Sabrina Beram v. City of Sedona

FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT SABRINA BERAM, No. 23-15912 Plaintiff-Appellant, D.C. No. 3:21-cv-08063- v. DJH CITY OF SEDONA, OPINION Defendant-Appellee. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Arizona Diane J. Humetewa, District Judge, Presiding Argued June 23, 2025 Submission Vacated June 24, 2025 Resubmitted November 12, 2026 Seattle, Washington Filed November 12, 2026 Before: Roopali H. Desai and Ana de Alba, Circuit Judges, and Edward M. Chen, * District Judge. Opinion by Judge Desai * The Honorable Edward M. Chen, United States District Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation. 2 BERAM V. CITY OF SEDONA SUMMARY ** Americans with Disabilities Act / Standing The panel affirmed in part the district court’s dismissal of Sabrina Beram’s action against the City of Sedona, reversed the dismissal for lack of standing of her claim under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and remanded. Beram, a Sedona resident, often sleeps in her car because her obsessive-compulsive disorder prevents her from entering her apartment. The city criminalized sleeping in a car, and Beram has twice been warned by city police officers for doing so. The city denied her request for reasonable accommodation under the ADA exempting her from enforcement of its criminal ordinance when she sleeps in her car at her apartment complex. The district court dismissed Beram’s claims for lack of standing. Reversing the dismissal of the ADA claim, the panel held that a person with a disability alleging discrimination must satisfy the case or controversy requirement of Article III by alleging that (1) she suffered a concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent injury-in-fact; (2) the defendant likely caused her injury, and (3) judicial relief would likely redress her injury. Discrimination under the ADA is generally an injury-in-fact, but a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must also allege a sufficient likelihood of future harm, causation, and redressability. ** This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.  BERAM V. CITY OF SEDONA 3 The panel held that, as to her claim for damages, Beram alleged an Article III injury by alleging that the city denied her request for reasonable accommodation and caused her monetary and emotional harm. The panel held that Beram also had standing to seek injunctive relief based on the city’s credible threat of enforcement of its criminal ordinance. The panel further held that Beram stated a viable theory under Title II of the ADA by alleging that (1) she is an individual with a disability; (2) she is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some public entity’s services, programs, or activities; (3) she was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the public entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity; and (4) such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of her disability. The panel held that the “benefits” of a public entity’s services, programs, or activities may include mandatory activities such as compliance with municipal codes. Accordingly, discrimination under Title II may include the failure to provide reasonable accommodation that would allow a person with a disability to comply with a criminal ordinance. The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal of and denial of leave to amend Beram’s ADA claim. The panel instructed that on remand, Beram may file a fifth amended complaint asserting her ADA claim for damages and for declaratory and injunctive relief. The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Beram’s Eighth Amendment claim, which she abandoned. 4 BERAM V. CITY OF SEDONA COUNSEL Pamela M. Bridge (argued), Martin J. Coleman, and Bret Rasner, Community Legal Services Inc., Prescott, Arizona, for Plaintiff-Appellant. Kurt W. Christianson (argued), Sedona City Attorney; Monique K. Coady, Assistant City Attorney; Office of the City Attorney, Sedona, Arizona; Kristin M. Mackin, Sims Mackin Ltd., Phoenix, Arizona; for Defendant-Appellee. Nancy L. Davidson, League of Arizona Cities and Towns, Phoenix, Arizona, for Amicus Curiae League of Arizona Cities and Towns. Rose A. Daly-Rooney, Arizona Center for Disability Law, Tucson, Arizona; Brenda M. Furnish and Michelle J. Simpson, William E. Morris Institute for Justice, Phoenix, Arizona; William Knight, National Homelessness Law Center, Washington, D.C.; M. Michelle Uzeta, Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund, Berkeley, California; for Amici Curiae Arizona Center for Disability Law, National Homelessness Law Center, Disability Rights Education & Defense Fund, and William E. Morris Institute for Justice.  