Full Opinion

J-A20033-26 NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37 SAUDA ISLAM ANIMA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF : PENNSYLVANIA : v. : : : KWAME WATKINS : : Appellant : No. 423 MDA 2026 Appeal from the Order Entered February 4, 2026 In the Court of Common Pleas of Centre County Civil Division at No: 2026-CV-0167-PR BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., STABILE, J., and BENDER, P.J.E. MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: OCTOBER 20, 2026 Kwame Watkins (Appellant) appeals pro se from the order granting the petition filed by Sauda Islam Anima (Mother) pursuant to the Protection from Abuse (PFA) Act, 23 Pa.C.S. §§ 6101-6122. After careful review, we affirm. Mother filed the underlying PFA petition on January 21, 2026. The trial court entered an order granting temporary relief that same day and held evidentiary hearings on January 29 and February 4, 2026. Mother was represented by counsel, who presented testimony from Mother and Mother’s friend, Rosanny Reyes. Father appeared pro se and testified in opposition to the petition. Mother testified that she and Appellant had been in a long-term romantic relationship and were the parents of three children: E.W., age 10; F.W., age 3; and G.W., age 1. N.T., 1/29/26, at 11-12. Mother stated that Appellant had “always been controlling” and she “did exactly as he said.” Id. at 13. J-A20033-26 Mother also testified that “for many years” she was scared and intimidated by Appellant. See id. Mother described the incident that prompted her to file the PFA petition as follows: On January 20th, [2026], 7:30 p.m., I heard [G.W.] crying. I was alarmed, so I went upstairs to just pick her up and console her. [Appellant] did not want to hand her over to me and eventually it got to a point where he picked me up by my throat and slammed me against the wall. Id. at 13-14. Mother testified that this was the first time Appellant had physically assaulted her, and as a result, she “called the police immediately.” Id. at 15. She explained that in the “weeks leading up to that physical assault” she had talked to Appellant about ending their relationship and Appellant had “been telling me to go die; go die, bitch. Earlier that morning he threatened to throw me out of our second-floor window.” Id. at 15-16. According to Mother, Appellant’s behavior had “gotten more volatile, more erratic” and “he’s just not who he used to be anymore.” Id. at 24. She stated, “from what I understand, when a man puts his hands on you, if he [does] it once, he will do it … again.” Id. at 25. Ms. Reyes testified next.1 She stated that she and Mother met “over a decade ago … through a mom’s group,” and that she also knew Appellant. Id. ____________________________________________ 1 Mother’s counsel explained that Ms. Reyes “would only be available by phone.” Id. at 43. When the trial court asked Appellant if he had “any objection to the telephone testimony,” Appellant replied, “I do not, Your Honor.” Id. at 44. -2- J-A20033-26 at 46. Ms. Reyes relayed that on January 20, 2026, Mother text messaged her that Appellant had “slammed her up against the wall,” and Mother “and the children were scared and locked themselves in a bedroom.” Id. Ms. Reyes testified that she called Mother. Ms. Reyes stated: I said would you like me to come? … Would you like me to come over and get you and the kids so that you’re feeling safe? And she was kind of hesitant. And then she asked [E.W.], do you feel good here? We can stay home or do you want to go with Auntie Rosanny, which is what they call me. And [E.W.] said I’m scared, I want to go with Auntie Rosanny. So my husband and I talked, got our kids somewhere safe, because we also have children, and then drove to [Mother and Appellant’s] house. Id. at 47. Ms. Reyes stated that when she arrived at Mother’s home, she observed Mother to be “really scared” and “very, very scared.” Id. at 49. Ms. Reyes testified that after she and her husband brought Mother and her children to their home, she “didn’t see [Mother’s] injuries until the following morning.” Id. at 48. Ms. Reyes explained: It looked like she had a scrape almost, or a bruise on where an Adam’s apple would be on a guy, more towards the right, and then it looked like a fingerprint or nail marks on the right side of her neck, and on the back of her neck, on the right side, again, there was a golf [ball] size lump. Id. Appellant contradicted the testimony of Mother and Ms. Reyes. He stated that on the evening of the incident, Mother was “just getting dramatic.” Id. at 81. He described Mother as “on me like I’m some sort of … kidnapper” -3- J-A20033-26 and “pulling on me.” Id. at 82. According to Appellant, Mother “took that opportunity to slam herself into the wall.” Id. at 83. However, when Mother’s counsel asked Appellant on cross-examination if his “body came into contact” with Mother, Appellant said he was “pretty sure” it did, and he was “certain that it did, yes.” Id. at 108. Appellant also testified that on the night of the incident, E.W. was “crying” and Appellant did not want E.W. “to see real violence” or “see fake violence.” Id. at 84. Appellant said that he told E.W. that “mommy must have slipped or something.” Id. at 85. Appellant recounted going downstairs, where Mother was on the phone with police, and described “raising my voice to speak to the person on the phone also.” Id. at 86. Appellant stated, “this was a mission from the beginning.” Id. at 101. Appellant attempted to introduce two videos he recorded of Mother on his cell phone, on December 31, 2025, and January 4, 2026, “that demonstrate my conduct when being confronted with conflict” by Mother. Id. at 111-14. Although the trial court