Diemert v. City of Seattle

FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT JOSHUA A. DIEMERT, an No. 25-1188 individual, D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:22-cv-01640- JNW v. OPINION CITY OF SEATTLE, a municipal Corporation, Defendant - Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Jamal N. Whitehead, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted April 23, 2026 Seattle, Washington Filed September 28, 2026 Before: Mary H. Murguia, Chief Judge, and William A. Fletcher and Lucy H. Koh, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Chief Judge Murguia 2 DIEMERT V. CITY OF SEATTLE SUMMARY * Employment Discrimination The panel affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the City of Seattle in Joshua Diemert’s action alleging a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment as well as hostile work environment, constructive discharge, disparate treatment, and retaliation in violation of Title VII and the Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”). Diemert, a white man who worked for the City’s Human Services Department, alleged that the City’s Race and Social Justice Initiative classified employees on account of race and, in combination with various workplace incidents, created a racially hostile work environment. Reversing the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the City on Diemert’s hostile work environment claims, the panel held that, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Diemert and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, he established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was subjected to a racially hostile work environment in violation of Title VII and WLAD. To succeed on a hostile work environment claim, a plaintiff must show: (1) that he was subjected to verbal or physical conduct because of his race, (2) that the conduct was unwelcome, and (3) that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of his employment * This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.  DIEMERT V. CITY OF SEATTLE 3 and create an abusive work environment. The panel concluded that the workplace incidents at issue were sufficiently numerous, frequent, and severe to create a triable issue as to the existence of a racially hostile work environment. The panel affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment as to constructive discharge, which Diemert alleged as part of his hostile work environment and retaliation claims. The panel affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the City on Diemert’s claims that he was subjected to disparate treatment and retaliation as a result of: (1) the City’s failure to investigate his discrimination claims; (2) the City’s initial denial of a leave extension under the Family and Medical Leave Act; and (3) his supervisor’s unfair treatment towards him. The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment on Diemert’s equal protection claim based on Article III standing. Diemert was required to establish a triable issue that (1) the City expressly classified employees based on race and (2) he was personally injured by that classification. Assuming without deciding that Diemert established a triable issue that racially aligned affinity groups in the Race and Social Justice Initiative involved an express racial classification, the panel concluded that he did not establish a triable issue that he was personally injured by any such classification. And even assuming that the City expressly classified employees based on race with respect to some trainings, Diemert did not show that he was personally injured by the classification. The panel therefore concluded that Diemert failed to establish standing for his equal protection claim. 4 DIEMERT V. CITY OF SEATTLE COUNSEL Laura M. D'Agostino (argued), Pacific Legal Foundation, Arlington, Virginia; Andrew R. Quinio and Erin E. Wilcox, Pacific Legal Foundation, Sacramento, California; for Plaintiff-Appellant. Sarah Tilstra (argued), Assistant City Attorney; Erika J. Evans and Ann Davison, Seattle City Attorneys; Seattle City Attorney's Office, Seattle, Washington; Victoria M. Slade, Davis Wright Tremaine LLP, Seattle, Washington; for Defendant-Appellee. Rachel Jankowski (argued), Deputy Chief; Andrew G. Braniff, Attorney, Appellate Section, Civil Rights Division; Jesus A. Osete, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General; Harmeet K. Dhillon, Assistant Attorney General; United States Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.; for Amicus Curiae United States of America. Alexia M. Diorio and May Che, Assistant Attorneys General; Nicholas W. Brown, Washington Attorney General; Office of the Washington Attorney General, Seattle, Washington; for Amicus Curiae State of Washington. Ilya Shapiro and Tim Rosenberger, Manhattan Institute, New York, New York, for Amicus Curiae Manhattan Institute. J. Michael Connolly, Thomas R. McCarthy, Cameron T. Norris, and R. Gabriel Anderson, Consovoy McCarthy Park PLLC, Arlington, Virginia, for Amicus Curiae American Alliance for Equal Rights. David C. Tryon and Jay R. Carson, The Buckeye Institute, Columbus, Ohio, for Amicus Curiae The Buckeye Institute.  