Arnett v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr.
CourtOhio Court of Claims
Date FiledOctober 23, 2026
Docket2025-00642JD
JudgeSadler
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
[Cite as Arnett v. Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2026-Ohio-4567.]
IN THE COURT OF CLAIMS OF OHIO
RONALD ARNETT, et al. Case No. 2025-00642JD
Plaintiffs Judge Lisa L. Sadler
Magistrate Gary Peterson
v.
DECISION
OHIO DEPARTMENT OF
REHABILITATION AND CORRECTION
Defendant
{¶1} On August 17, 2026, defendant, Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and
Correction (ODRC), filed a motion for summary judgment pursuant to Civ.R. 56. On
September 28, 2026, plaintiffs, Ronald Arnett (Arnett), Nicole Bowshier (Bowshier), and
Stephanie Finch (Finch), filed a response in opposition. On October 5, 2026, defendant
filed a reply in support. Pursuant to L.C.C.R. 4(D), the motion for summary judgment is
now before the court for a non-oral hearing. For the reasons stated below, the court
GRANTS ODRC’s motion.
Factual Background
{¶2} This case arises from plaintiffs’ allegations that ODRC engaged in age
discrimination and retaliation after plaintiffs raised repeated concerns about safety,
staffing, and other workplace issues through formal incident reports. Plaintiffs bring
claims for age discrimination and retaliation pursuant to R.C. 4113.52 in violation of Ohio’s
Whistleblower Statute. (Complaint, ¶ 22-28).
{¶3} In ODRC’s motion for summary judgment, ODRC argues that plaintiffs cannot
establish a prima facie case of age discrimination as plaintiffs did not suffer an adverse
employment action. ODRC also argues that plaintiffs cannot prevail on their claims for
retaliation under R.C. 4113.52 because this court lacks subject-matter jurisdiction over
plaintiffs’ claims. In support, ODRC filed: (1) the deposition of Arnett, and accompanying
exhibits; (2) the deposition of Bowshier, and accompanying exhibits; (3) the deposition of
Case No. 2025-00642JD -2- DECISION
Finch, and accompanying exhibits; (4) the deposition of Karen Oppy (Oppy); (5) the
deposition of Vicky Bussey (Bussey); (6) the deposition of Shannon Olds (Warden Olds),
and accompanying exhibits; and (7) the deposition of Darryl May (Deputy Warden May),
and accompanying exhibits.
{¶4} In plaintiffs’ response in opposition, plaintiffs argue that they can establish that
they suffered an adverse employment action, and that this court can entertain a
whistleblower claim pursuant to R.C. 4113.52. Plaintiffs further state that if the court
concludes that it does not have jurisdiction to consider the whistleblower claim, any
dismissal should be without prejudice. In support, plaintiffs filed the depositions of Oppy,
Warden Olds, Deputy Warden May, and Bussey, which were previously filed by ODRC,
and plaintiffs also each filed an affidavit.
{¶5} The relevant pleadings and evidence submitted, viewed in a light most
favorable to plaintiffs, show the following:
{¶6} Arnett, Bowshier, and Finch were all employed by ODRC and worked at
Dayton Correctional Institution (DCI) as Registered Nurses (RN). (Complaint, ¶ 1-3).
Arnett worked at DCI from May 2012 through April 30, 2025, Bowshier worked at DCI
from March 2014 through March 13, 2025, and Finch worked at DCI from March 2008
through April 30, 2025. (Complaint, ¶ 1-3). At the time of the filing of this lawsuit on July
7, 2025, Arnett was 65 years of age, Bowshier was 52 years of age, and Finch was 65
years of age. (Complaint, ¶ 4). Arnett, Bowshier, and Finch were all first shift RNs.
(Complaint, ¶ 6; Oppy Dep. at 23:20-25:4). Plaintiffs were all members of a union and
subject to progressive discipline. (Arnett Dep. at 70:9-71:10; Finch Dep. at 60:19-61:9;
Bowshier Dep.at 34:5-35:17). During their employment, Warden Olds was the Warden
of DCI, Deputy Warden May was the Deputy Warden at DCI, and Oppy was the Health
Care Administrator (HCA) at DCI. (Complaint, ¶ 5). The timeline of events relevant to
this litigation is explained below.
Oppy is hired as HCA at DCI
{¶7} Oppy was hired by ODRC in February 2007. (Oppy Dep. at 5:12-16). Oppy
continued her employment at ODRC and was promoted to various roles inside the
institution, including quality improvement coordinator (QIC) and HCA, but ended up
Case No. 2025-00642JD -3- DECISION
leaving her position due to personal reasons. (Oppy Dep. at 5:17-6:21). Oppy returned
to ODRC as an RN in 2019 until 2021 and left the position due to staffing issues related
to the COVID-19 pandemic. (Oppy Dep. at 8:18-10:4). Oppy continued some work at
various other places until November 2022 when she returned to ODRC at Chillicothe
Correctional Institution as an RN. (Oppy Dep. at 13:18-14:2).
