K.H. v. Dixon

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF NORTH CAROLINA No. 290A24 Filed 14 August 2026 K.H., A MINOR, BY AND THROUGH HER GUARDIAN AD LITEM, JOHN HARTMAN v. DANIELLE L. DIXON, INDIVIDUALLY AND IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY, AND ALAMANCE-BURLINGTON BOARD OF EDUCATION Appeal pursuant to N.C.G.S. § 7A-30(2) (2023) from the decision of a divided panel of the Court of Appeals, 296 N.C. App. 62 (2024), affirming an order entered on 17 April 2023 by Judge Michael L. Robinson in Superior Court, Alamance County. Heard in the Supreme Court on 17 September 2025. Fox Rothschild LLP, by Matthew Nis Leerberg, Nathan W. Wilson, and Margaret McCall Reece, for plaintiff-appellant. Tharrington Smith LLP, by David B. Noland and Joshua E. Renz, for defendant-appellee Alamance-Burlington Board of Education. Brooks, Pierce, McLendon, Humphrey & Leonard, L.L.P., by Elizabeth L. Troutman and William A. Robertson, for North Carolina School Boards Association, amicus curiae. EARLS, Justice. K.H. (Katherine)1 was a student at a public middle school in the Alamance- Burlington School District in the fall of 2022. She alleges that one day that semester, 1 A pseudonym to protect the minor’s privacy and for ease of reading.  K.H. V. DIXON Opinion of the Court her teacher violently attacked her in her classroom in front of other students, and that the Alamance-Burlington Board of Education (the Board) responded by first suspending Katherine, then revoking that suspension after news outlets covered the attack, and then transferring Katherine to an alternative school without her input. In addition to suing her teacher, Ms. Danielle Dixon, for these alleged events, Katherine sued the Board for its allegedly inadequate hiring and supervision of Ms. Dixon and its response to Ms. Dixon’s actions. In particular, Katherine brought a Corum claim directly under the North Carolina Constitution, asserting that the Board’s conduct infringed on her constitutional right to the opportunity to access a sound basic education and that she lacked another adequate state law remedy. See Corum v. Univ. of N.C., 330 N.C. 761, 782 (1992). We agree with Katherine that her complaint against the Board states a colorable constitutional claim and that she lacks an adequate other state remedy for the Board’s actions. See Deminski ex rel. C.E.D. v. St. Bd. of Educ., 377 N.C. 406, 413 (2021) (summarizing the three Corum elements as applied to an individual constitutional claim under Article I, Section 15 and Article IX, Section 2 of our state constitution). Although the “fundamental right” to “equal access to participation in our public school system,” Sneed v. Greensboro City Bd. of Educ., 299 N.C. 609, 618 (1980), does not generally hold school districts liable for the intentional torts of their teachers, it does make local authorities responsible for responding reasonably to such incidents once they occur. Failing to do so may constitute “deliberate[ ] indifferen[ce] -2-  K.H. V. DIXON Opinion of the Court to conduct that prevent[s schoolchildren] from accessing their constitutionally guaranteed right to a sound basic education.” Deminski, 377 N.C. at 414. Katherine’s allegations, if proved, would support the conclusion that the Board responded unreasonably to Ms. Dixon’s assault when it suspended Katherine and then transferred her to a new school, and that its deliberate indifference to the situation impaired Katherine’s academic performance and caused her to suffer negative educational consequences. Because Katherine’s complaint did state a Corum claim, the trial court erred by granting the Board’s motion to dismiss this claim under Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6). We reverse the Court of Appeals’ contrary decision and remand this action for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. I. Background A. The Assault and the Board’s Response Katherine’s complaint alleged the following, which we assume to be true in reviewing the decision to grant the Board’s Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. E.g., Jones v. J. Kim Hatcher Ins. Agencies, 387 N.C. 489, 492 (2025). In the fall of 2022, Katherine was a student at Broadview Middle School, a public school in the Alamance-Burlington School District. Danielle Dixon was one of Katherine’s assigned teachers. Ms. Dixon’s teaching license expired in 2015, and she was not licensed at the time she was assigned to be Katherine’s teacher. On 2 November 2022, when Katherine “was attending school” and “attempted to walk into -3-  K.H. V. DIXON Opinion of the Court her assigned