BERAM V. CITY OF SEDONA 5 OPINION DESAI, Circuit Judge: Sabrina Beram, a City of Sedona resident, often sleeps in her car because her obsessive-compulsive disorder prevents her from entering her apartment. The problem is that the city criminalizes sleeping in a car on public or private property. Beram has twice been warned by city police officers for sleeping in her car. She asked the city for reasonable accommodation under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) exempting her from enforcement of the city’s criminal ordinance when she sleeps in her car at her apartment complex. The city denied her request. Beram sued the city for violating her rights under the ADA and the Eighth Amendment, and the district court dismissed her claims for lack of standing. We reverse the dismissal of the ADA claim. Beram’s complaint alleges an Article III injury based on the city’s denial of her request for reasonable accommodation, and she has standing to seek injunctive relief based on the city’s credible threat of enforcement. Background Beram rents an apartment at a private apartment complex in Sedona, Arizona. Because Beram has severe, chronic, obsessive-compulsive anxiety, she is often unable to sleep in her apartment. When Beram “perceives unclean conditions in her apartment,” she “experiences a strong sensory perception” that feels like “an electric fence” that “commands her not to enter” her apartment. She has cleaning rituals “designed to make the unclean conditions tolerable,” but they take hours and often cannot be done “within enough time to obtain a restful sleep.” 6 BERAM V. CITY OF SEDONA On nights when her obsessive-compulsive disorder prevents her from entering her apartment, Beram sleeps in her car. She usually does so in the parking lot of her apartment complex, but when she cannot find a parking spot in her complex, she parks in “various public and private spaces” in Sedona. The city, however, prohibits sleeping in a vehicle on any public or private property. Sedona City Code § 9.10.010(A), (B) (the “ordinance”). The ordinance also makes it “unlawful for any property owner of any private property [or the owner’s agent] . . . to knowingly permit any person to violate” the ordinance. Id. § 9.10.010(D). Thus, a landlord violates the ordinance if they let a tenant sleep in a car on the landlord’s property. Violating the ordinance is “a class 1 misdemeanor, punishable by a fine of not more than $2,500 or by six months in jail, or both.” Id. § 9.10.010(K). A person may not be arrested under the ordinance unless they have been warned by a police officer or property owner. Id. § 9.10.010(E). Police officers have twice warned Beram that she cannot sleep in her car. First, when Beram was sleeping in her car at a public trailhead, “a Sedona police officer knocked on her window and told her she had to leave.” The officer told Beram that he “put a note in her file” so other officers would know she had been warned. Second, when Beram was sleeping in her car at a park, an officer woke her, told her that sleeping in a vehicle was illegal, directed her to leave the park, and warned her that she would be cited if she did  BERAM V. CITY OF SEDONA 7 not comply. 1 She has not yet been arrested or charged with violating the ordinance. Beram alleges that the city “expend[s] significant resources issuing warnings” under the ordinance, and “intends to continue filing criminal charges alleging violation of the [ordinance] against individuals who sleep in their vehicles in Sedona.” The city has criminally cited at least two people for violating the ordinance while parked on private property. Beram’s landlord has also warned her not to sleep in her car. When the apartment’s property manager learned that Beram often sleeps in her car in the parking lot, the property manager threatened to terminate Beram’s lease. Beram explained that she sleeps in her car because of her disability and requested reasonable accommodation. After the property manager did not respond, Beram sent a second request for an accommodation. The property manager again ignored it. The property manager sent Beram an addendum to her lease prohibiting her from sleeping in her car. The addendum explained that “[t]he City of Sedona does not permit sleeping in vehicles within the city limits,” and that her lease would not be renewed if she violated the ordinance. After she 1 The district court took judicial notice of the officer’s incident report. But it went further and relied on the officer’s statement in the report that Beram allegedly told the officer “she has a place to stay but that sometimes likes to rest in nature.” The district court abused its discretion by relying on this statement for its truth. See Khoja v. Orexigen Therapeutics, Inc., 899 F.3d 988, 999 (9th Cir. 2018). While the district court may take judicial notice of facts in the report “not subject to reasonable dispute,” like the date of the incident, it “cannot take judicial notice of disputed facts” in the report. Id. (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)). 