In re I.S.

[Cite as In re I.S., 2026-Ohio-3713.] STATE OF OHIO ) IN THE COURT OF APPEALS )ss: NINTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUNTY OF SUMMIT ) IN RE: I.S. C.A. Nos. 31874 X.S. 31875 Z.S. 31876 APPEAL FROM JUDGMENT ENTERED IN THE COURT OF COMMON PLEAS COUNTY OF SUMMIT, OHIO CASE Nos. DN 23 11 0931 DN 23 11 0932 DN 24 12 0826 DECISION AND JOURNAL ENTRY Dated: September 23, 2026 MANNING, Judge. {¶1} Appellant, C.G. (“Mother”), appeals from a judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, that terminated her parental rights to three of her minor children and placed them in the permanent custody of Summit County Children Services Board (“CSB”). This Court affirms. I. {¶2} Three of Mother’s children are parties to this appeal: I.S., born May 24, 2019; X.S., born June 8, 2020; and Z.S., born December 6, 2024. The children’s father (“Father”) voluntarily relinquished his parental rights and did not appeal the trial court’s judgment. {¶3} Mother and Father have seven other children together, none of whom reside in their custody. Two of the parents’ older children were adopted several years ago by a family friend,  2 S.S., who resides in Pennsylvania. Two of the children were adopted by the paternal grandmother during these Summit County proceedings. Details about the other children are not set forth in the record. {¶4} Mother, Father, and their children have been involved with multiple child welfare agencies over the years in Pennsylvania and other counties in Ohio. According to Father, Youth and Family Services in Pennsylvania was involved with the family for four years due to concerns about Mother’s mental health and cognitive limitations and the unsuitable condition of the home. That agency’s involvement began when the family lived in a dirty and cluttered one-bedroom home with multiple children and 17 cats. {¶5} CSB received several referrals about this family shortly after they moved to Summit County, more than a year before Z.S. was born. The initial referrals involved the children’s poor hygiene and the parents’ failure to meet their medical and dental needs. CSB worked with the family on a voluntary basis and closed the case without additional concerns. {¶6} During early November 2023, CSB received two more referrals after then four- year-old I.S. was found wandering alone outside and Akron Children’s Hospital expressed concern that X.S. had been physically abused because he had unusual bruising on his back. On November 7, 2023, CSB filed complaints to allege that I.S. and X.S. were dependent children. The parents waived their rights to a contested hearing and agreed to the dependency adjudication of the children. {¶7} The juvenile court initially allowed the children to remain in their parents’ custody under an order of protective supervision. The juvenile court later removed the children from the home and placed them in the temporary custody of CSB. The guardian ad litem had expressed concern about the worsening condition of the home and the parents’ continued failure to meet the  3 basic needs of the children. The guardian ad litem reported that she and her supervisor had been to the home and observed that the children were extremely dirty, in urine-soaked diapers, and that the parents were not otherwise meeting their needs. The parents had also failed to follow through with intervention services for the children. At that time, I.S. and X.S. were three and four years old and were not potty trained, spoke only a few incoherent words, and had not reached many other developmental milestones. Both parents demonstrated a lack of insight into the developmental delays of the children and their need for consistent intervention services. {¶8} The case plan required Mother to obtain mental health and parenting assessments and follow all recommendations; obtain and maintain suitable income and housing; and demonstrate that she could meet the basic needs of the children. Following the required assessments, Mother was diagnosed with borderline personality disorder, other specified personality disorder, mild intellectual disability, severe alcohol use disorder, and stimulant and hallucinogen disorder in remission. She was required to engage in ongoing mental health counseling, submit to random drug screens, participate in parenting coaching, and demonstrate that she could meet the children’s basic needs. {¶9} Three days after the Z.S.’s birth, CSB filed a complaint to allege that he was also a dependent child because of the ongoing problems in the older siblings’ cases. The parents waived their rights to a contested adjudicatory hearing. The juvenile court adjudicated Z.S. as a dependent child, later placed him in the temporary custody of CSB, and adopted a similar case plan. {¶10} While in foster care, I.S. and X.S. engaged in ongoing speech, occupational, and physical therapy and made significant progress. They were initially placed in the home of the paternal grandmother, but she was unable to care for them, given their extensive needs. Z.S. was also seeing a physical therapist to try to keep him developmentally on track.  