{¶8} ODRC hired Oppy as HCA at DCI in May of 2024. (Oppy Dep. at 23:20-23;
Bowshier Dep. at 59:20-22). Oppy was born in 1965 and has grandchildren of her own.
(Bowshier Dep. at 59:23-60:13; Oppy Dep. at 17:2-7). Prior to Oppy’s hiring as HCA at
DCI, Bowshier could not testify that the medical unit was running well. (Bowshier Dep. at
60:14-18). Rather, Bowshier testified that there was a lot of animosity in the unit between
the staff, the unit was short-staffed, and there were backlogs of nurse sick calls for
patients. (Bowshier Dep. 44:8-17, 56:11-14, 60:19-61:5).
{¶9} Oppy stated that, upon her arrival at DCI, staffing was already an issue and
remained a concern, noting that DCI’s medical staff was already short-staffed at that time.
(Oppy Dep. at 35:6-12, 98:10-24; Bowshier Dep. at 56:11-14). Warden Olds confirmed
that staffing was an issue because nurses who left DCI reported to other RNs that the
work environment was toxic and that bullying occurred among the nursing staff, prompting
nurses to transfer from DCI to other institutions. (Warden Olds Dep. at 21:15-21, 55:17-
60:5). Oppy explained that full staff would include 11 state-employed RNs, but that the
number of state-employed RNs stayed between 6-8 during the time she was there. (Oppy
Dep. at 27:19-28:16; May Dep. at 17:7-10). Although DCI was attempting to address the
medical staffing issue by allowing overtime, posting positions, and interviewing RNs,
people would sometimes not show up for their interviews, could not accept the low pay,
or did not feel comfortable working with inmates, making hiring new RNs difficult.
(Warden Olds Dep. at 51:3-52:9).
{¶10} When Oppy assumed the HCA position at DCI, second shift RNs were
responsible for conducting sick calls. (Oppy Dep. at 31:4-23). However, these calls were
often not completed because only one or two RNs were typically assigned to the second
shift, and they were also responsible for pill call and emergency care. (Oppy Dep. at
31:4-23). Thus, sick call appointments fell significantly behind, and patients were not
being timely seen, so patients were having to go to the emergency department for minor
Case No. 2025-00642JD -4- DECISION
issues. (Oppy Dep. at 31:4-23, 37:23-38:18). As a result of the ongoing efficiency issues
in the medical unit, Oppy implemented changes. (Oppy Dep. at 25:25-26:9; 36:13-41:15).
{¶11} One of these changes was moving nurse sick calls from second shift to first
shift. (Oppy Dep. at 31:4-12; 40:1-6; Arnett Dep. at 123:1-4; Bowshier Dep. at 81:8-12).
Warden Olds testified that this change made “absolute sense” based upon her previous
experience as working as the Assistant HCA at a different institution because such a
change would result in “more expedient nursing care” as advanced-level providers are
present during first shift. (Warden Olds Dep. at 17:10-19:10; Bowshier Dep. at 84:8-11).
Additionally, Oppy required first shift RNs to assist in medication dispensing (pill passing)
if there were not enough Licensed Practical Nurses (LPN) on shift to cover the pill passing.
(Oppy Dep. at 26:4-27:10; Bowshier Dep. at 64:8-65:16). However, Oppy testified that if
there were two LPNs available on shift for pill passing, then the two LPNs worked pill
passing and the RNs would not need to help assist. (Oppy Dep. at 29:14-17). Assisting
in dispensing medications was a time-consuming duty for first shift RNs. (Bowshier, Aff.
¶ 3-4; Finch Aff. ¶ 3-4; Arnett Aff. ¶ 3-4).
{¶12} Oppy also testified that she made changes to the medical staffing to help
alleviate first shift RNs of certain duties. This included assigning one LPN to two doctors
in accordance with standard ODRC policy, as LPNs are qualified to obtain vital signs and
enter them into the computer for the doctors’ review, rather than continuing the practice
of assigning two RNs to two doctors that had been in place upon her arrival. (Oppy Dep.
at 36:21-37:16; Bowshier Dep. at 70:18-71:2; Warden Olds Dep. at 20:24-21:10). Oppy
also stated that LPNs are qualified to inform the doctors of the patient’s status and how
the patient was responding to certain treatment. (Oppy Dep. at 37:17-22). Oppy also
assigned another RN, Nurse Janice May (Nurse May), from second shift to first shift to
help assist in certain duties that were reassigned to first shift, like nurse sick call and pill
passing. (Oppy Dep. at 31:24-32:9; Bowshier Dep. 84:12-85:14; Finch Dep. at 95:4-25;
Arnett Dep. at 123:5-13; Warden Olds Dep. at 20:14-22). Bowshier, Finch, and Arnett all
recalled that May was assigned to second shift but did work first shift periodically.
