Full Opinion

[Cite as Arnett v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2026-Ohio-4567.] IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO RONALD ARNETT, et al. Case No. 2025-00642JD Plaintiffs Judge Lisa L. Sadler Magistrate Gary Peterson v. DECISION OHIO DEPARTMENT OF REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION Defendant {¶1} On August 17, 2026, defendant, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Correction (ODRC), filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 56. On September 28, 2026, plaintiffs, Ronald Arnett (Arnett), Nicole Bowshier (Bowshier), and Stephanie Finch (Finch), filed a response in opposition. On October 5, 2026, defendant filed a reply in support. Pursuant to L.C.C.R. 4(D), the motion for summary judgment is now before the court for a non-oral hearing. For the reasons stated below, the court GRANTS ODRC’s motion. Factual Background {¶2} This case arises from plaintiffs’ allegations that ODRC engaged in age discrimination and retaliation after plaintiffs raised repeated concerns about safety, staffing, and other workplace issues through formal incident reports. Plaintiffs bring claims for age discrimination and retaliation pursuant to R.C. 4113.52 in violation of Ohio’s Whistleblower Statute. (Complaint, ¶ 22-28). {¶3} In ODRC’s motion for summary judgment, ODRC argues that plaintiffs cannot establish a prima facie case of age discrimination as plaintiffs did not suffer an adverse employment action. ODRC also argues that plaintiffs cannot prevail on their claims for retaliation under R.C. 4113.52 because this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over plaintiffs’ claims. In support, ODRC filed: (1) the deposition of Arnett, and accompanying exhibits; (2) the deposition of Bowshier, and accompanying exhibits; (3) the deposition of Case No. 2025-00642JD -2- DECISION Finch, and accompanying exhibits; (4) the deposition of Karen Oppy (Oppy); (5) the deposition of Vicky Bussey (Bussey); (6) the deposition of Shannon Olds (Warden Olds), and accompanying exhibits; and (7) the deposition of Darryl May (Deputy Warden May), and accompanying exhibits. {¶4} In plaintiffs’ response in opposition, plaintiffs argue that they can establish that they suffered an adverse employment action, and that this court can entertain a whistleblower claim pursuant to R.C. 4113.52. Plaintiffs further state that if the court concludes that it does not have jurisdiction to consider the whistleblower claim, any dismissal should be without prejudice. In support, plaintiffs filed the depositions of Oppy, Warden Olds, Deputy Warden May, and Bussey, which were previously filed by ODRC, and plaintiffs also each filed an affidavit. {¶5} The relevant pleadings and evidence submitted, viewed in a light most favorable to plaintiffs, show the following: {¶6} Arnett, Bowshier, and Finch were all employed by ODRC and worked at Dayton Correctional Institution (DCI) as Registered Nurses (RN). (Complaint, ¶ 1-3). Arnett worked at DCI from May 2012 through April 30, 2025, Bowshier worked at DCI from March 2014 through March 13, 2025, and Finch worked at DCI from March 2008 through April 30, 2025. (Complaint, ¶ 1-3). At the time of the filing of this lawsuit on July 7, 2025, Arnett was 65 years of age, Bowshier was 52 years of age, and Finch was 65 years of age. (Complaint, ¶ 4). Arnett, Bowshier, and Finch were all first shift RNs. (Complaint, ¶ 6; Oppy Dep. at 23:20-25:4). Plaintiffs were all members of a union and subject to progressive discipline. (Arnett Dep. at 70:9-71:10; Finch Dep. at 60:19-61:9; Bowshier Dep.at 34:5-35:17). During their employment, Warden Olds was the Warden of DCI, Deputy Warden May was the Deputy Warden at DCI, and Oppy was the Health Care Administrator (HCA) at DCI. (Complaint, ¶ 5). The timeline of events relevant to this litigation is explained below. Oppy is hired as HCA at DCI {¶7} Oppy was hired by ODRC in February 2007. (Oppy Dep. at 5:12-16). Oppy continued her employment at ODRC and was promoted to various roles inside the institution, including quality improvement coordinator (QIC) and HCA, but ended up Case No. 2025-00642JD -3- DECISION leaving her position due to personal reasons. (Oppy Dep. at 5:17-6:21). Oppy returned to ODRC as an RN in 2019 until 2021 and left the position due to staffing issues related to the COVID-19 pandemic. (Oppy Dep. at 8:18-10:4). Oppy continued some work at various other places until November 2022 when she returned to ODRC at Chillicothe Correctional Institution as an RN. (Oppy Dep. at 13:18-14:2). {¶8} ODRC hired Oppy as HCA at DCI in May of 2024. (Oppy Dep. at 23:20-23; Bowshier Dep. at 59:20-22). Oppy was born in 1965 and has grandchildren