In Re Othella S.

FILED 07/22/2026 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE Clerk of the AT NASHVILLE Appellate Courts Assigned on Briefs June 2, 2026 IN RE OTHELLA S. Appeal from the Juvenile Court for Sumner County No. 2023-TPR-2 N. Kee Bryant-McCormick, Judge ___________________________________ No. M2025-01263-COA-R3-PT ___________________________________ Mother/Appellant appeals the termination of her parental rights to the minor child on the grounds of: (1) severe child abuse, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4); and (2) failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). Appellant also appeals the trial court’s finding that termination of her parental rights is in the child’s best interest. Discerning no error, we affirm. Tenn. R. App. P. 3 Appeal as of Right; Judgment of the Juvenile Court Affirmed and Remanded STEVEN W. MARONEY, J., delivered the opinion of the court, in which ANDY D. BENNETT and KRISTI M. DAVIS, JJ., joined. Claire Adele Zanger, White House, Tennessee, for the appellant, Ashley A.1 Jonathan Skrmetti, Attorney General and Reporter, and Alison Elizabeth Potterfield, Assistant Attorney General, for the appellee, Tennessee Department of Children’s Services. Erin A. Stubbs, Gallatin, Tennessee, Guardian Ad Litem for Othella S. OPINION I. Background 1 In cases involving minor children, it is the policy of this Court to redact the parties’ names to protect their identities.  The minor child at issue in this case, Othella S. (the “Child”), was born in September of 2020. Ashley A. (“Mother,” or “Appellant”) is the Child’s biological mother. Thomas K. (“Father”) is the Child’s putative father.2 Appellee, Tennessee Department of Children’s Services (“DCS”), first became involved in 2021, when it received a referral, alleging that the Child was exposed to drugs. A. Initial DCS Contact On October 22, 2021, Case Manager Kaelyn Barker (“CM Barker”) made contact with Appellant and the Child. During CM Barker’s conversation with Appellant, she reported that she has used THC but refused a drug screen. Appellant and the Child were living with an uncle, who denied having any concern for the safety of the Child or the Mother. On October 25, 2021, DCS filed a petition for dependency and neglect in the Juvenile Court for Sumner County (“trial court”). Therein, DCS alleged, inter alia, that “[M]other leaves and will be gone for weeks or months at a time” and “will stay with people that use meth and drink daily.” The petition also asserted that Appellant had been missing since September 17, 2021, and that she “has fallen asleep and woke[n] up and the baby was missing and then when found had marks on her.” The petition alleged that CM Barker and law enforcement observed that Appellant was “severely underweight with bags under her eyes” and that “[t]here were marks on her arms and legs (including bruises and scratches).” DCS asked the trial court to order Appellant to complete a hair follicle test, complete an alcohol and drug assessment, and submit to random drug screens. The trial court entered an order granting DCS’ petition on December 1, 2021. B. Removal of Child from Appellant’s Custody Although DCS’ initial petition did not request custody of the Child, on February 28, 2022, DCS filed an amended petition seeking physical custody. The amended petition alleged that the Appellant had not maintained contact with DCS to schedule the hair follicle test as ordered by the court. DCS’ averred that its last contact with Mother was in November 22, 2021, prior to the filing of the amended petition. The amended petition further alleged that Mother had not been cooperative or communicative with DCS for several months and, based on the immediate, specific, physical threat of harm to the Child, it was in her best interest to be removed to DCS custody. 2 Thomas K.’s parental rights were terminated in the same order terminating Appellant’s parental rights. Thomas K. is not a party to this appeal. -2-  On February 28, 2022, the trial court issued an ex parte protective custody order, wherein it found that the Child was “subject to an immediate threat of harm to her health or safety” and that “no less drastic alternative” other than removal from Appellant’s custody would “adequately protect the child’s health and safety pending a hearing.” Before the trial court’s February 28th order could be effectuated, Appellant fled the state with the Child. However, on March 1, 2022, Appellant was located and arrested in Kentucky. At that time, the Child was with her, and Appellant had methamphetamines on her person. As a result, the Child entered DCS’ physical custody. The Child was placed with a foster family, where she has remained since that time. On March 2, 2022, the Child’s maternal grandparents filed a motion to intervene and petition seeking custody of the Child. On March 4, 2022, the trial court ordered the Child undergo a hair follicle test and ordered that she remain in the temporary custody of DCS. The trial court dismissed the grandparents’ petition on May 9, 2022, for failure to prosecute. As discussed below, the Child’s hair follicle test showed positive for methamphetamine. C. Trial Court’s Finding of Dependency and Neglect Following an adjudicatory hearing on January 4, 2023, the trial court entered an