4 {¶11} CSB was unable to find any relatives to take custody of these three children. It investigated two potential kinship caregivers for the children who live in Pennsylvania: S.S., who had adopted two of Mother’s older children; and her niece K.T. Those investigations are not explained in the record except that S.S. was the agency’s first choice and the children began having extended visits with her and their two older siblings. X.S. in particular was very fond of S.S. and her family. The Interstate Compact for the Placement of Children (“ICPC”) assessment of S.S. was denied, however, because the well water in her home was deemed unsafe to drink. S.S. hoped to remedy the problem, but it was unclear when she would be able to do that. Consequently, CSB focused its investigation on the niece, K.T., who had also visited the children and was willing to provide a permanent home for all three children. The ICPC assessment of K.T. was not completed during the trial court proceedings. {¶12} For more than one year, Mother engaged in ongoing mental health treatment and intensive hands-on parenting instruction, but CSB remained concerned that Mother did not appear to be able to care for the children or herself without the help of another adult. Although Father had also been diagnosed with mental health and substance use disorders, he made more noticeable progress in treatment and parenting instruction. CSB and the guardian ad litem consistently observed that Father was the primary caregiver for the children and the only parent who managed the household. Mother admitted that she was dependent on Father to meet the children’s needs and her own basic needs. {¶13} Mother and Father consistently engaged in mental health counseling and visited the children. They received intensive hands-on parenting instruction during their visits at the visitation center. For approximately five months, CSB permitted the parents to have monitored in-home visits, during which the parents received more intensive parenting instruction in their home.  5 Nevertheless, Father continued to handle most of the parenting and was unable to redirect Mother to become more engaged with the children. Mother’s interaction with the children was minimal and she lacked insight into how to meet their most basic needs. Mother also did not follow instructions from the parenting instructor and, at times, would become agitated and start screaming at the instructor, the guardian ad litem, or CSB personnel. CSB expressed concern that after more than one year of mental health counseling and intensive parenting instruction, Mother could not care for the children without assistance. {¶14} During the fall of 2025, Father ended his long-term relationship with Mother and moved out of the family home. Mother admittedly had been dependent on Father for many years. After he left, her financial situation, the condition of her home, and her mental health declined. She had not been employed for several years and was unable to manage the limited amount of SSI income that she received each month. Mother was later evicted from her housing and started sleeping in homeless shelters. She had also expressed suicidal thoughts to the caseworker, so CSB sought a psychiatric assessment. Mother was admitted to a mental health facility for a 72-hour involuntary psychiatric hold. {¶15} On September 26, 2025, CSB moved for permanent custody of I.S., X.S., and Z.S. Mother alternately requested legal custody of the children. Father appeared at the hearing and voluntarily relinquished his parental rights to the three children. Although the final ICPC assessments of S.S. and K.T. were still pending, none of the parties requested that the trial court continue the hearing or wait for the assessments to be completed before it determined the permanent placement of these children.  6 {¶16} Following the final hearing, the trial court terminated parental rights and placed all three children in the permanent custody of CSB. Mother appeals and raises three assignments of error. To facilitate review, this Court will address her third assignment of error first. II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR III AS TO Z.S., THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING UNDER R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(A) AND (E)(1) THAT HE COULD NOT OR SHOULD NOT BE PLACED WITH MOTHER WITHIN A REASONABLE TIME. {¶17} Mother’s third assignment of error pertains to the trial court’s finding on the first prong of the permanent custody test regarding Z.S. only. Before a juvenile court may terminate parental rights and award permanent custody of a child to a proper moving agency, it must find clear and convincing evidence of both prongs of the permanent custody test: (1) that the child is abandoned; orphaned; has been in the temporary custody of the agency for at least 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period; the child or another child of the same parent has been adjudicated abused, neglected, or dependent three times; or that the child cannot be placed with either parent, based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414(E); and (2) that the grant of permanent custody to the agency is in the best interest of the child, based on an analysis under R.C. 2151.414(D)(1). R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) and 2151.414(B)(2); see also In re William S., 75 Ohio St.3d 95, 98-99 (1996). {¶18} On the first prong of the permanent custody test, the trial court found that CSB had proven that the older children, I.S. and X.S., had been in the temporary custody of CSB for more than 12 months of a consecutive 22-month period. See R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(d). Mother does not dispute that finding, which was supported by the record. {¶19} Mother challenges the trial court’s finding that Z.S. could not or should not be returned to Mother’s custody because Mother failed to remedy the conditions that caused the child  7 to be removed and remain placed outside the home “[f]ollowing the placement of the child outside the child’s home[.]” See R.C. 2151.414(B)(1)(a); 2151.414(E)(1). Mother cites this Court’s decisions in In re A.T., 2016-Ohio-5907, ¶ 12-16 (9th Dist.) and In re Q.C., 2021-Ohio-3993, ¶ 18-21 (9th Dist.), which emphasized that the plain language of R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) requires clear and