Full Opinion

No. 1123 November 18, 2026 77 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF OREGON SHAWN O’BRIEN, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. MARION COUNTY SHERIFF’S OFFICE, a department of Marion County; Joe Kast; and Matt Meier, Defendants-Respondents. Marion County Circuit Court 20CV12625; A180647 J. Channing Bennett, Judge. Argued and submitted October 4, 2024. Kevin T. Lafky argued the cause for appellant. Also on the briefs were James P. Francis and Lafky & Lafky. Ruth A. Casby argued the cause for respondents. Also on the brief were Janet M. Schroer and Hart Wagner LLP. Before Shorr, Presiding Judge, Powers, Judge, and Pagán, Judge. POWERS, J. Judgment reversed and remanded as to the claim under ORS 659A.199; otherwise affirmed. 78 O’Brien v. Marion County Sheriff’s Office POWERS, J. Plaintiff, a former employee of defendant Marion County Sheriff’s Office (MCSO), appeals from a judgment dismissing his claims for whistleblower retaliation under ORS 659A.199, common-law wrongful discharge, and viola- tion of due process and 42 USC section 1983. Plaintiff raises three assignments of error in which he contends that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment on each of his three claims. For the reasons we explain below, although we reject the second and third assignments of error, we con- clude that the trial court erred in granting summary judg- ment on plaintiff’s statutory claim. Accordingly, we reverse and remand. I. BACKGROUND A. Standard of Review and Facts Drawn in Favor of Plaintiff ORCP 47 C provides that summary judgment is appropriate when “the pleadings, depositions, affidavits, declarations, and admissions on file show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is enti- tled to prevail as a matter of law. No genuine issue as to a material fact exists if, based on the record before the court viewed in a manner most favorable to the adverse party, no objectively reasonable juror could return a verdict for the adverse party on the matter that is the subject of the motion for summary judgment. The adverse party has the burden of producing evidence on any issue raised in the motion as to which the adverse party would have the bur- den of persuasion at trial.” We review a trial court’s decision to grant summary judg- ment for errors of law and, in so doing, we view the facts and all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from those facts in favor of the nonmoving party, who in this case is plaintiff. Boyd v. Legacy Health, 318 Or App 87, 88-89, 507 P3d 715 (2022). We describe the facts consistently with that standard of review. Plaintiff was employed by MCSO from March 2003 until his termination in December 2019 and worked as a Cite as 355 Or App 77 (2026) 79 parole and probation officer during that time. In June 2019, which is before the events that gave rise to this case, he was placed under a “Last Chance Agreement” in lieu of termi- nating his employment. That agreement was the result of a professional standards investigation into plaintiff’s viola- tion of seven MCSO policies. In July 2019, plaintiff moved into a new neighbor- hood and soon thereafter learned that he lived near a Salem police officer. Plaintiff communicated with that officer and learned that a neighbor across the street from plaintiff’s new residence had been under investigation for drugs by the Salem street crime unit and was suspected of dealing ille- gal substances. Plaintiff was told that the neighbor was a known heroin addict with a history of violating his parole. Based on the information plaintiff learned, and from his professional experience, he believed it was likely that the neighbor was on some type of court-ordered supervision. In August, plaintiff used MCSO’s Corrections Information System database DOC400 to search his neigh- bor’s address and discover his neighbor’s identity. He also discovered that his neighbor was, in fact, on court-ordered supervision in Polk County. A few weeks later, plaintiff was monitoring the Marion County Jail website, a public web- site, for daily arrests and lodges as part of his regular work duties, when he saw a picture of his neighbor; the informa- tion on the website also indicated that the neighbor had been arrested for driving under the influence of intoxicants (DUII). Plaintiff then looked up the neighbor in DOC400 and saw that the neighbor’s probation officer had not yet made an entry regarding the DUII arrest.1 Plaintiff then contacted the probation officer via email to let her know that his neighbor had been arrested and violated his probation; he also gave the probation officer his personal cell phone number. Plaintiff witnessed his neighbor driving a motor vehicle numerous times, both prior to and after his DUII 1 It is unclear from the record exactly how many times plaintiff used the DOC400 to look up information regarding his neighbor; however, that informa- tion is not pertinent to our decision on appeal. Plaintiff does not dispute that he accessed the DOC400 regarding his neighbor. 