order on January 11, 2023. The trial court found, by clear and convincing evidence that the Child is a dependent and neglected pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 37- 1-102(b)(13)(C) and (F) because of “Mother’s daily drug use and the fact she regularly parented the [C]hild while actively under the influence of methamphetamine.” The trial court also found the Child to be dependent and neglected pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-102(b)(13)(D) based on testimony that the Child “had an obvious and immediate medical need due to the [C]hild’s lack of muscle tone and emotional regulation issues which should have prompted a lay person to seek medical intervention.” Furthermore, the trial court noted that, despite being approximately 18 months old, the Child was unable to crawl or walk at the time she was brought into DCS’ custody. Moreover, the trial court found the Child to be dependent and neglected pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-102(b)(13)(G) because Appellant never participated in any of the drug treatment services offered, was “arrested with drugs on her person [in Kentucky]” and following hair follicle testing, “the [C]hild was ultimately found to test positive for those same drugs, namely, methamphetamine.” Accordingly, the trial court found that the Child was severely abused as defined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-102(B)(27)(F)(iii). D. Termination Proceedings On February 17, 2023, DCS filed a petition to terminate Appellant’s parental rights. After a series of changes to Appellant’s counsel, and a brief delay to determine whether -3- the Child was a member of the Oglala Sioux Tribe, the case was set for trial on May 29, 2024. Thereafter, more delays occurred due to changes in Appellant’s counsel, as well as pre-trial motions. The trial eventually took place on March 14, 2025, and May 30, 2025.3 By order of August 8, 2025, the trial court terminated Appellant’s parental rights on the grounds alleged in DCS’ petition and on its finding that termination of Appellant’s parental rights was in the Child’s best interest. Appellant appeals. II. Issues There are two dispositive issues: I. Whether there is clear and convincing evidence to support at least one of the grounds relied upon by the trial court to terminate Appellant’s parental rights. II. If so, whether there is clear and convincing evidence to support the trial court’s finding that termination of Appellant’s parental rights is in the Child’s best interest. III. Standard of Review It is well-settled that: A parent’s right to the care and custody of [his or] her child is among the oldest of the judicially recognized fundamental liberty interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the federal and state constitutions. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651 (1972); In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d 240, 250 (Tenn. 2010); In re Adoption of Female Child, 896 S.W.2d 546, 547-48 (Tenn. 1995); Hawk v. Hawk, 855 S.W.2d 573, 578-79 (Tenn. 1993). But parental rights, although fundamental and constitutionally protected, are not absolute. In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 250. “‘[T]he [S]tate as parens patriae has a special duty to protect minors. . . .’ Tennessee law, thus, upholds the [S]tate’s authority as parens patriae when interference with parenting is necessary to prevent serious harm to a child.” Hawk, 855 S.W.2d at 580 (quoting In re Hamilton, 657 S.W.2d 425, 429 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1983)); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982); In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d at 250. In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d 507, 521-22 (Tenn. 2016) (footnote omitted). 3 Following the first day of trial, Appellant’s then-counsel, Ms. Sorrells, filed a motion to withdraw as counsel on April 16, 2025, which the trial court granted on April 25, 2025. Appellant retained private counsel, Ms. Sankar, who filed a notice of appearance. The trial court held that Appellant “waived any issues on appeal related to the late substitution of counsel, as it was done at [Appellant’s] request.” -4-  Termination of parental rights proceedings are governed by statute in Tennessee, In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d 533, 541 (Tenn. 2015), and the statutes identify “those situations in which the state’s interest in the welfare of a child justifies interference with a parent’s constitutional rights by setting forth grounds on which termination proceedings can be brought.” In re Jacobe M.J., 434 S.W.3d 565, 568 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (quoting In re W.B., Nos. M2004-00999-COA-R3-PT, M2004-01572-COA-R3-PT, 2005 WL 1021618, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2005) (citing Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g))) (internal quotation marks omitted). Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113 governs the termination of parental rights. It provides, in pertinent part: © Termination of parental or guardianship rights must be based upon: (2) A finding by the court by clear and convincing evidence that the grounds for termination of parental or guardianship rights have been established; and (2) That termination of the parent’s or guardian’s rights is in the best interests of the child. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113©. Therefore, every termination of parental rights case requires the trial court “to determine whether the parent has engaged in a course of action or inaction that constitutes one of the statutory grounds for termination[,]” and whether termination of the parent’s rights is in the child’s best interest. In re Donna E.W., No. M2013-02856-COA-R3-PT, 2014 WL 2918107, at *2 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 24, 2014). “Because the stakes are so profoundly high[ ]” in a termination of parental rights case, the statute “requires persons seeking to terminate a . . . parent’s parental rights to prove the statutory grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence.” In re Audrey S., 182 S.W.3d 838, 861 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2005). This Court has observed that “[t]his heightened burden of proof minimizes the risk of erroneous decisions.” Id. (citations omitted). If the trial court determines that clear and convincing evidence supports grounds for termination in light of its factual findings, the court “should then consider the combined weight of those facts to determine whether they amount to clear and convincing evidence that termination is in the child’s best interest.” In re Kaliyah S., 455 S.W.3d at 555. The party petitioning for the termination of parental rights bears the burden of demonstrating that termination is in the best interest of the child by clear and convincing evidence. In re Angela E., 303 S.W.3d 240, 250 (Tenn. 2010). We review the trial court’s findings of fact de novo on the record with a presumption of correctness. Tenn. R. App. P. 3; In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 524 (citations -5- omitted). However, “[i]n light of the heightened burden of proof in termination proceedings . . . [we] must make [our] own determination as to whether the facts, either as found by the trial court or as supported by a preponderance of the evidence, amount to clear and convincing evidence of the elements necessary to terminate parental rights.” Id. at 524 (citation omitted). A trial court’s conclusion that clear and convincing evidence supports termination of parental rights is a conclusion of law that we review de novo with no presumption of correctness. Id. (citation omitted). “This standard of review is consistent with the standard of review for mixed questions of law and fact.” In re Taylor B.W., 397 S.W.3d at 112-113 (citing Starr v. Hill, 353 S.W.3d 478, 481-82 (Tenn. 2011) (“Although a presumption of correctness attaches to the trial court’s findings of fact, we are not bound by the trial court’s determination of the legal effect of its factual findings[.]”). IV. Grounds for Termination of Appellant’s Parental Rights The trial court terminated Appellant’s parental rights on the grounds of severe child abuse, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4), and failure to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody, Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). Although only one ground must be proven by clear and convincing evidence, the Tennessee Supreme Court has held that “appellate courts must review a trial court’s findings regarding all grounds for termination and whether termination is in a child’s best interests, even if a parent fails to challenge these findings on appeal.” In re Carrington H., 483 S.W.3d at 511. Accordingly, we will review the trial court’s findings as to both grounds. A. Severe Child Abuse The trial court terminated Appellant’s parental rights based on Appellant’s commission of severe child abuse pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated sections 36-1- 113(g)(4) and 37-1-102(b)(27).4 At the time the petition was filed, Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(4) provided a ground for termination of parental rights when “[t]he parent or guardian has been found to have committed severe child abuse, as defined in § 37-1-102, under any prior order of a court or is found by the court hearing the petition to terminate parental rights or the petition for adoption to have committed severe child abuse against any child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(4). As relevant here, at the time the petition was filed, Tennessee Code section 37-1- 102(b)(27) defined “severe child abuse” to include “[k]- 6 -nowingly or with gross negligence allowing a child under eight (8) years of age to ingest an illegal substance or a controlled substance that results in the child testing positive on a drug screen, except as legally prescribed to the child,” as well as “[k]- 6 -nowingly allowing a child to be within 4 The current version of the statute includes the definition for severe child abuse at Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102(b)(28). However, at the time of the hearing, the versions of the statute in effect defined severe child abuse at § 37-1-102(b)(27). -6- a structure where” methamphetamine, among other controlled substances “are present and accessible to the child[.]” Tenn. Code Ann. § 37-1-102(b)(27)(E), (F)(iii). Citing the January 11, 2023 dependency and neglect adjudicatory order, the trial court