(Bowshier Aff. ¶ 8; Finch Aff. ¶ 8; Arnett Aff. ¶ 8). Plaintiffs agreed that although Oppy
added certain job duties, she also did remove some responsibilities from first shift as well.
(Finch Dep. at 85:19-23; Bowshier Aff. ¶ 8; Finch Aff. ¶ 8; Arnett Aff. ¶ 8).
Case No. 2025-00642JD -5- DECISION
{¶13} Bowshier testified that when she began her employment with DCI in 2014,
she worked first shift despite not having seniority at the time. (Bowshier Dep. at 18:21-
20:1; Finch Dep. at 34:3-35:4). Additionally, Arnett testified that he chose to work the
second shift for a period of time to avoid being on the same shift as a former romantic
partner who also worked as an RN at DCI. (Arnett Dep. at 49:20-22; 59:11-15; 69:3-14).
Finch also testified that RNs could choose or prefer to work first, second, or third shift,
regardless of their age, and the employees would bid on shifts that aligned best with their
lifestyle. (Finch Dep. at 37:14-38:5). May further confirmed that it was his understanding
that RNs choose to work whatever shift fits their lifestyle rather than RNs with more
seniority specifically choosing the first shift. (May Dep. at 16:16-24).
DRC 1000s (incident report) reporting procedure change
{¶14} Prior to the process for incident reports changing, incident reports would be
filled out in paper format and sent to the Warden’s Office or the Deputy Warden of the
institution, but they were to stay in the institution and did not go to ODRC headquarters,
per policy. (Warden Olds Dep. at 30:3-31:9). Beginning on September 17, 2024, the
policy for submitting incident reports at DCI changed. (Warden Olds Dep. at 31:13-35:2,
Ex. 2; Finch Dep. at 115:2-116:17, Ex. I; Arnett Dep. at 138:12-139:15, Ex. I; Bowshier
Dep. at 107:24-109:15, Ex. I). On September 17, 2024, Angela Bush, the Deputy Warden
of Operations’ secretary, sent an email regarding the change, noting that corrections
officers are supposed to send incident reports to their shift commander, and all other
employees were supposed to send the incident reports to a specified email address.
(Warden Olds Dep. at 31:13-35:2, Ex. 2; May Dep. at 23:9-23, Ex. 2; Finch Dep. at 115:2-
117:8, Ex. I; Arnett Dep. at 138:12-139:15, Ex. I; Bowshier Dep. at 107:24-109:15, Ex. I).
{¶15} Finch and Arnett testified that they believed that everyone at ODRC
headquarters would look at and have access to the incident reports. (Finch Dep. at 116:2-
17; Arnett Dep. at 139:10-15; see also Complaint, ¶ 13). However, Warden Olds
confirmed that the incident reports would not leave the institution and would instead be
directed to the DCI electronic mailbox. (Warden Olds Dep. at 31:13-35:2). Thus, the
incident reports stayed at DCI to be addressed. (Warden Olds Dep. at 31:13-35:2,
113:20-24; Arnett Aff. ¶ 17; Finch Aff. ¶ 13; Bowshier Aff. ¶ 15). May explained that the
Case No. 2025-00642JD -6- DECISION
incident reports would be directed to the Warden and accessible by the Deputy Warden
of Operations. (May Dep. at 22:10-23:2). Warden Olds explained that an employee who
does not believe that institution management is appropriately dealing with reported
incidents could choose to file a grievance with their union, which would be addressed by
ODRC headquarters. (Warden Olds Dep. at 31:13-35:2).
Ongoing issues among staff at DCI
{¶16} On January 10, 2025, Oppy sent an email to medical staff with the subject
line titled “Team work” and addressed the “overabundance” of incident reports due to
“nurse professionals that are not willing to work as a team.” (Oppy Dep. at 62:14-63:3;
Deputy Warden May Dep. at 40:22-45:17, Ex. 13). Oppy explained that the purpose of
the email was not to criticize the incident reports, but rather to encourage the nursing staff
to work collaboratively as a team to address issues before they necessitated the
preparation of incident reports, such as covering shifts or duties for one another to avoid
staffing shortages or low medication stock issues, because the volume of incident reports
was taking time away from nurses’ primary duties and resolving these
issues collaboratively could improve overall productivity. (Oppy Dep. at 63:12-65:8).