80 O’Brien v. Marion County Sheriff’s Office arrest. Plaintiff suspected that the neighbor was illegally operating a motor vehicle. That suspicion was based on plaintiff’s personal experience as a probation officer, which afforded him the knowledge that a prior conviction for a drug charge would come with a license suspension, and was also based on the fact that the neighbor had been arrested for DUII. Plaintiff believed that he had an independent duty as a sheriff’s deputy to report probation violations to the neighbor’s probation officer. At some point in time thereafter, plaintiff learned that his neighbor’s probation officer had requested a war- rant. Plaintiff then contacted his own supervisor, Sergeant Hartford, and asked whether he could share the informa- tion he had gathered about his neighbor with the Salem police officers who lived in his neighborhood. Hartford indi- cated that he thought that would be fine, but that he did not really know the answer, and would have to get back to him. Hartford consulted with others in the office, which ultimately resulted in Commander Karvandi ordering an internal professional standards investigation of plaintiff. Plaintiff received a telephone call from a union represen- tative to let him know that he was going to be investigated and he was given a notice of investigation dated October 18, 2019, which informed him that an investigation was going to be conducted and why. The reason for the investigation as outlined in the notice was that plaintiff had “reported information to [his] supervisor indicating [he] may have used county equipment, programs, and resources to obtain information for a reason other than official county business” and that that use “constitutes a possible violation of Marion County Policy and Sheriff’s Office Policy and Procedures.” The notice lists possible policy violations: • Marion County Policy 701—Use of Computing and Communication Assets 1.1. Computing and communications assets acquired by the county are to be used for official county business functions. Cite as 355 Or App 77 (2026) 81 • Sheriff’s Office Policy 1445—Use of System Resources 2. Employees will only use system resources for Sheriff’s Office business. 12. Employees will use system resources in an ethical, legal, appropriate, and professional manner. • Sheriff’s Office Policy—1150 Standards of Conduct 1. Employees will conduct themselves both on and off duty, at all times, in such a manner as to reflect favorably on the Sheriff’s Office. Sergeant Meier conducted the investigation. He col- lected information, conducted interviews, and completed a report with his findings. Plaintiff admitted to Meier that he had accessed the DOC400 system four to five times regard- ing his neighbor. Plaintiff thought he was serving a busi- ness function at the time he was accessing the systems.2 He believed that as a deputy sheriff, he had the right to at least know if the neighbor was in violation of supervision or not, and that, for his own safety and that of two police officers who reside on the street, he should know whether the neigh- bor was engaging in behavior that might compromise their safety—partly because he and the officers come and go from their residences in marked vehicles and in uniform. Plaintiff told Meier that he did not access the computer systems for personal curiosity, interest, or any other motive regarding his neighbor. Once he found out about the DUII, he saw it as his duty to pass the information on to the probation officer. Plaintiff had a union representative, Deputy Prouser, with him during his interview. In his report, Meier made findings of fact and policy violations, but did not make any recommendation regard- ing discipline. Meier found that the allegations that plaintiff had violated Marion County Policy 701 (section 1.1), Sheriff’s 2 Plaintiff acknowledged that, in addition to the DOC400, he had accessed “Lock and Track” once to learn information on the neighbor and accessed eCourt on one or two occasions to gather information. 