8 BERAM V. CITY OF SEDONA received the addendum, Beram sent a letter to the Mayor of Sedona requesting reasonable accommodation under Title II of the ADA. She asked that she be relieved of “any application of the [ordinance] when she sleeps in her car in Sedona” because of her disability. Beram also alleged that the ordinance violated the Eighth Amendment and requested that the city rescind it. The city denied her requests. Beram made a second request for reasonable accommodation, this time asking only that the city “refrain from charging [Beram] with any violation of the [ordinance] while she sleeps in her vehicle on the premises of her apartment complex.” The city denied her request. For the next several months, Beram drove her car to other parts of the city when she could not sleep in her apartment and spent “115–135 hours searching for alternative sleeping options.” Her anxiety increased and her “mental condition worsened” because she feared prosecution and losing her home. Beram began seeing her psychologist again, who confirmed that her mental condition deteriorated. She alleges her emotional distress caused her to be less productive at work, to lose time with clients, and to miss out on professional opportunities. She alleges she lost income as a result. Beram sued the city and the owner of her apartment complex, alleging that the city violated the Eighth Amendment and that the city and the property owner violated the ADA. Beram settled with the property owner, who agreed to guarantee Beram housing for a period of time and to let her sleep in her car in the parking lot when necessary. But the settlement agreement also allows the property owner to “rescind” the agreement “if [Beram] or the property owner . . . are warned and/or charged with violation of” the ordinance. Beram alleges that she continues to sleep  BERAM V. CITY OF SEDONA 9 in her car at least three times a week because of her disability. The city moved to dismiss Beram’s original complaint and first amended complaint. The district court granted the motions and denied Beram’s requests for leave to file second and third amended complaints. Beram moved for leave to file a fourth amended complaint attempting to cure any deficiencies. The district court again denied leave to amend and dismissed the case. The district court held that Beram lacked standing because the two prior warnings were “insufficient to support a specific warning or threat to initiate prosecution,” and Beram failed to allege a history of past enforcement against anyone “similarly situated” to her. The district court addressed only Beram’s standing to seek injunctive relief, even though her proposed amendments to her complaint asserted claims for damages and for injunctive relief. Beram appealed. 2 Standard of Review We review de novo whether a plaintiff has Article III standing. Unified Data Servs., LLC v. Fed. Trade Comm’n, 39 F.4th 1200, 1209 (9th Cir. 2022). When reviewing a facial attack on a plaintiff’s standing, we “must accept as true all material allegations of the complaint” and construe them in the plaintiff’s favor. Maya v. Centex Corp., 658 F.3d 1060, 1068 (9th Cir. 2011). We review for an abuse of discretion the denial of leave to amend, but we review de novo whether amendment would 2 Beram abandoned her Eighth Amendment claim after the Supreme Court’s decision in City of Grants Pass, Oregon v. Johnson, 603 U.S. 520, 560 (2024). We thus affirm the district court’s dismissal of the Eighth Amendment claim. 10 BERAM V. CITY OF SEDONA be futile. St. Clair v. Cnty. of Okanogan, 154 F.4th 1154, 1161 (9th Cir. 2025). We also review de novo a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, and we may affirm on any ground supported by the record. ASARCO, LLC v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 765 F.3d 999, 1004 (9th Cir. 2014). Analysis I. Beram has standing. A plaintiff’s standing “in no way depends on the merits” of her claims, but “it often turns on the nature and source of the claim asserted.” Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975). Our standing analysis thus “must focus on the nature and source of [Beram’s] claim—discrimination as defined by the ADA.” Chapman v. Pier 1 Imports (U.S.) Inc., 631 F.3d 939, 947 (9th Cir. 2011) (en banc). The ADA’s purpose is “sweeping,” PGA Tour, Inc. v. Martin, 532 U.S. 661, 675 (2001), and the “Supreme Court has instructed us to take a broad view of constitutional standing” in private enforcement actions under the ADA. Doran v. 7-Eleven, Inc., 524 F.3d 1034, 1039 (9th Cir. 2008). No matter how broad the ADA’s reach, a person with a disability alleging discrimination “must satisfy the case or controversy requirement of Article III.” Chapman, 631 F.3d at 946. Thus, a plaintiff alleging discrimination under the ADA must allege that (1) she suffered a concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent injury-in-fact, (2) the defendant likely caused her injury, and (3) judicial relief would likely redress her injury. TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 423 (2021). Discrimination under the ADA is generally an injury-in-fact. Chapman, 631 F.3d at 947. But a plaintiff seeking injunctive relief must also allege “a sufficient likelihood that [she] will again be wronged in a  BERAM V. CITY OF SEDONA 11 similar way.” Id. at 948 (citation modified). Beram satisfies this test. A. Beram has standing to seek damages based on the city’s denial of her request for reasonable accommodation under the ADA. Beram alleges that, because of her disability, she cannot comply with the ordinance without accommodation. She contends that the city discriminated against her under Title II of the ADA when it denied her request for reasonable accommodation. Under Title II, “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. A public entity’s failure to “make reasonable modifications 3 in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability” is discrimination under the ADA, “unless the public entity can demonstrate that making the modifications would fundamentally alter the nature of the service, program, or activity.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i). 4 We have long held that discrimination under the ADA is an injury-in-fact. See Armstrong v. Davis, 275 F.3d 849, 865 3 The terms “reasonable modification” and “reasonable accommodation” are interchangeable. Wong v. Regents of Univ. of Cal., 192 F.3d 807, 816 n.26 (9th Cir. 1999). 4 See also 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A) (defining discrimination under Title I to include “not making reasonable accommodations”); id. § 12182(b)(2)(A)(ii) (defining discrimination under Title III to include the “failure to make reasonable modifications”); Armstrong v. Schwarzenegger, 622 F.3d 1058, 1067 (9th Cir. 2010) (Title II incorporates definitions of discrimination under Titles I and III). 12 BERAM V. CITY OF SEDONA (9th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by Johnson v. California, 543 U.S. 499 (2005). In Armstrong, we held that an “actual injury exists” when “plaintiffs are subjected to discriminatory treatment on account of their disabilities in violation of . . . the ADA.” 275 F.3d at 864–65. And because the “failure to provide reasonable accommodation can constitute discrimination,” Vinson v. Thomas, 288 F.3d 1145, 1154 (9th Cir. 2002), the denial of a request for reasonable accommodation is a “concrete injury” under Article III. See, e.g., Updike v. Multnomah Cnty., 870 F.3d 939, 947 n.5 (9th Cir. 2017) (holding that defendants’ “alleged failure to provide” the plaintiff’s requested accommodation was a “concrete and particularized injur[y]”); Duffy v. Riveland, 98 F.3d 447, 453 (9th Cir. 1996) (concluding that the denial of a plaintiff’s request for an interpreter at a disciplinary hearing was an injury-in-fact). To be sure, an alleged statutory violation, alone, is not always enough to confer Article III standing. “[E]ven in the context of a statutory violation,” courts must “independently decide” whether a plaintiff is “concretely harmed by a defendant’s statutory violation.” TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 426–27; Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 341 (2016) (a plaintiff “could not, for example, allege a bare procedural violation, divorced from any concrete harm, and satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement”). But Congress’s views are “instructive and important” when deciding whether a harm is sufficiently concrete. Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341; see also TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 425. Congress cannot “simply enact an injury into existence,” TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 426, but it can “elevate to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were previously inadequate in law.” Spokeo, 578 U.S. at 341 (citation modified).  