Warden Olds testified that, in responding to Oppy’s email, she agreed with Oppy’s
sentiments about working together as a team to accomplish the job, fostering
camaraderie, and avoiding negativity within the medical unit. (Warden Olds Dep. at 84:6-
85:10). However, Warden Olds did not believe that Oppy was warning people to not file
incident reports but rather informing medical staff that they need to “actually just do the
job.” (Warden Olds Dep. at 85:13-15). Deputy Warden May testified that he did not have
a concern about the number of incident reports that were being filed. (Deputy Warden
May Dep. at 45:11-17).
{¶17} Although Finch testified that Oppy’s email made her feel insulted because
“she was trying to teach us something that we already know,” Finch did not indicate that
she felt the email was related to any alleged discrimination. (Finch Dep. at 122:7-123:2).
Nevertheless, plaintiffs felt their concerns were not being addressed. (Arnett Aff. ¶ 15;
Finch Aff. ¶ 11; Bowshier Aff. ¶ 13).
Case No. 2025-00642JD -7- DECISION
{¶18} Oppy further testified that she never made a statement to Bussey, the QIC,
that she planned to replace Arnett, Finch, Bowshier, Dr. Moore, and Nurse May, nor did
she have the power to do so. (Oppy Dep. at 32:10-15). Bussey confirmed that Oppy
never made any statement to her that she wanted to replace Arnett, Finch, Bowshier,
Dr. Moore, and Nurse May. (Bussey Dep. at 9:21-25). However, Bussey did testify that
Oppy made a statement about wanting to get rid of Arnett, Finch, and Bowshier, but did
not make a similar statement about Dr. Moore or Nurse May. (Bussey Dep. at 10:1-24).
Incident reports and staff issues
{¶19} Plaintiffs allege that they were told by another coworker that Oppy informed
a temporary RN (Armstrong) that she should not listen to the day shift nurses because
they all hate her, and they were also informed that Oppy gave Armstrong incident reports
to look at from the nursing staff. (Arnett Dep. at 161:19-163:22; Finch Dep. at 123:23-
125:18; Bowshier Dep. at 118:19-120:9). However, Oppy never made any direct
comments to plaintiffs in this regard. (Arnett Dep. at 161:19-163:22; Finch Dep. at 123:23-
125:18; Bowshier Dep. at 118:19-120:9). Moreover, when describing the incident, Arnett
stated that he was told that Oppy said that Armstrong should not pay attention to the “first
shift nurses,” Finch could not recall whether the term “older nurses” or just “nurses” was
used, and Bowshier testified that she was told “older RNs.” (Arnett Dep. at 161:19-
163:22; Finch Dep. at 123:23-125:18, 127:23-128:2; Bowshier Dep. at 118:19-120:9).
However, a review of the incident reports that were submitted and related to this
communication between Oppy and Armstrong did not mention age, but rather, simply
stated that Oppy told Armstrong not to pay attention to the RNs because they do not like
her. (Deputy Warden May Dep. Ex. 14).
{¶20} Oppy testified that she did not recall telling Armstrong not to pay attention to
the first shift RNs because they all hated her. (Oppy Dep. at 82:9-85:9). She further
testified that she did not believe she would have made such a statement. (Oppy Dep. at
82:9-85:9). Oppy also testified that she did not give Armstrong copies of the incident
reports but believed that Armstrong may have seen an incident report that was on Oppy’s
desk. (Oppy Dep. at 82:9-85:9). However, Deputy Warden May testified that he believes
that Oppy admitted to him that she did tell the new RNs to not pay attention to the other
Case No. 2025-00642JD -8- DECISION
RNs, and that he informed her that it was “unprofessional and unnecessary,” but he did
not inquire about whether Oppy handed Armstrong copies of incident reports. (Deputy
Warden May Dep. at 49:13-50:7). Additionally, although Bowshier testified that she
believed all incident reports were confidential based on her own subjective beliefs, she
acknowledged during her deposition that the incident report form itself contained a
designated area for marking the form as confidential. (Bowshier Dep. at 122:10-123:24).
{¶21} Plaintiffs, upset about hearing through coworkers that Oppy hated them and
believing that she was out to sabotage them, decided to send their incident reports outside
of DCI and to ODRC headquarters. (Arnett Dep. at 165:4-168:3; Finch Dep. at 128:7-
132:15; Bowshier Dep. at 124:21-126:13; Warden Olds Dep. at 87:2-89:1). Plaintiffs sent
their incident reports to Kevin Runyon (Runyon), the medical operations director for the
state. (Warden Olds Dep. at 88:22-89:5). After receiving the incident reports, Runyon
contacted Deputy Warden May via phone and informed him that RNs sent him incident
reports and that he is sending them back to DCI to be addressed by DCI administration.