82 O’Brien v. Marion County Sheriff’s Office Office Policy 1445 (sections 2 and 12), and Sheriff’s Office Policy 1150 (sections 1 and 6) were sustained.3 The investi- gation was completed on November 5, 2019. A “Notice of Due Process for Economic Discipline Consideration” was given to plaintiff, and a hearing was scheduled for November 22. That notice provides that the investigation “concluded there was no business reason for [plaintiff] to monitor [neighbor’s] case for over two months using the Sheriff’s Office system resources. * * * His use of computing and communication assets was to gather information on [neighbor] for personal reasons.” The notice also stated that plaintiff had made statements throughout his investigative interview that indi- cated “his inquiries were of a personal matter for him.” In addition, plaintiff “used system resources in an unethical and unprofessional manner.” Plaintiff participated in the due process meeting. He was notified of his employment termination by letter dated December 9, 2019, which explained, in part, “There was no business reason for you to monitor an individual for over two months using the Sheriff’s Office system resources. The individual was neither a client of yours nor was he on supervision in Marion County. Your use of computing and communication assets was to gather information on the individual for personal reasons. As a result, you used system resources in an unethical and unprofessional manner. Your use of system resources to obtain information on the individual does not reflect favor- ably upon yourself or the Sheriff’s Office. Acts like these can cause individual and organizational embarrassment which tends to erode the public’s trust in Law Enforcement professionals in general and in the Sheriff’s Office in par- ticular. Additionally, these violations also constitute a vio- lation of the Last Chance Agreement that you signed on June 26, 2019.” 3 Sherriff’s Office Policy 1150, section 6, was not listed in the original notice; however, the notice provides that “other violations of rules, policies, or proce- dures in addition to those listed above may apply.” Section 6 provides, “The Sheriff’s Office may subject employees to disciplinary processes in the follow- ing circumstances: [(1)] Failure to reflect credit upon the Sheriff’s Office and/ or the employee[, and (2)] Failure to follow standards of behavior expected of all employees.” Cite as 355 Or App 77 (2026) 83 B. Procedural History Including the Trial Court’s Summary Judgment Ruling Plaintiff then filed an action against MCSO and two individuals, alleging whistleblower retaliation under ORS 659A.199, common-law wrongful termination, and violation of due process and 42 USC section 1983. Specifically, plain- tiff named three defendants in the lawsuit: Marion County Sheriff’s Office, Sheriff Joe Kast, and Matt Meier, a Marion County Lieutenant. Plaintiff relied on the same set of factual allegations for his first two claims. He alleged that he looked up the neighbor in the system for law enforcement purposes only and that he was looking out for and reported unlawful behavior; he claimed that he did not do it for personal gain, but believed it was part of his job duties. He further alleged that he was terminated because “he looked up and reported unlawful behavior.” Regarding his due process claim, he alleged that he was terminated “without proper notice or a meaningful chance to refute the allegations against him” and that the named individuals “did not conduct a reason- able or adequate investigation into the allegations against [p]laintiff.” Defendants filed a motion for summary judgment on all claims. Defendants argued to the trial court that there was no issue of fact and that the case should be dis- missed as a matter of law. According to defendants, plain- tiff’s common-law wrongful discharge claim is preempted by his statutory claim. In addition, defendants asserted that plaintiff did not engage in any protected activity or ful- fill an important public duty, and that the evidence estab- lished that plaintiff did not “whistleblow” about any unlaw- ful behavior by his employer or anyone in the ranks of the MCSO. Defendants also argued that plaintiff’s claims failed for the independent reason that the record established that plaintiff was discharged for violating MCSO policies, which also violated his Last Chance Agreement, and they asserted that there was no evidence to create an issue of fact that plaintiff was discharged for any other reason, let alone an improper one. Lastly, defendants argued that plaintiff was not deprived of due process. 