J. M. L. v. Lorenz
CourtCourt of Appeals of Oregon
Date FiledNovember 18, 2026
DocketA184057
JudgePag n
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
No. 1130 November 18, 2026 141
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF OREGON
J. M. L.,
Petitioner-Respondent,
v.
JONATHAN GERALD LORENZ,
Respondent-Appellant.
Marion County Circuit Court
22PO06086; A184057
Thomas M. Hart, Judge.
Submitted September 22, 2025.
Jason Shandler and Daniel J. Lounsbury filed the briefs
for appellant.
Andrew W. Newsom filed the briefs for respondent.
Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and
Pagán, Judge.
PAGÁN, J.
Affirmed.
142 J. M. L. v. Lorenz
PAGÁN, J.
Respondent appeals from an order, after a contested
hearing under ORS 163.767, upholding and continuing an
ex parte permanent sexual abuse protective order (SAPO)
under ORS 163.760 to 163.777 (describing procedures for a
SAPO petition and order).1 In six assignments of error, respon-
dent challenges the sufficiency of the evidence in support of
the SAPO and asserts various procedural errors by the trial
court. Respondent also appeals from a supplemental judg-
ment awarding petitioner attorney fees under ORS 20.105(1),
challenging the award in his seventh assignment of error.
By cross-assignment of error, petitioner seeks to
uphold the SAPO but asserts that the trial court erred in
issuing an order allowing a contested hearing on the SAPO,
because respondent’s request for hearing was untimely, hav-
ing been filed after the 30-day period authorized by ORS
163.765(6).2 Petitioner further contends that respondent has
not preserved his challenges to the supplemental judgment’s
attorney fee award.
As explained below, we agree with petitioner that,
having failed to timely request a hearing on the ex parte
SAPO, respondent was not entitled to a hearing to con-
test the order, because the ex parte SAPO was confirmed
by operation of law. Accordingly, we do not address respon-
dent’s assignments of error challenging the trial court’s con-
tinuation of the SAPO after the contested hearing, and we
affirm the trial court’s judgment upholding the SAPO. And,
as discussed in this opinion, as for respondent’s challenge
to the supplemental judgment’s award of attorney fees, we
1
Ordinarily, a SAPO has a duration of five years. ORS 163.765(7). But there
are circumstances under which a permanent order may be issued. ORS 163.765
(8)(c) provides:
“The circuit court may enter a permanent restraining order if the court
finds that it is objectively reasonable for a person in the petitioner’s situa-
tion to fear for the person’s physical safety and that the passage of time or a
change in circumstances would not dissipate that fear.”
The order signed by the court made that finding.
2
Petitioner preserved his cross-assignment by filing an objection to the order
allowing the hearing in which he argued that there was no basis for a hearing,
because respondent had not requested a hearing within 30 days of service of the
restraining order, as required by ORS 163.765.
Cite as 355 Or App 141 (2026) 143
reject on its merits respondent’s contention that the trial
court erred in failing to make a finding necessary to award
attorney fees under ORS 20.105(1), and we further agree
with petitioner that respondent failed to preserve his con-
tention that the trial court erred in relying on an incorrect
statute in awarding fees. We therefore affirm the SAPO and
the supplemental judgment.
The procedural facts are largely undisputed. On
June 15, 2022, petitioner filed a petition in the Marion
County Circuit Court seeking a SAPO under ORS 163.763,3
directed at respondent. On June 16, 2022, after an ex parte
hearing under ORS 163.765, the court issued the SAPO.
Respondent was served with the SAPO on July 14,
2022. Under ORS 163.765(6)(a) and (7),4 respondent had
3
ORS 163.763 provides:
“(1) A person who has been subjected to sexual abuse and who reason-
ably fears for the person’s physical safety may petition the circuit court for a
restraining order if:
“(a) The person and the respondent are not family or household members;
“(b) The respondent is at least 18 years of age; and
“(c) The respondent is not prohibited from contacting the person pursu-
ant to a foreign restraining order as defined in ORS 24.190, an order issued
under ORS 30.866, 124.015, 124.020, 163.738 or 419B.845 or an order entered
in a criminal action.