of her own. (Bowshier Dep. at 59:23-60:13; Oppy Dep. at 17:2-7). Prior to Oppy’s hiring as HCA at DCI, Bowshier could not testify that the medical unit was running well. (Bowshier Dep. at 60:14-18). Rather, Bowshier testified that there was a lot of animosity in the unit between the staff, the unit was short-staffed, and there were backlogs of nurse sick calls for patients. (Bowshier Dep. 44:8-17, 56:11-14, 60:19-61:5). {¶9} Oppy stated that, upon her arrival at DCI, staffing was already an issue and remained a concern, noting that DCI’s medical staff was already short-staffed at that time. (Oppy Dep. at 35:6-12, 98:10-24; Bowshier Dep. at 56:11-14). Warden Olds confirmed that staffing was an issue because nurses who left DCI reported to other RNs that the work environment was toxic and that bullying occurred among the nursing staff, prompting nurses to transfer from DCI to other institutions. (Warden Olds Dep. at 21:15-21, 55:17- 60:5). Oppy explained that full staff would include 11 state-employed RNs, but that the number of state-employed RNs stayed between 6-8 during the time she was there. (Oppy Dep. at 27:19-28:16; May Dep. at 17:7-10). Although DCI was attempting to address the medical staffing issue by allowing overtime, posting positions, and interviewing RNs, people would sometimes not show up for their interviews, could not accept the low pay, or did not feel comfortable working with inmates, making hiring new RNs difficult. (Warden Olds Dep. at 51:3-52:9). {¶10} When Oppy assumed the HCA position at DCI, second shift RNs were responsible for conducting sick calls. (Oppy Dep. at 31:4-23). However, these calls were often not completed because only one or two RNs were typically assigned to the second shift, and they were also responsible for pill call and emergency care. (Oppy Dep. at 31:4-23). Thus, sick call appointments fell significantly behind, and patients were not being timely seen, so patients were having to go to the emergency department for minor Case No. 2025-00642JD -4- DECISION issues. (Oppy Dep. at 31:4-23, 37:23-38:18). As a result of the ongoing efficiency issues in the medical unit, Oppy implemented changes. (Oppy Dep. at 25:25-26:9; 36:13-41:15). {¶11} One of these changes was moving nurse sick calls from second shift to first shift. (Oppy Dep. at 31:4-12; 40:1-6; Arnett Dep. at 123:1-4; Bowshier Dep. at 81:8-12). Warden Olds testified that this change made “absolute sense” based upon her previous experience as working as the Assistant HCA at a different institution because such a change would result in “more expedient nursing care” as advanced-level providers are present during first shift. (Warden Olds Dep. at 17:10-19:10; Bowshier Dep. at 84:8-11). Additionally, Oppy required first shift RNs to assist in medication dispensing (pill passing) if there were not enough Licensed Practical Nurses (LPN) on shift to cover the pill passing. (Oppy Dep. at 26:4-27:10; Bowshier Dep. at 64:8-65:16). However, Oppy testified that if there were two LPNs available on shift for pill passing, then the two LPNs worked pill passing and the RNs would not need to help assist. (Oppy Dep. at 29:14-17). Assisting in dispensing medications was a time-consuming duty for first shift RNs. (Bowshier, Aff. ¶ 3-4; Finch Aff. ¶ 3-4; Arnett Aff. ¶ 3-4). {¶12} Oppy also testified that she made changes to the medical staffing to help alleviate first shift RNs of certain duties. This included assigning one LPN to two doctors in accordance with standard ODRC policy, as LPNs are qualified to obtain vital signs and enter them into the computer for the doctors’ review, rather than continuing the practice of assigning two RNs to two doctors that had been in place upon her arrival. (Oppy Dep. at 36:21-37:16; Bowshier Dep. at 70:18-71:2; Warden Olds Dep. at 20:24-21:10). Oppy also stated that LPNs are qualified to inform the doctors of the patient’s status and how the patient was responding to certain treatment. (Oppy Dep. at 37:17-22). Oppy also assigned another RN, Nurse Janice May (Nurse May), from second shift to first shift to help assist in certain duties that were reassigned to first shift, like nurse sick call and pill passing. (Oppy Dep. at 31:24-32:9; Bowshier Dep. 84:12-85:14; Finch Dep. at 95:4-25; Arnett Dep. at 123:5-13; Warden Olds Dep. at 20:14-22). Bowshier, Finch, and Arnett all recalled that May was assigned to second shift but did work first shift periodically. (Bowshier Aff. ¶ 8; Finch Aff. ¶ 8; Arnett Aff. ¶ 8). Plaintiffs agreed that although Oppy added certain job duties, she also did remove some responsibilities from first shift as well. (Finch Dep. at 85:19-23; Bowshier Aff. ¶ 8; Finch Aff. ¶ 8; Arnett Aff. ¶ 8). Case No. 