84 O’Brien v. Marion County Sheriff’s Office In response to the motion, plaintiff argued that (1) his common-law claim was not preempted, (2) he was acting in the interest of officer safety (his claimed public duty), (3) he made a report to his supervisor and to his neighbor’s pro- bation officer, which qualifies as protected activity for pur- poses of his statutory claim, (4) he could establish a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action, therefore there was a question of mate- rial fact as to the motivation for his termination, and (5) his due process rights were violated because the investigation conducted by MCSO was inadequate. After a hearing, the trial court granted the motion and entered a judgment dismissing the entire matter. The court ruled that the common-law claim was subsumed by the statutory claim because the statutory claim provided a “greater remedy than anything available under the common law.” As for due process, the trial court noted that plaintiff was provided with notice, opportunity for a hearing, and opportunity for appeal, and, although plaintiff argued that the process was not fair and that the MCSO employees could have done more, no factual question was presented by the summary judgment record. Lastly, as to the whistleblowing claim, the trial court explained, “here there’s an improper surveillance of a civil—of a pri- vate citizen by someone using county resources and police resources, not over someone within their purview, but for their neighbor and for their use. I can’t call that whistle- blower in any form to have made that report and, even if the sheriff said using—I don’t want to simply saying, you know, we think fruits of the poison tree, it’s something you learned that you weren’t entitled to have and then you use it for a proper purpose does not allow you to use it in a criminal case for certain and so even if they’d said it, he shouldn’t have known that at least beyond the arrest, I don’t think you get there and I don’t think that’s whistle- blowing in any form, no one’s disputing that [the neighbor] had a DUII and that [plaintiff] reported it to the probation officer in Polk County, all well and good, but he shouldn’t [have] had that internal information and how it was and whether or not there was a warrant, et cetera, so I can’t fit that into what I think I have is a very broad definition of Cite as 355 Or App 77 (2026) 85 whistleblowing and protected activity and that’s just not there, so I grant summary judgment in total.” Plaintiff timely appeals. II. ANALYSIS A. Protected activity under ORS 659A.199(1) is not limited to reporting conduct by plaintiff’s employer or someone else in plaintiff’s workplace. In his first assignment of error, plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment as to his whistleblowing claim based on its holding that plaintiff did not engage in a protected activity. More specif- ically, plaintiff argues that, although it is correct that ORS 659A.199 requires the plaintiff to engage in a “protected activity” to be protected from retaliation by an employer, the trial court took too narrow a view of what constitutes a protected activity. Under ORS 659A.199(1), “It is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to discharge, demote, suspend or in any manner discrimi- nate or retaliate against an employee with regard to pro- motion, compensation or other terms, conditions or privi- leges of employment for the reason that the employee has in good faith reported information that the employee believes is evidence of a violation of a state or federal law, rule or regulation.” In plaintiff’s view, he engaged in protected activity under that statute because he reported information that he sub- jectively believed was a violation of a law or rule—that his neighbor had been arrested for DUII and was also likely violating the terms of his Polk County probation by driv- ing—and he had a good faith basis for that belief. Defendants respond that the court correctly found that plaintiff did not engage in protected activity. Defendants argue that sharing information recorded in a private citi- zen’s criminal record is not “whistleblowing,” because the statute protects only employees who in good faith report a violation of law by the employer or a person employed by the employer. Here, the report was not about any workplace misconduct—it was about a third party out in the commu- nity who potentially violated a law. Defendants also note 86 O’Brien v. Marion County Sheriff’s Office that plaintiff’s belief that his neighbor engaged in unlaw- ful activity and his good-faith basis for safety concerns is immaterial and not disputed. Given the parties’ arguments, the question we must answer is whether, to be protected activity under ORS 659A.199(1), the reported wrongdoing is limited to conduct by plaintiff’s employer or someone else in plaintiff’s work- place. As explained below, we conclude that the reported wrongdoing is not so limited; that is, protected activity can involve reporting a wrongdoing by someone other than an employer or someone else in the person’s workplace. To determine the legislature’s intent when it enacted a statute, we examine the statute’s text, context, and any relevant