Full Opinion

No. 1130 November 18, 2026 141 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON J. M. L., Petitioner-Respondent, v. JONATHAN GERALD LORENZ, Respondent-Appellant. Marion County Circuit Court 22PO06086; A184057 Thomas M. Hart, Judge. Submitted September 22, 2025. Jason Shandler and Daniel J. Lounsbury filed the briefs for appellant. Andrew W. Newsom filed the briefs for respondent. Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and Pagán, Judge. PAGÁN, J. Affirmed. 142 J. M. L. v. Lorenz PAGÁN, J. Respondent appeals from an order, after a contested hearing under ORS 163.767, upholding and continuing an ex parte permanent sexual abuse protective order (SAPO) under ORS 163.760 to 163.777 (describing procedures for a SAPO petition and order).1 In six assignments of error, respon- dent challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of the SAPO and asserts various procedural errors by the trial court. Respondent also appeals from a supplemental judg- ment awarding petitioner attorney fees under ORS 20.105(1), challenging the award in his seventh assignment of error. By cross-assignment of error, petitioner seeks to uphold the SAPO but asserts that the trial court erred in issuing an order allowing a contested hearing on the SAPO, because respondent’s request for hearing was untimely, hav- ing been filed after the 30-day period authorized by ORS 163.765(6).2 Petitioner further contends that respondent has not preserved his challenges to the supplemental judgment’s attorney fee award. As explained below, we agree with petitioner that, having failed to timely request a hearing on the ex parte SAPO, respondent was not entitled to a hearing to con- test the order, because the ex parte SAPO was confirmed by operation of law. Accordingly, we do not address respon- dent’s assignments of error challenging the trial court’s con- tinuation of the SAPO after the contested hearing, and we affirm the trial court’s judgment upholding the SAPO. And, as discussed in this opinion, as for respondent’s challenge to the supplemental judgment’s award of attorney fees, we 1 Ordinarily, a SAPO has a duration of five years. ORS 163.765(7). But there are circumstances under which a permanent order may be issued. ORS 163.765 (8)(c) provides: “The circuit court may enter a permanent restraining order if the court finds that it is objectively reasonable for a person in the petitioner’s situa- tion to fear for the person’s physical safety and that the passage of time or a change in circumstances would not dissipate that fear.” The order signed by the court made that finding. 2 Petitioner preserved his cross-assignment by filing an objection to the order allowing the hearing in which he argued that there was no basis for a hearing, because respondent had not requested a hearing within 30 days of service of the restraining order, as required by ORS 163.765. Cite as 355 Or App 141 (2026) 143 reject on its merits respondent’s contention that the trial court erred in failing to make a finding necessary to award attorney fees under ORS 20.105(1), and we further agree with petitioner that respondent failed to preserve his con- tention that the trial court erred in relying on an incorrect statute in awarding fees. We therefore affirm the SAPO and the supplemental judgment. The procedural facts are largely undisputed. On June 15, 2022, petitioner filed a petition in the Marion County Circuit Court seeking a SAPO under ORS 163.763,3 directed at respondent. On June 16, 2022, after an ex parte hearing under ORS 163.765, the court issued the SAPO. Respondent was served with the SAPO on July 14, 2022. Under ORS 163.765(6)(a) and (7),4 respondent had 3 ORS 163.763 provides: “(1) A person who has been subjected to sexual abuse and who reason- ably fears for the person’s physical safety may petition the circuit court for a restraining order if: “(a) The person and the respondent are not family or household members; “(b) The respondent is at least 18 years of age; and “(c) The respondent is not prohibited from contacting the person pursu- ant to a foreign restraining order as defined in ORS 24.190, an order issued under ORS 30.866, 124.015, 124.020, 163.738 or 419B.845 or an order entered in a criminal action. “(2)(a) A petition seeking relief under ORS 163.760 to 163.777 must be filed in the circuit court for the county in which the petitioner or the respondent resides or in which the abuse occurred. The petition may be filed, without the appointment of a guardian ad litem, by a person who is at least 12 years of age or by a parent or lawful guardian of a person who is under 18 years of age. “(b) The petition must allege that: “(A) The petitioner reasonably fears for the petitioner’s physical safety with respect to the respondent; and “(B) The respondent subjected the petitioner to sexual abuse. “(c) The petition must include allegations made under oath or affirma- tion or a declaration under penalty of perjury. “(d) The petitioner has the burden of proving a claim under ORS 163.760 to 163.777 by a preponderance of the evidence.” 