found that Appellant committed severe child abuse because she was “arrested in Kentucky with methamphetamine on her person while Minor Child was present.” Again, relying on the January 11, 2023 dependency and neglect adjudicatory order, the trial court found that the Child also tested positive for methamphetamine. In finding that these determinations were res judicata on the question of severe child abuse, the trial court noted that Appellant did no appeal or otherwise seek relief from the final dependency and neglect order. On appeal, Appellant asserts that the trial court’s determination that the January 11, 2023 order was res judicata on the issue of severe child abuse was error because the question of severe child abuse “was not addressed in the instant case by witnesses for the Department, nor on the Department’s cross-examination of [Appellant].” Thus, Appellant asks this Court “to make a finding of first impression: that a finding of severe child abuse at the adjudicatory phase of a dependency and neglect petition, does not amount to de facto termination of a parent’s rights, as appears to be the [trial court’s] ruling in the case at bar.” She further argues that “[t]he statute also requires a finding of severe child abuse using the standards of ‘knowing’ or ‘gross negligence,’” but the January 11, 2023 order made no such finding. Although Appellant argues that the trial court’s reliance on the finding of severe child abuse at the dependency and neglect stage amounted to a “de facto termination of [her] parent[al] rights[,]” we disagree. To the contrary, in its January 11, 2023 order, the trial court clearly based its finding of severe child abuse on two underlying circumstances (the Child in proximity to methamphetamine and the Child testing positive for methamphetamine). As we have previously held, “under the doctrine of res judicata, . . . a final order containing a finding of abuse cannot be attacked in subsequent actions.” In re William C., No. M2023-006460COA-R3-PT, 2024 WL 1665737, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 18, 2024) (citing In re Heaven L.F., 311 S.W.3d 435, 439 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2010); State Dept. of Human Serv. v. Tate, No. 01-A-01-9409-CV-00444, 1995 WL 138858, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 1995)). As we have explained, [t]he doctrine of res judicata applies when “an existing final judgment rendered upon the merits, without fraud or collusion, by a court of competent jurisdiction, is conclusive of rights, questions and facts in issue as to the parties and their privies, in all other actions in the same or any other judicial tribunal of concurrent jurisdiction.” -7- In re Heaven L.F., 311 S.W.3d at 439 (quoting Galbreath v. Harris, 811 S.W.2d 88, 90 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990). Accordingly, Appellant’s attempts to attack the January 11, 2023 order at this stage of the proceedings is futile, and her failure to file a timely appeal of that order is dispositive on the question of its res judicata effect. As discussed above, Appellant’s parental rights may be terminated pursuant to Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1- 113(g)(4) if, “under any prior order of a court,” the parent has been found to have committed severe child abuse. In the trial court’s January 11, 2023 order adjudicating the Child to be dependent and neglected, the court found that Appellant committed severe child abuse as defined in Tennessee Code Annotated section 37-1-102(b)(27)(F)(iii). Appellant did not appeal the trial court’s finding, and, as such, it became a final judgment and res judicata on the question of severe child abuse. Consequently, the trial court did not err in terminating Appellant’s parental rights on this ground. B. Failure to Manifest an Ability and Willingness to Assume Custody The trial court found that Appellant failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody or financial responsibility for the Child under Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(14) and that placing the Child in Appellant’s care would pose a substantial risk of harm. Tennessee Code Annotated section 36-1-113(g)(14) provides a ground for termination of parental rights when: [a] parent or guardian has failed to manifest, by act or omission, an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the child, and placing the child in the person’s legal and physical custody would pose a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the child[.] Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). This ground for termination of parental rights requires the movant to establish two elements by clear and convincing evidence. In re Maya R., No. E2017-01634-COA-R3- PT, 2018 WL 1629930, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 4, 2018) (citation omitted). Concerning the first element, DCS has the burden to prove that Appellant failed to manifest an ability and willingness to personally assume legal and physical custody or financial responsibility of the Child. Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). The Tennessee Supreme Court has adopted the interpretation of section 36-1-113(g)(14) set out in In re Amynn K., No. E2017-11866-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 3058280 (Tenn. Ct. App. June 20, 2018); see In re Neveah M., 614 S.W.3d 659, 677 (Tenn. 2020) (citing In re Amynn K., 2018 WL 3058280, at *14). The interpretation adopted by our Supreme Court places a conjunctive obligation on a parent or guardian to manifest both an ability and willingness to personally assume legal custody or financial responsibility for the child. If a party seeking to terminate -8- parental rights proves by clear and convincing evidence that a parent or guardian has failed to manifest either ability or willingness, then the first prong of the statute is satisfied. In re Neveah M., 614 S.W.3d at 677. If the first element is met, then DCS must additionally show that placing the Child in Appellant’s custody poses “a risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological welfare of the child.” Tenn. Code Ann. § 36-1-113(g)(14). Concerning whether Appellant manifested a willingness or ability to assume custody, the trial court found that Appellant: (1) has a substance abuse problem; (2) has never requested visitation with the Child; (3) has accrued additional criminal charges during the custodial episode; (4) was living in a sober home that does not allow children to reside there; and (5) does not have gainful employment. Based on these facts, the trial court summarized that: [Appellant] has a significant history of substance abuse and relapses. She is currently living in a sober living home and has recently found some success in her sobriety. She testified that she has been sober for approximately six (6) months. She has expressed a desire to assume custody[] but is not actually in a position to do so. The sober living home does not allow children to reside there. Based on her probation violation, she is court ordered to remain in this home until December 2025. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that [Appellant] has failed to manifest an ability and willingness to assume custody of the child satisfying the first prong of the analysis. The trial court’s findings are supported by the evidence. As to Appellant’s drug abuse issues, the record is replete with evidence supporting the trial court’s findings. From the start of DCS’ involvement with the Child, CM Barker and law enforcement noted concerns that Appellant was using illegal substances based on her appearance and behavior. Additionally, the circumstances that led DCS to seek custody of the Child included allegations that Appellant would leave for weeks or months at a time or would interact with known methamphetamine users. The evidence indicates that there were times where Appellant would lose track of the Child’s whereabouts, including at least one occasion when she “had fallen asleep and woke[n] up and the baby was missing, and then when found had marks on her.” Finally, the Child tested positive for methamphetamine. When Appellant and the Child were located, in Kentucky, on March 1, 2022, and the Child entered DCS custody, Appellant was arrested and incarcerated. Subsequently, Appellant entered Buffalo Valley treatment facility for drug and alcohol abuse. Concerning Appellant’s addiction issues, Family Services Worker Riggins (“FSW” Riggins), who was assigned to this case until July of 2024, testified, in relevant part, as follows: Q: Ms. Riggins, can you tell me the circumstances, to your knowledge, of -9- when the mother left – did you say Buffalo Valley? A: Uh-huh. Q: -- Buffalo Valley treatment center? A: So she left there – it would have been shortly into May or June [of 2022]. Q: And do you recall if that was – if she had completed that program? A: She did complete it, yes. Q: And as part of your case, did you speak to the mother through the duration of her time at that ranch? A: Yes. Q: Do you recall what some of the recommendations were upon her completing that program? A: So they provide like, a biopsychosocial assessment; regular, like group therapy; individual therapy and medication management while there. And typically it’s, like, a 30-day program, 28 to 30 days. From there, she was discharged to complete either [partial hospitalization program (PHP)] or [intensive outpatient program (IOP)] with Evolve in Knoxville. *** Q: And do you recall the circumstances of that discharge from Evolve? A: So, obviously she only stayed in Knoxville for, like, a week and then worked on treatment in Lebanon. She did not complete that whole treatment, which was – I can’t recall the certain circumstances that led to leaving there, but later she did complete IOP with another provider. Q: Did you ever, throughout the case, receive any indication that she had failed to complete the program at Evolve? A: Yes. Yes. Q: But you don’t recall the circumstances of why she failed to complete it? A: No. - 10 -  Then, on July 28, 2022, FSW Riggins conducted a mouth swab of Appellant to test for drug use. Concerning the results of that test, FSW Riggins testified: Q: And what was the first date of that mouth swab? A: July 28th, 2022. Q: And what were the results of that mouth swab? A: She was positive for marijuana. Q: I know that you mentioned that the mother had been in treatment around that time, correct? A: Yes. Q: Do you recall what the treatment circumstances were at the time of that screen? A: So at that point she had completed Buffalo Valley and had been