VINIT SHARMA v. MOHIT MANKAD
CourtCourt of Appeals of Tennessee
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
DocketE2025-01773-COA-R3-CV
JudgeKristi M. Davis, Judge
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
11/18/2026
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE
AT KNOXVILLE
August 11, 2026 Session
VINIT SHARMA v. MOHIT MANKAD ET AL.
Appeal from the Circuit Court for Monroe County
No. V230459S J. Michael Sharp, Judge
___________________________________
No. E2025-01773-COA-R3-CV
___________________________________
This case involves allegations of defamation and false light stemming from a dispute
between the parties over the management of a restaurant and related business interests. A
jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. The trial court denied the defendants’
motions for a new trial and entered judgment following a remittitur. On appeal, the
defendants raise separate challenges to the pleadings, the admission of evidence, the verdict
form, and the evidentiary basis for the jury’s verdict. We affirm.
Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Circuit Court Affirmed;
Case Remanded
KRISTI M. DAVIS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which FRANK G. CLEMENT, JR.,
C.J., and JOHN W. MCCLARTY, P.J., E.S., joined.
M. Edward Owens, Jr., Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Steven Dean Larimer.
Julie D. Eisenhower and Mital D. Patel, Knoxville, Tennessee, for the appellant, Mohit
Mankad.
Ameesh A. Kherani, Jacksboro, Tennessee, for the appellee, Vinit Sharma.
OPINION
BACKGROUND
This appeal arises from a dispute among Vinit Sharma, Mohit Mankad, Steven Dean
Larimer, and Ryan O’Farrell concerning the ownership and management of Iron Works
Grille (“Iron Works”) in Tellico Plains, Tennessee, and related business entities including
VSM Properties, LLC (“VSM”). Mr. Sharma initially met Mr. Larimer through a real
estate transaction and later became involved with him and Mr. Mankad in the Iron Works
venture beginning in 2022. Mr. Sharma served as manager until March 2023 when disputes
arose, and Mr. Mankad and Mr. Larimer assumed operational responsibilities. The
business relationship continued to deteriorate over management disagreements regarding
financial transactions, including disagreement over whether the “Cascade Cabin”
purchased in Mr. Sharma’s name belonged to him personally or to VSM and over the
handling of business funds. Rumors began circulating about alleged thefts by Mr. Sharma:
one concerning Mr. Sharma’s withdrawal of two cashier’s checks for litigation expenses
and another arising from Mr. Mankad and Mr. Larimer’s assertion that Mr. Sharma
wrongfully retained title to the Cascade Cabin. On November 9, 2023, several members
executed a “Consent of the Members in Lieu of a Meeting” designating Mr. Mankad and
Mr. Larimer as managers.
On November 17, 2023, Mr. Sharma filed a complaint in the Monroe County Circuit
Court (the “trial court”), alleging that Mr. Mankad, Mr. Larimer, and Mr. O’Farrell made
false statements accusing him of theft and sexual harassment, causing reputational harm
and emotional distress. Mr. O’Farrell served in a managerial supervisory role at Iron
Works, and the complaint alleged that he communicated accusations regarding Mr. Sharma
to law enforcement and others. The complaint stated in part that “[t]he Defendant, Ryan
O’Farrell, further reaffirmed that the Defendants, Mohit Mankad and Steve Larimer, had
conveyed to individuals, statements indicating that [Mr. Sharma] has committed theft as
well as sexually harassed female workers.” On January 2, 2024, each defendant filed an
answer in opposition. Mr. Larimer and Mr. Mankad also moved to dismiss under
Tennessee Rule of Civil Procedure 12.02(6). Mr. Mankad never set his motion to dismiss
for hearing, which would later become a point of dispute. The matter was tried before a
jury and lasted four days, beginning on August 5, 2025. We address the relevant testimony.
The first witness at trial was Officer Kaity Watson of the Tellico Plains Police
Department, who testified regarding her response to Iron Works on November 1, 2023,
following an altercation between Mr. Sharma and Mr. O’Farrell. She stated that Mr.
O’Farrell reported allegations of sexual harassment by Mr. Sharma although she
acknowledged that no corroborating evidence was found at that time. She testified further
that during a later January 8, 2025 disturbance call, Mr. Mankad stated that Mr. Sharma had
“a history of sexually harassing employees.” Officer Watson testified that she again found
no evidence substantiating the sexual harassment allegations during the January 8, 2025
call.
