mr. Sharma through their cricket group, testified that Mr. Mankad accused Mr. Sharma of mishandling business funds, prompting him to withdraw a planned investment. Janice Burgess, who assisted Mr. Sharma in the cabin rental business, testified that she had heard rumors at Iron Works concerning Mr. Sharma sexually harassing employees and having an affair with Summer Morgan, but she did not attribute any of those statements to Mr. Larimer or Mr. Mankad. -3- Melinda Dixon, a customer of Iron Works, testified that she had heard rumors that Mr. Sharma had sexually harassed someone, but not from either Mr. Larimer or Mr. Mankad. Summer Tilley—formerly Summer Morgan—testified that she previously worked at Iron Works. She denied ever having a sexual relationship with Mr. Sharma and stated that, although she had heard rumors to that effect in the community, she did not recall hearing such allegations directly from Mr. Mankad or Mr. Larimer. Ms. Tilley noted that “this is a very small community, so rumors spread very fast.” Lauren Thomas, a current Iron Works employee, testified that both Mr. Mankad and Mr. Larimer told her that Mr. Sharma had committed theft, sexually harassed employees, and was involved in an improper relationship with an employee. She added that these statements were not made privately, explaining that she “witnessed it being said to a couple of us.” On cross‑examination, Ms. Thomas clarified that she had been told by Mr. Larimer and Mr. Mankad that Mr. Sharma had been accused of sexual harassment, theft, and being involved in an improper relationship and confirmed that she did not recall either defendant stating the relationship allegation to her directly. On redirect, she stated that she was told by Mr. O’Farrell about Summer Morgan and Mr. Sharma having an improper relationship. Mr. Sharma took the stand and denied the allegations he attributed to the defendants: that he had stolen from Iron Works, sexually harassed employees, and had an improper relationship with Summer Morgan. He stated that these accusations spread among employees and in the community, and he described their impact on his business relationships and emotional health. Addressing the allegation that he stole company funds via $5,000 and $9,000 withdrawals, Mr. Sharma testified that he used the money to purchase cashier’s checks payable to his attorney for litigation that he believed was needed to protect the companies’ interests. He stated that none of the money was used for any personal purpose. Nidhita Sharma, Mr. Sharma’s wife, testified that she personally heard Mr. Mankad publicly refer to her husband as a “womanizer” and a “thief” and that such allegations caused significant strain in their lives. Amy Schlosser, a business associate of Mr. Sharma and Mr. Larimer, testified that Mr. Sharma asked her to say that Mr. Larimer had told her that Mr. Sharma was having an affair with Ms. Morgan. However, Ms. Schlosser stated that she had never heard such an allegation from Mr. Larimer, so she refused to do so. Rachel Harris of Mountainview Cabins testified next that, although she had heard community rumors concerning Mr. Sharma, she did not hear any such statements from Mr. Larimer or Mr. Mankad. Ms. Harris clarified further that she “never” heard Mr. Larimer say that Mr. Sharma sexually harassed anyone, “[n]ot one time.” Mr. Larimer took the stand next. Mr. Larimer testified that allegations concerning Mr. Sharma were discussed among Iron Works management and with investors. He acknowledged that if Mr. Sharma’s withdrawals of $5,000 and $9,000 for litigation expenses amounted to “stealing,” then similar attorney fee withdrawals that he and -4- Mr. Mankad made would fall into the same category. He nevertheless denied ever telling anyone that Mr. Sharma stole money or sexually harassed employees. Mr. Larimer testified that, instead, he tried to stop the spread of rumors by instructing employees not to repeat them. He acknowledged, however, that he discussed the allegations within the management team and participated in communications in which the allegations were addressed. Ryan O’Farrell testified next and described a November 1, 2023 encounter with Mr. Sharma and testified that he reported employee‑raised sexual harassment allegations to Officer Watson and later to the police chief. Mr. O’Farrell testified further that the sexual harassment allegations were first raised by employees during internal discussions, explaining that the topic “was brought up by the employees to them[.]” Mr. Mankad testified last. He acknowledged that he accused Mr. Sharma of theft based on his understanding of the Cascade Cabin transaction and on Mr. Sharma’s withdrawals of $5,000 and $9,000 for attorney fees. He testified further that he paid attorneys from VSM without Mr. Sharma’s consent, including payments related to VSM’s bankruptcy filing. He also admitted withdrawing approximately $18,000 from Iron Works before a court hearing and that the court ordered him to return the funds. He acknowledged sending emails to around ten to fifteen investors asserting that Mr. Sharma had stolen money. Finally, Mr. Mankad conceded that he had no written agreement requiring