4 ORS 163.765 provides, in relevant part: “(1) When a petition is filed in accordance with ORS 163.763, the circuit court shall hold an ex parte hearing in person or by telephone on the day the petition is filed or on the following judicial day. Upon a finding that it is objectively reasonable for a person in the petitioner’s situation to fear for the person’s physical safety if an order granting relief under ORS 163.760 to 163.777 is not entered and that the respondent has subjected the petitioner to sexual abuse, the circuit court: 144 J. M. L. v. Lorenz until the 30th day from the date of service (which the par- ties agree was August 13) within which to request a hearing on the ex parte order. On August 10, 2022, respondent filed a document entitled “Motion to Strike,” citing ORCP 21 E.5 The document asserted: “NOW HERE COMES, [respondent] by and through his attorney Daniel J. Lounsbury, and requests that this Petitioner’s Petition for Sexual Abuse Protective Orders herein be dismissed pursuant to ORCP 21 E Motion as a redundant matter[.]” Respondent also asserted in the motion that the petition should be stricken because it was “frivolous and sham.”6 The trial court denied respondent’s motion on November 1, 2022. “(a) Shall enter an order restraining the respondent from contacting the petitioner and from intimidating, molesting, interfering with or menacing the petitioner, or attempting to intimidate, molest, interfere with or menace the petitioner. “* * * * * “(4) If the circuit court enters a restraining order under subsection (1) of this section: “(a) The clerk of the court * * * shall have a true copy of the petition and the restraining order delivered to the county sheriff for service upon the respondent * * *. “* * * * * “(6)(a) Within 30 days after a restraining order is served under this section, the respondent may request a circuit court hearing upon any relief granted. “* * * * * “(7) If the respondent fails to request a hearing within 30 days after a restraining order is served, the restraining order is confirmed by operation of law.” (Emphasis added.) 5 ORCP 21 E provides: “On motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if no responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, on motion made by a party within 10 days after the service of the pleading on such party or on the court’s own initiative at any time, the court may order stricken: “E(1) any sham, frivolous, or irrelevant pleading or defense or any plead- ing containing more than one claim or defense not separately stated; “E(2) any insufficient defense or any sham, frivolous, irrelevant, or redundant matter inserted in a pleading; or “E(3) any response to an amended pleading, or part thereof, that raises new issues, when justice so requires.” 6 In addition to asserting that the petition should be dismissed as a “redun- dant matter,” the August 10, 2022, motion asserted: Cite as 355 Or App 141 (2026) 145 In the meantime, on August 18, 2022, the 34th day after issuance of the ex parte SAPO, respondent filed a doc- ument entitled “Objection to Restraining Order.”7 At a point that cannot be determined from the record, but according to the briefing provided by the par- ties, the trial court set a “trial date” of December 9, 2022. Then, on December 1, 2022, respondent filed a request for a postponement. On December 7, in response to both the August 18, 2022, “objection” and the December 1, 2022, request for postponement, petitioner filed a “motion for judgment on the pleadings,” citing ORCP 21 B, and arguing that respon- dent was not entitled to a hearing.8 Petitioner asserted that respondent’s August 18, 2022, objection to the SAPO was untimely and petitioner sought judgment on that basis. On December 8, 2022, the court granted petitioner’s motion and issued an order that “confirmed” the June 16 protective order. Respondent did not appeal that order. Six months later, on July 11, 2023, respondent requested a hearing on the June 16, 2022, SAPO.9 Although the request was dated July 11, 2022, in fact it was not filed with the court until July 11, 2023. A different judge of the Marion County Circuit Court considered the parties’ argu- ments and briefing, including petitioner’s assertion that respondent’s request for hearing was untimely and that the SAPO had become final by operation of law and by virtue of the December 8, 2022, order confirming the SAPO. The court issued an order on September 20, 2023, granting the request for hearing, stating simply that “no evidentiary “Petitioner can not reasonably fear for his safety given that Respondent has been assigned to a different National Guard Armory, lives in different cities (Respondent is currently in Washington state but lives in Portland) does not outrank Petitioner and Petitioner is taller and larger than Respondent.” 7 The document stated, simply: “COMES NOW [respondent] by and through his attorney, Daniel J. Lounsbury, and objects to the restraining order.” 8 ORCP 21 B provides: “After the pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to delay the trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.” 9 It appears to be undisputed that the document was filed on July 11, 2023. 