Former Iron Works employee Chelsie Morgan—formerly Chelsie Tallent—
testified that Mr. Larimer and Mr. O’Farrell told her that Mr. Sharma was “sleeping with”
Summer Morgan, the restaurant office assistant, and that this alleged affair was the reason
for Summer Morgan’s departure from Iron Works and her subsequent divorce.
Ms. Morgan stated that she never witnessed any inappropriate conduct by Mr. Sharma;
never observed any relationship between Mr. Sharma and Summer Morgan; and never
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heard such allegations from anyone else. She also authenticated a June 6, 2024 email that
she sent to Mr. Larimer and Mr. Mankad following her termination in which she wrote that
management had asked employees to make “wrongful statements” about Mr. Sharma. She
testified further that both Mr. Mankad and Mr. Larimer asked staff to “say things,” if the
need ever arose, regarding Mr. Sharma engaging in sexual harassment and theft. Asked if
she felt intimidated by Mr. Mankad or Mr. Larimer, Ms. Morgan said that she did not.
Former employee Jennifer Wooten—formerly Jennifer Keller—testified that
management personnel told her that Mr. Sharma had stolen restaurant funds and sexually
harassed employees. On cross‑examination, she stated that she could not recall exactly
who made those statements. She did not believe that Mr. Mankad made the statements,
but she said that it might have been Mr. Larimer. However, she was uncertain. Former
employee Stephanie Beaver also testified about rumors in the workplace. She said that she
often heard talk that Mr. Sharma was involved in an inappropriate relationship with
Summer Morgan and recalled Mr. Larimer repeating the rumor as a joke. She added that
she never witnessed any improper conduct and never heard such statements directly from
Mr. Mankad.
Dr. Moez Premji testified next regarding Mr. Sharma’s reported anxiety, depression,
and referral for counseling. Dr. Premji, an internal medicine physician, treated Mr. Sharma
in December 2023. However, Mr. Sharma did not report to Dr. Premji that he was suffering
from emotional distress, depression, or anxiety until April 2025. Dr. Premji testified that
Mr. Sharma screened at zero for depression during an evaluation. Nevertheless,
Mr. Sharma told Dr. Premji that he had been experiencing “a lot of social stress” over the
prior year and that the stress had begun “affecting his activities of daily living and his
functionality.” Dr. Premji prescribed Mr. Sharma an antidepressant and referred him for
psychological counseling. Dr. Premji testified that Mr. Sharma did not describe in detail
what caused his stress, identifying only “social” and “business related” pressures, and that
Mr. Sharma did not disclose the specific source of his symptoms. Although LifeStance
Health records were referenced at trial, the records introduced concerned Mr. Sharma’s
wife, and the trial court sustained defense counsel’s hearsay objection to any testimony by
Dr. Premji based on those materials.
Investor Jigar Patel testified next that after hearing accusations of theft from
Mr. Mankad during investor meetings and through group emails, he declined to invest
approximately $400,000 in a project associated with Mr. Sharma. Pankaj Sharma, an
investor who knew Mr. Sharma through their cricket group, testified that Mr. Mankad
accused Mr. Sharma of mishandling business funds, prompting him to withdraw a planned
investment. Janice Burgess, who assisted Mr. Sharma in the cabin rental business, testified
that she had heard rumors at Iron Works concerning Mr. Sharma sexually harassing
employees and having an affair with Summer Morgan, but she did not attribute any of those
statements to Mr. Larimer or Mr. Mankad.
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Melinda Dixon, a customer of Iron Works, testified that she had heard rumors that
Mr. Sharma had sexually harassed someone, but not from either Mr. Larimer or
Mr. Mankad. Summer Tilley—formerly Summer Morgan—testified that she previously
worked at Iron Works. She denied ever having a sexual relationship with Mr. Sharma and
stated that, although she had heard rumors to that effect in the community, she did not
recall hearing such allegations directly from Mr. Mankad or Mr. Larimer. Ms. Tilley noted
that “this is a very small community, so rumors spread very fast.”
Lauren Thomas, a current Iron Works employee, testified that both Mr. Mankad and
Mr. Larimer told her that Mr. Sharma had committed theft, sexually harassed employees,
and was involved in an improper relationship with an employee. She added that these
statements were not made privately, explaining that she “witnessed it being said to a couple
of us.” On cross‑examination, Ms. Thomas clarified that she had been told by Mr. Larimer
and Mr. Mankad that Mr. Sharma had been accused of sexual harassment, theft, and being
involved in an improper relationship and confirmed that she did not recall either defendant
stating the relationship allegation to her directly. On redirect, she stated that she was told
by Mr. O’Farrell about Summer Morgan and Mr. Sharma having an improper relationship.