at Evolve, and then after leaving Evolve in May or June, this was completed in July. *** Q: Are you concerned that the mother is still testing positive for marijuana subsequent to a treatment facility? A: Yes. It’s a concern in regards to needing her to maintain sobriety to work a permanency plan. Q: And is it fair to say that marijuana – I don’t want to say “just marijuana,” but marijuana would still be a concern if she was using that, correct? A: Yes. For someone that has struggled with any type of substance use, it’s a mind-altering substance, whether it’s less in society’s eyes, I will say. On October 17, 2022, Appellant submitted to another mouth swab test. FSW Riggins testified that the results of that test were positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine. FSW Riggins further testified, and the submitted permanency plans show, that, in July of 2023, Appellant completed an alcohol and drug] assessment, and twenty sessions of IOP. FSW Riggins noted that, at that time, Appellant was employed and relatively stable. In December of 2023, FSW Riggins noted, in her updates to the - 11 - permanency plan, that Appellant had “worked to improve parenting skills through a parenting assessment and recommendations,” and had “completed necessary tasks to maintain compliance with DCS.” At that point, she was also “reported [as being] eager to rebuild her relationship with her daughter” and “searching for full-time employment in Sumner County[.]” Then, on March 28, 2024, DCS conducted another mouth swab test, and Appellant tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamine. FSW Riggins testified: Q: And in your opinion has the mother failed – biological mother failed to make any sort of lasting changes in her circumstances? A: I mean, I guess kind of clarify like – Q: So you provided testimony that the mother has had continuous relapses through the duration of your case, correct? A: Yes. Q: Do you have anything to suggest that she’s had a significant, long-time absence of some sort of drug use? A: No. *** Q: You provided testimony today that the mother has completed the A and D assessments after her relapses, correct? A: Yes. Q: Has the mother – at least for three of those relapses, did she, in your opinion, actively take advantage of all the resources that could have been available to her at that time in terms of treatment? A: Yes, especially while I’ve been – while I was on the case, yes. Q: So after the THC drug screen, did she enroll in an inpatient program? A: Not for that, no. Q: After the subsequent screen which was positive for methamphetamine, did she enroll in an inpatient treatment program? - 12 -  A: No. That was just an A and D assessment, as well as the third time. Q: And then the third failed drug screen, did she enroll in an inpatient treatment program? A: No. In addition to her continuing struggles with drug abuse, according to FSW Riggins’ testimony, Appellant has not been consistent in visiting the Child, to-wit: Q: [to FWS Riggins] The child has been in custody how long, did you say? A: Physically since March 1st, 2022, but legally, February 8th. Q: So going on three years? A: Yes. Q: Has the child had any sort of visitation or seen the mother in that timeframe? A: We had one Pre-K assessment where the foster mom was – we was [sic] looking at possibly getting services within the Sumner County Schools. Mom did participate in that and was able to visit. Q: What date would that have been? A: That was September or October of 2024. ■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■■- Q: Throughout the duration of your case – so two years, you could say, you had the case – did the mother ever file anything in court asking to be a part of [appointments for evaluations, services, or other meetings] or to have the ability to go and take the child to appointments or be at the child’s appointments? A: She had requested visitation pretty often with her previous counsel. Q: Were you there present when she was talking to her counsel? A: No. But there was one time in particular that I had reached out to her counsel, saying, hey, she’s wanting visitation. - 13 -  Q: My original question was had she ever filed anything for it? A: Not to my knowledge. Q: So through the duration of the case and the Juvenile Court record was there ever a motion for visitation or a motion to attend any of the appointments you were talking about? A: No, not until recently. She had a court hearing that I wasn’t present for regarding visitation. The motion Ms. Riggins refers to in her testimony was denied by the trial court at the outset of the hearing on DCS’ petition to terminate Appellant’s parental rights. In sum, during the entire custodial episode, Appellant has visited the Child one time. In addition to continuing drug use, the evidence shows that, during the custodial episode, Appellant was detained for assault. FSW Riggins testified: Q: Okay. So through the duration of your case, was she on probation? A: Yes. Some of it, yes. Q: Do you recall any sort of violations or concerns with her probation? A: I know she briefly went to Sumner County Jail for an assault and was worried about probation violation at that point. Q: Are you aware if the violation occurred based off of that assault? A: I can’t recall on that. As to her parole