Full Opinion

[Cite as Ohio Civ. Rights Comm. v. Akron Metro. Hous. Auth., 2026-Ohio-3714.] STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) OHIO CIVIL RIGHTS COMMISSION, et C.A. Nos. 31554 al. 31558 Appellants v. APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE AKRON METROPOLITAN HOUSING COURT OF COMMON PLEAS AUTHORITY COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO CASE No. CV 2024-02-0654 Appellee DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY Dated: September 23, 2026 HENSAL, Judge. {¶1} The Ohio Civil Rights Commission (“OCRC”), Kimberely Abu-Alasal, and Fair Housing Advocates Association appeal a judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas that granted summary judgment to the Akron Metropolitan Housing Authority (“AMHA”) on Ms. Abu-Alasal’s reasonable accommodation request. For the following reasons, this Court reverses. I. {¶2} Ms. Abu-Alasal lives in an apartment in a multi-story building operated by AMHA. She has a disabling condition that is worsened by second-hand smoke. Although AMHA buildings are supposed to be smoke-free, Ms. Abu-Alasal alleges that she has a neighbor who smokes and that the smoke infiltrates part of her apartment, making it inaccessible to her. {¶3} Ms. Abu-Alasal learned that a corner apartment was going to become available and knew that the resident of its neighboring apartment does not smoke. She, therefore, completed a 2 request to transfer to that apartment. AMHA denied the request. Ms. Abu-Alasal appealed, but her appeal was also denied. She then filed a charge with OCRC, arguing that AMHA had failed to provide her a reasonable accommodation. OCRC determined that it was probable that discrimination had occurred but was unable to reach a resolution with AMHA. OCRC, therefore, filed a complaint with the common pleas court. Ms. Abu-Alasal and Fair Housing Advocates Association (collectively “Ms. Abu-Alasal”) intervened as plaintiffs. {¶4} Following discovery, the parties each moved for summary judgment. The trial court granted OCRC’s motion in part and denied it in part. It determined that there is no genuine issue that Ms. Abu-Alasal has a disabling condition and that AMHA denied her reasonable accommodation request. It determined there is a genuine issue, however, whether the requested accommodation is necessary to afford her an equal opportunity to use and enjoy her dwelling. The court granted AMHA’s motion, determining that Ms. Abu-Alasal’s requested accommodation was not necessary to afford her an equal opportunity to use and enjoy her dwelling. OCRC and Ms. Abu-Alasal have appealed, both assigning two errors. Because all the assignments focus on whether the trial court correctly granted summary judgment to AMHA, we will address them together. II. OCRC’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT TO APPELLEE AKRON METROPOLITAN HOUSING AUTHORITY (“AMHA”) WHEN THERE WERE DISPUTED ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT. OCRC’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY CONCLUDING NO ACCOMMODATION WAS NECESSARY IN ORDER FOR KIMBERLY ABU-ALASAL TO HAVE AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY TO USE AND ENJOY HER APARTMENT. 3 MS. ABU-ALASAL’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I THE TRIAL COURT’S APPLICATION OF STATUTE AND FEDERAL FAIR HOUSING LAW WAS TOO NARROW REGARDING THE NECESSITY OF A REASONABLE ACCOMMODATION FOR KIMBERLY ABU-ALASAL. MS. ABU-ALASAL’S ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II BECAUSE THE EVIDENTIARY RECORD CONTAINED GENUINE ISSUES OF DISPUTED MATERIAL FACT, THE GRANTING OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF APPELLEE CONTRAVENED OHIO RULE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 56 AND WAS THEREFORE ERRONEOUS. {¶5} OCRC and Ms. Abu-Alasal’s assignments of error argue that the trial court incorrectly granted AMHA’s motion for summary judgment. Under Rule 56(C), summary judgment is appropriate if: [n]o genuine issue as to any material fact remains to be litigated; (2) the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; and (3) it appears from the evidence that reasonable minds can come to but one conclusion, and viewing such evidence most strongly in favor of the party against whom the motion for summary judgment is made, that conclusion is adverse to that party. Temple v. Wean United, Inc., 50 Ohio St.2d 317, 327 (1977). To succeed on a motion for summary judgment, the party moving for summary judgment must first be able to point to evidentiary materials that demonstrate there is no genuine issue as to any material fact, and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Dresher v. Burt, 75 Ohio St.3d 280, 292 (1996). If the movant satisfies this burden, the