watched the videos, the court subsequently sustained Mother’s objection to the videos based on relevancy. Id. at 115. The court advised Appellant, “if you have video footage from [the incident on] January 20th, we’re going to continue this case to another date.” Id. at 116. After Appellant said, “I do have video from that day,” the court remarked that it “was a little late to be letting me know” but “we’re going to be getting a new hearing date for you” to present video evidence from the January 20, 2026 incident. Id. at 118-19. -4- J-A20033-26 The trial court scheduled a second day of hearing for February 4, 2026. When the hearing began, Appellant advised the court that he would not be offering video evidence but asked “to offer additional testimony.” N.T., 2/4/26, at 3-4. Appellant stated that he “never abused any person” and “the protection from abuse order is not necessary.” Id. at 6-7. He maintained that Mother wanted to separate “and she does not want me to be near her. She wants me out of the house.” Id. at 18. After hearing the testimony and the parties’ closing arguments, the trial court stated that it found Mother had met her burden of proof and “there’s going to be a PFA [order] because I’m going to grant the PFA [petition].” Id. at 41. The court entered a final PFA order which, inter alia, excludes Appellant from Mother’s residence and prohibits Appellant from contacting Mother for a three-year period.2 On February 26, 2026, Appellant filed a notice of appeal, followed by a court-ordered Pa.R.A.P. 1925 concise statement of errors on March 23, 2026. See In re K.T.E.L., 983 A.2d 745, 747 n.1 (Pa. Super. 2009) (finding an appellant’s failure to file a simultaneous concise statement did not result in waiver where the appellant filed a late concise statement and there was no allegation of prejudice from the filing). ____________________________________________ 2 The order grants Mother primary physical custody of the parties’ children subject to Appellant’s partial physical custody, and states that the parties may “file a custody action to resolve the issues regarding custody.” Order, 2/4/26, at 3. In addition, the court verbally advised that “final PFA[ orders] are always temporary, [and both parties] have the right to … file a custody action.” N.T., 1/29/26, at 9. -5- J-A20033-26 Appellant presents the following questions for review: 1. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by permitting cross-examination of Appellant concerning video evidence that was never formally admitted into the evidentiary record, never preserved for appellate review, and never captured in the hearing transcript, thereby creating an incomplete record that prevents meaningful appellate review? 2. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by allowing [Mother’s] telephone witness testimony to be presented through the courtroom microphone system and fully captured in the official transcript, while Appellant’s video evidence was viewed privately at the bench and not preserved in the record, resulting in fundamentally unequal treatment of evidence? 3. Whether the trial court erred in finding [Mother] met her burden of proving abuse by a preponderance of the evidence where the record contains significant credibility concerns, [Mother’s] own witness testified that police were unable to file an emergency PFA because there was insufficient evidence on the night of the alleged incident, and the allegation that Appellant lifted [Mother] by the throat and slammed her against a wall while simultaneously holding an infant raises substantial questions regarding physical feasibility? 4. Whether the trial court gave unreasonable weight to the testimony of Rosanny Reyes regarding injuries she claims to have observed the morning after the alleged incident, where Reyes was not present during the alleged incident, where Reyes herself testified that [Mother] reported to her that police were unable to file an emergency PFA because there was insufficient evidence on the night in question? 5. Whether the trial court erred and/or abused its discretion by failing to meaningfully address the inconsistency between [Mother’s] serious allegations of abuse regarding the minor children as set forth in her petition, and her early stated intention to remove those same children as protected parties from the final order? Appellant’s Brief at 4-6. -6- J-A20033-26 This Court reviews a PFA order for an error of law or an abuse of discretion. Kaur v. Singh, 259 A.3d 505, 509 (Pa. Super. 2021). We have explained: A trial court does not abuse its discretion for a mere error of judgment; rather, an abuse of discretion occurs where the judgment is manifestly unreasonable or where the law is not applied or where the record shows that the action is a result of partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill will. Moreover, on appeal, this Court will defer to the credibility determinations of the trial court as to witnesses who appeared before it. It is well-settled that the trier of fact while passing upon the credibility of witnesses and the weight of the evidence produced, is free to believe all, part or none of the evidence. Finally, we review the evidence of record in the light most favorable to, and grant all reasonable inferences to, the party that prevailed before the PFA court. Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted). In his first issue, Appellant claims the trial court impermissibly permitted him to be cross-examined about the two cell phone videos which the trial court found to be irrelevant and inadmissible. This issue is waived due to Appellant’s failure to raise it during the hearing. See Pa.R.A.P. 302(a) (stating that issues “not raised in the trial court are waived and cannot be raised for the first time on appeal.”). Waiver notwithstanding, the trial court observed, the Pennsylvania Rules of Evidence place “control of the mode and order of examining witnesses” within the discretion of the trial judge. See Pa.R.E. 611(a). That control should be exercised to make the mode and order “effective for determining the truth.” Id. At the hearing on February 4, 2026, [Mother’s] counsel was permitted to question [Appellant] regarding the circumstances involved in the December 31, 2025 video footage, as she had not previously been given the opportunity to do so. Her questions were limited in nature and appear to have been geared toward -7- J-A20033-26 providing context for the scene that had played out in [Appellant’s] video. To the extent this issue is not waived altogether, the [c]ourt submits that it lacks merit. Trial Court Opinion (TCO), 4/23/26, at 4-5. We agree with the trial court. After the court watched the videos, Mother’s counsel asserted that they were “irrelevant for today’s purposes.” N.T., 1/29/26, at 115. The court agreed that “these are irrelevant,” and added that it “got the flavor of … the nine-minute-and-something-second video that we just watched.” Id. We discern no error in the court permitting counsel to cross-examine Appellant about the videos, as the court had the discretion to allow the questioning and did so because counsel’s questions “were limited in nature and … geared toward providing context.” TCO at 5 (citing Pa.R.E. 611). Appellant’s second issue concerning the admissibility of Ms. Reyes’ testimony is also waived. Appellant challenges the admission of Ms. Reyes’ testimony “through the courtroom microphone system and fully captured in the official transcript.” Appellant’s Brief at 4. As noted above, Appellant stated that he had no objection to Ms. Reyes testifying by telephone. See N.T., 1/29/26, at 44; Pa.R.E. 103(a)(1)(A) (providing that a party challenging the admission of evidence must make a timely objection on the record). To the extent Appellant claims that his cellphone videos, like Ms. Reyes’ testimony, should have been transcribed, Appellant disregards that he “did not have the videos prepared to be displayed on a monitor, such as a flash drive or similar storage device, but, rather, asked the [c]ourt to view the videos on his cell phone.” TCO at 4. -8- J-A20033-26 In his third, fourth and fifth issues, Appellant claims the evidence was insufficient for the trial court to find that Mother met her burden of proving abuse. In his third issue, Appellant states that Mother’s “account is uncorroborated, where the contemporaneous police response resulted in no arrest, no emergency PFA, and no documented injuries, where substantial questions regarding physical feasibility exist, and where the petition and trial testimony are internally inconsistent.” Appellant’s Brief at 23. In his fourth issue, Appellant argues the trial court “gave unreasonable weight to the testimony of Rosanny Reyes.” Id. at 27. Finally, in his fifth issue, Appellant impugns the trial court’s assessment of “the inconsistency between [Mother’s] allegations regarding the parties’ children and her decision to remove them as protected parties” in the PFA petition. Id. at 29. Appellant’s claims fail because “we defer to the trial court’s credibility determinations, and we are not entitled to re-weigh the evidence.” K.B. v. Tinsley, 208 A.3d 123, 129 (Pa. Super. 2019) (citation omitted). The PFA Act “does not seek to determine criminal culpability,” and a petitioner “is not required to establish abuse occurred beyond a reasonable doubt, but only to establish it by a preponderance of the evidence.” Bhatia v. Fernandez, 319 A.3d 517, 520 (Pa. Super. 2024) (citation omitted). “Notably, ‘the purpose of the PFA Act is to protect victims of domestic violence from those who perpetrate such abuse, with the primary goal of advance prevention of physical and sexual abuse.’” Id. -9- J-A20033-26 Section 6102(a) of the PFA Act contains five definitions of abuse. Here, the trial court found: Most pertinent to the instant case are paragraphs 1 and 2 of section 6102(a), which define abuse as: (1) Attempting to cause or intentionally, knowingly or recklessly causing bodily injury . . . (2) Placing another in reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury. TCO at 1. The trial court explained: As to paragraph 6102(a)(1), the [c]ourt found [Mother’s] testimony credible and did not credit [Appellant’s] testimony that he had not assaulted [Mother] on January 20, 2026, by picking her up by her neck and slamming her into a wall. That [Appellant] was attempting to cause her bodily harm in that instance can be fairly inferred from the conduct and surrounding circumstances. The [c]ourt also determined [Mother] had proven abuse as defined under paragraph 6102(a)(2). The credible evidence established that in the weeks leading up the January 20, 2026 incident, [Appellant] told [Mother] to “go die,” and he threated to throw her out a window that very morning. Things escalated later that evening when [Appellant] picked [Mother] up by the neck and slammed her into a wall while holding the parties’ youngest child and as the other two children stood by. A PFA plaintiff need not prove actual injury to succeed on a claim; the proof required is that the plaintiff had a reasonable fear of imminent serious bodily injury. Clearly, [Mother] her burden in this respect through her credible testimony. Id. at 3. The trial court did not err or abuse its discretion, as the record provides ample evidence to support the entry of the PFA order. Order affirmed. - 10 - J-A20033-26 Judgment Entered. Benjamin D. Kohler, Esq. Prothonotary Date: 10/20/2026 - 11 -