BERAM V. CITY OF SEDONA 13 Discrimination is one of these concrete, intangible harms Congress has given “actionable legal status.” TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 425–26 (citing Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 757 n.22 (1984) (noting that a person suffers a “cognizable injury” when she is “personally subject to discriminatory treatment”)). By enacting the ADA, Congress thus did not “enact an injury into existence.” Id. at 426. Rather, it “elevate[d]” the legal status of disability discrimination, a “harm that exist[ed] in the real world.” Id.; see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(6), (b)(1) (explaining that the purpose of the ADA is to “eliminat[e] . . . discrimination against individuals with disabilities,” which causes, among other harms, severe “social[], vocational[], economic[] and educational[]” disadvantages). Thus, Beram’s allegation that the city discriminated against her in violation of the ADA, alone, is a sufficient concrete injury. See Armstrong, 275 F.3d at 865. Beyond that, Beram alleges that the city’s discrimination caused her monetary harm and severe emotional distress. Monetary harms “are traditional tangible harms” that “readily qualify as concrete injuries under Article III.” TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 425; see also Isaacson v. Mayes, 84 F.4th 1089, 1096 (2023) (“For standing purposes, a loss of even a small amount of money is ordinarily an ‘injury.’” (quoting Czyzewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. 451, 464 (2017))). And Beram’s alleged emotional and psychological harms likewise have a “close relationship to” traditional harms long recognized in American courts. See TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 424; Gross v. CitiMortgage, Inc., 33 F.4th 1246, 1253 (9th Cir. 2022) (concluding that a plaintiff’s actual damages may include “emotional distress and humiliation”); Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and Emotional Harm § 46 (A.L.I. 2012). 14 BERAM V. CITY OF SEDONA In sum, Beram alleges that the city denied her request for reasonable accommodation in violation of the ADA and caused her monetary and emotional harm. These are “concrete and particularized” injuries caused by the city, and they are redressable by an injunction requiring the city to provide Beram’s requested accommodation. Beram thus has standing to seek damages. B. Beram has standing to seek injunctive relief. Because Beram also seeks injunctive relief, allegations of past injury are not enough. To have standing to seek an injunction, Beram must allege a “sufficient likelihood” of future harm, causation, and redressability. Langer v. Kiser, 57 F.4th 1085, 1092 (9th Cir. 2023). Beram makes that showing. 1. Beram alleges a “sufficient likelihood” of future harm. To satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement, an “allegation of future injury may suffice if the threatened injury is certainly impending, or there is a substantial risk that the harm will occur.” Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 158 (2014) (citation modified). In the pre- enforcement context, a plaintiff can make this showing by alleging “a credible threat of enforcement.” Id. at 161. We have not had occasion to apply this standard to an ADA claim. But we do so here in this unique context because Beram seeks to enjoin enforcement of the city’s criminal ordinance when she sleeps in her car at her apartment. 5 Thus, 5 Beram’s complaint sought to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance against her “in Sedona.” But now that the ADA claim is the only remaining claim, Beram’s counsel clarified at oral argument that Beram  BERAM V. CITY OF SEDONA 15 like any other plaintiff bringing “a pre-enforcement suit” challenging a criminal law and “seeking prospective relief,” Beram can establish a future injury by alleging “a credible threat of enforcement.” First Choice Women’s Res. Ctrs., Inc. v. Davenport, 608 U.S. 174, 183 (2026) (citation modified). To decide whether a plaintiff has alleged a credible threat of enforcement, “we consider: (1) whether the plaintiff has a ‘concrete plan’ to violate the law, (2) whether the enforcement authorities have ‘communicated a specific warning or threat to initiate proceedings,’ and (3) whether there is a ‘history of past prosecution or enforcement.’” Isaacson, 84 F.4th at 1099 (quoting Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rts. Comm’n, 220 F.3d 1134, 1139 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc)). No one factor is dispositive. See LSO, Ltd. v. Stroh, 205 F.3d 1146, 1155 (9th Cir. 2000). The first factor cuts in Beram’s favor. She alleges that she has often slept in her car because of her disability and that she will continue to do so “multiple times each week.” In particular, she alleges she intends to sleep in her car on private property. And there is no dispute that the ordinance prohibits sleeping in a car on public or private property in Sedona. Sedona City Code § 9.10.010(A), (B). Beram has thus alleged a “concrete plan” to violate the law. The second factor also weighs in Beram’s favor. She alleges that Sedona police officers have twice made “specific warnings” against her. Two officers warned her that she was violating the ordinance and required her to move her car, and the second officer warned her she would be cited if caught seeks a narrow injunction preventing enforcement only when she sleeps in her car at her apartment. 