DIEMERT V. CITY OF SEATTLE 5 William E. Trachman and Grady J. Block, Mountain States Legal Foundation, Lakewood, Colorado, for Amicus Curiae Mountain States Legal Foundation. Kevin P. Garvey and Anthony A. Pericolo, Steptoe LLP, Washington, D.C.; Michael A. Petrino, Center for Individual Rights, Washington, D.C.; for Amicus Curiae Center for Individual Rights. Maureen Riordan, Equal Protection Project, Barrington, Rhode Island; Timothy R. Snowball, James R. Nault, and William A. Jacobson, Legal Insurrection Foundation, Barrington, Rhode Island; for Amicus Curiae Equal Protection Project. Amanda Karras, International Municipal Lawyers Association, Rockville, Maryland, for Amicus Curiae International Municipal Lawyers Association. Heidi J. Jacobsen-Watts, Senior Deputy Prosecuting Attorney; Leesa Manion, King County Prosecuting Attorney; King County Office of the Prosecuting Attorney, Seattle, Washington; for Amicus Curiae County of King. Alexsis M. Johnson and Alaizah Koorji, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund Inc., New York, New York; Jason P. Bailey and Avatara Smith-Carrington, NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund Inc., Washington, D.C.; for Amicus Curiae NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund Inc.. Jonathan B. Collins, Smith Goodfriend PS, Seattle, Washington; Bob C. Sterbank, Foster Garvey PC, Seattle, Washington; for Amicus Curiae Washington State Association of Municipal Attorneys. 6 DIEMERT V. CITY OF SEATTLE OPINION MURGUIA, Chief Circuit Judge: Joshua Diemert is a white man who worked for the Human Services Department (“HSD”) of the City of Seattle (the “City”). During his employment, Diemert participated in the City’s Race and Social Justice Initiative (the “RSJI”). The RSJI aims to undo institutionalized racism in the workplace by, among other things, requiring employees to attend trainings on racial justice and facilitating racially aligned affinity groups. 1 Diemert asserts that the RSJI classified employees on account of race and, in combination with various workplace incidents, created a racially hostile work environment. Diemert resigned from his employment with the City in September 2021, and he commenced this action against the City and its then-mayor, Bruce Harrell (collectively, “Defendants”), in November 2022. Diemert alleges a violation of the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as hostile work environment, constructive discharge, disparate treatment, and retaliation in violation of state and federal civil rights laws. The district court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment, and Diemert timely appealed. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand. 1 Affinity groups, also called caucuses, are City-sponsored workgroups associated with the RSJI. The City’s SharePoint page described the role of these groups as follows: “During off-work hours or during work hours with special permission, City of Seattle employees meet regularly to organize affinity groups focused on forwarding the City of Seattle’s Race and Social Justice Initiative’s efforts to eliminate racial disparities and achieve racial equity in Seattle.”  DIEMERT V. CITY OF SEATTLE 7 I When reviewing a grant of summary judgment, we construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Fried v. Wynn Las Vegas, LLC, 18 F.4th 643, 646–47 (9th Cir. 2021). We therefore recite the facts in the summary judgment record in the light most favorable to Diemert. We emphasize that Defendants vigorously dispute some of these facts and that Diemert’s version of disputed facts has not been proven. A Diemert began working for HSD in 2013. In his role as a program intake representative, Diemert assessed applicants’ eligibility for assistance with utility bills under the City’s Utility Discount Program. Diemert received satisfactory performance evaluations and was never disciplined or placed on a performance improvement plan. Like all HSD employees, Diemert participated in the City’s Race and Social Justice Initiative. The RSJI, which began in 2004, aims to undo institutionalized racism and achieve racial equity in City government and the Seattle community. The RSJI does not involve racial quotas. Rather, the RSJI assesses City programs and procedures for barriers to entry and seeks to undo these barriers in order “to create a level playing field for all.” The RSJI offers workplace activities. These activities include trainings or events regarding racial and other social justice issues, such as gender, poverty, Indian affairs, and LGBTQ issues. While HSD employees are required to participate in two RSJI activities per year, employees who do not meet this requirement can still receive satisfactory performance evaluations. 