Mr. Sharma took the stand and denied the allegations he attributed to the defendants:
that he had stolen from Iron Works, sexually harassed employees, and had an improper
relationship with Summer Morgan. He stated that these accusations spread among
employees and in the community, and he described their impact on his business
relationships and emotional health. Addressing the allegation that he stole company funds
via $5,000 and $9,000 withdrawals, Mr. Sharma testified that he used the money to
purchase cashier’s checks payable to his attorney for litigation that he believed was needed
to protect the companies’ interests. He stated that none of the money was used for any
personal purpose. Nidhita Sharma, Mr. Sharma’s wife, testified that she personally heard
Mr. Mankad publicly refer to her husband as a “womanizer” and a “thief” and that such
allegations caused significant strain in their lives.
Amy Schlosser, a business associate of Mr. Sharma and Mr. Larimer, testified that
Mr. Sharma asked her to say that Mr. Larimer had told her that Mr. Sharma was having an
affair with Ms. Morgan. However, Ms. Schlosser stated that she had never heard such an
allegation from Mr. Larimer, so she refused to do so. Rachel Harris of Mountainview
Cabins testified next that, although she had heard community rumors concerning
Mr. Sharma, she did not hear any such statements from Mr. Larimer or Mr. Mankad. Ms.
Harris clarified further that she “never” heard Mr. Larimer say that Mr. Sharma sexually
harassed anyone, “[n]ot one time.”
Mr. Larimer took the stand next. Mr. Larimer testified that allegations concerning
Mr. Sharma were discussed among Iron Works management and with investors. He
acknowledged that if Mr. Sharma’s withdrawals of $5,000 and $9,000 for litigation
expenses amounted to “stealing,” then similar attorney fee withdrawals that he and
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Mr. Mankad made would fall into the same category. He nevertheless denied ever telling
anyone that Mr. Sharma stole money or sexually harassed employees. Mr. Larimer
testified that, instead, he tried to stop the spread of rumors by instructing employees not to
repeat them. He acknowledged, however, that he discussed the allegations within the
management team and participated in communications in which the allegations were
addressed.
Ryan O’Farrell testified next and described a November 1, 2023 encounter with
Mr. Sharma and testified that he reported employee‑raised sexual harassment allegations
to Officer Watson and later to the police chief. Mr. O’Farrell testified further that the
sexual harassment allegations were first raised by employees during internal discussions,
explaining that the topic “was brought up by the employees to them[.]”
Mr. Mankad testified last. He acknowledged that he accused Mr. Sharma of theft
based on his understanding of the Cascade Cabin transaction and on Mr. Sharma’s
withdrawals of $5,000 and $9,000 for attorney fees. He testified further that he paid
attorneys from VSM without Mr. Sharma’s consent, including payments related to VSM’s
bankruptcy filing. He also admitted withdrawing approximately $18,000 from Iron Works
before a court hearing and that the court ordered him to return the funds. He acknowledged
sending emails to around ten to fifteen investors asserting that Mr. Sharma had stolen
money. Finally, Mr. Mankad conceded that he had no written agreement requiring
Mr. Sharma to transfer the Cascade Cabin to VSM.
After the close of proof, the trial court conducted a charge conference during which
counsel for both sides participated in finalizing the jury instructions and verdict form. The
trial court then instructed the jury on the elements of defamation and false light—including
publication to a third person, falsity, fault, and injury—and further instructed that
emotional distress damages required proof of a “serious mental injury,” providing the
standards for both intentional and negligent infliction of emotional distress, including the
requirement of expert proof for negligent infliction. The jury returned a verdict finding
Mr. Mankad and Mr. Larimer liable and Mr. O’Farrell not liable; awarding Mr. Sharma
$265,000 for reputational injury and $200,000 for emotional distress as to Mr. Mankad and
$110,000 for reputational injury and $60,000 for emotional distress as to Mr. Larimer; and
declining to award punitive damages.