legislative history. State v. Gaines, 346 Or 160, 171- 72, 206 P3d 1042 (2009). In addition, consistent with ORS 174.010, our task simply is “to ascertain and declare what is, in terms or in substance, contained therein, not to insert what has been omitted, or to omit what has been inserted; and where there are several provisions or particulars such construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give effect to all.” Beginning with the words in ORS 659A.199(1), the pertinent portion of subsection (1) provides that it is unlaw- ful for the employer to retaliate against an employee “for the reason that the employee has in good faith reported infor- mation that the employee believes is evidence of a violation of a state or federal law, rule or regulation.” Notably absent from the text of the statute is any qualifier about who must violate the law, rule, or regulation, and under ORS 174.010 we may not “insert what has been omitted” when constru- ing a statute. Thus, the text alone does not shed light on whether the reported activity is limited to the plaintiff’s employer generally or whether the protection afforded by the whistleblower statute encompasses reports of other wrongdoing. See Gaines, 346 Or at 175 (noting that appel- late courts “begin—as exercises in statutory interpretation always should begin—with the text of the statute”). Thus, in analyzing the scope of the protection in ORS 659A.199, we turn to context, which includes prior Cite as 355 Or App 77 (2026) 87 case law. See, e.g., State v. Silver, 335 Or App 377, 381, 559 P3d 431 (2024) (explaining that a “statute’s context includes other provisions of the same or related statutes, the pre-ex- iting statutory framework within which the statute was enacted, and prior decisions interpreting the relevant statu- tory wording.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)). We have previously examined the language of ORS 659A.199 in different circumstances. In Burley v. Clackamas County, 298 Or App 462, 464, 446 P3d 564, rev den, 365 Or 721 (2019), rev den, 369 Or 504 (2022), we were asked to determine, in part, whether ORS 659A.199 applied to both private and public employers. As part of our discussion explaining our conclusion that it did apply to both, we made an observation about the very question presented in this case. We explained: “ORS 659A.199 guards against retaliation ‘for the reason that the employee has in good faith reported information that the employee believes is evidence of a violation of a state or federal law, rule or regulation.’ By its terms, then, the provision protects good faith reports of any illegal activity and does not require that the reported activity be attributable to the employer. Thus, for example, the stat- ute protects an employee who reports illegal conduct by a fellow employee, even if that conduct could not be deemed to be conduct of the employer itself. By contrast, ORS 659A.203(1)(b) safeguards against retaliation for reports of illegal and other inappropriate conduct by a ‘public or nonprofit employer.’ (Emphasis added.) Given the text and context of ORS 659A.199, it is reasonable to think that, in enacting it, the legislature intended both to provide pro- tections against retaliation to the employees of private employers and to supply additional protections to employ- ees of public employers.” Id. at 468 (emphases in original). We have applied that understanding of ORS 659A.199 in subsequent cases. See, e.g., Cuddigan-Placito v. SAIF, 335 Or App 663, 679, 560 P3d 715 (2024) (concluding that the plaintiff had not made a good faith report under ORS 659A.199 and agreeing that the trial court had “erred to the extent that it concluded that a good faith report under ORS 659A.199 must be about the employ- ee’s employer”); McClusky v. City of North Bend, 332 Or App 88 O’Brien v. Marion County Sheriff’s Office 1, 16, 549 P3d 557, rev den, 372 Or 812 (2024) (citing Burley and observing that ORS 659A.199 “is not limited to reported violations about the employer”). Although we were answer- ing a different question in Burley, that analysis applies here. As we noted in Burley, in a companion whistleblower statute, ORS 659A.203, which addresses prohibited conduct by a public or nonprofit employer, the statute does contain a qualifier of the type that is absent in ORS 659A.199. ORS 659A.203(1)(b)(A), provides, in part: “it is an unlawful employment practice for any public or nonprofit employer to: * * * [p]rohibit any employee from disclosing, or take or threaten to take disciplinary action against an employee for the disclosure of any information that the employee reasonably believes is evidence of: * * * [a] violation of any federal, state or local law, rule or regu- lation