Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS OCT 29 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT BRENDA MOORE, No. 25-3965 D.C. No. 3:25-cv-00482-BJC-DDL Plaintiff - Appellant, v. MEMORANDUM* STEVEN QUICK; JULIA DOUGLAS; CALIFORNIA CIVIL RIGHTS DEPARTMENT; YESENIA GUTIERREZ, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Benjamin J. Cheeks, District Judge, Presiding Submitted October 27, 2026** Before: SILVERMAN, FORREST, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges. Brenda Moore appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing her action alleging a failure to accommodate under the Fair Housing Act, Rehabilitation Act, and other claims. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). We review de novo. Watison v. Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)); Janicki Logging Co. v. Mateer, 42 F.3d 561, 563 (9th Cir. 1994) (dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction). We vacate and remand. The district court dismissed Moore’s claims under the Fair Housing Act and Rehabilitation Act for lack of subject matter jurisdiction but the district court had federal question jurisdiction over these federal claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Dismissal of these claims was nevertheless proper because Moore failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible claim. See Csutoras v. Paradise High Sch., 12 F.4th 960, 968-69 (9th Cir. 2021) (setting forth elements of a reasonable accommodation claim under the Rehabilitation Act); Dubois v. Ass’n of Apartment Owners of 2987 Kalakaua, 453 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 2006) (setting forth elements of a reasonable accommodation claim under the Fair Housing Act). However, dismissal without leave to amend was premature because it is not “absolutely clear” that any deficiencies could not be cured by amendment. See Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc) (setting forth standard of review and explaining that “a district court should grant leave to amend even if no request to amend the pleading was made, unless it determines that the pleading could not possibly be cured by the allegation of other facts” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)); Lucas v. Dep’t of Corr., 66 F.3d 245, 248 (9th 2 25-3965 Cir. 1995) (“Unless it is absolutely clear that no amendment can cure the defect . . . a pro se litigant is entitled to notice of the complaint’s deficiencies and an opportunity to amend prior to dismissal of the action.”). Because it is not impossible that the deficiencies in Moore’s claims may be cured by amendment, we vacate the judgment and remand for the district court to provide Moore with an opportunity to file an amended complaint. We reject as unsupported by the record Moore’s contentions that the district court violated her right to due process. VACATED and REMANDED. 3 25-3965