16 BERAM V. CITY OF SEDONA sleeping in her car again. This is a specific threat of enforcement. See, e.g., Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452, 459 (1974) (holding that a plaintiff had standing to bring a pre-enforcement suit when he received two warnings to stop distributing handbills and the government threatened to prosecute him if he continued). Indeed, because the ordinance requires a warning before a person is criminally charged, Sedona Code § 9.10.010(E), the officers’ warnings were not mere threats of enforcement: they were the first step of enforcement. Nor has the city “disavowed” enforcement against Beram when she sleeps in her car at her apartment because of her disability. See Matsumoto v. Labrador, 122 F.4th 787, 798 (9th Cir. 2024). To the contrary, the city denied her reasonable accommodation request asking the city to “refrain from charging [her] with any violation of the code while she sleeps in her vehicle on the premises of her apartment complex.” The third factor slightly favors Beram. Beram alleges that “[a]t least two” people have been cited under the ordinance “while on private property.” But a history of enforcement is evidence of a credible threat only when it is “against parties similarly situated to the plaintiff.” Lopez v. Candaele, 630 F.3d 775, 786–87 (9th Cir. 2010). Because Beram alleges no specific facts about the people who were cited, “it is impossible to tell” the degree to which she is “similarly situated to the parties against whom the enforcement action was brought.” Unified Data Servs., LLC v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 39 F.4th 1200, 1211 n.10 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation modified). Yet the city’s demonstrated willingness to enforce the ordinance against even those on private property provides some, albeit limited, support of a credible threat of enforcement.  BERAM V. CITY OF SEDONA 17 All told, Beram’s concrete plan to sleep in her car, the police officers’ prior warnings, the city’s express refusal to provide an accommodation to enforcement of the ordinance against Beram when she sleeps on private property, and the city’s prior enforcement against people on private property establish a “credible threat” of enforcement. Beram thus alleges a “sufficient likelihood” of future harm to satisfy the injury-in-fact requirement for standing to seek injunctive relief. Langer, 57 F.4th at 1092. 2. Beram’s alleged risk of future harm is traceable to the city and redressable by an injunction. The second and third standing requirements, “causation and redressability, are usually flip sides of the same coin.” Diamond Alt. Energy, LLC v. Env’t Prot. Agency, 606 U.S. 100, 111 (2025) (citation modified). Causation requires that the injury is “fairly traceable to the challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action of some third party not before the court.” Mecinas v. Hobbs, 30 F.4th 890, 899 (9th Cir. 2022) (citation modified). And redressability requires “that the injury would likely be redressed by judicial relief.” Diamond Alt. Energy, LLC, 606 U.S. at 111. The city contends that Beram’s alleged injuries are traceable to her landlord, not to the city. The city maintains that it “is not responsible” if Beram’s landlord does not let her sleep in her car on the landlord’s property, because the city “cannot control private lease agreements.” This argument ignores that the ordinance criminalizes sleeping on both public and private property, and it prohibits private property owners from allowing someone to sleep in their car 18 BERAM V. CITY OF SEDONA on the owner’s property. Sedona City Code § 9.10.010(A), (B), (D). The city also argues that, because the landlord signed a settlement agreement allowing Beram to sleep in her car, Beram cannot be cited for sleeping in her car on the landlord’s property. The city points to subsection I of the ordinance, which says that the ordinance “shall not apply to the parking of any vehicle[,] camper or recreational vehicle for a period of less than 24 hours with the consent, express or implied, of the respective government property owner, manager, renter, lessee or agent thereof.” Sedona City Code § 9.10.010(I). The city misreads this narrow exemption. The ordinance prohibits using a “vehicle, camper or any other thing” for “camping, lodging, sleeping . . . or establishing a temporary place of rest” on any public or private property. Id. § 9.10.010(A), (B). Subsection I exempts “parking” with the consent of a “government property owner” or its agent. Id. § 9.10.010(I). By its terms, this