(Warden Olds Dep. at 89:6-12). Runyon wanted DCI administration to inform the RNs
that the incident reports are not to be routed to central office and that they need to send
the incident reports through the internal institution reporting policy. (Warden Olds Dep.
at 90:2-14).
Plaintiffs’ meeting with DCI Warden Olds and Deputy Warden May
{¶22} On February 12, 2025, Warden Olds and Deputy Warden May held a
meeting with plaintiffs to discuss the proper protocol for submitting incident reports,
provide the policy on submitting incident reports, and to inquire with plaintiffs why they
felt they needed to go the route they did. (Warden Olds Dep. at 93:16-94:1, 105:15-19;
Finch Dep. at 132:16-18). Warden Olds explained that they planned to discuss it with
everyone who sent incident reports to central office, but she only called plaintiffs at the
time into the meeting because they were the only RNs on the grounds at the time.
(Warden Olds Dep. at 94:2-95:8). Warden Olds also had Nurse DeArmond, the union
representative, attend the meeting for transparency. (Warden Olds Dep. at 94:2-95:8).
She explained that she also wanted the union representative there because plaintiffs were
going to be told “something that they probably didn’t want to hear, which is not forwarding
Case No. 2025-00642JD -9- DECISION
any Incident Reports outside of my institution” and clarified that it was not because she
was going to inform them that they could not file so many incident reports. (Warden Olds
Dep. 104:2-11). Deputy Warden May testified that Nurse DeArmond’s presence did not
mean that there was any potential for discipline at the meeting and that it is not unusual
for union employees to meet with the Warden. (Deputy Warden May Dep. at 53:18-25).
{¶23} The meeting eventually shifted away from the proper filing of incident reports
to discuss some of the ongoing issues with plaintiffs and medical staff generally. (99:1-
23; 105:9-106:3, 106:14-25). During the meeting, Warden Olds also discussed plaintiffs’
concerns about being overworked and understaffed, and Warden Olds informed them
that workplace drama and gossip were contributing to the medical employee departures.
(Warden Olds Dep. at 98:19-99:25). She stated that the medical staffing shortage was
largely attributable to constant employee turnover, which she attributed to “mean girls and
mean guys” and employees “picking on each other,” rather than focusing on their job
responsibilities. (Warden Olds Dep. at 98:19-99:25). Warden Olds explained that the
conversation was casual and was not intended to be directed at plaintiffs. (Warden Olds
Dep. at 98:19-99:25).
{¶24} At the meeting, Warden Olds stated that she informed plaintiffs that
“everyone in here is probably around my age or older, so we’re all good and grown.”
(Warden Olds Dep. at 97:3-98:2). Bowshier recalled that she stated: “I believe that I’m
much younger than the nurses here present, and therefore you should be more mature
when expressing your concerns with the numerous DRC 1000s submitted.” (Bowshier
Aff. ¶ 18). Warden Olds explained that her comment was intended to convey that
everyone was mature enough to conduct themselves appropriately and should not
behave like “mean girls and mean guys” or engage in bullying, particularly because a
significant number of medical staff had been leaving due to bullying issues. (Warden
Olds Dep. at 55:17-25; 97:3-98:2). Warden Olds also testified that her comment was
made regarding behavioral problems between medical staff, not regarding filing incident
reports. (Warden Olds Dep. at 100:10-21).
{¶25} Warden Olds testified that plaintiffs then used the meeting to complain
about Oppy and how they could not stand her. (Warden Olds Dep. at 108:22-23).
Warden Olds explained that plaintiffs informed her that Oppy created “crazy job
Case No. 2025-00642JD -10- DECISION
assignments” and “put too much work on them” and that they did not like what she was
doing. (Warden Olds Dep. at 108:22-109:1). Warden Olds testified that plaintiffs
informed her that if everything went back to the way it was before she was hired and
began enacting changes, everything would be fine. (Warden Olds Dep. at 109:1-4;
110:20-22). However, Warden Olds stated that reverting to the previous approach would
lead to decreased productivity and prevent tasks from being completed effectively.
(Warden Olds Dep. at 109:5-13). Therefore, returning to the old way of doing things was
not an option. (Warden Olds Dep. at 109:5-13).