8 DIEMERT V. CITY OF SEATTLE In addition to trainings, the City offers employees the opportunity to participate in racially and ethnically aligned affinity groups, or caucuses, such as the “White Caucus,” the “African Descent Caucus,” and the “European Descent Community Group.” The City advised employees that: Caucuses are completely voluntary and no one will be turned away. Caucuses are intended to deepen our understanding of our racialized experiences. City employees may choose to attend the caucus that aligns with how they identify racially. Although the City presented evidence that RSJI trainings are open to all, regardless of race, some record evidence suggests otherwise. The details for the “Internalized Racial Oppression (White Allies)” training, for example, stated, “Who can attend: City employees that identify as white allies.” The details for the “Internalized Racial Superiority” training stated, “Who should take it? City employees who identify as white.” The details for the “Internalized Racial Oppression (For POC [Person of Color])” training stated, “Who can attend: City employees that identify as Person of Color.” The details for the “Internalized Racial Inferiority” training stated, “Who should take it? City employees who identify as a person of color.” In 2020, the City invited “City employees who identify as white,” including “White Caucus members,” to attend the “Training on Internalized Racial Superiority for White People.” According to a 2021 email, several employees who “identified as white/Caucasian” were “asked . . . to remove themselves” from a training for “POC employees.”  DIEMERT V. CITY OF SEATTLE 9 In March 2015, Diemert participated in an RSJI training entitled “Race: The Power of an Illusion.” As part of this training, Diemert was required to play “Privilege Bingo,” in which all employees, regardless of race, identified their perceived “privileges,” such as privileges based on height, weight, gender, and race. This training also included a discussion of “[w]hite [s]upremacy [c]ulture.” Diemert contends that the RSJI was hostile to white employees and that this racial hostility spilled over into the workplace generally. According to Diemert, his “supervisors and coworkers applied the Racial Initiative’s teachings to justify discriminatory behavior, deny him advancement, and retaliate when he objected.” In 2015, for instance, Diemert’s manager, Gloria Hatcher-Mays, advised Diemert not to apply for an open supervisor position “because she was looking for someone who was bilingual and who had contacts within one of the marginalized communities.” Hatcher-Mays filled the position with a person of color, who was inexperienced and unqualified. Because of the chosen coworker’s inexperience, Diemert was forced to perform many of the position’s duties without receiving the commensurate title or pay. In the same month, another HSD manager asked Diemert, “[W]hat could you possibly offer our department . . . , being a straight white male?” In 2016, Diemert discovered that one of his coworkers had denied utility assistance to an eligible white applicant because, in the coworker’s words, the applicant had “white privilege.” When Diemert told his coworker that she was not permitted to discriminate against applicants based on race, his manager, Hatcher-Mays, berated him and told him that “it was ‘impossible’ to be racist toward ‘white people.’” 10 DIEMERT V. CITY OF SEATTLE In April 2017, Diemert’s supervisor, Tina Inay, told him that he should step down from his lead role at HSD because his Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) needs conflicted with the department’s business needs. Inay told Diemert that he was preventing a person of color from being promoted by remaining in his lead role. Diemert ultimately stepped down from the role. In April 2017, Diemert attended an RSJI training entitled “Equity Lens[:] Why we lead with race.” This training concerned racial biases. Diemert again participated in “Privilege Bingo.” In the same year, Diemert engaged in a lunchroom conversation with a coworker who said that “white people” were to blame for “all atrocities” and that the United States was built upon a system of “white supremacy.” The coworker also deemed Diemert a “racist” because he “favored capitalism.” At a department retreat, Diemert participated in a “racist/anti-racist continuum” exercise in which employees were required to line up based on how “racist” or “anti-racist” they