by the public or nonprofit employer[.]” We can tell from that example that when the legislature intends to include limiting language, it does so. The legisla- ture did not include a similar qualifier in ORS 659A.199(1), and “it is not our role to displace that legislative choice.” Burley, 298 Or App at 466. As for legislative history, “the primary purpose of the statute was to provide protections against whistleblower retaliation to employees of private employers comparable to the protections already afforded to employees of public employers under ORS 659A.203.” Burley, 298 Or App at 467. In our review of the legislative history, we did not find any- thing to indicate an intention to limit the application of the statute as defendants would have us interpret it. In urging us to conclude that protected whistle- blowing is when an employee has reported information that discloses illegal activity or wrongdoing about employer misconduct or workplace malfeasance, defendants rely on three cases. The first is Walker v. Oregon Travel Information Council, 367 Or 761, 768-69, 484 P3d 1035 (2021). Defendants note that the Supreme Court acknowledged that protected whistleblowing is disclosing or reporting a violation of law by the employer; however, in that case, the court was describing a jury instruction that was used in the trial court and was not endorsing the substance of the instruction as Cite as 355 Or App 77 (2026) 89 part of its holding. Second is Bjurstrom v. Oregon Lottery, 202 Or App 162, 171, 120 P3d 1235 (2005), which defen- dants describe as “recognizing that a ‘whistleblower’ is one who discloses internal misconduct within the workplace.” Although it is correct that we did so, the question that we answered there was whether the “disclosure of any informa- tion” under ORS 659A.203(1)(b) included a disclosure within the agency as opposed to an audience external to the agency. Id. at 169. Lastly, defendants rely on an unpublished opin- ion from the United States District Court for the District of Oregon, Molan v. Deschutes County Sheriff’s Office, No 6:19-CV-01422-MC, 2020 WL 5507531 (D Or Sept 11, 2020). We are not bound by the decisions of that court. Burley, 298 Or App at 467. We are not persuaded by any of that author- ity that our statutory interpretation above is incorrect. In sum, we agree with plaintiff that the whistle- blowing activity that is protected by ORS 659A.199 is not limited to reports of wrongdoing within that person’s workplace. B. The alternative basis for affirmance fails because an issue of fact remains. Although we conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on plaintiff’s ORS 659A.199 claim on the rationale it articulated, defendants assert that we can affirm the grant of summary judgment on an alter- native basis that was briefed and argued before the trial court: that plaintiff failed to present any evidence that the termination decision was retaliatory. “When an alternative argument was made in the trial court * * * [and] is properly presented again on appeal and raises a question of law, we may simply resolve it, typically remanding only if it is nec- essary for the trial court to make factual findings from con- flicting evidence, exercise discretion, or the like.” Sherertz v. Brownstein Rask, 314 Or App 331, 341, 498 P3d 850 (2021), rev den, 369 Or 338 (2022). Here, if the alternate argument presents a genuine issue of fact and we cannot decide it as a matter of law, we must remand it. ORCP 47 C. In Boyd, 318 Or App at 96, we concluded that the motivation for a person’s termination is a question of fact. 90 O’Brien v. Marion County Sheriff’s Office In that case, the plaintiff brought a wrongful termination action against his employer, claiming that he was fired because he had engaged in statutorily protected activity; the employer claimed that plaintiff was fired because he inappropriately accessed a patient’s medical records in vio- lation of the employer defendant’s HIPAA privacy policy. Id. at 88, 91. We explained that “ ‘[a] plaintiff’s prima facie case does not disappear merely because a defendant asserts a non-discriminatory reason which may or may not persuade the trier of fact.’ ” Id. at 96 (quoting Henderson v. Jantzen Inc., 79 Or App 654, 658, 719 P2d 1322, rev den, 302 Or 35 (1986)). The trial court erred in Boyd because it had pro- ceeded from the premise that the plaintiff could not prevail on any of his wrongful-discharge claims if he had violated the defendant’s privacy policies and it had misapplied the summary judgment standard. We concluded that “if, in fact [the] plaintiff violated [the] defendant’s policies and if, in fact, [the] defendant fired him for that reason, [the] plaintiff would be unable to establish an essential ele- ment of each of his claims, namely, that [the] defendant had fired him because he had engaged in a protected activity. But because [the] defendant’s true motivation was a ques- tion of fact and [the] plaintiff did not concede the answer to that question, the trial court should not have granted summary judgment on that basis.” Id. (emphases omitted). Here, defendants contend that the record contains no evidence of retaliation against plaintiff for conveying his neighbor’s DUII arrest to his neighbor’s probation officer or requesting to share it with other law enforcement officers. Rather, according to defendants, the unrefuted evidence demonstrates that an investigation determined that plaintiff had violated employment policies by using MCSO resources to access and monitor his neighbor’s law-enforcement activ- ity outside the scope of his employment and for no official business reason. Plaintiff asserts in response that an infer- ence can be made that he was fired for engaging in protected activity because of the close temporal proximity between the activity and the termination—his employment was termi- nated roughly seven weeks after reporting the information to his supervisor. Cite as 355 Or App 77 (2026) 91 A causal connection can be established indirectly or directly. We have explained, “Proof of a causal connection between protected conduct and a materially adverse action can be established (1) indi- rectly, by showing that the protected activity was followed closely by discriminatory treatment or through other evi- dence such as disparate treatment of fellow employees who engaged in similar conduct or (2) directly, through evidence of retaliatory animus directed against a plaintiff by the defendant.” Meyer v. Oregon Lottery, 292 Or App 647, 681-82, 426 P3d 89 (2018) (emphases and internal quotation marks omitted). Although case law “has not identified how very close in time the discriminatory treatment must follow the protected activity such that, by itself, the timing raises an issue of fact regarding causation,” we concluded in Meyer that “the gap of one to two months between the claimed protected activity and the subsequent adverse action [was] sufficient to raise an issue of fact on causation.” Id. at 682-83 (internal quota- tion marks omitted). Although Meyer involved an employ- ment action under a different statutory provision in ORS Chapter 659A, it nevertheless is instructive to the situation presented by this case. Here, the record reflects that on October 17, 2019, plaintiff had a conversation with Hartford about his neigh- bor, that plaintiff was notified on October 18 that there would be an investigation, and that plaintiff was notified by letter dated December 9 that his employment was ter- minated. We conclude that that short temporal proximity is indirect evidence of causation and, therefore, there is an issue for the trier of fact that prevents a grant of summary judgment in defendants’ favor. Accordingly, we reject defen- dants’ alternative basis for affirmance and conclude that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on plain- tiff’s statutory whistleblower claim. C. The trial court correctly granted summary judgment on plaintiff’s common-law claim. In his second assignment of error, plaintiff contends that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on plaintiff’s common-law wrongful discharge claim based on 92 O’Brien v. Marion County Sheriff’s Office its holding that ORS 659A.199 provides a complete remedy. In his view, he should be permitted to bring both his stat- utory claim and his common-law claim. In response, defen- dants argue that the trial court correctly ruled that plain- tiff’s common-law wrongful discharge claim is preempted by ORS 659A.199 because plaintiff’s claims are duplicative, and the statute affords a complete remedy.4 As we explain below, we reject this assignment of error. “The common-law tort of wrongful discharge is a public-policy exception to Oregon’s general rule of at-will employment.” Vergara v. Patel, 305 Or App 288, 302, 471 P3d 141 (2020) (internal quotation marks omitted). In Vergara, we observed that there has been an “inconsistency in Oregon’s wrongful discharge law”—both from the Supreme Court and our court—and we concluded that “wrongful dis- charge was not intended to be a tort of general application; rather, it is an interstitial tort, designed to fill a gap where a discharge in violation of public policy would otherwise not be adequately remedied.” Id. at 305-06 (internal quotation marks omitted). Plaintiff relies on Olsen v. Deschutes County, 204 Or App 7, 14, 127 P3d 655, rev den, 341 Or 80 (2006), in which we explained that for a defendant to show that a common-law claim