2025-00642JD -5- DECISION {¶13} Bowshier testified that when she began her employment with DCI in 2014, she worked first shift despite not having seniority at the time. (Bowshier Dep. at 18:21- 20:1; Finch Dep. at 34:3-35:4). Additionally, Arnett testified that he chose to work the second shift for a period of time to avoid being on the same shift as a former romantic partner who also worked as an RN at DCI. (Arnett Dep. at 49:20-22; 59:11-15; 69:3-14). Finch also testified that RNs could choose or prefer to work first, second, or third shift, regardless of their age, and the employees would bid on shifts that aligned best with their lifestyle. (Finch Dep. at 37:14-38:5). May further confirmed that it was his understanding that RNs choose to work whatever shift fits their lifestyle rather than RNs with more seniority specifically choosing the first shift. (May Dep. at 16:16-24). DRC 1000s (incident report) reporting procedure change {¶14} Prior to the process for incident reports changing, incident reports would be filled out in paper format and sent to the Warden’s Office or the Deputy Warden of the institution, but they were to stay in the institution and did not go to ODRC headquarters, per policy. (Warden Olds Dep. at 30:3-31:9). Beginning on September 17, 2024, the policy for submitting incident reports at DCI changed. (Warden Olds Dep. at 31:13-35:2, Ex. 2; Finch Dep. at 115:2-116:17, Ex. I; Arnett Dep. at 138:12-139:15, Ex. I; Bowshier Dep. at 107:24-109:15, Ex. I). On September 17, 2024, Angela Bush, the Deputy Warden of Operations’ secretary, sent an email regarding the change, noting that corrections officers are supposed to send incident reports to their shift commander, and all other employees were supposed to send the incident reports to a specified email address. (Warden Olds Dep. at 31:13-35:2, Ex. 2; May Dep. at 23:9-23, Ex. 2; Finch Dep. at 115:2- 117:8, Ex. I; Arnett Dep. at 138:12-139:15, Ex. I; Bowshier Dep. at 107:24-109:15, Ex. I). {¶15} Finch and Arnett testified that they believed that everyone at ODRC headquarters would look at and have access to the incident reports. (Finch Dep. at 116:2- 17; Arnett Dep. at 139:10-15; see also Complaint, ¶ 13). However, Warden Olds confirmed that the incident reports would not leave the institution and would instead be directed to the DCI electronic mailbox. (Warden Olds Dep. at 31:13-35:2). Thus, the incident reports stayed at DCI to be addressed. (Warden Olds Dep. at 31:13-35:2, 113:20-24; Arnett Aff. ¶ 17; Finch Aff. ¶ 13; Bowshier Aff. ¶ 15). May explained that the Case No. 2025-00642JD -6- DECISION incident reports would be directed to the Warden and accessible by the Deputy Warden of Operations. (May Dep. at 22:10-23:2). Warden Olds explained that an employee who does not believe that institution management is appropriately dealing with reported incidents could choose to file a grievance with their union, which would be addressed by ODRC headquarters. (Warden Olds Dep. at 31:13-35:2). Ongoing issues among staff at DCI {¶16} On January 10, 2025, Oppy sent an email to medical staff with the subject line titled “Team work” and addressed the “overabundance” of incident reports due to “nurse professionals that are not willing to work as a team.” (Oppy Dep. at 62:14-63:3; Deputy Warden May Dep. at 40:22-45:17, Ex. 13). Oppy explained that the purpose of the email was not to criticize the incident reports, but rather to encourage the nursing staff to work collaboratively as a team to address issues before they necessitated the preparation of incident reports, such as covering shifts or duties for one another to avoid staffing shortages or low medication stock issues, because the volume of incident reports was taking time away from nurses’ primary duties and resolving these issues collaboratively could improve overall productivity. (Oppy Dep. at 63:12-65:8). Warden Olds testified that, in responding to Oppy’s email, she agreed with Oppy’s sentiments about working together as a team to accomplish the job, fostering camaraderie, and avoiding negativity within the medical unit. (Warden Olds Dep. at 84:6- 85:10). However, Warden Olds did not believe that Oppy was warning people to not file incident reports but rather informing medical staff that they need to “actually just do the job.” (Warden Olds Dep. at 85:13-15). Deputy Warden May testified that he did not have a concern about the number of incident reports that were being filed. (Deputy Warden May Dep. at 45:11-17). {¶17} Although Finch testified that Oppy’s email made her feel insulted because “she was trying to teach us something that we already know,” Finch did not indicate that she felt the email was related to any alleged