perceived themselves to be in comparison to their coworkers. In 2018, Diemert approached a union representative about signing up for an RSJI training that the City had designed for persons of color. Diemert was interested in attending the training to protest what he perceived as the training’s racially discriminatory nature, and he compared himself to the “four black students [who had] refused to leave the segregated lunch counter at Woolworth’s” in 1960. Diemert abandoned his interest in attending the training after the representative advised him that the trainers “probably would not allow [him] to participate.” In December 2018, an HSD coworker invited Diemert to attend a monthly meeting of the White Caucus affinity  DIEMERT V. CITY OF SEATTLE 11 group. Diemert declined the invitation, asked to be removed from such invitations in the future, and threatened to file harassment charges. In November 2019, Diemert attended an RSJI training entitled “Undoing Institutional Racism Workshop.” One of the trainers went “off into a rant,” stating that “there was a lie that Christopher Columbus went to the Caribbean and that [the indigenous people living there] were cannibals” when “the real truth is . . . that all white people are cannibals.” Other trainers said that “‘racism is in white people’s DNA,’ and that ‘white people are like the devil.’” Diemert’s coworkers called him a “white supremacist” as a result of comments he had made during the training. That year, Diemert did not meet the requirement that he participate in two RSJI activities per year but received a “fully performing” rating in his annual performance evaluation. Around February 2020, Diemert reported his supervisor, Shamsu Said, for enrolling Said’s family members in the utility assistance program. Said later “physically accosted” Diemert and called Diemert a “colonist” who had “white privilege” and “was to blame for all injustices in the United States.” Said made similar statements towards Diemert in 2019 and 2020. After the incident, Diemert filed a Human Resources (“HR”) complaint against Said. HR responded to the complaint by moving Diemert’s and Said’s desks further apart and removing Said as Diemert’s lead supervisor. Diemert, however, maintains that the City still required him to report to Said, pointing to an email in which his manager, Chaney Kilpatrick-Goodwill, instructed him to include Said on leave requests. 12 DIEMERT V. CITY OF SEATTLE Also in 2020, Diemert overheard a group of coworkers, including Kilpatrick-Goodwill, discussing white privilege in the lunchroom. When Diemert interjected, his coworkers said that he “did not have a right to speak about black oppression” and accused him of using his “white privilege” to discredit their lived experiences. Diemert also heard coworkers openly discuss the need to lay off white employees during the COVID-19 pandemic. On December 23, 2020, Diemert filed a discrimination charge with the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”), alleging that he was harassed and discriminated against due to his race and that the RSJI trainings were racially hostile. The City opened an investigation into Diemert’s claims, but Diemert chose “not [to] give the City much” help in the investigation because he perceived the investigators as biased. With limited information, the investigators rejected Diemert’s charges of unlawful discrimination and harassment. In February 2021, Diemert was offended by an email in which a new employee noted that he provided self-care to himself by “being around Black and brown folks.” In the same year, Diemert informed his HR manager, Ryan Groce, that he found RSJI trainings offensive and would no longer participate in them. HSD took no corrective action against Diemert for refusing to participate. In June 2021, an HSD executive, Edward Odom, posted about the Tulsa Race Massacre on the City’s internal website. The Tulsa Race Massacre involved a violent attack by a mob of 10,000 white men against the thriving Black community of Tulsa, Oklahoma’s Greenwood District in 1921. See Review and Evaluation, Tulsa Race Massacre, DOJ Report, Civil Rights Division (Jan. 17, 2025) (available  DIEMERT V. CITY OF SEATTLE 13 at https://perma.cc/87ST-5AN4). Odom wrote that events such as the Tulsa Race Massacre were being erased from history because of critical race theory bans. Diemert interpreted the post as an attack against all white people and posted a defense of critical race theory bans in which he decried racial stereotyping and asserted that saying “white people . . . enslaved black people” was bigoted. One of Diemert’s coworkers responded by posting a passage about ignorance from Octavia Butler’s novel The Parable of the Talents. Additionally, Odom emailed Diemert directly to address perceived historical