On August 26, 2025, the trial court entered an order adopting the jury’s verdict. On
September 25, 2025, Mr. Larimer and Mr. Mankad filed motions for a new trial. On
November 5, 2025, the trial court denied the defendants’ motions for a new trial and
granted a remittitur reducing the reputational damage awards to conform to the $250,000
ad damnum limit, reducing the award against Mr. Mankad to $177,500 and the award
against Mr. Larimer to $72,500. Mr. Sharma accepted this, and the trial court entered final
judgment accordingly. The trial court expressly found that Mr. Mankad had abandoned
his previously filed Rule 12.02(6) motion to dismiss by failing to set it for hearing in
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accordance with Local Rule 6.01.1 Mr. Larimer and Mr. Mankad timely appealed to this
Court.
ISSUES
Mr. Larimer and Mr. Mankad raise multiple issues on appeal, which are restated as
follows:
1. Whether the trial court erred in deeming Mr. Mankad’s Rule 12.02(6) motion to
dismiss abandoned.
2. Whether the trial court erred in admitting certain evidence.
3. Whether the trial court erred in submitting the verdict form and instructions
without requiring specific findings on the essential elements.
4. Whether the trial court erred in upholding the jury’s findings against Mr. Larimer
and denying his motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was unsupported by
material evidence.
5. Whether the trial court erred in upholding the compensatory damages awarded
against Mr. Mankad and in denying his motion for a new trial or remittitur.
Mr. Sharma asserts no separate issues.2
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review a jury verdict under the material evidence standard, which requires us to
“review the record and ‘take the strongest legitimate view of all the evidence in favor of
the verdict, assume the truth of all evidence that supports the verdict, allow all reasonable
inferences to sustain the verdict, and discard all countervailing evidence.’” Borne v.
Celadon Trucking Servs., Inc., 532 S.W.3d 274, 298 (Tenn. 2017) (quoting Akers v. Prime
Succession of Tenn., Inc., 387 S.W.3d 495, 501 (Tenn. 2012)). The material evidence
1
Rule 6 of the Local Rules of Court for the Circuit, Chancery, and Criminal Courts of Monroe
County, Tennessee, 10th Judicial District, provides as relevant:
Rule 6.01. Pretrial Motions – Responsibility of Movant. It is the responsibility of
the moving party to call for a hearing of all pretrial motions as far in advance as possible
of the trial as reasonably possible. All motions not called for disposition prior to the trial
date will be deemed to have been abandoned, except for extraordinary circumstances.
2
Mr. Sharma sought and obtained leave to file separate appellee briefs responding individually to
the issues raised by each appellant.
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standard “lies at the foundation of the right to trial by jury,” and “[a]s a result, we are
required to affirm a jury verdict ‘if there is material evidence to support [it].’” Almuawi v.
Gregory, No. M2020-01018-COA-R3-CV, 2021 WL 2226624, at *1 (Tenn. Ct. App. June
2, 2021) (quoting Meals ex rel. Meals v. Ford Motor Co., 417 S.W.3d 414, 422 (Tenn.
2013)). Material evidence is “‘evidence material to the question in controversy, which
must necessarily enter into the consideration of the controversy and by itself, or in
connection with the other evidence, be determinative of the case.’” Meals, 417 S.W.3d at
422 (quoting Knoxville Traction Co. v. Brown, 89 S.W. 319, 321 (Tenn. 1905)). “A trial
court’s decision regarding whether to grant or deny a motion for a new trial is discretionary
in nature, and we accord such rulings great deference. We will only disturb such a decision
if it amounts to an abuse of discretion.” Buckley v. Elephant Sanctuary in Tenn., Inc., 639
S.W.3d 38, 46 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2021) (quoting Ali v. Fisher, 145 S.W.3d 557, 564 (Tenn.
2004)). Moreover, a trial court may suggest an additur or remittitur if it is dissatisfied with
the amount of the jury’s award. Bonner v. Deyo, No. W2014-00763-COA-R3-CV, 2014
WL 6873058, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 5, 2014).
Insofar as the issues on appeal implicate the abuse of discretion standard of review,
a trial court abuses its discretion “when it causes an injustice to the party challenging the
decision by (1) applying an incorrect legal standard, (2) reaching an illogical or
unreasonable decision, or (3) basing its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment of the
evidence.” Lee Med., Inc. v. Beecher, 312 S.W.3d 515, 524 (Tenn. 2010). We review the
trial court’s determinations on issues of law de novo, with no presumption of correctness.
Lind v. Beaman Dodge, Inc., 356 S.W.3d 889, 895 (Tenn. 2011).