146 J. M. L. v. Lorenz hearing on the merits took place and the court will schedule one in the normal course.” The court held a hearing and issued an order on March 14, 2024, continuing the SAPO. In a supplemen- tal judgment, the court awarded petitioner attorney fees. Respondent now appeals, challenging both the March 14, 2024, order and the supplemental judgment. Because it is dispositive, we begin our discussion with petitioner’s cross-assignment of error, which challenges the court’s September 20, 2023, order scheduling a hearing on the SAPO. A respondent has an opportunity to contest an ex parte SAPO but must raise the challenge within 30 days of service. ORS 163.765(7) provides: “If the respondent fails to request a hearing within 30 days after a restraining order is served, the restraining order is confirmed by operation of law.” (Emphasis added.) Citing that provision, petitioner asserts in his cross-assignment that because respondent failed to request a hearing within 30 days after he was served with the restraining order, the ex parte SAPO became final by oper- ation of law and was not subject to challenge. Additionally, petitioner notes that respondent did not appeal the circuit court’s order of December 8, 2022, which had explicitly “con- firmed” the ex parte SAPO. Respondent responds that he did in fact timely request a hearing on the ex parte SAPO. He contends that his motion of August 10, 2022, seeking to dismiss the peti- tion as “a redundant matter” and “frivolous or sham,” served both as a motion to dismiss and a request for hearing. Respondent contends, further, that petitioner’s December 6, 2022, motion for judgment on the pleadings was untimely and procedurally defective, and that the circuit court there- fore erred in granting the motion and confirming the SAPO without first providing a contested hearing. Finally, respon- dent contends that the circuit court had inherent authority under ORCP 71 C to set aside the December 8, 2022, order confirming the ex parte SAPO. The parties’ arguments present procedural ques- tions under the statutes governing the SAPO. As an initial Cite as 355 Or App 141 (2026) 147 matter, we reject respondent’s contention that his August 10, 2022, “motion to strike” constituted a request for hear- ing. ORS 163.765(6)(a) unambiguously states that “[w]ithin 30 days after a restraining order is served under this sec- tion, the respondent may request a circuit court hearing upon any relief granted.” The August 10, 2022, motion was not a request for hearing; further, it was directed against and sought to strike or dismiss the petition, not the ex parte SAPO. We conclude that respondent’s motion did not consti- tute a request for hearing. Further, although respondent’s “objection,” filed on August 18, 2022, did explicitly object to the SAPO, it was filed beyond the 30-day deadline stated in ORS 163.765(6), after which the ex parte SAPO was considered to be confirmed “by operation of law.” ORS 163.765(7). The ex parte SAPO was sub- sequently also confirmed by the court on December 8, 2022, and respondent did not appeal that order. Thus, the time for requesting a hearing to contest the ex parte SAPO had expired, and the SAPO was “confirmed.”10 “Confirmed” is not defined in the statutes, but we have no hesitation concluding that, as used in ORS 163.765(7), “confirmed” means adhered to. See Merriam Webster online Dictionary (defining “confirm” as “to give approval to : ratify ”) (https://www.merriam-web- ster.com/dictionary/confirm, accessed Oct 13, 2026)); see also State v. Dickerson, 356 Or 822, 831, 345 P3d 447 (2015) (when statutes do not define such terms, we assume that the legisla- ture intended them to have their plain, ordinary meanings.). The confirmed permanent SAPO was thus final. We note that respondent was not necessarily with- out a remedy from the confirmed SAPO. Respondent could have sought relief under ORCP 71 B or C to set aside the original ex parte SAPO and the court’s order of December 8, 2022, confirming the ex parte SAPO.11 Indeed, respondent 10 Additionally, we note that ORS 163.775 provides that “[a]t any time after the time period set forth in ORS 163.765(6) * * * [a] party may request that the circuit court modify terms in the restraining order for good cause shown.” 11 ORCP 71 C provides: “This rule does not limit the inherent power of a court to modify a judg- ment within a reasonable time, or the power of a court to entertain an inde- pendent action to relieve a party from a judgment, or the power of a court to grant relief to a defendant under Rule 7 D(6)(d), or the power of a court to set aside a judgment for fraud upon the court.” 148 J. M. L. v. Lorenz argues in response to the cross-assignment that the court had inherent authority under ORCP 71 C, to correct its “errors”; but that is not what the court did here. It is not apparent on this record that, in holding a hearing, the cir- cuit court was acting under its inherent authority under ORCP 71 C to either correct an error or set aside the prior orders. Additionally, the court did not set aside the SAPO or the order confirming the SAPO—after a hearing, the court continued the SAPO. We agree with petitioner that, because the SAPO had been “confirmed,” both by operation of law and by the circuit court’s December 8, 2022, order, respon- dent’s request for hearing was untimely, and there was no basis for a hearing in the absence of a ruling providing a basis for reconsidering the determination that the SAPO was confirmed. We next address respondent’s seventh assignment of error, in which he challenges the supplemental judgment awarding petitioner attorney fees under ORS 20.105(1).12 Under ORS 20.105(1), a prevailing party is entitled to attor- ney fees if the court finds that the other party “willfully disobeyed a court order or that there was no objectively reasonable basis for asserting the claim, defense or ground for appeal.” Here, after hearing argument on petitioner’s request for attorney