nonmoving party “must set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.” Id. at 293, quoting Civ.R. 56(E). This Court reviews an award of summary judgment de novo. Grafton v. Ohio Edison Co., 77 Ohio St.3d 102, 105 (1996). {¶6} Ms. Abu-Alasal raised claims under both federal and state law, but the parties acknowledge that the laws are analogous. Under Revised Code Section 4112.02(H)(19), it is an unlawful discriminatory practice to “[r]efuse to make reasonable accommodations in rules, 4 policies, practices, or services when necessary to afford a person with a disability equal opportunity to use and enjoy a dwelling unit . . . .” See also 42 U.S.C. 3604(f)(3)(B). The elements of such a claim require a plaintiff to demonstrate that (1) she suffers from a disability; (2) the defendants knew or reasonably should have known of the disability; (3) accommodation of the disability “may be necessary” to afford the plaintiff an equal opportunity to use and enjoy the dwelling; and (4) the defendants refused to make such an accommodation. Reid v. Plainsboro Partners, III, 2010-Ohio-4373, ¶ 47 (10th Dist.). {¶7} The trial court noted that there is no genuine issue that Ms. Abu-Alasal is a person with a disability, that AMHA knew of the disability, and that AMHA denied her accommodation request. It determined that the only dispute was whether the requested accommodation is necessary to afford her an equal opportunity to use and enjoy her dwelling. It concluded that AMHA has a non-smoking policy that is in place for the benefit of all tenants and that Ms. Abu- Alasal had not submitted any evidence to support that she “is entitled to a different or better opportunity than non-disabled tenants.” {¶8} OCRC and Ms. Abu-Alasal argue that her accommodation request is necessary because she is suffering negative health effects from the current situation and can only enjoy her living space to the same extent as a non-disabled tenant if she is able to move. They argue that Ms. Abu-Alasal’s reaction to the environmental toxin of second-hand smoke is more severe than is typical because of her medical conditions. They also argue that AMHA cannot avoid responsibility for accommodating her merely by having a non-smoking policy because they have not done anything to enforce that policy. According to OCRC and Ms. Abu-Alasal, Ms. Abu- Alasal needs to move away from a neighbor who is violating the non-smoking policy and, if she moved to the corner apartment, it would improve her circumstances and allow her to enjoy her tenancy. 5 {¶9} If AMHA had a non-smoking policy that was followed by all the residents or enforced by AMHA, Ms. Abu-Alasal’s requested accommodation would not be necessary. OCRC and Ms. Abu-Alasal, however, submitted evidence that Ms. Abu-Alasal’s neighbor smokes, that second-hand smoke from the neighbor infiltrates her apartment and balcony, that the smoke exacerbates her medical condition, and that the only things AMHA has done to enforce its non- smoking policy is to send out reminders of the policy to residents and to check for signs of smoking during its annual inspection of the apartment units.1 AMHA also did not investigate whether transferring Ms. Abu-Alasal to another unit would reduce her exposure to second-hand smoke or be beneficial to her. {¶10} Upon review of the record, construing the evidence in a light most favorable to OCRC and Ms. Abu-Alasal, we conclude there are genuine issues of material fact regarding whether transferring Ms. Abu-Alasal to a different unit is necessary to afford her an equal opportunity to use and enjoy her dwelling. The trial court incorrectly determined that AMHA was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on OCRC’s and Ms. Abu-Alasal’s claims. OCRC’s and Ms. Abu-Alasal’s assignments of error are sustained. III. {¶11} OCRC’s and Ms. Abu-Alasal’s assignments of error are sustained. The judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas is reversed, and this matter is remanded for proceedings consistent with this decision. Judgment reversed, and cause remanded. 1 AMHA states in its appellate brief that the neighbor who Ms. Abu-Alasal alleges is the source of the second-hand smoke has moved but it has not pointed to any place in the record that establishes that fact. 6 There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. Costs taxed to Appellee. JENNIFER HENSAL FOR THE COURT FLAGG LANZINGER, P. J. SUTTON, J. CONCUR. APPEARANCES: FRANK MAZGAJ, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. JAMES D. CASEY, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. BRIAN J. WILLIAMS, Attorney at Law, for Appellants. DAVID A. OPPENHEIMER, Principal Assistant Attorney General, and ISAAC BLEICH, Assistant Attorney General, for Appellee.