DISCUSSION
I. Abandonment of the Rule 12.02(6) Motion and Sufficiency of the Pleadings
Mr. Mankad argues in his brief that the trial court erred by allowing the defamation
and false light claims to proceed against him without ruling on his Rule 12.02(6) motion
to dismiss. He asserts that the complaint was overly vague and did not provide him with
fair notice of the claims presented at trial. He also asserts that the trial court improperly
deemed his motion abandoned under Local Rule 6.01, despite Rule 12.02(6) governing
preservation of challenges to pleading sufficiency. In response, Mr. Sharma contends that
the trial court correctly found abandonment because Mr. Mankad never set his motion for
hearing and raised the issue only after the verdict. He also argues that the complaint
satisfied Tennessee’s notice pleading standard and that discovery and trial cured any
alleged defect.
Whether a complaint satisfies Tennessee’s notice pleading requirements or states a
claim under Rule 12.02(6) is a question of law reviewed de novo. Webb v. Nashville Area
Habitat for Humanity, Inc., 346 S.W.3d 422, 426 (Tenn. 2011). “Trial courts have clear
authority to adopt local rules of practice to supplement the Tennessee Rules of Civil
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Procedure.” Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty. v. Cuozzo, No. M2007-01851-
COA-R3-CV, 2008 WL 3914890, at *4 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 25, 2008), perm. app. denied
(Tenn. Feb. 17, 2009). In addition, “[trial courts] have broad authority to control their
dockets and the procedures in their courts.” Id. The record shows that although
Mr. Mankad filed a Rule 12.02(6) motion, he never set it for hearing. Local Rule 6.01
requires parties to obtain settings for their motions, and a motion that is filed but never
noticed, argued, or mentioned thereafter is treated as abandoned. In other words, Mr.
Mankad was not entitled to see how the trial turned out before seeking to revive his motion.
By waiting until the jury returned its decision to follow up on the motion to dismiss,
Mr. Mankad forfeited any pleading challenge. The trial court’s treating the motion as
abandoned in view of Mr. Mankad’s failure to call it for hearing did not elevate a local rule
above the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. It simply reflected that Mr. Mankad went
to trial without pursuing the motion again, thereby abandoning it. Furthermore, Mr.
Mankad has not articulated any extraordinary circumstances that would justify his failure
to act on his motion. The trial court did not err by declining to consider the issue after the
verdict.
Regarding the alleged insufficiency of the complaint, Tennessee applies a notice
pleading standard under Rule 8 of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure. See Webb, 346
S.W.3d at 426. Notice pleading reflects that “the primary purpose of pleadings is to provide
notice of the issues presented to the opposing party and court.” Id. Consistent with that
principle, Rule 8 requires only a short and plain statement of the claim and a demand for
the relief sought. Tenn. R. Civ. P. 8.01. Mr. Sharma alleged in his complaint that
Mr. Mankad made defamatory statements accusing Mr. Sharma of theft and sexual
harassment. He identified at least one specific instance of publication and placed
Mr. Mankad on notice of the theories to be pursued at trial. Mr. Mankad then defended the
claims throughout the proceedings without asserting prejudice based upon the pleadings.
He cannot realistically point to any surprise. Mr. Sharma’s complaint was adequate to
satisfy Tennessee’s non-stringent notice pleading standard. We conclude that Mr.
Sharma’s complaint stated claims upon which relief may be granted, and the trial court
properly allowed them to proceed.
II. Evidentiary Rulings
Mr. Mankad argues next that the trial court abused its discretion by admitting
evidence that he characterizes as irrelevant, unfairly prejudicial, or unauthenticated. He
points to the following: (1) questions to Ms. Morgan that he contends wrongly implied
witness intimidation; (2) Facebook video footage depicting Mr. O’Farrell; (3) speculative
medical causation testimony from Dr. Premji; (4) LifeStance Health medical notes, which
he asserts were irrelevant, hearsay, and prejudicial; and (5) a text message exchange
between Ms. Burgess and Mr. Sharma that he says was irrelevant to whether Mr. Mankad
published false or defamatory statements and improperly suggested character‑based
inferences. He argues that these items lacked foundation under Tennessee Rules of
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Evidence 401, 402, 403, and 901 and risked misleading the jury. Mr. Sharma responds that
the trial court acted within its discretion in admitting these items. He contends that the
challenged evidence was relevant to publication, credibility, emotional distress, and
damages; that it was authenticated where necessary; and that it was not unfairly prejudicial.