exemption does not apply to Beram’s conduct: sleeping in her car on private property with the owner’s consent. What’s more, subsection D prohibits private property owners from allowing a person to violate the ordinance. Id. § 9.10.010(D). If, as the city argues, subsection I is a broad exemption allowing private property owners to consent to any conduct that violates the ordinance, then subsection D means nothing. In any event, even if subsection I is ambiguous, Beram alleged that the landlord fears prosecution under the ordinance. Indeed, the landlord refused to let Beram sleep in her car until it entered a settlement agreement, and the settlement agreement allows the landlord to “rescind” the agreement if Beram or the landlord is “warned and/or  BERAM V. CITY OF SEDONA 19 charged with violation of the [ordinance].” 6 The ambiguity of the exemption in subsection I and the heavy-handedness of subsection D—a criminal offense punishable by up to six months in jail—cause harm traceable to the city and redressable by an injunction preventing enforcement when Beram sleeps in her car at her apartment. Mecinas, 30 F.4th at 900 (“Redressability is satisfied so long as the requested remedy would amount to a significant increase in the likelihood that the plaintiff would obtain relief that directly redresses the injury suffered.” (citation modified)). * * * Beram alleges that the city’s denial of reasonable accommodation caused her past injury under the ADA and a sufficient likelihood of future injury. She thus has standing to sue for damages and injunctive relief. II. Beram states a viable theory under the ADA. The city alternatively argues that we should affirm the denial of leave to amend and dismissal of Beram’s ADA claim because she fails to state a claim. According to the city, Beram’s claim fails because the ADA categorically does not apply to a person seeking reasonable accommodation to comply with a criminal ordinance. We disagree. 6 At oral argument, Beram’s counsel stated that the property owner is no longer allowing Beram to sleep in her car because the owner fears enforcement. The City conceded that Beram has standing under these circumstances. We do not consider this fact because it was not alleged in the complaint or proposed amendments, and we conclude that Beram has standing even without this change in circumstances. But Beram may allege these new circumstances when she files an amended complaint on remand. 20 BERAM V. CITY OF SEDONA To state a claim of discrimination under Title II of the ADA, a plaintiff must allege four elements: (1) she “is an individual with a disability”; (2) she “is otherwise qualified to participate in or receive the benefit of some public entity’s services, programs, or activities”; (3) she “was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of the public entity’s services, programs, or activities, or was otherwise discriminated against by the public entity”; and (4) “such exclusion, denial of benefits, or discrimination was by reason of [her] disability.” McGary v. City of Portland, 386 F.3d 1259, 1265 (9th Cir. 2004) (citation modified). There is no dispute at this stage that Beram is a qualified person with a disability. But the city argues that Beram cannot be denied the “benefits” of a “service, program, or activity” based on the city’s enforcement of a criminal law. 7 We reject this narrow reading of Title II. A “program or activity” under Title II is broadly defined to include “all of the operations of a qualifying local government.” Bay Area Addiction Rsch. & Treatment, Inc. v. City of Antioch (BAART), 179 F.3d 725, 731 (9th Cir. 1999) (citation modified); see also 28 C.F.R. § 42.540(h). “We have interpreted these terms to encompass anything a public entity does.” Sheehan v. City & Cnty. of San 7 The city also contends that the ordinance does not discriminate based on disability because it applies equally to everyone in Sedona. The city misses the point. We have “repeatedly recognized that facially neutral policies may violate the ADA when such policies unduly burden disabled persons, even when such policies are consistently enforced.” McGary, 386 F.3d at 1265. “Indeed, the crux of a reasonable accommodation claim is a facially neutral requirement that is consistently enforced” when “particular accommodations are necessary to level the playing field.” Id. at 1266–67 (citation modified). The city’s neutral application of the ordinance is precisely what Beram challenges.  BERAM V. CITY OF SEDONA 21 Francisco, 743 F.3d 1211, 1232 (9th Cir. 2014) (citation modified), rev’d in part on other grounds by City & Cnty. of San Francisco, Calif. v. Sheehan, 575 U.S. 600 (2015). “Benefit” is similarly broad: it includes “provision of services, financial aid[,] or disposition (i.e., treatment, handling, decision, sentencing, confinement, or other prescription of conduct).” 