is precluded, the “defendant must demonstrate both that the remedy for violation of [the statute] is adequate in comparison to the remedy available under a common-law tort action and also that the legislature intended the statute to abrogate the common law.” However, plaintiff’s argument fails to acknowledge that in Vergara, we observed that that conclusion in Olsen “would seem to enlarge the tort in a way that contravenes” the principle that wrongful discharge is “an interstitial tort that is deigned to fill a gap.” Vergara, 305 Or App at 305-06. We ultimately concluded in Vergara that adequate statutory remedies existed under the statute at issue for the wrongful conduct that had been alleged by the plaintiff, and that meant that the plaintiff was precluded 4 Defendants also assert that, in any event, summary judgment may be affirmed for the alternative reason, briefed and argued to the trial court, that plaintiff’s reporting of his neighbor’s DUII arrest is not a protected public duty. Given our analysis below, we need not reach that alternative basis. Cite as 355 Or App 77 (2026) 93 from bringing a common-law wrongful discharge claim. Id. at 306; cf. Rohrer v. Oswego Cove, LLC, 309 Or App 489, 497- 98, 482 P3d 811 (2021) (common-law claim remained avail- able when the plaintiff’s common-law wrongful termination claim was based on her conduct of seeking legal advice, not premised on an allegation that she had reported evidence of unlawful activity, therefore ORS 659A.199 did not provide her with a remedy for her claim). In his complaint, plaintiff pleaded a common-law wrongful discharge claim as follows: “As described in more detail above, Defendant terminated Plaintiff because he exercised a legal right related to his status or role as an employee that is of important public interest. Plaintiff had a societal obligation to exercise those rights.” On appeal, plaintiff contends that case law and ORS 659A.199(2) provide that it is permissible to pursue both common-law and statutory claims that allege the same or similar conduct in a single proceeding.5 In support of his con- tention, he relies on the analysis in Olsen, which, as noted above, we declined to follow in Vergara. As we understand plaintiff’s argument, he appears to be asserting a general proposition that he should be permitted to bring both stat- utory and common-law claims even if those two claims are based on the same conduct. Although we agree with plaintiff’s argument that it could be possible to bring both statutory and common-law claims in the same lawsuit, those claims would need to be based on different conduct—that is, the basis for the common-law claim would need to be conduct that was not covered by a statute. As defendants note, plaintiff makes no argument that his two claims are in any way distinct or that the statutory remedies are inadequate as compared to the common-law remedies. Plaintiff does not develop any argument about why, in his view, the trial court erred when it concluded that plaintiff’s common-law discharge claim was wholly subsumed by ORS 659A.199. It is not “our proper 5 ORS 659A.199(2) provides that “[t]he remedies provided by this chapter are in addition to any common law remedy or other remedy that may be available to an employee for the conduct constituting a violation of this section.” 94 O’Brien v. Marion County Sheriff’s Office function to make or develop a party’s argument when that party has not endeavored to do so itself.” Beall Transport Equipment Co. v. Southern Pacific, 186 Or App 696, 700 n 2, 64 P3d 1193, adh’d to as clarified on recons, 187 Or App 472, 68 P3d 259 (2003). Therefore, without a further devel- oped argument from plaintiff to support his claimed error, we will not reverse the trial court on its grant of summary judgment on the common-law wrongful discharge claim. D. The trial court did not err in granting summary judg- ment on plaintiff’s due process claim under 42 USC sec- tion 1983. In his third assignment of error, plaintiff asserts that the trial court erred in granting summary judgment on his third claim for relief, due process violation under sec- tion 1983. In his complaint, plaintiff alleged that his proce- dural due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution were violated because his employment was terminated “without proper notice or a meaningful chance to refute the allegations against him.”6 As explained above, the trial court granted defendants’ sum- mary judgment on that claim. The court determined that defendants had “provided notice, opportunity for a hearing, [and] opportunity for appeal” and that there was an asser- tion by plaintiff that “it wasn’t fair, they could have done more,” but the court did not see in the record