discrimination. (Finch Dep. at 122:7-123:2). Nevertheless, plaintiffs felt their concerns were not being addressed. (Arnett Aff. ¶ 15; Finch Aff. ¶ 11; Bowshier Aff. ¶ 13). Case No. 2025-00642JD -7- DECISION {¶18} Oppy further testified that she never made a statement to Bussey, the QIC, that she planned to replace Arnett, Finch, Bowshier, Dr. Moore, and Nurse May, nor did she have the power to do so. (Oppy Dep. at 32:10-15). Bussey confirmed that Oppy never made any statement to her that she wanted to replace Arnett, Finch, Bowshier, Dr. Moore, and Nurse May. (Bussey Dep. at 9:21-25). However, Bussey did testify that Oppy made a statement about wanting to get rid of Arnett, Finch, and Bowshier, but did not make a similar statement about Dr. Moore or Nurse May. (Bussey Dep. at 10:1-24). Incident reports and staff issues {¶19} Plaintiffs allege that they were told by another coworker that Oppy informed a temporary RN (Armstrong) that she should not listen to the day shift nurses because they all hate her, and they were also informed that Oppy gave Armstrong incident reports to look at from the nursing staff. (Arnett Dep. at 161:19-163:22; Finch Dep. at 123:23- 125:18; Bowshier Dep. at 118:19-120:9). However, Oppy never made any direct comments to plaintiffs in this regard. (Arnett Dep. at 161:19-163:22; Finch Dep. at 123:23- 125:18; Bowshier Dep. at 118:19-120:9). Moreover, when describing the incident, Arnett stated that he was told that Oppy said that Armstrong should not pay attention to the “first shift nurses,” Finch could not recall whether the term “older nurses” or just “nurses” was used, and Bowshier testified that she was told “older RNs.” (Arnett Dep. at 161:19- 163:22; Finch Dep. at 123:23-125:18, 127:23-128:2; Bowshier Dep. at 118:19-120:9). However, a review of the incident reports that were submitted and related to this communication between Oppy and Armstrong did not mention age, but rather, simply stated that Oppy told Armstrong not to pay attention to the RNs because they do not like her. (Deputy Warden May Dep. Ex. 14). {¶20} Oppy testified that she did not recall telling Armstrong not to pay attention to the first shift RNs because they all hated her. (Oppy Dep. at 82:9-85:9). She further testified that she did not believe she would have made such a statement. (Oppy Dep. at 82:9-85:9). Oppy also testified that she did not give Armstrong copies of the incident reports but believed that Armstrong may have seen an incident report that was on Oppy’s desk. (Oppy Dep. at 82:9-85:9). However, Deputy Warden May testified that he believes that Oppy admitted to him that she did tell the new RNs to not pay attention to the other Case No. 2025-00642JD -8- DECISION RNs, and that he informed her that it was “unprofessional and unnecessary,” but he did not inquire about whether Oppy handed Armstrong copies of incident reports. (Deputy Warden May Dep. at 49:13-50:7). Additionally, although Bowshier testified that she believed all incident reports were confidential based on her own subjective beliefs, she acknowledged during her deposition that the incident report form itself contained a designated area for marking the form as confidential. (Bowshier Dep. at 122:10-123:24). {¶21} Plaintiffs, upset about hearing through coworkers that Oppy hated them and believing that she was out to sabotage them, decided to send their incident reports outside of DCI and to ODRC headquarters. (Arnett Dep. at 165:4-168:3; Finch Dep. at 128:7- 132:15; Bowshier Dep. at 124:21-126:13; Warden Olds Dep. at 87:2-89:1). Plaintiffs sent their incident reports to Kevin Runyon (Runyon), the medical operations director for the state. (Warden Olds Dep. at 88:22-89:5). After receiving the incident reports, Runyon contacted Deputy Warden May via phone and informed him that RNs sent him incident reports and that he is sending them back to DCI to be addressed by DCI administration. (Warden Olds Dep. at 89:6-12). Runyon wanted DCI administration to inform the RNs that the incident reports are not to be routed to central office and that they need to send the incident reports through the internal institution reporting policy. (Warden Olds Dep. at 90:2-14). Plaintiffs’ meeting with DCI Warden Olds and Deputy Warden May {¶22} On February 12, 2025, Warden Olds and Deputy Warden May held a meeting with plaintiffs to discuss the proper protocol for submitting incident reports, provide the policy on submitting incident reports, and to inquire with plaintiffs why they felt they needed to go the route they did. (Warden Olds Dep. at 93:16-94:1, 105:15-19; Finch Dep. at 132:16-18). Warden Olds explained that they planned to discuss it with everyone who sent incident reports to central office, but