Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 9 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT BRIDGETT FISHER; CAROLYN SABIN; No. 25-3798 KATRINA ROY; BRIGITTE NORTON, D.C. No. 3:22-cv-05991-TSZ Plaintiffs - Appellants, MEMORANDUM* ELIZABETH HAMPTON, Plaintiff, v. WASHINGTON DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS, Defendant - Appellee, DOES 1-50, Defendant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Thomas S. Zilly, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted October 27, 2026 Seattle, Washington Before: M. SMITH, CHRISTEN, and MILLER, Circuit Judges. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Bridgett Fisher, Carolyn Sabin, Katrina Crews, and Brigitte Norton appeal the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of their former employer, the Washington Department of Financial Institutions (DFI), in their action against DFI under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1), and the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), Wash. Rev. Code § 49.60.030(1)(a). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we review de novo the district court’s grant of summary judgment. Desire, LLC v. Manna Textiles, Inc., 986 F.3d 1253, 1259 (9th Cir. 2021). We affirm as to Fisher, Crews, and Norton. We reverse as to Sabin and remand for further proceedings. Both Title VII and the WLAD make it unlawful for an employer to discriminate against an individual based on her religion. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e- 2(a)(1); Wash. Rev. Code. § 49.60.030(1)(a). We consider “Title VII and WLAD claims simultaneously because the Washington standard mirrors the federal one.” Petersen v. Snohomish Reg’l Fire & Rescue, 150 F.4th 1211, 1216 n.3 (9th Cir. 2025). To establish a prima facie case of failure to accommodate, a plaintiff must demonstrate that (1) she had a bona fide religious belief, the practice of which conflicted with an employment duty; (2) she informed her employer of her belief and the conflict; and (3) the employer threatened her with or subjected her to adverse treatment because of her inability to fulfill her job requirements. Detwiler v. Mid-Columbia Med. Ctr., 156 F.4th 886, 893 (9th Cir. 2025). “A plaintiff seeking a religious exemption must plead a sufficient nexus between her religion and the specific belief in conflict with the work requirement.” Detwiler, 156 F.4th at 895. “Invocations of broad, religious tenets cannot, on their own, convert a secular preference into a religious conviction.” Id. Construing the facts in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, we conclude that Fisher, Crews, and Norton did not raise a triable issue of fact as to whether they had a bona fide religious belief that conflicted with their employment duty to receive the COVID-19 vaccine. Crews’s concern for her pregnancy was a personal medical judgment, and under Detwiler, her statements that she arrived at that judgment through prayer are insufficient to make it a religious conviction. 156 F.4th at 897. Similarly, Fisher’s and Norton’s secular beliefs—that the body could handle airborne illnesses and that the Pfizer and Moderna vaccines alter the human body through mRNA gene therapy, respectively—did not become religious convictions just because Fisher and Norton also believe that the body is a temple of the Holy Spirit. Id. at 895. Although Norton also objected to receiving the Johnson & Johnson vaccine based on its use of aborted fetal cell lines, DFI would have allowed her to receive either the Pfizer or Moderna vaccine, and her stated objection did not extend to those vaccines. In contrast, Sabin objected to receiving any of the three COVID-19 vaccines due to their use of aborted fetal cell lines in development. Sabin explained that she 3 25-3798 opposed abortion on religious grounds and that she would not get a COVID-19 vaccine that was tested on aborted fetal cell lines. Sabin did not elaborate on the religious basis for her objection until her deposition, which was taken after she was terminated, but DFI waived any argument that she failed to “inform[] her employer of [her] belief” prior to termination. See Detwiler, 156 F.4th at 893. Accordingly, Sabin established a triable issue of fact as to whether she had a bona fide religious belief that conflicted with the employment duty to receive the COVID-19 vaccine. See Ridings v. PeaceHealth, — F.4th —, 2026 WL 2871881, at *6 (9th Cir. Sept. 24, 2026); Detwiler, 156 F.4th at 896 n.2. Because the district court did not consider whether accommodating Sabin’s religious objection would pose an undue hardship for DFI, we remand to allow the district court to consider that issue in the first instance. See Planned Parenthood of Greater Wash. & N. Idaho v. United States Dep’t of Health & Hum. Servs., 946 F.3d 1100, 1110 (9th Cir. 2020). The parties shall bear their own costs on appeal. AFFIRMED IN PART; REVERSED IN PART; REMANDED. 4 25-3798