classroom to retrieve her bookbag,” “[Ms. Dixon] blocked [Katherine’s] path with her arm.” Katherine was only “approximately three inches away and still moving forward” when Ms. Dixon put out her arm, and because of that “close proximity,” Katherine “was unable to avoid any contact” and ran into Ms. Dixon’s arm. After that contact, Ms. Dixon “grabbed [Katherine] and pulled her inside of the classroom while closing the door.” She then proceeded to violently beat Katherine. First, “[Ms. Dixon] grabbed [Katherine] by the hair and slammed [Katherine] into the door with enough force to break a broom that was located between [Katherine] and the wall and door area.” Ms. Dixon then “forcefully slammed [Katherine] to the ground” by her hair. Ms. Dixon then continued to “slam[ ] [Katherine’s] head into the ground” at least four more times while grasping the back of Katherine’s head and hair. During the assault, students inside the classroom “began yelling” for Ms. Dixon to release Katherine and stop harming her. Upon hearing this “yelling and commotion,” “two other teachers entered the room and called for help.” Katherine “attempted to defend herself but was unable to because of [Ms.] Dixon’s large size and age advantage.” The complaint also included still images that allegedly capture the unfolding assault, apparently taken by a student onlooker. The images similarly show a teacher figure pinning a student figure to the wall behind a classroom door, forcing the student to the floor, grasping the student’s head and hair while the student’s legs are -4-  K.H. V. DIXON Opinion of the Court splayed out, and appearing to yell at another teacher figure who approached her during the assault. After the attack, Katherine experienced bruises, hair loss from where Ms. Dixon had grabbed her, and ongoing emotional distress. The superintendent for the Board, Dr. Dain Butler, initially suspended Katherine for ten days. But when “video of the altercation was made available to local news outlets,” the Board reversed that decision. Still, Katherine was not allowed to return to Broadview Middle School. Instead, she was transferred to Ray Street Academy, an alternative school, without her input or consent. This cumulative disruption, starting with the assault and followed by the suspension and transfer, meant that Katherine “was forced to change her schools,” her “academic performance . . . was placed in peril,” and she “suffered educational consequences.” B. The Complaint and Subsequent Proceedings On 5 January 2023, Katherine, by and through her guardian ad litem, sued Ms. Dixon in her individual and official capacities, as well as the Board. Against both defendants, Katherine brought claims for damages for assault and battery, negligent infliction of emotional distress, intentional infliction of emotional distress, and violations of the North Carolina Constitution Article I, Section 15, and Article IX, Section 2. Against the Board specifically, she also brought a claim of negligent hiring, retention, and supervision of Ms. Dixon. Katherine alleged that, in addition to teaching without an active teacher’s license and attacking Katherine, “[Ms.] Dixon -5-  K.H. V. DIXON Opinion of the Court had multiple issues within her classroom with other students and [faced] disciplinary actions by the Principal of Broadview Middle School,” and that the Board failed to investigate whether Ms. Dixon “had the emotional capacity” and adequate training to teach minor children. The Board moved to dismiss the complaint on 21 February 2023. As grounds to dismiss Katherine’s tort claims under Civil Procedure Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(2), the Board invoked sovereign immunity, arguing that those claims were barred because the Board had not waived its immunity up to the extent of its insurance coverage under N.C.G.S. § 115C-42. The Board also moved to dismiss Katherine’s constitutional claim under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The trial court agreed and dismissed Katherine’s tort claims against the Board because “the Complaint does not sufficiently demonstrate a basis for waiver of the Board’s sovereign immunity as required under Rules 12(b)(1)–(2).” The trial court also granted the Board’s motion to dismiss Katherine’s constitutional claim under Rule 12(b)(6) because “the Complaint falls short of alleging facts giving rise to the type of claims contemplated in Deminski.” Katherine’s claims against Ms. Dixon in her individual capacity remained. Katherine appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed. K.H. v. Dixon, 296 N.C. App. 62, 