convincing evidence that the parent failed to remedy the conditions that caused the child’s removal from the home after the child was removed from the home in the current case. Id. In each case, this Court reversed the trial court’s permanent custody decision because the trial court focused its failure to remedy finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) entirely or primarily on evidence that predated the child’s removal from the home. Id. {¶20} In this case, Mother asserts that the trial court improperly relied on Mother’s lack of case plan progress before Z.S. was born and removed from her custody. Specifically, the trial court supported its finding with one sentence that Mother had failed to make progress on the case plan of the older two children (I.S. and X.S.) for more than two years. The trial court fully explained its finding under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) as follows: Mother has failed to remedy the conditions that brought the child into care. Mother is homeless and has not benefitted from the services that were put into place to assist her in parenting this child. Mother has been working on her case plan objectives as to this child’s siblings for two years but has made no progress whatsoever. R.C. § 2151.414 (E)(1). {¶21} Mother’s attempts to analogize this case to In re A.T., 2016-Ohio-5907, at ¶ 12-16 (9th Dist.) and In re Q.C., 2021-Ohio-3993, at ¶ 18-21 (9th Dist.) are unpersuasive. Unlike the facts of the cases upon which Mother relies, the trial court did not base its R.C. 2151.414(E)(1) finding “on facts that predated” the child’s placement outside the home. In re A.T., 2016-Ohio- 5907, ¶ 12-16 (9th Dist.).  8 {¶22} The trial court explicitly relied on Mother’s ongoing lack of progress after Z.S. was born and removed from her custody. During the time that Mother worked on reunification after the birth of Z.S., her ability to care for or interact with the young child did not improve, despite ongoing services provided by CSB. Mother was admittedly dependent on Father to care for her and the children. Mother’s relationship with Father ended many months after Z.S. was born and her ability to care for the child declined. While living with Father, the family had housing. It was not until after Father moved out that Mother became homeless. Without Father, Mother lacked the ability to budget her limited finances, and her mental health had also declined. Mother received nearly one year of case planning services in Z.S.’s case. The trial court’s final statement about the two years of case planning services in the older children’s cases only emphasized that Mother still had made no progress on these same case plan goals. {¶23} Mother has failed to demonstrate reversible error in the trial court’s finding that Z.S. could not or should not be returned to her care because she failed to remedy the conditions that caused the child’s initial and ongoing removal from her custody under R.C. 2151.414(E)(1). Mother’s third assignment of error is overruled. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR I THE TRIAL COURT’S BEST-INTEREST DETERMINATION AND LEGALLY-SECURE-PLACEMENT FINDING WERE NOT SUPPORTED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE AND WERE AGAINST THE MANIFEST WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE. {¶24} Mother also challenges the trial court’s finding on the best interest prong of the permanent custody test. When reviewing the trial court’s best interest determination, this Court focuses primarily on the specific factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(D). In re M.S., 2023-Ohio- 1558, ¶ 25 (9th Dist.). The trial court was required to consider the statutory best interest factors, which include: the interaction and interrelationships of the children, their wishes and custodial  9 history, the children’s need for permanence and whether that can be achieved without a grant of permanent custody, and whether any of the factors outlined in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7)-(11) apply. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(a)-(e); see also In re R.G., 2009-Ohio-6284, ¶ 11 (9th Dist.). None of the factors set forth in R.C. 2151.414(E)(7)-(11) were proven in this case. {¶25} Mother does not challenge the trial court’s overall finding on the best interest factors but confines her challenge to only one of the best interest factors: whether a legally secure permanent placement could be achieved without a grant of permanent custody to the agency. R.C. 2151.414(D)(1)(d). She argues that the trial court erred in finding that a legally secure permanent placement could only be achieved by granting permanent custody because the ICPCs remained pending for S.S. and K.T. Mother asserts that the trial court should have waited for the results of the ICPCs, implying that termination of her parental rights could have been avoided because legal custody to S.S. or K.T. might have been possible. {¶26} Mother unsuccessfully attempts to analogize this case to In re T.S., 2025-Ohio-2140 (9th Dist.), in which this Court reversed a permanent custody decision explicitly “based on the specific facts” of that case. Id. at ¶ 35. Those facts included that the mother had made significant progress on the case plan, had recently moved to West Virginia and was living with two aunts who provided her with a stable support system, an expedited ICPC assessment of that home was still pending, the guardian ad litem had moved for a continuance of the hearing until the ICPC was completed, the guardian ad litem recommended placing the children with the mother or the aunt but needed the ICPC results, and all best interest factors supported preserving Mother’s parental rights. Id. at ¶ 26-35. Further, the record included facts that the aunt was interested in taking legal custody of both children.  