she only called plaintiffs at the time into the meeting because they were the only RNs on the grounds at the time. (Warden Olds Dep. at 94:2-95:8). Warden Olds also had Nurse DeArmond, the union representative, attend the meeting for transparency. (Warden Olds Dep. at 94:2-95:8). She explained that she also wanted the union representative there because plaintiffs were going to be told “something that they probably didn’t want to hear, which is not forwarding Case No. 2025-00642JD -9- DECISION any Incident Reports outside of my institution” and clarified that it was not because she was going to inform them that they could not file so many incident reports. (Warden Olds Dep. 104:2-11). Deputy Warden May testified that Nurse DeArmond’s presence did not mean that there was any potential for discipline at the meeting and that it is not unusual for union employees to meet with the Warden. (Deputy Warden May Dep. at 53:18-25). {¶23} The meeting eventually shifted away from the proper filing of incident reports to discuss some of the ongoing issues with plaintiffs and medical staff generally. (99:1- 23; 105:9-106:3, 106:14-25). During the meeting, Warden Olds also discussed plaintiffs’ concerns about being overworked and understaffed, and Warden Olds informed them that workplace drama and gossip were contributing to the medical employee departures. (Warden Olds Dep. at 98:19-99:25). She stated that the medical staffing shortage was largely attributable to constant employee turnover, which she attributed to “mean girls and mean guys” and employees “picking on each other,” rather than focusing on their job responsibilities. (Warden Olds Dep. at 98:19-99:25). Warden Olds explained that the conversation was casual and was not intended to be directed at plaintiffs. (Warden Olds Dep. at 98:19-99:25). {¶24} At the meeting, Warden Olds stated that she informed plaintiffs that “everyone in here is probably around my age or older, so we’re all good and grown.” (Warden Olds Dep. at 97:3-98:2). Bowshier recalled that she stated: “I believe that I’m much younger than the nurses here present, and therefore you should be more mature when expressing your concerns with the numerous DRC 1000s submitted.” (Bowshier Aff. ¶ 18). Warden Olds explained that her comment was intended to convey that everyone was mature enough to conduct themselves appropriately and should not behave like “mean girls and mean guys” or engage in bullying, particularly because a significant number of medical staff had been leaving due to bullying issues. (Warden Olds Dep. at 55:17-25; 97:3-98:2). Warden Olds also testified that her comment was made regarding behavioral problems between medical staff, not regarding filing incident reports. (Warden Olds Dep. at 100:10-21). {¶25} Warden Olds testified that plaintiffs then used the meeting to complain about Oppy and how they could not stand her. (Warden Olds Dep. at 108:22-23). Warden Olds explained that plaintiffs informed her that Oppy created “crazy job Case No. 2025-00642JD -10- DECISION assignments” and “put too much work on them” and that they did not like what she was doing. (Warden Olds Dep. at 108:22-109:1). Warden Olds testified that plaintiffs informed her that if everything went back to the way it was before she was hired and began enacting changes, everything would be fine. (Warden Olds Dep. at 109:1-4; 110:20-22). However, Warden Olds stated that reverting to the previous approach would lead to decreased productivity and prevent tasks from being completed effectively. (Warden Olds Dep. at 109:5-13). Therefore, returning to the old way of doing things was not an option. (Warden Olds Dep. at 109:5-13). {¶26} Warden Olds recalls informing plaintiffs that they need to focus on nursing care and if they continue to delay or neglect care, they would be written up and will go through an administrative investigation. (Warden Olds Dep. at 104:14-105:5, 111:12- 112:8). They were also informed that if they do not follow the scopes of practice, they would be reported to the Nursing Board. (Warden Olds Dep. at 104:14-105:5, 111:12- 112:8). Warden Olds testified that this had nothing to do with incident reports but rather not administering or delaying nursing care. (Warden Olds Dep. at 103:12-17; 105:6-8). Additionally, Warden Olds testified that she did not tell plaintiffs or intend to tell plaintiffs that they should not be filing as many incident reports. (Warden Olds Dep. at 104:2-11). Plaintiffs recall that Warden Olds said that if the pattern of DRC 1000s continued, her only option would be to discipline the RNs and possibly file a report with the Nursing Board. (Bowshier Aff. 18; Finch Aff. ¶ 14-15; Arnett Aff ¶ 18). Nevertheless, as a