72 (2024). First, the Court of Appeals concluded that it had jurisdiction to entertain Katherine’s interlocutory appeal because “appeals raising issues of governmental or sovereign immunity affect a substantial right sufficient to warrant -6-  K.H. V. DIXON Opinion of the Court immediate appellate review.” Id. at 64 (quoting Kawai Am. Corp. v. Univ. of N.C. at Chapel Hill, 152 N.C. App. 163, 165 (2002)). Katherine’s appeal fell within this precedent, it reasoned, because the trial court dismissed her tort claims on grounds involving sovereign immunity and dismissed her constitutional claim for failure to state a claim. Id. at 65 (first citing Hinson v. City of Greensboro, 232 N.C. App. 204, 209 (2014); and then citing Horne v. Town of Blowing Rock, 223 N.C. App. 26, 29 (2012)). As to the merits, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial court that Katherine had not adequately pleaded a waiver of sovereign immunity under N.C.G.S. § 115C-42 and thus dismissal was appropriate. Id. at 65–67. The court also agreed that Katherine failed to allege facts to show that she “was subjected to repeated or ongoing issues with Dixon” and thus failed to state a claim for constitutional injury under Deminski. Id. at 71. On this last point, Judge Murphy dissented. He would have held that Katherine’s complaint, taken as a whole, adequately alleged that the Board “was deliberately indifferent to the hostile environment it created when it placed” an unqualified, unlicensed, and inadequately trained and supervised individual in a classroom and when it suspended Katherine after her teacher attacked her. Id. at 78– 79 (Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). The Board’s actions, in his view, were sufficient to support allegations of an injury to Katherine’s constitutional rights to a sound basic education in our public schools. And because he agreed that -7-  K.H. V. DIXON Opinion of the Court Katherine’s common-law actions were barred by sovereign immunity, no other adequate state remedy exists for her injuries and her Corum claim should be allowed to proceed. Id. at 79. Katherine appealed to this Court as of right based on Judge Murphy’s dissent. N.C.G.S. § 7A-30 (2023) (repealed 2023). II. Analysis A. Jurisdiction First, this Court has subject matter jurisdiction to hear Katherine’s constitutional claims against the Board. See In re K.J.L., 363 N.C. 343, 346 (2009) (“[A] court’s lack of subject matter jurisdiction is not waivable and can be raised at any time.”). Subject matter jurisdiction is, fundamentally, “a court’s ‘power to pass on the merits of a case.’ ” Askew v. City of Kinston, 386 N.C. 286, 297 (2024) (quoting Slattery v. Appy City, LLC, 385 N.C. 726, 729 (2024)). In part because “the state judiciary . . . has the responsibility to protect the state constitutional rights of the citizens,” a court’s authority to hear Corum claims specifically “flows from the ‘authority granted to it by the Constitution.’ ” Id. at 298–99 (first quoting Corum, 330 N.C. at 783–84; and then quoting Henderson County v. Smyth, 216 N.C. 421, 423 (1939)). According to her pleadings, Katherine’s claims against the Board arise directly under the North Carolina Constitution, specifically Article I, Section 15, and Article IX, Section 2, for harms the Board allegedly inflicted upon her personally. Her complaint thus activated the court’s subject matter jurisdiction by alleging -8-  K.H. V. DIXON Opinion of the Court “ ‘infringement of a legal right’ secured by the Constitution and [by] present[ing] a justiciable controversy.” Id. at 299 (quoting Comm. to Elect Dan Forest v. Emps. Pol. Action Comm., 376 N.C. 558, 608 (2021)); Deminski, 377 N.C. at 414 (concluding that allegations of a “school’s deliberate indifference to ongoing student harassment” stated a “colorable constitutional claim” under Article I, Section 15 of the North Carolina Constitution). After this Court heard argument on the merits of the issues on appeal, we directed the parties to file supplemental briefing on whether the Court of Appeals had appellate jurisdiction over Katherine’s appeal. See K.H. v. Dixon, 388 N.C. 513 (2025) (order). Although we have had multiple occasions to consider whether an interlocutory order granting a motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds is immediately appealable, as the Court of Appeals has held, this Court has yet to resolve the merits of that issue. E.g., Farmer v. Troy Univ., 382 N.C. 366, 369 n.1 (2022) (declining, as in Teachy v. Coble Dairies, Inc., 306 N.C. 324, 328 (1982), to “decide whether a motion to dismiss on the basis of sovereign