{¶26} Warden Olds recalls informing plaintiffs that they need to focus on nursing
care and if they continue to delay or neglect care, they would be written up and will go
through an administrative investigation. (Warden Olds Dep. at 104:14-105:5, 111:12-
112:8). They were also informed that if they do not follow the scopes of practice, they
would be reported to the Nursing Board. (Warden Olds Dep. at 104:14-105:5, 111:12-
112:8). Warden Olds testified that this had nothing to do with incident reports but rather
not administering or delaying nursing care. (Warden Olds Dep. at 103:12-17; 105:6-8).
Additionally, Warden Olds testified that she did not tell plaintiffs or intend to tell plaintiffs
that they should not be filing as many incident reports. (Warden Olds Dep. at 104:2-11).
Plaintiffs recall that Warden Olds said that if the pattern of DRC 1000s continued, her only
option would be to discipline the RNs and possibly file a report with the Nursing Board.
(Bowshier Aff. 18; Finch Aff. ¶ 14-15; Arnett Aff ¶ 18). Nevertheless, as a result of this
meeting and discussion, none of the plaintiffs received any discipline related to the
meeting, including sending the incident reports to central office and not following
established protocols, rescheduling or not getting to nurse sick call, or any alleged over-
filing of reports. (Arnett Dep. 123:22-124:3; Finch Dep. 96:22-97:3, 140:8-15; Bowshier
Dep. at 137:24-138:4).
Plaintiffs all call off work on February 19, 2025
{¶27} On February 19, 2025, all three plaintiffs called off work on the same day,
although plaintiffs testified that they did not discuss calling off work nor did they
communicate while they were off work. (Arnett Dep. at 178:23-179:12; Finch Dep. at
144:10-145:8; Bowshier Dep. at 139:3-140:18). Five days later, with plaintiffs still off
Case No. 2025-00642JD -11- DECISION
work, Deputy Warden May sent an email to regional nurse administrators from different
regions throughout Ohio, indicating that DCI needed assistance with shift coverage.
(Deputy Warden May Dep. at 66:5-68:13, Ex. 17). Deputy Warden May testified that he
did not know whether the RNs calling off were specifically plaintiffs and did not implicate
any individual. (Deputy Warden May Dep. at 66:5-68:13, Ex. 17). Rather, he testified
that he was aware only of a nursing shortage at DCI and the facility’s need for additional
assistance. (Deputy Warden May Dep. at 66:5-68:13, Ex. 17). He also testified that there
was no discipline for the nurses that called off nor incident reports created to address the
call-offs, and he noted that other medical staff called off as well. (Deputy Warden May
Dep. at 72:5-10; Finch Dep. at 10-12). Plaintiffs similarly testified that they were not
disciplined for taking time off during either February or March of 2025. (Arnett Dep. at
186:2-5; Finch Dep. at 155:10-12).
All plaintiffs leave ODRC
{¶28} Bowshier resigned from ODRC on March 13, 2025. (Complaint, ¶ 20; Oppy
Dep. at 33:8-14). Arnett and Finch both retired from ODRC on April 30, 2025. (Id.; Finch
Dep. at 105:20-23).
Standard of Review
{¶29} Motions for summary judgment are reviewed under the standard set forth in
Civ.R. 56(C):
Summary judgment shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, written admissions, affidavits,
transcripts of evidence, and written stipulations of fact, if any, timely filed in
the action, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and
that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. No evidence
or stipulation may be considered except as stated in this rule. A summary
judgment shall not be rendered unless it appears from the evidence or
stipulation, and only from the evidence or stipulation, that reasonable minds
can come to but one conclusion and that conclusion is adverse to the party
against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that party being
Case No. 2025-00642JD -12- DECISION
entitled to have the evidence or stipulation construed most strongly in the
party’s favor.
{¶30} When seeking summary judgment on the ground that the nonmoving party
cannot prove its case, the moving party “bears the initial burden of informing the trial court
of the basis for the motion, and identifying those portions of the record which demonstrate
the absence of a genuine issue of material fact on the essential element(s) of the
nonmoving party’s claims.” Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 293 (1996). A moving
party does not discharge this initial burden under Civ.R. 56 by simply making a conclusory
allegation that the nonmoving party has no evidence to prove its case. Id. Rather, the
moving party must affirmatively demonstrate by affidavit or other evidence allowed by
Civ.R. 56(C) that the nonmoving party has no evidence to support its claims. Id.
{¶31} If the moving party meets its initial burden, the nonmoving party bears a
reciprocal burden outlined in Civ.R. 56(E):
When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided
in this rule, an adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of the party’s pleadings, but the party’s response, by affidavit or as
otherwise provided in this rule, must set forth specific facts showing that
there is a genuine issue for trial. If the party does not so respond, summary
judgment, if appropriate, shall be entered against the party.