Mr. Sharma to transfer the Cascade Cabin to VSM. After the close of proof, the trial court conducted a charge conference during which counsel for both sides participated in finalizing the jury instructions and verdict form. The trial court then instructed the jury on the elements of defamation and false light—including publication to a third person, falsity, fault, and injury—and further instructed that emotional distress damages required proof of a “serious mental injury,” providing the standards for both intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, including the requirement of expert proof for negligent infliction. The jury returned a verdict finding Mr. Mankad and Mr. Larimer liable and Mr. O’Farrell not liable; awarding Mr. Sharma $265,000 for reputational injury and $200,000 for emotional distress as to Mr. Mankad and $110,000 for reputational injury and $60,000 for emotional distress as to Mr. Larimer; and declining to award punitive damages. On August 26, 2025, the trial court entered an order adopting the jury’s verdict. On September 25, 2025, Mr. Larimer and Mr. Mankad filed motions for a new trial. On November 5, 2025, the trial court denied the defendants’ motions for a new trial and granted a remittitur reducing the reputational damage awards to conform to the $250,000 ad damnum limit, reducing the award against Mr. Mankad to $177,500 and the award against Mr. Larimer to $72,500. Mr. Sharma accepted this, and the trial court entered final judgment accordingly. The trial court expressly found that Mr. Mankad had abandoned his previously filed Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss by failing to set it for hearing in -5- accordance with Local Rule 6.01.1 Mr. Larimer and Mr. Mankad timely appealed to this Court. ISSUES Mr. Larimer and Mr. Mankad raise multiple issues on appeal, which are restated as follows: 1. Whether the trial court erred in deeming Mr. Mankad’s Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss abandoned. 2. Whether the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence. 3. Whether the trial court erred in submitting the verdict form and instructions without requiring specific findings on the essential elements. 4. Whether the trial court erred in upholding the jury’s findings against Mr. Larimer and denying his motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was unsupported by material evidence. 5. Whether the trial court erred in upholding the compensatory damages awarded against Mr. Mankad and in denying his motion for a new trial or remittitur. Mr. Sharma asserts no separate issues.2 STANDARD OF REVIEW We review a jury verdict under the material evidence standard, which requires us to “review the record and ‘take the strongest legitimate view of all the evidence in favor of the verdict, assume the truth of all evidence that supports the verdict, allow all reasonable inferences to sustain the verdict, and discard all countervailing evidence.’” Borne v. Celadon Trucking Servs., Inc., 532 S.W.3d 274, 298 (Tenn. 2017) (quoting Akers v. Prime Succession of Tenn., Inc., 387 S.W.3d 495, 501 (Tenn. 2012)). The material evidence 1 Rule 6 of the Local Rules of Court for the Circuit, Chancery, and Criminal Courts of Monroe County, Tennessee, 10th Judicial District, provides as relevant: Rule 6.01. Pretrial Motions – Responsibility of Movant. It is the responsibility of the moving party to call for a hearing of all pretrial motions as far in advance as possible of the trial as reasonably possible. All motions not called for disposition prior to the trial date will be deemed to have been abandoned, except for extraordinary circumstances. 2 Mr. Sharma sought and obtained leave to file separate appellee briefs responding individually to the issues raised by each appellant. -6- standard “lies at the foundation of the right to trial by jury,” and “[a]s a result, we are required to affirm a jury verdict ‘if there is material evidence to support [it].’” Almuawi v. Gregory, No. M2020-01018-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 2226624, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 2, 2021) (quoting Meals ex rel. Meals v. Ford Motor Co., 417 S.W.3d 414, 422 (Tenn. 2013)). Material evidence is “‘evidence material to the question in controversy, which must necessarily enter into the consideration of the controversy and by itself, or in connection with the other evidence, be determinative of the case.’” Meals, 417 S.W.3d at 422 (quoting Knoxville Traction Co. v. Brown, 89 S.W. 319, 321 (Tenn. 1905)). “A trial court’s decision regarding whether to grant or deny a motion for a new trial is discretionary in nature, and we accord such rulings great deference. We will only disturb such a decision if it amounts to an abuse of discretion.” Buckley v. Elephant Sanctuary in Tenn., Inc., 639 S.W.3d 38, 46 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Ali v. Fisher, 145 S.W.3d 557, 564 (Tenn. 2004)). Moreover, a trial court may suggest an additur or remittitur if it is dissatisfied with the amount of the jury’s award. Bonner v. Deyo, No. W2014-00763-COA-R3-CV, 2014 WL 6873058, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2014). Insofar as the issues on appeal implicate the abuse of discretion standard of review, a trial court abuses its discretion “when it causes an injustice to the party challenging the decision by (1) applying an incorrect legal standard, (2) reaching an illogical or unreasonable decision, or (3) basing its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.” Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tenn. 2010). We review the trial court’s determinations on issues of law de novo, with no presumption of correctness. Lind v. Beaman Dodge, Inc., 356 S.W.3d 889, 895 (Tenn. 2011). DISCUSSION I. Abandonment of the Rule 12.02(6) Motion and Sufficiency of the Pleadings Mr. Mankad argues in his brief that the trial court erred by allowing the defamation and false light claims to proceed against him without ruling on his Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss. He asserts that the complaint was overly vague and did not provide him with fair notice of the claims presented at trial. He also asserts that the trial court improperly deemed his motion abandoned under Local Rule 6.01, despite Rule 12.02(6) governing preservation of challenges to pleading sufficiency. In response, Mr. Sharma contends that the trial court correctly found abandonment because Mr. Mankad never set his motion for hearing and raised the issue only after the verdict. He also argues that the complaint satisfied Tennessee’s notice pleading standard and that discovery and trial cured any alleged defect. Whether a complaint satisfies Tennessee’s notice pleading requirements or states a claim under Rule 12.02(6) is a question of law reviewed de novo. Webb v. Nashville Area Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422, 426 (Tenn. 2011). “Trial courts have clear authority to adopt local rules of practice to supplement the Tennessee Rules of Civil -7- Procedure.” Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty. v. Cuozzo, No. M2007-01851- COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 3914890, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2008), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Feb. 17, 2009). In addition, “[trial courts] have broad authority to control their dockets and the procedures in their courts.” Id. The record shows that although Mr. Mankad filed a Rule 12.02(6) motion, he never set it for hearing. Local Rule 6.01 requires parties to obtain settings for their motions, and a motion that is filed but never noticed, argued, or mentioned thereafter is treated as abandoned. In other words, Mr. Mankad was not entitled to see how the trial turned out before seeking to revive his motion. By waiting until the jury returned its decision to follow up on the motion to dismiss, Mr. Mankad forfeited any pleading challenge. The trial court’s treating the motion as abandoned in view of Mr. Mankad’s failure to call it for hearing did not elevate a local rule above the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. It simply reflected that Mr. Mankad went to trial without pursuing the motion again, thereby abandoning it. Furthermore, Mr. Mankad has not articulated any extraordinary circumstances that would justify his failure to act on his motion. The trial court did not err by declining to consider the issue after the verdict. Regarding the alleged insufficiency of the complaint, Tennessee applies a notice pleading standard under Rule 8 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. See Webb, 346 S.W.3d at 426. Notice pleading reflects that “the primary purpose of pleadings is to provide notice of the issues presented to the opposing party and court.” Id. Consistent with that principle, Rule 8 requires only a short and plain statement of the claim and a demand for the relief sought. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8.01. Mr. Sharma alleged in his complaint that Mr. Mankad made defamatory statements accusing Mr. Sharma of theft and sexual harassment. He identified at least one specific instance of publication and placed Mr. Mankad on notice of the theories to be pursued at trial. Mr. Mankad then defended the claims throughout the proceedings without asserting prejudice based upon the pleadings. He cannot realistically point to any surprise. Mr. Sharma’s complaint was adequate to satisfy Tennessee’s non-stringent notice pleading standard. We conclude that Mr. Sharma’s complaint stated claims upon which relief may be granted, and the trial court properly allowed them to proceed. II. Evidentiary Rulings Mr. Mankad argues next that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting evidence that he characterizes as irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, or unauthenticated. He points to the following: (1) questions to Ms. Morgan that he contends wrongly implied witness intimidation; (2) Facebook video footage depicting Mr. O’Farrell; (3) speculative medical causation testimony from Dr. Premji; (4) LifeStance Health medical notes, which he asserts were irrelevant, hearsay, and prejudicial; and (5) a text message exchange between Ms. Burgess and Mr. Sharma that he says was irrelevant to whether Mr. Mankad published false or defamatory statements and improperly