result of this meeting and discussion, none of the plaintiffs received any discipline related to the meeting, including sending the incident reports to central office and not following established protocols, rescheduling or not getting to nurse sick call, or any alleged over- filing of reports. (Arnett Dep. 123:22-124:3; Finch Dep. 96:22-97:3, 140:8-15; Bowshier Dep. at 137:24-138:4). Plaintiffs all call off work on February 19, 2025 {¶27} On February 19, 2025, all three plaintiffs called off work on the same day, although plaintiffs testified that they did not discuss calling off work nor did they communicate while they were off work. (Arnett Dep. at 178:23-179:12; Finch Dep. at 144:10-145:8; Bowshier Dep. at 139:3-140:18). Five days later, with plaintiffs still off Case No. 2025-00642JD -11- DECISION work, Deputy Warden May sent an email to regional nurse administrators from different regions throughout Ohio, indicating that DCI needed assistance with shift coverage. (Deputy Warden May Dep. at 66:5-68:13, Ex. 17). Deputy Warden May testified that he did not know whether the RNs calling off were specifically plaintiffs and did not implicate any individual. (Deputy Warden May Dep. at 66:5-68:13, Ex. 17). Rather, he testified that he was aware only of a nursing shortage at DCI and the facility’s need for additional assistance. (Deputy Warden May Dep. at 66:5-68:13, Ex. 17). He also testified that there was no discipline for the nurses that called off nor incident reports created to address the call-offs, and he noted that other medical staff called off as well. (Deputy Warden May Dep. at 72:5-10; Finch Dep. at 10-12). Plaintiffs similarly testified that they were not disciplined for taking time off during either February or March of 2025. (Arnett Dep. at 186:2-5; Finch Dep. at 155:10-12). All plaintiffs leave ODRC {¶28} Bowshier resigned from ODRC on March 13, 2025. (Complaint, ¶ 20; Oppy Dep. at 33:8-14). Arnett and Finch both retired from ODRC on April 30, 2025. (Id.; Finch Dep. at 105:20-23). Standard of Review {¶29} Motions for summary judgment are reviewed under the standard set forth in Civ.R. 56(C): Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits, transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. No evidence or stipulation may be considered except as stated in this rule. A summary judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from the evidence or stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being Case No. 2025-00642JD -12- DECISION entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the party’s favor. {¶30} When seeking summary judgment on the ground that the nonmoving party cannot prove its case, the moving party “bears the initial burden of informing the trial court of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on the essential element(s) of the nonmoving party’s claims.” Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293 (1996). A moving party does not discharge this initial burden under Civ.R. 56 by simply making a conclusory allegation that the nonmoving party has no evidence to prove its case. Id. Rather, the moving party must affirmatively demonstrate by affidavit or other evidence allowed by Civ.R. 56(C) that the nonmoving party has no evidence to support its claims. Id. {¶31} If the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party bears a reciprocal burden outlined in Civ.R. 56(E): When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or denials of the party’s pleadings, but the party’s response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the party does not so respond, summary judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the party. “When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in Civ.R. 56, the nonmoving party may not rest on the mere allegations of his pleading, but his response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Civ.R. 56, must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine triable issue.” State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Tompkins, 75 Ohio St.3d 447, 449 (1996). Law & Analysis {¶32} ODRC argues that plaintiffs cannot present any direct evidence of age discrimination and cannot establish a prima facie case of age discrimination through an indirect method as there is no evidence of any adverse action taken against plaintiffs. In response, plaintiffs appear to concede that they have no direct evidence of age discrimination; nevertheless, plaintiffs argue that their job duties were “dramatically Case No. 2025-00642JD -13- DECISION increased” amounting to an adverse employment action and that they all felt compelled to end their employment. (Memorandum in opposition, p. 13-14). Age