10 {¶27} In this case, none of the parties had sought a continuance or asked the trial court to wait for the ICPC results before ruling on CSB’s permanent custody motion. There is also no evidence in the record that S.S. or K.T. was willing to take legal custody of the children. S.S. had not taken legal custody of Mother’s two older children but had adopted them. Similarly, K.T. was in the process of fostering to adopt another relative. {¶28} In fact, the recommendation of the guardian ad litem was that the children be placed in the permanent custody of CSB so they could be placed for adoption. She clearly stated that she believed that permanent custody was the only means to place any of the children with S.S. She explained that the adoption plan would depend on the outcomes of the ICPC assessments. Her preference was that the children be adopted by S.S., if the well-water problems could be resolved. If the ICPC of S.S. was again denied, she recommended that CSB pursue adoption by K.T., if her ICPC assessment is ultimately approved. {¶29} Because Mother has failed to demonstrate that there was a kinship legal custody option that the trial court should have considered, the court had no reason to sua sponte continue the hearing for evidence of the ICPC results. Mother’s first assignment of error is overruled. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR II THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT [CSB] MADE REASONABLE AND DILIGENT REUNIFICATION EFFORTS WHERE THE AGENCY DID NOT PROVIDE SERVICES TAILORED TO MOTHER’S KNOWN COGNITIVE DISABILITY AND NEED FOR INTENSIVE IN-HOME PARENTING SUPPORT AND CASE MANAGEMENT. {¶30} Finally, Mother asserts that the trial court erred in finding that CSB had made reasonable efforts to reunify Mother and the children because the agency failed to provide her with one-on-one parenting instruction and other services tailored to address her cognitive delays. Mother has failed to demonstrate that the trial court was required to make a finding of reasonable  11 reunification efforts at the permanent custody stage of the proceedings. See In re L.A., 2023-Ohio- 1877, ¶ 8 (9th Dist). Therefore, any error in the trial court’s reasonable efforts finding would be harmless. In re E.R., 2025-Ohio-4546, ¶ 20 (9th Dist.). {¶31} R.C. 2151.419(A) specifically required CSB to establish, and the trial court to find, that the agency made reasonable efforts toward reunification or to prevent the continued removal of the children from the home: at any hearing held pursuant to section 2151.28 [shelter care], division (E) of section 2151.31 [ex parte emergency temporary custody], or section 2151.314 [shelter care placement], 2151.33 [pre-adjudication temporary placement], or 2151.353 [disposition following adjudication] of the Revised Code at which the court removes a child from the child's home or continues the removal of a child from the child’s home[.] R.C. 2151.419(A)(1). CSB was not required to demonstrate that it made reasonable reunification efforts at the permanent custody hearing unless it had not done so at one of the prior hearings identified in R.C. 2151.419(A)(1). In re C.F., 2007-Ohio-1104, ¶ 43. {¶32} Beginning with the first shelter care hearing, the magistrate found that CSB had made reasonable efforts to prevent the removal of the children at numerous hearings throughout this case. Mother does not argue that those findings were not proper, nor did she object to or move to set aside any of those findings in the trial court. Mother has not argued plain error or demonstrated any prejudicial error in the trial court’s reasonable efforts findings. {¶33} Moreover, the record reveals that Mother was provided with intensive, hands-on parenting instruction for more than one year during her weekly visits with the children, including in her home for five months while she had visits there. Her family support specialist testified at the hearing that, in addition to weekly intensive parenting instruction, she had helped Mother complete an AMHA housing application, brought her bus passes and supplies for the children, and sometimes brought the family food.  12 {¶34} Although the trial court was not required to make a finding of reasonable efforts at this stage of the proceedings, Mother has failed to demonstrate any error. Her second assignment of error is overruled accordingly. III. {¶35} Mother’s assignments of error are overruled. The judgment of the Summit County Court of Common Pleas, Juvenile Division, is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. There were reasonable grounds for this appeal. We order that a special mandate issue out of this Court, directing the Court of Common Pleas, County of Summit, State of Ohio, to carry this judgment into execution. A certified copy of this journal entry shall constitute the mandate, pursuant to App.R. 27. Immediately upon the filing hereof, this document shall constitute the journal entry of judgment, and it shall be file stamped by the Clerk of the Court of Appeals at which time the period for review shall begin to run. App.R. 22(C). The Clerk of the Court of Appeals is instructed to mail a notice of entry of this judgment to the parties and to make a notation of the mailing in the docket, pursuant to App.R. 30. Costs taxed to Appellant. NATHAN MANNING FOR THE COURT  13 FLAGG LANZINGER, P. J. STEVENSON, J. CONCUR. APPEARANCES: JASON D. WALLACE, Attorney at Law, for Appellant. ELLIOT KOLKOVICH, Prosecuting Attorney, and HEAVEN R. DIMARTINO, Assistant Proecuting Attorney, for Appellee. BRIAN ASHTON, Attorney at Law, for Appellee. DIANA QUEZADA, Attorney at Law, for X.S. HOLLY FARAH, Guardian ad Litem.