suggested character‑based inferences. He argues that these items lacked foundation under Tennessee Rules of -8- Evidence 401, 402, 403, and 901 and risked misleading the jury. Mr. Sharma responds that the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting these items. He contends that the challenged evidence was relevant to publication, credibility, emotional distress, and damages; that it was authenticated where necessary; and that it was not unfairly prejudicial. He further contends that Mr. Mankad is attempting to reweigh properly admitted evidence and that any arguable error was harmless in light of substantial independent proof supporting liability. “[T]rial courts are generally afforded a great deal of discretion regarding the admission or exclusion of evidence.” Tire Shredders, Inc. v. ERM‑N. Cent., Inc., 15 S.W.3d 849, 858 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). We will not disturb such rulings unless there is a clear showing of abuse of discretion. Danny L. Davis Contractors, Inc. v. Hobbs, 157 S.W.3d 414, 419 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). Even where error occurs, it warrants reversal only if, considering the whole record, it “more probably than not affected the judgment.” Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b). It is unclear from Mr. Mankad’s briefing how the evidentiary rulings he challenges constitute error, much less reversible error. His objections rest on broad assertions that the challenged items were irrelevant or prejudicial, without explaining how any particular ruling misapplied Rules 401, 402, 403, or 901 or otherwise fell outside of the trial court’s discretion. That certain of the evidence admitted was unfavorable to Mr. Mankad does not in itself mean that it was unfairly prejudicial. Moreover, Mr. Mankad does not demonstrate how any given evidentiary ruling was outcome determinative in a multi‑day jury trial featuring numerous witnesses and substantial proof independent of the challenged items. The items he identifies do not appear to have materially influenced the jury’s deliberations, and none was more prejudicial than the unchallenged evidence properly admitted elsewhere in the case. We review this issue for abuse of discretion and within the narrow limits of that standard. Here, the trial court neither applied an incorrect legal standard, reached an illogical or unreasonable decision, nor based its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence. We discern no basis to conclude that the trial court misapplied the Tennessee Rules of Evidence or exceeded the bounds of its discretion. Moreover, even if any of the challenged evidence was admitted in error, we conclude that none of it more probably than not affected the judgment. The trial court therefore did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence Mr. Mankad challenges. III. Verdict Form and Jury Instructions Mr. Mankad argues that the verdict form was overly generalized because it asked only whether he was at fault and did not require findings on publication, falsity, the requisite level of fault, reputational injury, or even the specific tort theory supporting liability. He argues that the result is an ambiguous verdict that cannot be meaningfully -9- reviewed. In response, Mr. Sharma argues that any objection was waived because defense counsel helped draft the form. He argues further that, when read with the jury instructions, the form accurately submitted the issues and required individualized findings. He points to the jury’s differentiated verdict, including its decision that Mr. O’Farrell was not liable, as evidence that it understood and applied the instructions properly. The detailed jury instructions defined fault and set out the elements of defamation and false light.3 This Court has articulated the standards for constructing verdict forms and the consequences of deficiencies in those forms as follows: Trial courts have wide discretion in tailoring the questions on a verdict form to meet the needs of each unique case. Concrete Spaces, Inc. v. Sender, 2 S.W.3d 901, 910 (Tenn. 1999). When a party advances multiple theories of relief, common sense principles should guide the attorneys and the judge in preparing both the jury instructions and the verdict form. Id. Verdict forms should use the same terms as those used in the jury instructions and should repeat and highlight important issues discussed in the instructions. Id. A new trial is warranted when a verdict form does not address each theory of relief and allow the jury to respond to them adequately. Id. at 911. Even when a verdict form is defective, the jury’s verdict will be upheld as long as it sufficiently defines the issues in such a way as to enable the court to intelligently articulate a judgment. Id. In re Est. of Link, 542 S.W.3d 438, 463 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017). The Tennessee Supreme Court has described the standard of review for jury instruction issues as follows: Whether a jury instruction is erroneous is a question of law and is therefore subject to de novo review with no presumption of correctness. Solomon v. First Am. National Bank of Nashville, 774 