violations, Appellant testified as follows: Q: Have you seen this document [Exhibit 23, copies of Appellant’s Allen County, Kentucky Criminal Records] before? A: It looks similar to the cell I was in, incarcerated in Kentucky, but its not exactly the same. Q: It indicates your current violations, right? A: Uh-huh. - 14 -  Q: What are the highlighted violations? A: Possession, possession – what? Possession of controlled substances? Q: Methamphetamine. A: For a violation? Q: Uh-huh. And what was the next one? A: Failure to report to parole officer as directed, failure to cooperate with parole officer, use of controlled substances. Q: They found probable cause and detained you for a period of time, right? A: Yes. Q: They detained you in jail. And then on November 26th, 2024, defendant stipulates to using illegal drugs and failing to report, right? A: I had to, but I didn’t fail to report ever. Q: But you stipulated in a court of law that you did fail to report, right? A: I had to, yes. In addition to the foregoing parole violations, Appellant has failed to obtain stable housing during the time the Child has been removed from her custody. According to the testimony, for a period of time after the Child’s removal, Appellant lived with a paramour. FSW Riggins expressed concerns due to the paramour’s prior drug use. After being detained in December of 2024, Appellant was discharged to Doors of Hope, a sober living home. However, children cannot not reside in the facility, and Appellant “anticipate[d] being there for 12 months” based on a court order. Appellant testified that her plan, should she be able to regain custody of the Child, was as follows: Q: And I know you’ve still got a while at Doors of Hope, when the time comes that you complete and are discharged from that program, where are you intending to live? I know you’ve said that your environment and the people around you are a trigger for you. What are your plans or the plans that you’ve developed within your program to keep you from having these issues in the future? - 15 -  A: Well, I’m definitely not going to go back near my hometown. I would like to stay in the Murfreesboro area where I’m at. It’s got a very strong community of recovery. I have options. I mean I would potentially like to be able to afford my own place, hopefully, for if the time comes that I can have [the Child], a two bedroom for us. And I do have a lot of resources, like Tennessee Voices is my advocate. They will help me get started. They have, like, housing and stuff. They would help me pay for that. They’re providing me with a car, paying my license off. If I can’t for some reason make that happen – I do foresee me being able to get my own place in the area of Murfreesboro, but there are always mother and children homes all over the place that I could potentially go to. It’s not ideal for me, but it wouldn’t be so bad because there’s kids to play with and stuff, but there are a lot of options. It’s something I’ll think about a little bit, because I just started working, but my plan is to move up there, too, and so I can get a little more income and stuff, and I’ve been saving money. Although Mother’s aspirations for future stability are commendable, our inquiry centers on her present ability to assume custody. As to Appellant’s employment, at the outset of the case, she reported working at 7- Eleven. Appellant then worked at Starstruck Farm, followed by ABC Technologies, followed by a period of unemployment. At the time of the termination hearing, Appellant testified: Q: Where are you working? A: Right now, I’m working at McDonald’s. Q: And what is your rate of pay there? A: It’s, I think, almost $14 an hour. Q: How many hours a week do you typically work? A: About 40. Appellant then testified she made a approximately $891.54 bi-weekly, and she had just started paying $600 in rent at the Doors of Hope living facility. She testified that she had no transportation and no license. From the foregoing testimony, Appellant’s ability and willingness to assume custody of this Child clearly have been hindered by her continuing drug use and the - 16 - instability caused by her addiction. At the time of the hearing to terminate her parental rights, Appellant was unable to care for the Child. Her own testimony supports this conclusion, to-wit: Q [to Appellant]: Is it your position today that you’re capable today to take custody of your child? A: I wouldn’t be able to take her right now, no. Q: And you are aware this has been going on for some time. Is that fair? A: Yes, sir. This testimony clearly shows that Appellant does not have the present ability to assume custody or care of the Child. See In re Nevaeh B., No. E2019-01539-COA-R3- PT, 2020 WL 1527001, at *7 (Tenn. Ct. App. Mar. 31, 2020). “When analyzing a parent’s ability to assume custody, we focus on his or her ‘lifestyle and circumstances.’” In re Jonathan M., No. E2018-00484-COA-R3-PT, 2018 WL 5310750, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 26, 2018)). Her unresolved addiction issues, lack of involvement in the Child’s life, parole violations, unstable housing, lack of transportation, and spotty employment history provide ample evidence to clearly and convincingly support the trial court’s conclusion that Appellant has failed to manifest an ability o