He further contends that Mr. Mankad is attempting to reweigh properly admitted evidence
and that any arguable error was harmless in light of substantial independent proof
supporting liability.
“[T]rial courts are generally afforded a great deal of discretion regarding the
admission or exclusion of evidence.” Tire Shredders, Inc. v. ERM‑N. Cent., Inc.,
15 S.W.3d 849, 858 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999). We will not disturb such rulings unless there
is a clear showing of abuse of discretion. Danny L. Davis Contractors, Inc. v. Hobbs,
157 S.W.3d 414, 419 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2004). Even where error occurs, it warrants reversal
only if, considering the whole record, it “more probably than not affected the judgment.”
Tenn. R. App. P. 36(b).
It is unclear from Mr. Mankad’s briefing how the evidentiary rulings he challenges
constitute error, much less reversible error. His objections rest on broad assertions that the
challenged items were irrelevant or prejudicial, without explaining how any particular
ruling misapplied Rules 401, 402, 403, or 901 or otherwise fell outside of the trial court’s
discretion. That certain of the evidence admitted was unfavorable to Mr. Mankad does not
in itself mean that it was unfairly prejudicial. Moreover, Mr. Mankad does not demonstrate
how any given evidentiary ruling was outcome determinative in a multi‑day jury trial
featuring numerous witnesses and substantial proof independent of the challenged items.
The items he identifies do not appear to have materially influenced the jury’s deliberations,
and none was more prejudicial than the unchallenged evidence properly admitted
elsewhere in the case.
We review this issue for abuse of discretion and within the narrow limits of that
standard. Here, the trial court neither applied an incorrect legal standard, reached an
illogical or unreasonable decision, nor based its decision on a clearly erroneous assessment
of the evidence. We discern no basis to conclude that the trial court misapplied the
Tennessee Rules of Evidence or exceeded the bounds of its discretion. Moreover, even if
any of the challenged evidence was admitted in error, we conclude that none of it more
probably than not affected the judgment. The trial court therefore did not abuse its
discretion in admitting the evidence Mr. Mankad challenges.
III. Verdict Form and Jury Instructions
Mr. Mankad argues that the verdict form was overly generalized because it asked
only whether he was at fault and did not require findings on publication, falsity, the
requisite level of fault, reputational injury, or even the specific tort theory supporting
liability. He argues that the result is an ambiguous verdict that cannot be meaningfully
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reviewed. In response, Mr. Sharma argues that any objection was waived because defense
counsel helped draft the form. He argues further that, when read with the jury instructions,
the form accurately submitted the issues and required individualized findings. He points
to the jury’s differentiated verdict, including its decision that Mr. O’Farrell was not liable,
as evidence that it understood and applied the instructions properly. The detailed jury
instructions defined fault and set out the elements of defamation and false light.3
This Court has articulated the standards for constructing verdict forms and the
consequences of deficiencies in those forms as follows:
Trial courts have wide discretion in tailoring the questions on a verdict form
to meet the needs of each unique case. Concrete Spaces, Inc. v. Sender, 2
S.W.3d 901, 910 (Tenn. 1999). When a party advances multiple theories of
relief, common sense principles should guide the attorneys and the judge in
preparing both the jury instructions and the verdict form. Id. Verdict forms
should use the same terms as those used in the jury instructions and should
repeat and highlight important issues discussed in the instructions. Id. A
new trial is warranted when a verdict form does not address each theory of
relief and allow the jury to respond to them adequately. Id. at 911. Even
when a verdict form is defective, the jury’s verdict will be upheld as long as
it sufficiently defines the issues in such a way as to enable the court to
intelligently articulate a judgment. Id.
In re Est. of Link, 542 S.W.3d 438, 463 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2017).
The Tennessee Supreme Court has described the standard of review for jury
instruction issues as follows:
Whether a jury instruction is erroneous is a question of law and is therefore
subject to de novo review with no presumption of correctness. Solomon v.
First Am. National Bank of Nashville, 774 S.W.2d 935, 940 (Tenn. Ct. App.