S.W.2d 935, 940 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1989). The legitimacy of a jury’s verdict is dependent on the accuracy of the trial court’s instructions, which are the sole source of the legal principles required for the jury’s deliberations. Therefore, a trial court is under a duty to impart “substantially accurate instructions concerning the law applicable to the matters at issue.” Hensley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 310 S.W.3d 824, 833 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Bara v. Clarksville Mem’l Health Sys., Inc., 3 Defamation requires a published statement that is false and defamatory, made with knowledge of falsity, reckless disregard, or negligence, and resulting in actual damages. See Austin v. Plese, --- S.W.3d ----, 2025 WL 763752, at *7–8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2025), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 7, 2025). Publication is satisfied by communicating the challenged statement to a third person. Id. at *7. False light requires publicity placing the plaintiff in a highly offensive false light, made knowingly or with reckless disregard for falsity. Id. at *8. - 10 - 104 S.W.3d 1, 3–4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)). When considering whether a trial court committed prejudicial error in a jury instruction, it is our duty to review the charge in its entirety and consider it as a whole, and the instruction will not be invalidated if it “fairly defines the legal issues involved in the case and does not mislead the jury.” Otis v. Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 850 S.W.2d 439, 446 (Tenn. 1992). The judgment of a trial court will not be set aside based on an erroneous jury instruction unless it appears that the erroneous instruction more probably than not affected the judgment of the jury. Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b); Gorman v. Earhart, 876 S.W.2d 832, 836 (Tenn. 1994). Nye v. Bayer Cropscience, Inc., 347 S.W.3d 686, 699 (Tenn. 2011). In addition, “where the trial court’s instructions clearly and definitely set forth the elements upon which liability must be based, the failure to recite each element in the verdict form will not render the verdict invalid.” Goodale v. Langenberg, 243 S.W.3d 575, 584 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007). As a threshold matter, we note that Mr. Mankad participated in drafting the verdict form. He argues on appeal that the verdict form was so flawed that it is reviewable notwithstanding his participation in its drafting. However, under Tennessee Rule of Appellate Procedure 36(a), “[n]othing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.” With respect to verdict forms specifically, this Court has explained: Counsel should object promptly to a proposed verdict form. If possible, they should object to the form before its submission to the jury. However, if unaware of the form’s substance, they should object before the jury returns its verdict. . . . Failure to make a timely objection to a verdict form constitutes a waiver of the objection. Hatfield v. Allenbrooke Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., LLC, No. W2017-00957-COA-R3-CV, 2018 WL 3740565, at *26 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2018), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan. 17, 2019) (quoting Creech v. Addington, 281 S.W.3d 363, 386 (Tenn. 2009)). Regarding jury instructions, “[a]lthough it is the duty of the trial court to provide accurate instructions to the jury, the Plaintiffs, after being made aware of the limitations on the jury’s consideration of the evidence prior to closing arguments, neither objected nor made a special request for any alternative directive. The Plaintiffs, therefore, waived appellate consideration of [this issue].” Id. (quoting Creech, 281 S.W.3d at 386). Here, Mr. Mankad failed to take any action to nullify or prevent the harmful effect of the alleged error that is at issue; on the contrary, he invited the alleged error by participating in the drafting of the verdict form and approving it. We therefore conclude that Mr. Mankad has waived this issue. - 11 - IV. Material Evidence Supporting the Jury’s Findings Against Mr. Larimer Mr. Larimer argues that no material evidence supports the jury’s finding that he stated that Mr. Sharma committed sexual harassment or theft. He contends that the witnesses merely repeated workplace rumors and were unsure of who said what. He relies heavily on his own testimony that he tried to quell the rumors rather than spread them. He also contends that no material evidence supports emotional distress damages because the medical testimony did not link Mr. Sharma’s symptoms to anything Mr. Larimer personally said. In response, Mr. Sharma asserts that several witnesses directly connected Mr. Larimer to statements repeating the allegations. He asserts further that the record includes proof of reputational and emotional injury. Although Mr. Larimer characterizes the proof as insufficient, the record contains testimony that reasonably permitted the jury to conclude that he stated that Mr. Sharma committed sexual harassment