immunity is properly designated as a Rule 12(b)(1) motion or a 12(b)(2) motion,” only the latter of which is immediately appealable under statute (quoting Estate of Long v. Fowler, 378 N.C. 138, 142 n.1 (2021))). In their supplemental briefing, both Katherine and the Board contended that the Court of Appeals did have such jurisdiction. They argued that Court of Appeals precedent correctly holds that an interlocutory order granting a motion to dismiss -9-  K.H. V. DIXON Opinion of the Court based on governmental immunity is immediately appealable under the substantial rights doctrine, as is an order denying the same. E.g., Ballard v. Shelley, 257 N.C. App. 561, 564 (2018); Greene v. Barrick, 198 N.C. App. 647, 649–50 (2009). As an alternative to the substantial rights justification, Katherine further argued that sovereign immunity is a matter of personal jurisdiction, so adverse rulings on such grounds are immediately appealable under N.C.G.S. § 1-277(b) (2025) (“Any interested party has the right of immediate appeal from an adverse ruling as to the jurisdiction of the court over the person or property of the defendant . . . .” (emphasis added)). Further, fairness considerations support applying a rule of mutual appealability because procedural rules “must be applied equally to all parties to a lawsuit,” she argued, quoting Goins v. Puleo, 350 N.C. 277, 281 (1999). Once the Court of Appeals had jurisdiction over the tort claims dismissed based on immunity defenses, Katherine reasoned, it had attendant jurisdictional authority to review dismissal of her Corum claim. In addition, both Katherine and the Board argued that immediate appellate review was warranted because the posture of the claims before the trial court risked inconsistent verdicts on the same factual issues—namely, whether Ms. Dixon in fact assaulted Katherine and whether that assault caused Katherine emotional distress. See, e.g., Gardner v. Richmond County, 386 N.C. 594, 595 (2024) (per curiam) (reversing the Court of Appeals for failing to apply the doctrine of inconsistent verdicts to allow an immediate appeal of the dismissal of claims by one plaintiff when -10-  K.H. V. DIXON Opinion of the Court claims by another plaintiff that raised the same issues were allowed to proceed); Bernick v. Jurden, 306 N.C. 435, 439 (1982) (holding that “the possibility of inconsistent verdicts in separate trials” from an order allowing summary judgment for some but not all defendants “affects the substantial right . . . to have one jury decide whether the conduct of one, some, all or none of the defendants caused his injuries”). We agree with this basis for appellate jurisdiction—the posture of the claims below indicates a risk of inconsistent verdicts on the same factual issues. The risk of inconsistent verdicts doctrine arises when there is “a risk of two actual trials resulting in two different verdicts” on the same issues. Foster v. Crandell, 181 N.C. App. 152, 162–63, disc. rev. denied, 361 N.C. 567 (2007). That circumstance can occur where claims against multiple defendants involve identical legal issues and some but not all of those claims are dismissed before trial. E.g., Cook v. Bankers Life & Cas. Co., 329 N.C. 488, 491 (1991) (concluding that a risk of inconsistent verdicts existed where common issues of agency, waiver, estoppel, and the necessity of consent arose across distinct claims against two defendants and the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of one defendant but not the other). That risk can also arise where the factual issues underlying separate claims are substantially the same, and some of the claims will proceed while others will not. E.g., Green v. Duke Power Co., 305 N.C. 603, 608 (1982) (noting that undergoing a second trial affects a substantial right when there is “the possibility that a party will be prejudiced by different juries in -11-  K.H. V. DIXON Opinion of the Court separate trials rendering inconsistent verdicts on the same factual issue”); SciGrip, Inc. v. Osae, 373 N.C. 409, 433 n.9 (2020) (concluding that two breach of contract claims brought against two defendants posed a risk of inconsistent verdicts because factual issues in the conduct giving rise to both claims overlapped, and holding that the order granting summary judgment to the plaintiff on one claim but not the other was immediately appealable). In these cases, “the possibility of separate trials involving the same issues which could lead to inconsistent verdicts” affects a substantial right. Hamby v. Profile Prods., L.L.C., 361 N.C. 630, 634 (2007); see also Cook, 329 N.C. at 