“When a motion for summary judgment is made and supported as provided in Civ.R. 56,
the nonmoving party may not rest on the mere allegations of his pleading, but his
response, by affidavit or as otherwise provided in Civ.R. 56, must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine triable issue.” State ex rel. Zimmerman v. Tompkins, 75
Ohio St.3d 447, 449 (1996).
Law & Analysis
{¶32} ODRC argues that plaintiffs cannot present any direct evidence of age
discrimination and cannot establish a prima facie case of age discrimination through an
indirect method as there is no evidence of any adverse action taken against plaintiffs. In
response, plaintiffs appear to concede that they have no direct evidence of age
discrimination; nevertheless, plaintiffs argue that their job duties were “dramatically
Case No. 2025-00642JD -13- DECISION
increased” amounting to an adverse employment action and that they all felt compelled
to end their employment. (Memorandum in opposition, p. 13-14).
Age Discrimination
{¶33} It shall be an unlawful discriminatory practice:
(A) For any employer, because of the . . . age . . . of any person, to
discharge without just cause, to refuse to hire, or otherwise to
discriminate against that person with respect to hire, tenure, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, or any matter directly or
indirectly related to employment.
R.C. 4112.02.
{¶34} “To prevail in an age discrimination case, a plaintiff must prove discriminatory
intent, and may do so through either direct or indirect methods of proof.” Nist v. Nexeo
Solutions, LLC, 2015-Ohio-3363, ¶ 31 (10th Dist.). Relevant here, establishing
discriminatory intent through the indirect method of proof is subject to the burden shifting
analysis established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Id; see
also Little Forest Med. Ctr. v. Ohio Civil Rights Comm., 61 Ohio St.3d 607, 609-610 (1991)
(“federal case law interpreting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Section 2000(e) et
seq., Title 42, U.S. Code, is generally applicable to cases involving alleged violations of
R.C. Chapter 4112.”).
{¶35} “[A] plaintiff may indirectly prove a prima facie case of age discrimination by
presenting evidence of the following: (1) the plaintiff is a member of the statutorily
protected class; (2) the plaintiff suffered an adverse employment action; (3) the plaintiff
was qualified for the position; and (4) the plaintiff was replaced by a substantially younger
person or that a comparable, substantially younger person was treated more favorably.”
Coryell v. Bank One Trust Co., N.A., 2008-Ohio-2698, ¶ 18 (10th Dist.).
{¶36} “Once a plaintiff establishes a prima facie case [of age discrimination], the
employer is required to set forth some legitimate, non-discriminatory basis or bases for
its action.” Bogdas v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2009-Ohio-6327, ¶ 9 (10th Dist.). “If
the employer is able to meet this burden, the plaintiff is then afforded an opportunity to
prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the legitimate reasons offered by the
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employer were not its true reasons, but were a pretext for discrimination.” Id. “The
ultimate burden of persuasion always remains with the plaintiff . . . . In order to show
pretext, a plaintiff must show both that the reason was false, and that discrimination was
the real reason.” Ames v. Ohio Dept. of Rehab. & Corr., 2014-Ohio-4774, ¶ 27 (10th
Dist.).
{¶37} “‘Generally, an adverse employment action is a materially adverse change
in the terms and conditions of the plaintiff's employment.’” O’Brien v. Ohio Bureau of
Workers’ Comp., 2026-Ohio-3001, ¶ 61 (10th Dist.), quoting Canady v. Rekau & Rekau,
Inc., 2009-Ohio-4974, ¶ 25 (10th Dist.). “Factors to consider in determining whether an
employment action was materially adverse include termination, demotion evidenced by a
decrease in salary, a less distinguished title, a material loss of benefits, significantly
diminished material responsibilities or other indices unique to a particular situation.”
Dautartas v. Abbott Labs., 2012-Ohio-1709, ¶ 52 (10th Dist.). Moreover, “[n]ot everything
that makes an employee unhappy or resentful is an actionable adverse action. . . .
Employment actions that result in mere inconvenience or an alteration of job
responsibilities are not disruptive enough to constitute adverse employment actions.”
(Cleaned up.) Canady at ¶ 25.
{¶38} Adverse employment actions generally entail a “‘significant change in
employment status, such as hiring, firing, failing to promote, reassignment with
significantly different responsibilities, or a decision causing a significant change in
benefits.’” White v. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 364 F.3d 789, 798 (6th Cir.2004),
quoting Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 761 (1998). “The adverse
employment action must materially affect the terms and conditions of employment instead
of being a mere inconvenience or alteration of responsibilities.” Turner v. Shahed Ents.,
2011-Ohio-4654, ¶ 11-12, ¶ 17 (10th Dist.). The employer’s action must impact the
“terms, conditions, or privileges” of the plaintiff’s job in a “real and demonstrable way,”
and the asserted impact cannot be speculative and must at least have a “tangible adverse
effect” on the plaintiff’s employment. Davis v. Town of Lake Park, 245 F.3d 1232, 1239
(11th Cir.2001). “The employee’s subjective view of the significance and adversity of the
employer’s action is not controlling; the employment action must be materially adverse as
viewed by a reasonable person in the circumstances.” Id. at 1239.