Discrimination {¶33} It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice: (A) For any employer, because of the . . . age . . . of any person, to discharge without just cause, to refuse to hire, or otherwise to discriminate against that person with respect to hire, tenure, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, or any matter directly or indirectly related to employment. R.C. 4112.02. {¶34} “To prevail in an age discrimination case, a plaintiff must prove discriminatory intent, and may do so through either direct or indirect methods of proof.” Nist v. Nexeo Solutions, LLC, 2015-Ohio-3363, ¶ 31 (10th Dist.). Relevant here, establishing discriminatory intent through the indirect method of proof is subject to the burden shifting analysis established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Id; see also Little Forest Med. Ctr. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm., 61 Ohio St.3d 607, 609-610 (1991) (“federal case law interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 2000(e) et seq., Title 42, U.S. Code, is generally applicable to cases involving alleged violations of R.C. Chapter 4112.”). {¶35} “[A] plaintiff may indirectly prove a prima facie case of age discrimination by presenting evidence of the following: (1) the plaintiff is a member of the statutorily protected class; (2) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action; (3) the plaintiff was qualified for the position; and (4) the plaintiff was replaced by a substantially younger person or that a comparable, substantially younger person was treated more favorably.” Coryell v. Bank One Trust Co., N.A., 2008-Ohio-2698, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.). {¶36} “Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case [of age discrimination], the employer is required to set forth some legitimate, non-discriminatory basis or bases for its action.” Bogdas v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2009-Ohio-6327, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.). “If the employer is able to meet this burden, the plaintiff is then afforded an opportunity to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the Case No. 2025-00642JD -14- DECISION employer were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.” Id. “The ultimate burden of persuasion always remains with the plaintiff . . . . In order to show pretext, a plaintiff must show both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was the real reason.” Ames v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2014-Ohio-4774, ¶ 27 (10th Dist.). {¶37} “‘Generally, an adverse employment action is a materially adverse change in the terms and conditions of the plaintiff's employment.’” O’Brien v. Ohio Bureau of Workers’ Comp., 2026-Ohio-3001, ¶ 61 (10th Dist.), quoting Canady v. Rekau & Rekau, Inc., 2009-Ohio-4974, ¶ 25 (10th Dist.). “Factors to consider in determining whether an employment action was materially adverse include termination, demotion evidenced by a decrease in salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly diminished material responsibilities or other indices unique to a particular situation.” Dautartas v. Abbott Labs., 2012-Ohio-1709, ¶ 52 (10th Dist.). Moreover, “[n]ot everything that makes an employee unhappy or resentful is an actionable adverse action. . . . Employment actions that result in mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities are not disruptive enough to constitute adverse employment actions.” (Cleaned up.) Canady at ¶ 25. {¶38} Adverse employment actions generally entail a “‘significant change in employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in benefits.’” White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 798 (6th Cir.2004), quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998). “The adverse employment action must materially affect the terms and conditions of employment instead of being a mere inconvenience or alteration of responsibilities.” Turner v. Shahed Ents., 2011-Ohio-4654, ¶ 11-12, ¶ 17 (10th Dist.). The employer’s action must impact the “terms, conditions, or privileges” of the plaintiff’s job in a “real and demonstrable way,” and the asserted impact cannot be speculative and must at least have a “tangible adverse effect” on the plaintiff’s employment. Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1239 (11th Cir.2001). “The employee’s subjective view of the significance and adversity of the employer’s action is not controlling; the employment action must be materially adverse as viewed by a reasonable person in the circumstances.” Id. at 1239. Case No. 2025-00642JD -15- DECISION {¶39} This case involves a lengthy set of facts which may involve some disagreements. However, there is no dispute that plaintiffs never experienced a decrease in salary, plaintiffs never suffered a loss of benefits, plaintiffs never suffered diminished responsibilities, plaintiffs never received demoted job titles, and plaintiffs never received any disciplinary actions such as written reprimands or suspensions. Rather, plaintiffs argue that they experienced “dramatically increased” job responsibilities. There is no dispute that Oppy rearranged job responsibilities for all first and second shift nurses by moving nurse sick call from the second shift to the first shift. At the same time, Oppy assigned nurse May, at least on a periodic basis, to assist on first shift. Oppy also removed doctor’s sick call from the first shift RNs. Additionally, Oppy required first shift RNs to assist in administering medication when there were not enough LPNs to administer the medication. There is no dispute that all of the above duties constitute general nursing duties. {¶40} While plaintiffs maintain that the change in job responsibilities was to “teach them a lesson” or to “get rid of them”, the question before the court is whether the change in job responsibilities amounted to an adverse employment action. Upon review, reasonable minds can only conclude that the alteration in job responsibilities amount to inconvenience or ordinary tribulations of the workplace and that plaintiffs did not suffer some harm sufficient to constitute an adverse employment action. “Employment actions that result in mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities are not disruptive enough to constitute adverse employment actions.” Canady, 2009-Ohio-4974, at ¶ 25 (Cleaned up.). Given the chronic nursing staff shortages and other generalized animosity amongst staff, it is no surprise that plaintiffs felt burdened by the alteration of responsibilities; nevertheless, plaintiffs did not suffer harm to an identifiable term or condition of employment. Additionally, there is no dispute that the changes applied to any nurse assigned to the first shift. Moreover, an alteration in job responsibilities does not amount to adverse employment action when unaccompanied by harm. Davis, 245 F.3d 1232, at 1244-1245; Downs v. Collins, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 19718, *6-7 (6th Cir. 2026) citing Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024) (to establish an adverse employment action, a plaintiff must show some harm respecting an identifiable term or Case No. 2025-00642JD -16- DECISION condition of employment.). Finally, there is no dispute that Oppy did not have the authority to terminate plaintiffs’ employment. (Bowshier Dep. 93:19-23, 96:13-19). {¶41} To the extent plaintiffs argue that the meeting with Warden Olds was threatening of disciplinary action such that it amounts to an adverse employment action, there is no evidence that plaintiffs were disciplined during or after the meeting. Furthermore, even assuming that the meeting was disciplinary in nature, there is no evidence that the meeting resulted in altered terms or conditions of employment to constitute an adverse employment action. O’Brien, 2026-Ohio-3001, ¶ 62 (“Similarly, here, even assuming the discipline was a step in the agency’s progressive discipline framework, we do not find evidence presented that the discipline altered the terms and conditions of employment to constitute an adverse employment action.”). Likewise, plaintiffs received no discipline or changes to the terms or condition of their employment associated with the emails sent by Oppy or Deputy Warden May. Perez v. Theller, 2011- Ohio-2176, ¶ 15 (6th Dist.) (verbal and written reprimands, counseling, and negative write-ups are not adverse employment actions). {¶42} In short, there is no evidence that plaintiffs’ employment terms, conditions, or privileges were altered in any meaningful way or that plaintiffs suffered some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment. O’Brien, 2026-Ohio-3001, ¶ 68. Upon review, defendant met its burden of demonstrating that plaintiffs cannot establish a prima facie case for discrimination on the basis of age as defendant has presented evidence that plaintiffs never suffered an adverse employment action. Plaintiffs failed to meet their reciprocal burden under Civ.R. 56(E) to identify specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial as they have failed to demonstrate that defendant took an adverse employment action against them. Having considered the evidence most strongly in plaintiffs’ favor, the only reasonable conclusion is that they cannot state a prima facie claim for age discrimination. Accordingly, defendant