491 (“[W]e hold that the order dismissing the case as to [one defendant but not the other] affected a substantial right of the plaintiff which she will lose if it is not corrected before a final judgment is entered.”). Here, even as the trial court dismissed all of Katherine’s claims against the Board, Katherine’s separate tort claims against Ms. Dixon remain. The record indicates that the trial court filed an entry of default against Ms. Dixon on 20 February 2023. That sort of Rule 55(a) entry of default “is only an interlocutory act looking toward subsequent entry of final judgment of default.” E.g., Estate of Teel v. Darby, 129 N.C. App. 604, 607 (1998) (citing State Emps. Credit Union, Inc. v. Gentry, 75 N.C. App. 260, 265 (1985)). An entry of default can be set aside prior to a final judgment of default upon “good cause shown” under Civil Procedure Rule 55(d). N.C.G.S. § 1A-1, Rule 55(d) (2025). Thus, on this record, were Katherine unable to obtain immediate appellate review of the order dismissing her claims against the -12-  K.H. V. DIXON Opinion of the Court Board, and were Ms. Dixon to successfully move to set aside the entry of default, it is still possible that Katherine would proceed to a first trial on the merits of her claims against Ms. Dixon. Further, if the dismissal of her claims against the Board was overturned on appellate review, she could face a second jury trial on the merits of the Board’s conduct. Although Katherine’s constitutional claims against the Board are distinct from her tort claims against Ms. Dixon, many of the same factual issues must be resolved in both—including the alleged events relating to the assault and the extent of harm to Katherine. That would risk exposing Katherine to inconsistent verdicts on the same factual issues. On this basis, the trial court’s otherwise interlocutory order dismissing her claim against the Board but not against all defendants affects Katherine’s substantial rights and grants her an immediate right of appeal. See Gardner, 386 N.C. at 595.2 B. Katherine’s Claim under Article I, Section 15 and Article IX, Section 2 of the North Carolina Constitution 2 Because we conclude that the risk of inconsistent verdicts supports Katherine’s immediate right of appeal, we are satisfied of our own appellate jurisdiction and subsequently do not reach the issue of whether Katherine also has the right to appeal based on her substantial rights in “orders raising issues of governmental or sovereign immunity,” as the Court of Appeals put it. See K.H. v. Dixon, 296 N.C. App. 62, 65 (2024) (quoting Hinson v. City of Greensboro, 232 N.C. App. 204, 209 (2014)). After all, our review is cabined by another limitation on our appellate jurisdiction, namely that we obtained review of this matter through an appeal as of right based on a dissent at the Court of Appeals. See N.C.G.S. § 7A- 30(2) (2023) (repealed 2023). In turn, the dissent did not dispute the majority’s conclusion as to Katherine’s right to immediate appeal, perhaps because the dissent was similarly bound by long-standing Court of Appeals precedent. See K.H., 296 N.C. App. at 73 (Murphy, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Issues not “specifically set out as the basis for the dissent” are not preserved for this Court’s appellate jurisdiction arising from an appeal based on that dissent. See Cryan v. Nat’l Council of YMCAs of the U.S., 384 N.C. 569, 570 (2025). We leave this jurisdictional issue for future resolution. -13-  K.H. V. DIXON Opinion of the Court Katherine alleges that the Board violated her constitutional right to equal access to a sound basic education in our public schools when it hired an unlicensed and unqualified teacher, failed to adequately train and supervise that teacher, and responded to the teacher’s physical attack on Katherine in a classroom by suspending Katherine, reversing that decision when news outlets reported about the altercation, and then transferring her to an alternative school without her input. We agree with Katherine that her allegations as to the Board’s conduct after the alleged assault do state a colorable constitutional rights violation, the second element of her Corum claim. Because the other two elements are similarly met, the trial court wrongly dismissed Katherine’s constitutional claim against the Board under Rule 12(b)(6). 