28 C.F.R. § 42.540(j). In other words, Title II is “a general prohibition against discrimination by public entities.” BAART, 179 F.3d at 731. We have never considered whether Title II applies to criminal ordinances, but we have rejected arguments like the city’s in the civil context. McGary, 386 F.3d 1269–70 (public nuisance ordinance); BAART, 179 F.3d at 730–32 (zoning ordinance). In BAART, we rejected the argument that Title II does not apply to zoning laws. 179 F.3d at 732. Given the broad definition of “program or activity” and Congress’s sweeping purpose to provide a “comprehensive national mandate for the elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabilities,” 42 U.S.C. § 12101(b)(1), we held that Title II “should not be construed to allow the creation of spheres in which public entities may discriminate on the basis of an individual’s disability.” BAART, 179 F.3d at 731. We came to a similar conclusion in McGary. There, we rejected the City of Portland’s argument that Title II does not apply to “municipal code enforcement.” 386 F.3d at 1269– 70. The plaintiff, Richard McGary, was a homeowner whose disability made it difficult to clean up his yard. Id. at 1260. The City of Portland cited him under a civil nuisance abatement ordinance requiring property owners to keep their yards clean. Id. McGary sued Portland under Title II for failing to provide reasonable accommodation giving him more time to comply with the ordinance. Id. at 1261, 1264. 22 BERAM V. CITY OF SEDONA Portland made the same argument the city makes here: that “enforcement of a municipal ordinance is not a cognizable ‘benefit’ under the ADA.” Id. at 1268. We rejected that argument. We explained that the ADA “must be construed broadly,” and the “benefits” of a public entity’s “services, programs, or activities” may include “mandatory activities” such as compliance with municipal codes. Id. at 1268–69 (citation modified); see also Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232 (holding that Title II applies to law enforcement activities, including investigations and arrests). We thus held that McGary stated a claim under Title II. McGary, 386 F.3d at 1269. “The ‘benefit’ McGary sought . . . was to be allowed sufficient time to comply with [Portland]’s code enforcement activities in a manner consistent with his disability.” Id. at 1269–70. So too here. Like McGary, Beram has a disability that she alleges prevents her from complying with the city’s ordinance. And like McGary, Beram seeks reasonable accommodation that would exempt her from certain of the city’s enforcement activities. We see no principled way to distinguish between the criminal ordinance here and the civil ordinance in McGary, which allowed the City of Portland to issue a “warrant,” impose fines, and “place[] a lien on [McGary’s] home.” Id. at 1260–61; see also BAART, 179 F.3d at 731–32 (declining to carve out an exemption for certain types of city ordinances under Title II when Congress declined to do so). The city suggests that applying the ADA to criminal ordinances is unworkable and will impair the city’s ability to protect public safety. But these arguments go to the merits,  BERAM V. CITY OF SEDONA 23 not to whether the ADA applies. 8 The city’s public safety arguments may “inform the reasonableness analysis under the ADA,” see Sheehan, 743 F.3d at 1232, and the city may argue that exempting certain conduct from criminal enforcement “would fundamentally alter the nature of the [city’s] service, program, or activity.” 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)(i). But these issues “depend[] on the individual circumstances of each case” and “require[] a fact- specific, individualized analysis.” Wong, 192 F.3d at 818. And here, contrary to the city’s concerns about “a far- reaching ADA injunction” and “a complete abrogation” of the ordinance, Beram seeks to enjoin enforcement of the code only when she sleeps in her car at her apartment complex. The city may argue that Beram’s requested accommodation is unreasonable, but that issue is not before us. In short, “we decline to draw an arbitrary distinction—to prohibit public entities from discriminating against persons with disabilities in some of their activities and not in others.” BAART, 179 F.3d at 732 (citation modified). Discrimination under Title II may include the failure to provide reasonable accommodation that would allow a person with a disability to comply with a criminal ordinance. Conclusion We affirm the dismissal of Beram’s Eighth Amendment claim, and we reverse the district court’s dismissal of and denial of leave to amend Beram’s ADA claim. The proposed 8 Indeed, had Congress wanted to limit Title II’s reach and exclude municipal code enforcement from