inaccuracies in Diemert’s post. Odom stated, “I get it—it can seem as [sic] it was a personal attack directed against all white people, but it is not. It is about accurately telling the stories that have been buried for years.” In July 2021, Diemert emailed his HR manager, Groce, about his interest in “creat[ing] a non-race-based [affinity] group that [would] advocate[] for western liberal values and reject[] stereotyping people by race.” Diemert wrote that the existing affinity groups were all “based on race” and said that his new group would “oppose[] the political and ideological stance that the current affinity groups are based on.” Groce advised Diemert that he would have to submit his proposal to the HSD Change Team—the group of employees responsible for administering the RSJI program and approving new affinity groups—to ensure that his group “would support and advance the efforts of the City’s RSJ Initiative and aid in eliminating racial disparities.” Believing that the Change Team would reject his proposed group, Diemert did not submit his proposal. 14 DIEMERT V. CITY OF SEATTLE B Diemert contends that he was subjected to retaliatory and discriminatory acts after he filed his December 2020 EEOC charge. First, Diemert contends that his manager, Kilpatrick-Goodwill, retaliated against him by: (1) sending him and an administrative assistant an email asking about his delays in processing applications; (2) declining to help him with a technological issue; and (3) cancelling meetings. These events occurred in or around January 2021. Second, Diemert contends that Defendants retaliated against him by denying his request to renew his reduced- work schedule under the FMLA. In early 2021, Diemert’s FMLA reduced-work schedule was set to expire. Diemert submitted paperwork to renew his leave certification, but HR denied the request. Despite that denial, Diemert continued to work reduced hours, and he filed a complaint with the U.S. Department of Labor, which found that the request had been denied in error. The City corrected the error and granted the certification retroactively. Finally, Diemert contends that Defendants retaliated against him by failing to promptly grant his request to continue working remotely following the COVID-19 pandemic. Diemert began teleworking in April 2020. In early 2021, unbeknownst to HSD, Diemert moved to Texas. In June 2021, HSD directed employees to return to in-person work. In response, Diemert requested full-time telework as a disability accommodation. Diemert resigned his employment in September 2021, before HSD resolved his request.  DIEMERT V. CITY OF SEATTLE 15 C Diemert filed this action on November 16, 2022, alleging a claim of racial discrimination under the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, as well as claims of hostile work environment, disparate treatment, and retaliation under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and the Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”), Wash. Rev. Code ch. 49.60. Diemert also alleged that the hostile work environment and retaliation he faced amounted to constructive discharge. The district court dismissed as time-barred the Title VII disparate treatment and retaliation claims based on discrete acts that occurred before February 27, 2020, which was 300 days before Diemert filed his EEOC charge. It also dismissed as time-barred Diemert’s WLAD disparate treatment and retaliation claims based on discrete acts that occurred before November 16, 2019, which was three years before Diemert commenced this action. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1); Antonius v. King County, 103 P.3d 729, 732 (Wash. 2004). The district court subsequently granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment as to the remaining claims. In addressing summary judgment, the district court partially sustained Defendants’ objections to two of Diemert’s exhibits, Exhibits 6 and 36. Diemert timely appealed. II We review a district court’s order granting summary judgment de novo. Desire, LLC v. Manna Textiles, Inc., 986 F.3d 1253, 1259 (9th Cir. 2021). We view the evidence in the light most favorable to Diemert and determine whether there are any genuine issues of material fact and whether the district court correctly applied the law. Fried, 18 F.4th at 646–47. 16 DIEMERT V. CITY OF SEATTLE We review the district court’s evidentiary rulings at summary judgment for an abuse of discretion. Sandoval v. County of San Diego, 985 F.3d 657, 665 (9th Cir. 2021). “[W]e must affirm the district court unless its evidentiary ruling was manifestly erroneous and prejudicial.” Orr v. Bank of Am., NT & SA, 285 F.3d 764, 773 (9th Cir. 2002). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 requires a movant to establish that the evidence “would be admissible in evidence” at trial. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)(4). 2 2 On appeal, Diemert challenges for the first time the district court’s ruling on two exhibits (Exhibit 6 and 36) that he proffered in opposition to Defendants’ motion for summary judgment. Exhibit 6 consists of undated and unsigned bulleted lists, photos of whiteboards, and purported excerpts from other documents. In summary judgment proceedings before the district court, Diemert did not state that he ever received these materials in the workplace or that they were used in trainings he attended. Nor did he state who created the materials or when they were created. And Diemert did not cite Exhibit 6 in his opposition to summary judgment. The district court granted Defendants’ motion to strike Exhibit 6 on the grounds that Diemert failed to properly authenticate the materials. Exhibit 36 consists of discrimination complaints and interview summaries from various HSD employees in 2018 and 2019. The district court denied Defendants’ motion to strike Exhibit 36 but declined to consider the statements contained in the exhibit to the extent they contained hearsay and did not fall within a hearsay exception. The court therefore considered Exhibit 36 only “insofar as it shows that discrimination complaints were filed.” Although Diemert did not respond to Defendants’ motion to strike these exhibits in the district court, he argues on appeal that the district court abused its discretion. We disagree. Diemert does not establish that he would have been able to proffer the exhibits in an admissible form at trial. Orr, 285 F.3d at 773. The district court, therefore, did not abuse its discretion. In any event, Diemert has not shown that he was prejudiced by the district court’s rulings.  DIEMERT V. CITY OF SEATTLE 17 III We first address Diemert’s hostile work environment claims. Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Diemert, and drawing all reasonable inferences in his favor, we conclude that Diemert has established a genuine issue of material fact as to whether he was subjected to a racially hostile work environment in violation of Title VII and the WLAD. We therefore reverse the grant of summary judgment to Defendants on these claims. We, however, affirm the grant of summary judgment as to constructive discharge. A Title VII and the WLAD prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, including racially hostile work environments. To succeed on a hostile work environment claim under Title VII, Diemert must show: (1) that he was subjected to verbal or physical conduct because of his race, (2) that the conduct was unwelcome, and (3) that the conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of his employment and create an abusive work environment. Vasquez v. County of Los Angeles, 349 F.3d 634, 642 (9th Cir. 2003). Washington courts interpret WLAD to require similar showings. Glasgow v. Ga.-Pac. Corp., 693 P.2d 708, 712 (Wash. 1985) (outlining the elements required for a sex- based hostile work environment claim under WLAD); Fisher v. Tacoma Sch. Dist. No. 10, 769 P.2d 318, 320 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989) (extending Glasgow’s hostile work environment standard to race-based hostile work environment claims). “The working environment must both subjectively and objectively be perceived as abusive.” Manatt v. Bank of Am., NA, 339 F.3d 792, 799 n.6 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting Brooks 18 DIEMERT V. CITY OF SEATTLE v. City of San Mateo, 229 F.3d 917, 923 (9th Cir. 2000)). To determine whether a work environment is abusive, courts consider the totality of the circumstances, including “the frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its severity; whether it is physically threatening or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.” Reynaga v. Roseburg Forest Prods., 847 F.3d 678, 687 (9th Cir. 2017) (citation and internal quotations marks omitted) (Title VII); accord Blackburn v. State, 375 P.3d 1076, 1081 n.4 (Wash. 2016) (WLAD). “No single factor in this non-exhaustive list is required.” Okonowsky v. Garland, 109 F.4th 1166, 1179 (9th Cir. 2024) (citation and internal quotations marks omitted). “The required level of severity or seriousness varies inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct.” El-Hakem v. BJY Inc., 415 F.3d 1068, 1073 (9th Cir. 2005) (quoting Nichols v. Azteca Rest. Enters., Inc., 256 F.3d 864, 872 (9th Cir. 2001)). “Not every insult or harassing comment will constitute a hostile work environment.” Fried, 18 F.4th at 648 (quoting Ray v. Henderson, 217 F.3d 1234, 1245 (9th Cir. 2000)). “‘[S]imple teasing, offhand comments, and isolated incidents (unless extremely serious)’ will not trigger Title VII’s protections.” Okonowsky, 109 F.4th at 1179 (quoting Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 778 (1998)). “The standard for judging hostility is meant to ‘ensure that Title VII does not become a “general civility code.”’” Fried, 18 F.4th at 648 (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788). And “properly applied, this standard ‘will filter out complaints attacking the ordinary tribulations of the workplace, such as the sporadic use of abusive language, gender-related jokes, and occasional teasing.’” Id. (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788).  