1. Applicable Legal Principles We review an order granting a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) de novo. Farmer, 382 N.C. at 369. “On a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, well-pleaded allegations of fact in the complaint are treated as true,” and “[f]actual inferences should be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party.” Cato Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 386 N.C. 667, 672 (2024) (cleaned up). In Corum v. University of North Carolina, 330 N.C. 761 (1992), this Court “recognized a direct action under the State Constitution against state officials for violation of rights guaranteed by the Declaration of Rights.” Id. at 783. Sovereign immunity is no defense to such claims. Craig v. New Hanover Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 363 -14-  K.H. V. DIXON Opinion of the Court N.C. 334, 338 (2009). In Deminski, we explained that an individual student could bring such Corum claims against local education authorities for deliberate indifference to the conduct of others that deprived that student of access to their constitutionally guaranteed education rights: “Notably, the right to a sound basic education rings hollow if the structural right exists but in a setting that is so intimidating and threatening to students that they lack a meaningful opportunity to learn.” Deminski, 377 N.C. at 414. These types of Corum claims, we explained, require a claimant to meet three elements to “sufficiently allege[ ] a claim for relief under Article I, Section 15 and Article IX, Section 2”: (1) that a state actor violated the student’s right to access a sound basic education; (2) that the claim is colorable; and (3) that there is no other adequate remedy under state law, meaning that the claimant at least has “the opportunity to enter the courthouse doors and present his claim.” Id. at 413–14 (cleaned up). 2. Application The trial court ruled that Katherine’s complaint fell short of articulating a claim under Deminski. But that determination rests on an overly narrow interpretation of our precedent and the constitutional right at stake. The North Carolina Constitution vests in every schoolchild a right to the opportunity to access a sound basic education. Leandro v. State, 346 N.C. 336, 345, 347 (1997). This “fundamental right” is rooted in the text, structure, and history of our Constitution as well as our precedent. See id. at 348; Sneed, 299 N.C. at 618. -15-  K.H. V. DIXON Opinion of the Court Specifically, Article I, Section 15 places an affirmative duty on “the State to guard and maintain” the “right to the privilege of education.” Article IX, Section 2 guarantees a uniform public school system “wherein equal opportunities shall be provided for all students.” This mandatory language creates an obligation on the State to “take charge of the education of its citizens,” Lane v. Stanly, 65 N.C. 153, 158 (1871), and reflects the framers’ intent to constitutionally “establish and secure . . . a system of free popular education,” Collie v. Comm’rs of Franklin Cnty., 145 N.C. 170, 175 (1907) (cleaned up). This constitutional requirement is not opportunity in name only. Reading the constitution as a whole, these two articles “combine” to guarantee schoolchildren the opportunity to access a quality education. See Leandro, 346 N.C. at 347. And these directives require the State and localities to provide “a safe environment where learning can take place,” Deminski, 377 N.C. at 412–13, and where “considerations of procedural due process” apply, Sneed, 299 N.C. at 618. Local education agencies in particular have an important role to play in delivering on “the duty of the State to guard and maintain” the right to access a sound basic education. N.C. Const. art. I, § 15. Because “[e]ducation is the corner-stone of a political fabric,” especially for a government based on “popular suffrage,” local authorities charged with “instruction of the children” occupy positions of great trust and authority essential to safeguarding constitutional education rights. Smith v. Sch. Trs., 141 N.C. 143, 154–55 (1906). -16-  K.H. V. DIXON Opinion of the Court Two of our precedents bear directly on Katherine’s allegations. In Deminski we recognized that “a government entity with control over the school” could be liable to a student for its “deliberate[ ] indifferen[ce] to ongoing harassment that prevents [that] student from accessing his constitutionally guaranteed right to a sound basic education.” 