“(2)(a) A petition seeking relief under ORS 163.760 to 163.777 must be filed
in the circuit court for the county in which the petitioner or the respondent
resides or in which the abuse occurred. The petition may be filed, without the
appointment of a guardian ad litem, by a person who is at least 12 years of age
or by a parent or lawful guardian of a person who is under 18 years of age.
“(b) The petition must allege that:
“(A) The petitioner reasonably fears for the petitioner’s physical safety
with respect to the respondent; and
“(B) The respondent subjected the petitioner to sexual abuse.
“(c) The petition must include allegations made under oath or affirma-
tion or a declaration under penalty of perjury.
“(d) The petitioner has the burden of proving a claim under ORS 163.760
to 163.777 by a preponderance of the evidence.”
4
ORS 163.765 provides, in relevant part:
“(1) When a petition is filed in accordance with ORS 163.763, the circuit
court shall hold an ex parte hearing in person or by telephone on the day
the petition is filed or on the following judicial day. Upon a finding that it
is objectively reasonable for a person in the petitioner’s situation to fear for
the person’s physical safety if an order granting relief under ORS 163.760 to
163.777 is not entered and that the respondent has subjected the petitioner
to sexual abuse, the circuit court:
144 J. M. L. v. Lorenz
until the 30th day from the date of service (which the par-
ties agree was August 13) within which to request a hearing
on the ex parte order. On August 10, 2022, respondent filed
a document entitled “Motion to Strike,” citing ORCP 21 E.5
The document asserted:
“NOW HERE COMES, [respondent] by and through his
attorney Daniel J. Lounsbury, and requests that this
Petitioner’s Petition for Sexual Abuse Protective Orders
herein be dismissed pursuant to ORCP 21 E Motion as a
redundant matter[.]”
Respondent also asserted in the motion that the petition
should be stricken because it was “frivolous and sham.”6 The
trial court denied respondent’s motion on November 1, 2022.
“(a) Shall enter an order restraining the respondent from contacting the
petitioner and from intimidating, molesting, interfering with or menacing
the petitioner, or attempting to intimidate, molest, interfere with or menace
the petitioner.
“* * * * *
“(4) If the circuit court enters a restraining order under subsection (1) of
this section:
“(a) The clerk of the court * * * shall have a true copy of the petition and
the restraining order delivered to the county sheriff for service upon the
respondent * * *.
“* * * * *
“(6)(a) Within 30 days after a restraining order is served under this
section, the respondent may request a circuit court hearing upon any relief
granted.
“* * * * *
“(7) If the respondent fails to request a hearing within 30 days after a
restraining order is served, the restraining order is confirmed by operation of
law.”
(Emphasis added.)
5
ORCP 21 E provides:
“On motion made by a party before responding to a pleading or, if no
responsive pleading is permitted by these rules, on motion made by a party
within 10 days after the service of the pleading on such party or on the court’s
own initiative at any time, the court may order stricken:
“E(1) any sham, frivolous, or irrelevant pleading or defense or any plead-
ing containing more than one claim or defense not separately stated;
“E(2) any insufficient defense or any sham, frivolous, irrelevant, or
redundant matter inserted in a pleading; or
“E(3) any response to an amended pleading, or part thereof, that raises
new issues, when justice so requires.”
6
In addition to asserting that the petition should be dismissed as a “redun-
dant matter,” the August 10, 2022, motion asserted:
Cite as 355 Or App 141 (2026) 145
In the meantime, on August 18, 2022, the 34th day
after issuance of the ex parte SAPO, respondent filed a doc-
ument entitled “Objection to Restraining Order.”7
At a point that cannot be determined from the
record, but according to the briefing provided by the par-
ties, the trial court set a “trial date” of December 9, 2022.