fees, the court stated that it believed that an award of fees was appropriate under the circum- stances and that it would award a fee.13 In a supplemental 12 ORS 20.105(1) provides: “In any civil action, suit or other proceeding in a circuit court or in the regular division or the magistrate division of the Oregon Tax Court, or in any civil appeal to or review by the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court, the court shall award reasonable attorney fees to a party against whom a claim, defense or ground for appeal or review is asserted, if that party is a pre- vailing party in the proceeding and to be paid by the party asserting the claim, defense or ground, upon a finding by the court that the party willfully disobeyed a court order or that there was no objectively reasonable basis for asserting the claim, defense or ground for appeal.” 13 The court stated: “I sat through the hearing, it was both visible and palpable the effect that it had on [petitioner] from the testimony, I think that I wouldn’t say dilatory, but it was not prosecuted with timeliness at times and I believe that the attorneys fees requested by [petitioner] are appropriate in the circumstances as well as the appearance for today, so add that on and submit a judgment accordingly and we’ll go from there.” Cite as 355 Or App 141 (2026) 149 judgment awarding fees under ORS 20.105(1), the court cited criteria from ORS 20.075:14 “(1) the conduct of the parties in the transactions that gave rise to the litigation; (2) the objective reasonableness of the claims and defenses asserted by the parties; (3) the extent to which an award of attorney fees in the case would deter others from asserting good faith claims or defenses in similar cases; (4) the extent to which an award of attorney fees in the case would deter others from asserting meritless claims or defenses; (5) the objective reasonableness of the parties and the diligence of the parties and their attorneys during the proceedings; (6) the objective reasonableness of the parties and the diligence of the parties in pursuing set- tlement of the dispute.” Respondent’s first contention is that the court lacked authority to award attorney fees under ORS 20.105(1), because the court did not make a finding that there was “no objectively reasonable” basis for respondent’s response to the SAPO. We reject respondent’s contention. The trial court had before it written submissions and arguments from both parties stating the correct legal standard. It is clear from the trial court’s written ruling that the trial court 14 ORS 20.075(1) provides: “(1) A court shall consider the following factors in determining whether to award attorney fees in any case in which an award of attorney fees is authorized by statute and in which the court has discretion to decide whether to award attorney fees: “(a) The conduct of the parties in the transactions or occurrences that gave rise to the litigation, including any conduct of a party that was reckless, willful, malicious, in bad faith or illegal. “(b) The objective reasonableness of the claims and defenses asserted by the parties. “(c) The extent to which an award of an attorney fee in the case would deter others from asserting good faith claims or defenses in similar cases. “(d) The extent to which an award of an attorney fee in the case would deter others from asserting meritless claims and defenses. “(e) The objective reasonableness of the parties and the diligence of the parties and their attorneys during the proceedings. “(f) The objective reasonableness of the parties and the diligence of the parties in pursuing settlement of the dispute. “(g) The amount that the court has awarded as a prevailing party fee under ORS 20.190. “(h) Such other factors as the court may consider appropriate under the circumstances of the case.” 150 J. M. L. v. Lorenz was aware of the correct standard. The court cited ORS 20.105 as the statute under which attorney fees were being awarded, and the court’s written findings stated that it had considered “the objective reasonableness of the claims and defenses asserted by the parties.” Although the court did not make an explicit finding that respondent had no objectively reasonable basis for his objection to the SAPO, the finding is implicit from the trial court’s conclusion awarding fees. See Magno, LLC v. Bowden, 313 Or App 686, 690, 496 P3d 1049 (2021) (holding that the court’s finding of no objectively reasonable basis was implicit in the court’s discussion of the correct legal standard and its conclusion that the party was entitled to those fees. “Thus, the only plausible reading of the order is that the court made the necessary finding.”). In addition, respondent asserts that, in awarding fees, the trial court incorrectly considered factors from ORS 20.075. We agree with petitioner that the argument respon- dent makes on appeal was not made below, despite an oppor- tunity to do so. Respondent argued below that his opposition to the SAPO was reasonable, because a military tribunal had already issued a restraining order against respondent and, further, that the factual circumstances did not support the issuance of the SAPO. Respondent did not express to the trial court the concerns that he now raises that the trial court based its ruling on incorrect criteria. We conclude that respondent’s argument is not preserved and we therefore decline to consider it. Affirmed.