377 N.C. at 407. That was so even as the harassment was allegedly perpetrated only by fellow students, not any public employees. Id. at 407–09. There we noted that the harassment of the plaintiff students by fellow students was allegedly “severe and discriminatory,” id. at 410, and “ongoing,” and the school and local school board knew about it yet “failed to take adequate action,” id. at 414. We relied in part on federal court interpretations of Title IX, which bars recipients of federal education funding from denying educational benefits or equal participation in an educational program to students based on sex. See id. (citing Davis ex rel. LaShonda D. v. Monroe Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 526 U.S. 629, 644–47 (1999)). Under Title IX, “severe, pervasive, and objectively offensive” “student-on-student harassment” may “den[y] its victims the equal access to education that Title IX is designed to protect.” Davis, 526 U.S. at 652. The second relevant case is Sneed v. Greensboro City Board of Education, 299 N.C. 609 (1980). There we concluded that our state constitutional requirement of a general and uniform system of free public schools does not bar public schools from “charging [ ] modest, reasonable fees . . . to support the purchase of supplementary supplies and materials for use by or on behalf of students.” Id. at 617 (emphasis -17-  K.H. V. DIXON Opinion of the Court omitted). The state constitution does, however, limit a public school’s ability to charge such fees under threat of penalty to “a student who cannot pay required fees because of real economic hardship.” Id. at 618. We concluded that, to survive constitutional scrutiny, mechanisms must exist so that “all students and their parents are given adequate and timely notice” of how they may be eligible to have such charges waived and “the simple procedures by which they may confidentially apply for” that waiver. Id. at 619. Such procedural safeguards were necessary to protect the fundamental right of “equal access to participation in our public school system,” we reasoned, because otherwise students might inevitably feel they must forgo educational opportunities to avoid the “stigma” of being singled out on the basis of their socioeconomic status or because they are unaware of possible relief. Id. at 618–19. Taken together then, Deminski and Sneed underscore that local school authorities may not be deliberately indifferent to extreme, in-school conduct that deprives a student of the opportunity to access a sound basic education on equal terms. A governmental entity must respond reasonably, including with adequate procedural protections, to incidents of severe harassment or assault that would make schoolchildren more vulnerable to future harassment or deprive them of their opportunity to access a sound basic education. See Doe v. Fairfax Cnty. Sch. Bd., 1 F.4th 257, 274 (4th Cir. 2021) (“[A] school may be held liable under Title IX if its response to a single incident of severe sexual harassment, or the lack thereof, was clearly unreasonable and thereby made the plaintiff more vulnerable to future -18-  K.H. V. DIXON Opinion of the Court harassment or further contributed to the deprivation of the plaintiff’s access to educational opportunities.”); Fitzgerald v. Barnstable Sch. Comm., 504 F.3d 165, 172– 73, 175 (1st Cir. 2007) (recognizing that “a single instance of peer-on-peer harassment theoretically might form a basis for Title IX liability if that incident were vile enough and the institution’s response, after learning of it, unreasonable enough to have the combined systemic effect of denying access to a scholastic program or activity,” and noting that “an institutional response to harassment may be carried out so inartfully as to render it clearly unreasonable”), rev’d on other grounds, 555 U.S. 246 (2009); Davis, 526 U.S. at 648 (noting that deliberate indifference to acts of student-on- student harassment occurs where an institution’s “response . . . or lack thereof is clearly unreasonable in light of the known circumstances”). Here Katherine’s complaint does state a colorable claim under Article I, Section 15, and Article IX, Section 2. Assuming her allegations are true and taking factual inferences in her favor, Katherine’s teacher violently assaulted her in a manner that required intervention by two other teachers and led to significant physical injury. Yet the Board and its administrators responded by suspending Katherine for ten days. They only reversed that suspension after news outlets learned details of the attack. Even still, the Board and administrators further responded by transferring Katherine to an alternative school without her input. The cumulative effect of these events impaired Katherine’s ability to learn and jeopardized her academic performance. Effectively punishing a student when a teacher violently -19-  K.H. V. DIXON Opinion of the Court assaults her in the classroom is clearly unreasonable. Such