DIEMERT V. CITY OF SEATTLE 19 Workplace training programs designed to address racial barriers are not inherently discriminatory, and nothing in Title VII prohibits employers from either discussing historical and ongoing discrimination against persons of color or seeking to address such discrimination. See, e.g., Chislett v. N.Y.C. Dep’t of Educ., 157 F.4th 172, 191 (2d Cir. 2025) (rejecting the proposition that “the conduct of implicit bias trainings is per se racist”). But “Title VII’s disparate- treatment provision draws no distinctions between majority- group plaintiffs and minority-group plaintiffs.” Ames v. Ohio Dep’t of Youth Servs., 605 U.S. 303, 309 (2025). Accordingly, race-conscious training programs may violate Title VII when they create a racially hostile work environment. See Chislett, 157 F.4th at 191 (“When employment trainings discuss any race ‘with a constant drumbeat of essentialist, deterministic, and negative language [about a particular race], they risk liability under federal law.’ And when a municipal agency consistently ignores the racial harassment of employees in both trainings and workplace interactions, it can be held liable.” (alteration in original) (quoting De Piero v. Pa. State Univ., 711 F. Supp. 3d 410, 424 (E.D. Pa. 2024))). Time-barred “[d]iscrete acts such as termination, failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire” on their own are not “actionable,” but they may be considered as evidence of a hostile work environment. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 114–15 (2002); see also Lui v. DeJoy, 129 F.4th 770, 781 (9th Cir. 2025). This is so because the “very nature” of hostile work environment claims “involves repeated conduct.” Morgan, 536 U.S. at 115. Here, the parties dispute only whether the workplace incidents at issue were sufficiently severe or pervasive to 20 DIEMERT V. CITY OF SEATTLE create an objectively hostile work environment. We therefore focus on this element. Diemert points to the following as evidence of an objectively hostile work environment: (1) in 2015, Diemert was discouraged from applying for a supervisory role, a person of color was hired for the position, and Diemert was required to perform the responsibilities of the position without receiving the commensurate title or pay; (2) in 2015, an HSD manager asked Diemert, “[W]hat could you possibly offer our department . . . , being a straight white male?”; (3) in 2016, manager Gloria Hatcher-Mays told Diemert “that it was ‘impossible’ to be racist toward ‘white people’”; (4) in 2017, supervisor Tina Inay encouraged Diemert to step down from his lead role in the department in part to allow a person of color to take his position; (5) in 2017, a coworker called Diemert a “racist” and told him “that ‘white people’ are to be blamed for ‘all atrocities’ and that the United States was built upon a system of ‘white supremacy’”; (6) in 2019, Diemert overheard RSJI trainers say that “white people are cannibals,” that “racism is in white people’s DNA,” and that “white people are like the devil”; (7) between 2019 and 2020, supervisor Shamsu Said called Diemert a “colonist,” “physically accosted” Diemert, accused Diemert of having “white privilege,” and informed Diemert that he was “to blame for all injustices in the United States”; (8) in 2020, coworkers told Diemert that he “did not have a right to speak about black oppression” and accused him of using his “white privilege” to discredit their lived experiences; (9) in 2021, a new coworker stated that his “[s]elf and personal care” included “being around Black and brown folks”; and (10) also in 2021, Diemert was criticized by coworkers after Diemert defended critical race theory  DIEMERT V. CITY OF SEATTLE 21 bans in connection with a discussion of the Tulsa Race Massacre. We conclude that these incidents were sufficiently numerous, frequent, and severe to create a triable issue as to the existence of a racially hostile work environment. Viewed in isolation, the incidents at issue here might not be sufficient. We have held, for example, that referring to a Chinese coworker as “China Man” while mocking her appearance, Manatt, 339 F.3d at 795, 799; telling a Hispanic coworker that “Hispanics do good in the