and theft. For instance, Ms. Morgan testified that the defendants asked staff to “say things” or otherwise support allegations of sexual harassment and stealing against Mr. Sharma. She also testified that Mr. Larimer said that Mr. Sharma was “sleeping with” Summer Morgan. Ms. Thomas, for her part, testified that Mr. Larimer told her that Mr. Sharma had been accused of sexual harassment, theft, and having an affair. Mr. Larimer implicitly suggests a distinction between addressing rumors and propagating them, but he identifies no Tennessee authority treating repeated accusations differently from original ones. See SmileDirectClub, Inc. v. NBCUniversal Media, LLC, 708 S.W.3d 556, 574 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2024) (recognizing liability for repeating defamatory statements). The Tennessee Supreme Court has explained that “a person who repeats the defamatory statements made by another is also liable for defamation,” illustrating the point with the historical example: “Thou art a sheep stealing rogue, and farmer Parker told me so.” Funk v. Scripps Media, Inc., 570 S.W.3d 205, 211 (Tenn. 2019) (quoting VI Matthew Bacon with Henry G. William & Bird Wilson, A New Abridgment of the Law 238–39 (Philadelphia, Philip H. Nicklin 1813)). One of the questions for the jury to resolve was whether Mr. Larimer bore responsibility under the defamation and false light instructions the trial court provided. A reasonable jury could conclude from the testimony that Mr. Larimer published statements about Mr. Sharma by repeating or discussing allegations of sexual harassment, theft, or an improper relationship in conversations with employees, management, or investors. Testimony from Ms. Morgan and Ms. Thomas identified him as a participant in these communications. The jury was therefore entitled to view the statements attributed to Mr. Larimer as capable of supporting liability either as false and defamatory or as placing Mr. Sharma before others in a false and highly offensive light. Our review does not involve reweighing testimony or resolving conflicts in the proof. When viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the accounts of Ms. Morgan, Ms. Thomas, and Mr. Larimer himself, along with other evidence in the record, constitute material evidence from which - 12 - the jury reasonably could find that Mr. Larimer published statements within the scope of the theories submitted. The record also supports the jury’s assessment of harm under the theories submitted. Several witnesses described how the allegations circulated within the workplace and the community. Testimony reflects that the allegations had tangible, adverse effects on Mr. Sharma’s standing in the business arena. A reasonable jury could treat this as evidence of injury to reputation or as evidence that the statements placed Mr. Sharma in a false and damaging light. With respect to emotional distress, Dr. Premji testified that he treated Mr. Sharma during the period when the allegations were being discussed among employees, management, and members of the community and that Mr. Sharma reported major stress affecting his daily life. Although Dr. Premji did not attribute those symptoms to any particular defendant, the jury heard evidence that the allegations were public and harmful. The jury was entitled to determine whether the conditions created by the spreading of rumors contributed to Mr. Sharma’s emotional injury. Viewed in the light most favorable to the verdict, the proof provides material evidence supporting the jury’s harm findings. Accordingly, the trial court did not apply an incorrect legal standard, did not reach an illogical or unreasonable decision, did not base its ruling on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence, and therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying Mr. Larimer’s motion for a new trial. V. Cumulative Error and Material Evidence Supporting the Damages Awards Against Mr. Mankad Mr. Mankad argues that the damages awards resulted from inadmissible testimony and speculative emotional distress evidence. He contends that the doctrine of cumulative error warrants a new trial or at least further remittitur. Mr. Sharma disagrees that any underlying error occurred, cumulative or otherwise. He argues that the awards are supported by material evidence and were properly reviewed by the trial court. He also notes that he accepted the trial court’s remittitur and that the modified judgment is entitled to deference. We disagree with Mr. Mankad’s characterization of the evidence. There was testimony supporting both reputational harm and emotional distress suffered by Mr. Sharma. Mr. Patel testified that he declined to invest approximately $400,000 in a project with Mr. Sharma after hearing Mr. Mankad accuse Mr. Sharma of theft during investor meetings and in email communications. Mr. Mankad admitted making those accusations to a group of investors. The jury could reasonably view this testimony as supporting reputational injury or as supporting a finding that the statements placed Mr. Sharma before others in a false and damaging light under the instructions given. Our task is not to reweigh the proof but t