deliberate indifference by the Board states a colorable constitutional claim that the government actor denied Katherine equal access to a sound basic education.3 Because the second element of Deminski is met, we also address the final two elements to assess whether the trial court erred by dismissing Katherine’s Corum claim. The first element, that defendant Alamance-Burlington Board of Education, is a state actor, is satisfied. See Deminski, 377 N.C. at 414. The third element is met, 3 To the extent that Katherine alleged a constitutional claim because Ms. Dixon’s intentional torts “are imputed to Defendant Board pursuant to the doctrines of agency and/or respondeat superior,” because Ms. Dixon lacked a valid teaching license at the time of the attack, or because the Board was on notice that Ms. Dixon was likely to violently assault a student because of unspecified earlier “issues within her classroom with other students and disciplinary actions by the Principal,” the trial court correctly determined that these allegations alone are too vague and therefore insufficient to state a claim under Article I, Section 15 and Article IX, Section 2. As in other contexts, local school boards are not vicariously liable for the intentional torts of their employees, because “intentional tortious acts are rarely considered to be within the scope of an employee’s employment.” Medlin v. Bass, 327 N.C. 587, 594 (1990) (cleaned up). Moreover, the allegations do not establish a factual relationship between the earlier “issues” of which the Board and its administrators had notice and Ms. Dixon’s eventual assault of Katherine. Cf. Davis, 526 U.S. at 652–53 (noting that Congress likely intended Title IX’s private damages actions to apply to those incidents “serious enough to have the systematic effect of denying the victim equal access to an educational program or activity[,] . . . in light of the inevitability of student misconduct and the amount of litigation that would be invited by entertaining claims of official indifference to a single instance of one-on-one peer harassment”). The dissent raises the possibility that the Board may not have had a full understanding of what transpired when the Board initially decided to suspend Katherine. See dissent infra Part II. To be sure, the evidence may ultimately show that the Board acted reasonably. But a Rule 12(b)(6) motion asks specifically whether, taking the facts and factual inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, the complaint states a valid legal claim. E.g., Cato Corp. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 386 N.C. 667, 672 (2024). We hold only that Katherine’s allegations were sufficient to meet that standard. This decision does not afford bellicose students a constitutional claim when they are appropriately disciplined for their own participation in a school fight. The facts alleged here are plainly more severe than a simple schoolyard tiff. Moreover, trial courts and defendants have plenty of tools at their disposal to quickly dispose of frivolous lawsuits. -20-  K.H. V. DIXON Opinion of the Court too: Katherine seeks monetary damages for her injuries. The Board successfully obtained dismissal of Katherine’s tort claims against it based on sovereign immunity. An alternative remedy is not adequate when it is barred by sovereign immunity because “a plaintiff must have at least the opportunity to enter the courthouse doors and present his claim.” Craig, 363 N.C. at 340. Additionally, Katherine’s tort claims against Ms. Dixon would redress Katherine’s alleged injuries only for the assault; however, they do not redress her alleged injury by the Board for its response to this assault and the “educational consequences” she “suffered” that violated her right to equal access to a sound basic education. See Askew, 386 N.C. at 294 (“Corum requires courts to disaggregate the rights violated, the constitutional harms alleged, and the appropriate remedy on the facts of the particular case.” (cleaned up)). Without her Corum claim, Katherine lacks another remedy at law against the Board specifically for its conduct. Thus, Katherine’s complaint satisfies all three elements of Deminksi. III. Conclusion Because Katherine’s complaint states a colorable constitutional claim that a government actor failed to guard and maintain her right to access a sound basic education as a result of its deliberate indifference to a severe instance of misconduct, and because she lacks another adequate state law remedy, the trial court erred by dismissing her Corum claim against the Board on a Rule 12(b)(6) motion. According