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{¶39} This case involves a lengthy set of facts which may involve some
disagreements. However, there is no dispute that plaintiffs never experienced a decrease
in salary, plaintiffs never suffered a loss of benefits, plaintiffs never suffered diminished
responsibilities, plaintiffs never received demoted job titles, and plaintiffs never received
any disciplinary actions such as written reprimands or suspensions. Rather, plaintiffs
argue that they experienced “dramatically increased” job responsibilities. There is no
dispute that Oppy rearranged job responsibilities for all first and second shift nurses by
moving nurse sick call from the second shift to the first shift. At the same time, Oppy
assigned nurse May, at least on a periodic basis, to assist on first shift. Oppy also
removed doctor’s sick call from the first shift RNs. Additionally, Oppy required first shift
RNs to assist in administering medication when there were not enough LPNs to
administer the medication. There is no dispute that all of the above duties constitute
general nursing duties.
{¶40} While plaintiffs maintain that the change in job responsibilities was to “teach
them a lesson” or to “get rid of them”, the question before the court is whether the change
in job responsibilities amounted to an adverse employment action. Upon review,
reasonable minds can only conclude that the alteration in job responsibilities amount to
inconvenience or ordinary tribulations of the workplace and that plaintiffs did not suffer
some harm sufficient to constitute an adverse employment action. “Employment actions
that result in mere inconvenience or an alteration of job responsibilities are not disruptive
enough to constitute adverse employment actions.” Canady, 2009-Ohio-4974, at ¶ 25
(Cleaned up.). Given the chronic nursing staff shortages and other generalized animosity
amongst staff, it is no surprise that plaintiffs felt burdened by the alteration of
responsibilities; nevertheless, plaintiffs did not suffer harm to an identifiable term or
condition of employment. Additionally, there is no dispute that the changes applied to
any nurse assigned to the first shift. Moreover, an alteration in job responsibilities does
not amount to adverse employment action when unaccompanied by harm. Davis, 245
F.3d 1232, at 1244-1245; Downs v. Collins, 2026 U.S. App. LEXIS 19718, *6-7 (6th Cir.
2026) citing Muldrow v. City of St. Louis, 601 U.S. 346 (2024) (to establish an adverse
employment action, a plaintiff must show some harm respecting an identifiable term or
Case No. 2025-00642JD -16- DECISION
condition of employment.). Finally, there is no dispute that Oppy did not have the authority
to terminate plaintiffs’ employment. (Bowshier Dep. 93:19-23, 96:13-19).
{¶41} To the extent plaintiffs argue that the meeting with Warden Olds was
threatening of disciplinary action such that it amounts to an adverse employment action,
there is no evidence that plaintiffs were disciplined during or after the meeting.
Furthermore, even assuming that the meeting was disciplinary in nature, there is no
evidence that the meeting resulted in altered terms or conditions of employment to
constitute an adverse employment action. O’Brien, 2026-Ohio-3001, ¶ 62 (“Similarly,
here, even assuming the discipline was a step in the agency’s progressive discipline
framework, we do not find evidence presented that the discipline altered the terms and
conditions of employment to constitute an adverse employment action.”). Likewise,
plaintiffs received no discipline or changes to the terms or condition of their employment
associated with the emails sent by Oppy or Deputy Warden May. Perez v. Theller, 2011-
Ohio-2176, ¶ 15 (6th Dist.) (verbal and written reprimands, counseling, and negative
write-ups are not adverse employment actions).
{¶42} In short, there is no evidence that plaintiffs’ employment terms, conditions,
or privileges were altered in any meaningful way or that plaintiffs suffered some harm
respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment. O’Brien, 2026-Ohio-3001,
¶ 68. Upon review, defendant met its burden of demonstrating that plaintiffs cannot
establish a prima facie case for discrimination on the basis of age as defendant has
presented evidence that plaintiffs never suffered an adverse employment action. Plaintiffs
failed to meet their reciprocal burden under Civ.R. 56(E) to identify specific facts showing
a genuine issue for trial as they have failed to demonstrate that defendant took an adverse
employment action against them. Having considered the evidence most strongly in
plaintiffs’ favor, the only reasonable conclusion is that they cannot state a prima facie
claim for age discrimination. Accordingly, defendant