Then, on December 1, 2022, respondent filed a request for a
postponement.
On December 7, in response to both the August
18, 2022, “objection” and the December 1, 2022, request for
postponement, petitioner filed a “motion for judgment on
the pleadings,” citing ORCP 21 B, and arguing that respon-
dent was not entitled to a hearing.8 Petitioner asserted that
respondent’s August 18, 2022, objection to the SAPO was
untimely and petitioner sought judgment on that basis. On
December 8, 2022, the court granted petitioner’s motion
and issued an order that “confirmed” the June 16 protective
order. Respondent did not appeal that order.
Six months later, on July 11, 2023, respondent
requested a hearing on the June 16, 2022, SAPO.9 Although
the request was dated July 11, 2022, in fact it was not filed
with the court until July 11, 2023. A different judge of the
Marion County Circuit Court considered the parties’ argu-
ments and briefing, including petitioner’s assertion that
respondent’s request for hearing was untimely and that the
SAPO had become final by operation of law and by virtue
of the December 8, 2022, order confirming the SAPO. The
court issued an order on September 20, 2023, granting the
request for hearing, stating simply that “no evidentiary
“Petitioner can not reasonably fear for his safety given that Respondent has
been assigned to a different National Guard Armory, lives in different cities
(Respondent is currently in Washington state but lives in Portland) does not
outrank Petitioner and Petitioner is taller and larger than Respondent.”
7
The document stated, simply:
“COMES NOW [respondent] by and through his attorney, Daniel J.
Lounsbury, and objects to the restraining order.”
8
ORCP 21 B provides:
“After the pleadings are closed, but within such time as not to delay the
trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings.”
9
It appears to be undisputed that the document was filed on July 11, 2023.
146 J. M. L. v. Lorenz
hearing on the merits took place and the court will schedule
one in the normal course.”
The court held a hearing and issued an order on
March 14, 2024, continuing the SAPO. In a supplemen-
tal judgment, the court awarded petitioner attorney fees.
Respondent now appeals, challenging both the March 14,
2024, order and the supplemental judgment.
Because it is dispositive, we begin our discussion
with petitioner’s cross-assignment of error, which challenges
the court’s September 20, 2023, order scheduling a hearing
on the SAPO. A respondent has an opportunity to contest an
ex parte SAPO but must raise the challenge within 30 days
of service. ORS 163.765(7) provides:
“If the respondent fails to request a hearing within 30
days after a restraining order is served, the restraining
order is confirmed by operation of law.”
(Emphasis added.) Citing that provision, petitioner asserts
in his cross-assignment that because respondent failed to
request a hearing within 30 days after he was served with the
restraining order, the ex parte SAPO became final by oper-
ation of law and was not subject to challenge. Additionally,
petitioner notes that respondent did not appeal the circuit
court’s order of December 8, 2022, which had explicitly “con-
firmed” the ex parte SAPO.
Respondent responds that he did in fact timely
request a hearing on the ex parte SAPO. He contends that
his motion of August 10, 2022, seeking to dismiss the peti-
tion as “a redundant matter” and “frivolous or sham,” served
both as a motion to dismiss and a request for hearing.
Respondent contends, further, that petitioner’s December 6,
2022, motion for judgment on the pleadings was untimely
and procedurally defective, and that the circuit court there-
fore erred in granting the motion and confirming the SAPO
without first providing a contested hearing. Finally, respon-
dent contends that the circuit court had inherent authority
under ORCP 71 C to set aside the December 8, 2022, order
confirming the ex parte SAPO.
The parties’ arguments present procedural ques-
tions under the statutes governing the SAPO. As an initial
Cite as 355 Or App 141 (2026) 147
matter, we reject respondent’s contention that his August
10, 2022, “motion to strike” constituted a request for hear-
ing. ORS 163.765(6)(a) unambiguously states that “[w]ithin
30 days after a restraining order is served under this sec-
tion, the respondent may request a circuit court hearing
upon any relief granted.” The August 10, 2022, motion was
not a request for hearing; further, it was directed against
and sought to strike or dismiss the petition, not the ex parte
SAPO. We conclude that respondent’s motion did not consti-
tute a request for hearing.