1989). The legitimacy of a jury’s verdict is dependent on the accuracy of the
trial court’s instructions, which are the sole source of the legal principles
required for the jury’s deliberations. Therefore, a trial court is under a duty
to impart “substantially accurate instructions concerning the law applicable
to the matters at issue.” Hensley v. CSX Transp., Inc., 310 S.W.3d 824, 833
(Tenn. Ct. App. 2009) (quoting Bara v. Clarksville Mem’l Health Sys., Inc.,
3
Defamation requires a published statement that is false and defamatory, made with knowledge of
falsity, reckless disregard, or negligence, and resulting in actual damages. See Austin v. Plese, --- S.W.3d
----, 2025 WL 763752, at *7–8 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2025), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Aug. 7, 2025).
Publication is satisfied by communicating the challenged statement to a third person. Id. at *7. False light
requires publicity placing the plaintiff in a highly offensive false light, made knowingly or with reckless
disregard for falsity. Id. at *8.
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104 S.W.3d 1, 3–4 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2002)). When considering whether a trial
court committed prejudicial error in a jury instruction, it is our duty to review
the charge in its entirety and consider it as a whole, and the instruction will
not be invalidated if it “fairly defines the legal issues involved in the case and
does not mislead the jury.” Otis v. Cambridge Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 850 S.W.2d
439, 446 (Tenn. 1992). The judgment of a trial court will not be set aside
based on an erroneous jury instruction unless it appears that the erroneous
instruction more probably than not affected the judgment of the jury. Tenn.
R. App. P. 36(b); Gorman v. Earhart, 876 S.W.2d 832, 836 (Tenn. 1994).
Nye v. Bayer Cropscience, Inc., 347 S.W.3d 686, 699 (Tenn. 2011). In addition, “where
the trial court’s instructions clearly and definitely set forth the elements upon which
liability must be based, the failure to recite each element in the verdict form will not render
the verdict invalid.” Goodale v. Langenberg, 243 S.W.3d 575, 584 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2007).
As a threshold matter, we note that Mr. Mankad participated in drafting the verdict
form. He argues on appeal that the verdict form was so flawed that it is reviewable
notwithstanding his participation in its drafting. However, under Tennessee Rule of
Appellate Procedure 36(a), “[n]othing in this rule shall be construed as requiring relief be
granted to a party responsible for an error or who failed to take whatever action was
reasonably available to prevent or nullify the harmful effect of an error.” With respect to
verdict forms specifically, this Court has explained:
Counsel should object promptly to a proposed verdict form. If possible, they
should object to the form before its submission to the jury. However, if
unaware of the form’s substance, they should object before the jury returns
its verdict. . . . Failure to make a timely objection to a verdict form constitutes
a waiver of the objection.
Hatfield v. Allenbrooke Nursing & Rehab. Ctr., LLC, No. W2017-00957-COA-R3-CV,
2018 WL 3740565, at *26 (Tenn. Ct. App. Aug. 6, 2018), perm. app. denied (Tenn. Jan.
17, 2019) (quoting Creech v. Addington, 281 S.W.3d 363, 386 (Tenn. 2009)). Regarding
jury instructions, “[a]lthough it is the duty of the trial court to provide accurate instructions
to the jury, the Plaintiffs, after being made aware of the limitations on the jury’s
consideration of the evidence prior to closing arguments, neither objected nor made a
special request for any alternative directive. The Plaintiffs, therefore, waived appellate
consideration of [this issue].” Id. (quoting Creech, 281 S.W.3d at 386). Here, Mr. Mankad
failed to take any action to nullify or prevent the harmful effect of the alleged error that is
at issue; on the contrary, he invited the alleged error by participating in the drafting of the
verdict form and approving it. We therefore conclude that Mr. Mankad has waived this
issue.
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IV. Material Evidence Supporting the Jury’s Findings Against Mr. Larimer
Mr. Larimer argues that no material evidence supports the jury’s finding that he
stated that Mr. Sharma committed sexual harassment or theft. He contends that the
witnesses merely repeated workplace rumors and were unsure of who said what. He relies
heavily on his own testimony that he tried to quell the rumors rather than spread them. He
also contends that no material evidence supports emotional distress damages because the
medical testimony did not link Mr. Sharma’s symptoms to anything Mr. Larimer personally
said. In response, Mr. Sharma asserts that several witnesses directly connected
Mr. Larimer to statements repeating the allegations. He asserts further that the record
includes proof of reputational and emotional injury.
