J. Y. L. C. v. Iribarren

No. 1084 November 4, 2026 489 This is a nonprecedential memorandum opinion pursuant to ORAP 10.30 and may not be cited except as provided in ORAP 10.30(1). IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON J. Y. L. C., Petitioner-Respondent, v. STUART GLEN IRIBARREN, Respondent-Appellant. Clackamas County Circuit Court 22PO11565; A185600 Katherine E. Weber, Judge. Submitted May 20, 2026. Stuart G. Iribarren filed the brief pro se. Natalie Anne Hedman filed the brief for respondent. Before Aoyagi, Presiding Judge, Kamins, Judge, and Pagán, Judge. PER CURIAM Affirmed. 490 J. Y. L. C. v. Iribarren PER CURIAM Respondent appeals the renewal of a restraining order issued pursuant to the Family Abuse Prevention Act (FAPA), ORS 107.700 to 107.735. He contends that the trial court erred (1) by ruling that petitioner had a subjec- tive fear for her safety that was objectively reasonable; and (2) by admitting improper evidence over objection, making an improper credibility determination based on that evi- dence, and failing to require evidence of a continued behav- ior pattern. As explained below, we affirm. We review the trial court’s legal conclusions for errors of law. K. R. M. v. Baker, 321 Or App 313, 315, 515 P3d 905 (2022). In doing so, we are bound by the trial court’s findings of historical fact if there is any evidence to support them.1 Id. The renewal of a FAPA restraining order is gov- erned by ORS 107.725. As relevant here, the trial court may renew the order “upon a finding that * * * [a] person in the petitioner’s situation would reasonably fear further acts of abuse by the respondent if the order is not renewed.” ORS 107.725(1)(a). “A finding that there has been a further act of abuse is not required to renew” the order. ORS 107.725(2). Here, in arguing that the court erred and that respondent posed no credible threat to petitioner’s safety, respondent relies on the wrong legal standard. He contends that “ORS 107.716(3) controls” and cites case law applying that stat- utory standard. But ORS 107.716(3) does not apply to the renewal of a FAPA order—it applies when a FAPA order is issued at an ex parte hearing, the respondent contests the order, and a contested hearing is held to determine whether to continue it. In other words, that was the standard that applied at the original contested hearing in 2022. Renewal, by contrast, is governed by ORS 107.725. Although the two legal standards were historically the same, the legislature relaxed the renewal standard in 2019, K. E. B. v. Bradley, 1 We have discretion to provide de novo review in some cases, ORS 19.415(3) (b), including FAPA cases, E. R.-F. v. Browning, 208 Or App 600, 603, 145 P3d 328 (2006). Respondent has not requested de novo review, and we decline to provide it. See ORAP 5.40(8) (describing procedure for appellant to request de novo review, which is “disfavored” and will be provided only in “exceptional cases”). We there- fore apply the normal standard of review. Nonprecedential Memo Op: 354 Or App 489 (2026) 491 327 Or App 39, 44-45, 533 P3d 1128 (2023), and respondent has not developed any argument under the correct legal standard. Further, the fact that the parties no longer live together does not, as a matter of law, preclude a finding that petitioner reasonably feared further abuse. M. A. B. v. Buell, 366 Or 553, 566, 466 P3d 949 (2020). We reject the first assignment of error. As for respondent’s evidentiary arguments, we are unpersuaded that the trial court committed any error. Respondent identifies six specific evidentiary rulings that he claims were erroneous, but he has not developed any argument as to how they were erroneous under the applica- ble rules and case law. Nor do those rulings appear to be in error. The trial court properly instructed the witness Band not to speculate in answering the question, and respon- dent’s attorney expressed satisfaction with the court’s han- dling of the situation, so respondent cannot now complain about that ruling. State v. Kammeyer, 226 Or App 210, 214, 203 P3d 274, rev den, 346 Or 590 (2009). And we discern no error in the court’s overruling of respondent’s other objec- tions. We therefore reject respondent’s claim of evidentiary error, as well as his derivative argument about the court’s credibility assessment. Finally, like his first assignment of error, respondent’s argument regarding the lack of evidence of a continued behavior pattern is based on the wrong legal standard. It also disregards the trial court’s role as fact- finder. For both reasons, that argument fails. Affirmed.