Further, although respondent’s “objection,” filed on
August 18, 2022, did explicitly object to the SAPO, it was filed
beyond the 30-day deadline stated in ORS 163.765(6), after
which the ex parte SAPO was considered to be confirmed “by
operation of law.” ORS 163.765(7). The ex parte SAPO was sub-
sequently also confirmed by the court on December 8, 2022,
and respondent did not appeal that order. Thus, the time
for requesting a hearing to contest the ex parte SAPO had
expired, and the SAPO was “confirmed.”10 “Confirmed” is not
defined in the statutes, but we have no hesitation concluding
that, as used in ORS 163.765(7), “confirmed” means adhered
to. See Merriam Webster online Dictionary (defining “confirm”
as “to give approval to : ratify ”) (https://www.merriam-web-
ster.com/dictionary/confirm, accessed Oct 13, 2026)); see also
State v. Dickerson, 356 Or 822, 831, 345 P3d 447 (2015) (when
statutes do not define such terms, we assume that the legisla-
ture intended them to have their plain, ordinary meanings.).
The confirmed permanent SAPO was thus final.
We note that respondent was not necessarily with-
out a remedy from the confirmed SAPO. Respondent could
have sought relief under ORCP 71 B or C to set aside the
original ex parte SAPO and the court’s order of December 8,
2022, confirming the ex parte SAPO.11 Indeed, respondent
10
Additionally, we note that ORS 163.775 provides that “[a]t any time after
the time period set forth in ORS 163.765(6) * * * [a] party may request that the
circuit court modify terms in the restraining order for good cause shown.”
11
ORCP 71 C provides:
“This rule does not limit the inherent power of a court to modify a judg-
ment within a reasonable time, or the power of a court to entertain an inde-
pendent action to relieve a party from a judgment, or the power of a court to
grant relief to a defendant under Rule 7 D(6)(d), or the power of a court to set
aside a judgment for fraud upon the court.”
148 J. M. L. v. Lorenz
argues in response to the cross-assignment that the court
had inherent authority under ORCP 71 C, to correct its
“errors”; but that is not what the court did here. It is not
apparent on this record that, in holding a hearing, the cir-
cuit court was acting under its inherent authority under
ORCP 71 C to either correct an error or set aside the prior
orders. Additionally, the court did not set aside the SAPO or
the order confirming the SAPO—after a hearing, the court
continued the SAPO. We agree with petitioner that, because
the SAPO had been “confirmed,” both by operation of law
and by the circuit court’s December 8, 2022, order, respon-
dent’s request for hearing was untimely, and there was no
basis for a hearing in the absence of a ruling providing a
basis for reconsidering the determination that the SAPO
was confirmed.
We next address respondent’s seventh assignment
of error, in which he challenges the supplemental judgment
awarding petitioner attorney fees under ORS 20.105(1).12
Under ORS 20.105(1), a prevailing party is entitled to attor-
ney fees if the court finds that the other party “willfully
disobeyed a court order or that there was no objectively
reasonable basis for asserting the claim, defense or ground
for appeal.” Here, after hearing argument on petitioner’s
request for attorney fees, the court stated that it believed
that an award of fees was appropriate under the circum-
stances and that it would award a fee.13 In a supplemental
12
ORS 20.105(1) provides:
“In any civil action, suit or other proceeding in a circuit court or in the
regular division or the magistrate division of the Oregon Tax Court, or in
any civil appeal to or review by the Court of Appeals or Supreme Court, the
court shall award reasonable attorney fees to a party against whom a claim,
defense or ground for appeal or review is asserted, if that party is a pre-
vailing party in the proceeding and to be paid by the party asserting the
claim, defense or ground, upon a finding by the court that the party willfully
disobeyed a court order or that there was no objectively reasonable basis for
asserting the claim, defense or ground for appeal.”