Although Mr. Larimer characterizes the proof as insufficient, the record contains
testimony that reasonably permitted the jury to conclude that he stated that Mr. Sharma
committed sexual harassment and theft. For instance, Ms. Morgan testified that the
defendants asked staff to “say things” or otherwise support allegations of sexual
harassment and stealing against Mr. Sharma. She also testified that Mr. Larimer said that
Mr. Sharma was “sleeping with” Summer Morgan. Ms. Thomas, for her part, testified that
Mr. Larimer told her that Mr. Sharma had been accused of sexual harassment, theft, and
having an affair. Mr. Larimer implicitly suggests a distinction between addressing rumors
and propagating them, but he identifies no Tennessee authority treating repeated
accusations differently from original ones. See SmileDirectClub, Inc. v. NBCUniversal
Media, LLC, 708 S.W.3d 556, 574 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2024) (recognizing liability for
repeating defamatory statements). The Tennessee Supreme Court has explained that “a
person who repeats the defamatory statements made by another is also liable for
defamation,” illustrating the point with the historical example: “Thou art a sheep stealing
rogue, and farmer Parker told me so.” Funk v. Scripps Media, Inc., 570 S.W.3d 205, 211
(Tenn. 2019) (quoting VI Matthew Bacon with Henry G. William & Bird Wilson, A New
Abridgment of the Law 238–39 (Philadelphia, Philip H. Nicklin 1813)).
One of the questions for the jury to resolve was whether Mr. Larimer bore
responsibility under the defamation and false light instructions the trial court provided. A
reasonable jury could conclude from the testimony that Mr. Larimer published statements
about Mr. Sharma by repeating or discussing allegations of sexual harassment, theft, or an
improper relationship in conversations with employees, management, or investors.
Testimony from Ms. Morgan and Ms. Thomas identified him as a participant in these
communications. The jury was therefore entitled to view the statements attributed to
Mr. Larimer as capable of supporting liability either as false and defamatory or as placing
Mr. Sharma before others in a false and highly offensive light. Our review does not involve
reweighing testimony or resolving conflicts in the proof. When viewed in the light most
favorable to the verdict, the accounts of Ms. Morgan, Ms. Thomas, and Mr. Larimer
himself, along with other evidence in the record, constitute material evidence from which
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the jury reasonably could find that Mr. Larimer published statements within the scope of
the theories submitted.
The record also supports the jury’s assessment of harm under the theories submitted.
Several witnesses described how the allegations circulated within the workplace and the
community. Testimony reflects that the allegations had tangible, adverse effects on
Mr. Sharma’s standing in the business arena. A reasonable jury could treat this as evidence
of injury to reputation or as evidence that the statements placed Mr. Sharma in a false and
damaging light. With respect to emotional distress, Dr. Premji testified that he treated
Mr. Sharma during the period when the allegations were being discussed among
employees, management, and members of the community and that Mr. Sharma reported
major stress affecting his daily life. Although Dr. Premji did not attribute those symptoms
to any particular defendant, the jury heard evidence that the allegations were public and
harmful. The jury was entitled to determine whether the conditions created by the
spreading of rumors contributed to Mr. Sharma’s emotional injury. Viewed in the light
most favorable to the verdict, the proof provides material evidence supporting the jury’s
harm findings. Accordingly, the trial court did not apply an incorrect legal standard, did
not reach an illogical or unreasonable decision, did not base its ruling on a clearly erroneous
assessment of the evidence, and therefore did not abuse its discretion in denying
Mr. Larimer’s motion for a new trial.
V. Cumulative Error and Material Evidence Supporting the Damages Awards
Against Mr. Mankad
Mr. Mankad argues that the damages awards resulted from inadmissible testimony
and speculative emotional distress evidence. He contends that the doctrine of cumulative
error warrants a new trial or at least further remittitur. Mr. Sharma disagrees that any
underlying error occurred, cumulative or otherwise. He argues that the awards are
supported by material evidence and were properly reviewed by the trial court. He also
notes that he accepted the trial court’s remittitur and that the modified judgment is entitled
to deference.
We disagree with Mr. Mankad’s characterization of the evidence. There was
testimony supporting both reputational harm and emotional distress suffered by
Mr. Sharma. Mr. Patel testified that he declined to invest approximately $400,000 in a
project with Mr. Sharma after hearing Mr. Mankad accuse Mr. Sharma of theft during
investor meetings and in email communications. Mr. Mankad admitted making those
accusations to a group of investors. The jury could reasonably view this testimony as
supporting reputational injury or as supporting a finding that the statements placed
Mr. Sharma before others in a false and damaging light under the instructions given. Our
task is not to reweigh the proof but t