field,” Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 643; and referring to a female coworker as a “madonna,” a “regina,” and a “castrating bitch,” Kortan v. Cal. Youth Auth., 217 F.3d 1104, 1107 (9th Cir. 2000), were not severe enough to create a hostile work environment. But unlike cases involving only one or two racially offensive incidents, see Manatt, 339 F.3d at 798–99 (two incidents “over a span of two-and-a-half years”); Vasquez, 349 F.3d at 644 (two incidents “over the course of more than one year”); Kortan, 217 F.3d at 1110–11 (incidents were concentrated in “one occasion”), Diemert has presented evidence of numerous incidents over a five-year span. This case, therefore, is comparable in frequency and severity to cases in which the evidence supported a finding of a hostile work environment. Reynaga, for instance, is instructive. There, the plaintiff, Reynaga, was one of two Hispanic employees who worked as a millwright. 847 F.3d at 683. Reynaga alleged that his coworker made racially derogatory comments and engaged in other harassing conduct repeatedly over his six years of employment, including: (1) using racial slurs to refer to Blacks and Arabs; (2) stating “I’m a true believe[r] that we should close the borders to keep motherf---ers like you from coming up here”; (3) stating “Minorities are taking over the country”; 22 DIEMERT V. CITY OF SEATTLE (4) asking Reynaga whether “all Mexican women [were] fat”; (5) referring to Native American women, one of whom Reynaga was married to, as “nasty fat squaws”; (6) belittling Reynaga in front of a coworker as “a big boy” with a “little, tiny dick” who “needs all the help he can get”; and (7) while Reynaga was working, commenting “Boy, you’re slow,” and remarking to the other millwrights, “Man, he just dinks around.” Id. We held that a reasonable trier of fact could find that the coworker’s conduct was sufficiently severe or pervasive to create a hostile work environment because: (1) the comments were directed at Reynaga and often referenced race or national origin; (2) Reynaga felt physically threatened due to the proximity to dangerous machinery and his coworker’s large stature; (3) the harassment interfered with Reynaga’s work performance because it led to verbal and written complaints to management; and (4) management had to ensure the coworker and Reynaga were not scheduled to work on the same shift to limit their interactions. Id. at 688. This case is comparable. As in Reynaga, the incidents at issue here referenced Diemert’s race, targeted Diemert, caused Diemert to file complaints, required the City to separate Diemert from an allegedly harassing coworker, occurred over a substantial period of time, and were comparable in number and frequency. This case is also comparable to Chislett. There, the plaintiff, Chislett, was a white woman who directed an initiative under the Office of Equity & Access in New York City’s education department and supervised fifteen employees. 157 F.4th at 178–79. Chislett attended bias trainings where an instructor stated that the “values of white culture are supremacist,” id. at 180 (alteration omitted), and an executive director declared that “[t]here is white toxicity  DIEMERT V. CITY OF SEATTLE 23 in the air, and we all breathe it in,” id. At an overnight retreat, speakers “stated that ‘white culture’s values’ are ‘homogenous and supremacist.’” Id. In another training, participants were asked to write “white values” on a poster and form a line based on their proximity to white privilege. Id. The trainings conveyed a persistent message that “white culture is generally defensive; entitled; paternalistic; power hoarders; and privileged.” Id. at 188 (alterations omitted). At another staff retreat, Chislett was singled out by coworkers in a fifteen-minute confrontation that referenced her race. Id. at 182–83. She was assigned a leadership coach who “offered [her] insight into what it means to be a white leader leading staff members of color.” Id. at 181 (internal quotation marks omitted). Racialized comments from trainings spilled over into the broader workplace. Id. at 189. When Chislett “asked her Black subordinate . . . why she was late to a meeting,” for example, the employee accused Chislett of making a “race- based judgment” and told Chislett that she “could ‘not be trusted.’” Id. The employee later referenced the incident and scolded Chislett, “How dare you approach me out of your white privilege!” Id. Another Black subordinate called Chislett a “racist,” id., both subordinates told Chislett that “‘race [wa]s at the center of every conversation’ they had with her,” id. at 181, and other subordinates told Chislett “that she was ‘socialized as a white person to be defensive,’” id. Chislett also heard employees “ma[k]e racist statements about a colleague of partially white pare