13
The court stated:
“I sat through the hearing, it was both visible and palpable the effect that it
had on [petitioner] from the testimony, I think that I wouldn’t say dilatory,
but it was not prosecuted with timeliness at times and I believe that the
attorneys fees requested by [petitioner] are appropriate in the circumstances
as well as the appearance for today, so add that on and submit a judgment
accordingly and we’ll go from there.”
Cite as 355 Or App 141 (2026) 149
judgment awarding fees under ORS 20.105(1), the court
cited criteria from ORS 20.075:14
“(1) the conduct of the parties in the transactions that
gave rise to the litigation; (2) the objective reasonableness
of the claims and defenses asserted by the parties; (3) the
extent to which an award of attorney fees in the case would
deter others from asserting good faith claims or defenses in
similar cases; (4) the extent to which an award of attorney
fees in the case would deter others from asserting meritless
claims or defenses; (5) the objective reasonableness of the
parties and the diligence of the parties and their attorneys
during the proceedings; (6) the objective reasonableness of
the parties and the diligence of the parties in pursuing set-
tlement of the dispute.”
Respondent’s first contention is that the court
lacked authority to award attorney fees under ORS 20.105(1),
because the court did not make a finding that there was
“no objectively reasonable” basis for respondent’s response
to the SAPO. We reject respondent’s contention. The trial
court had before it written submissions and arguments from
both parties stating the correct legal standard. It is clear
from the trial court’s written ruling that the trial court
14
ORS 20.075(1) provides:
“(1) A court shall consider the following factors in determining whether
to award attorney fees in any case in which an award of attorney fees is
authorized by statute and in which the court has discretion to decide whether
to award attorney fees:
“(a) The conduct of the parties in the transactions or occurrences that
gave rise to the litigation, including any conduct of a party that was reckless,
willful, malicious, in bad faith or illegal.
“(b) The objective reasonableness of the claims and defenses asserted by
the parties.
“(c) The extent to which an award of an attorney fee in the case would
deter others from asserting good faith claims or defenses in similar cases.
“(d) The extent to which an award of an attorney fee in the case would
deter others from asserting meritless claims and defenses.
“(e) The objective reasonableness of the parties and the diligence of the
parties and their attorneys during the proceedings.
“(f) The objective reasonableness of the parties and the diligence of the
parties in pursuing settlement of the dispute.
“(g) The amount that the court has awarded as a prevailing party fee
under ORS 20.190.
“(h) Such other factors as the court may consider appropriate under the
circumstances of the case.”
150 J. M. L. v. Lorenz
was aware of the correct standard. The court cited ORS
20.105 as the statute under which attorney fees were being
awarded, and the court’s written findings stated that it had
considered “the objective reasonableness of the claims and
defenses asserted by the parties.” Although the court did not
make an explicit finding that respondent had no objectively
reasonable basis for his objection to the SAPO, the finding
is implicit from the trial court’s conclusion awarding fees.
See Magno, LLC v. Bowden, 313 Or App 686, 690, 496 P3d
1049 (2021) (holding that the court’s finding of no objectively
reasonable basis was implicit in the court’s discussion of the
correct legal standard and its conclusion that the party was
entitled to those fees. “Thus, the only plausible reading of
the order is that the court made the necessary finding.”).
In addition, respondent asserts that, in awarding
fees, the trial court incorrectly considered factors from ORS
20.075. We agree with petitioner that the argument respon-
dent makes on appeal was not made below, despite an oppor-
tunity to do so. Respondent argued below that his opposition
to the SAPO was reasonable, because a military tribunal
had already issued a restraining order against respondent
and, further, that the factual circumstances did not support
the issuance of the SAPO. Respondent did not express to
the trial court the concerns that he now raises that the trial
court based its ruling on incorrect criteria. We conclude that
respondent’s argument is not preserved and we therefore
decline to consider it.
Affirmed.