Holland-Thielen v. Spacex

FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT PAIGE HOLLAND-THIELEN, an No. 25-4811 individual; YAMAN ABDULHAK, D.C. No. an individual; SCOTT BECK, an 2:24-cv-06972- individual; REBEKAH CLARK; JAK-RAO DEBORAH LAWRENCE, an individual; CLAIRE MALLON, an individual; ANDRE NADEAU, an OPINION individual; TOM MOLINE, an individual, Plaintiffs - Appellees, v. SPACEX, Defendant - Appellant, and ELON MUSK, Defendant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California John A. Kronstadt, District Judge, Presiding 2 HOLLAND-THIELEN V. SPACEX Argued and Submitted June 25, 2026 Pasadena, California Filed November 10, 2026 Before: Michelle T. Friedland, Danielle J. Forrest, and Eric C. Tung, Circuit Judges. Opinion by Judge Friedland; Dissent by Judge Tung SUMMARY * Arbitration / Sexual Harassment The panel affirmed the district court’s order denying SpaceX’s motion to compel arbitration of plaintiffs’ employment-related claims and held that the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (“EFAA”) exempted plaintiffs’ case from arbitration. SpaceX fired plaintiffs, eight former employees, shortly after they circulated a letter to SpaceX management that voiced concerns about conduct that they asserted to be sexual harassment. Plaintiffs brought retaliatory-termination claims and several other claims under California law related to the conditions of their employment. SpaceX removed the state action to federal court. Once in federal court, SpaceX asserted that all eight plaintiffs had signed arbitration * This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.  HOLLAND-THIELEN V. SPACEX 3 agreements as part of their employment contracts and moved to compel arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act. The panel rejected SpaceX’s contention that plaintiffs’ allegations did not satisfy the EFAA’s definition of “sexual harassment dispute” under 9 U.S.C. § 401(4). The panel held that the phrase “conduct that is alleged to constitute sexual harassment” means “conduct that is asserted to amount to sexual harassment.” Because the word “allege” requires only an assertion, which may or may not eventually be proven meritorious, § 401(4)’s plain terms are not limited to conduct that certainly amounts to sexual harassment. Rather, to decide if § 401(4)’s definition is satisfied, courts must determine whether the plaintiff’s complaint describes conduct asserted to be a basis for a sexual harassment claim. Congress did not intend to import the federal pleading standard from Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 8 into § 401(4). The panel next addressed whether plaintiffs properly invoked the EFAA in this case. Under § 402(a), a plaintiff may avoid arbitration of a case if the plaintiff is “alleging conduct constituting a sexual harassment dispute” and if the case “relates to . . . the sexual harassment dispute.” The panel concluded that plaintiffs satisfied both conditions. First, by alleging that SpaceX retaliated against them for opposing conduct that they assert amounts to sexual harassment (SpaceX founder Elon Musk’s Twitter posts), plaintiffs “alleg[ed] conduct constituting” a “sexual harassment dispute.” Second, and for similar reasons, plaintiffs’ case “relates to” that sexual harassment dispute. Because each plaintiff brought a claim challenging their terminations that were allegedly in response to their accusation about sexual harassment, each plaintiff met the “relates to” bar and thus invoked the EFAA with respect to the entire case. 4 HOLLAND-THIELEN V. SPACEX Dissenting, Judge Tung would hold that a bare assertion of sexual harassment is not enough to evade arbitration. Courts are to assess whether plaintiffs have pleaded facts that, if proven true, would constitute sexual harassment under applicable law. In the context of the EFAA, to “allege” conduct constituting sexual harassment means to state facts that, if true, amount to sexual harassment under law. Because the district court incorrectly interpreted the EFAA, Judge Tung would have vacated its denial of the motion to compel arbitration and remanded for it to apply the correct standard. COUNSEL Anne B. Shaver (argued), Lieff Cabraser Heimann & Bernstein LLP, San Francisco, California; Laurie M. Burgess, Burgess Law Offices PC, San Francisco, California; for Plaintiffs-Appellees. Michael E. Kenneally (argued), Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP, Washington, D.C.; Thomas M. Peterson, Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP, San Francisco, California; Karen Cho and Jennifer B. Zargarof, Morgan Lewis & Bockius LLP, Los Angeles, California; for Defendant-Appellant. Shelby H. Leighton, Public Justice PC, Washington, D.C.; Leila Nasrolahi and Lavanya Prabhakar, Public Justice PC, Oakland, California; for Amici Curiae Public Justice, National Women’s Law Center, American Association for Justice, and National Employment Lawyers Association. Maha Ibrahim, Catherine Bendor, and Lucy Cheskin, Equal Rights Advocates, San Francisco, California, for Amici Curiae Equal Rights Advocates, the California Employment  HOLLAND-THIELEN V. SPACEX 5 Lawyers Association, the California Women’s Law Center, and Legal Aid. OPINION FRIEDLAND, Circuit Judge: The Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (“EFAA”) permits individuals alleging a “sexual harassment dispute” to pursue their cases in court rather than in arbitration, notwithstanding an arbitration agreement. The statute defines a “sexual harassment dispute” as “a dispute relating to conduct that is alleged to constitute sexual harassment under applicable Federal, Tribal, or State law.” 9 U.S.C. § 401(4). We must decide whether that definition requires making sexual harassment allegations that are sufficient to state a claim under which relief can be granted. Plaintiffs-Appellees here are eight former employees of Defendant-Appellant Space Exploration Technologies Corporation (“SpaceX”). SpaceX fired Plaintiffs shortly after they circulated a letter to SpaceX management that voiced concerns about conduct that they asserted to be sexual harassment. Following their dismissals, Plaintiffs sued, bringing retaliatory-termination claims along with several other claims under California law relating to the conditions of their employment. SpaceX moved to compel arbitration. Plaintiffs opposed, arguing that the EFAA exempts their case from arbitration. The district court agreed with Plaintiffs and denied SpaceX’s motion. 6 HOLLAND-THIELEN V. SPACEX SpaceX appeals, arguing that the EFAA does not apply to Plaintiffs’ case. We disagree and therefore affirm. I. Congress enacted the EFAA in response to reports that exposed pervasive sexual misconduct at various companies. Some of those companies were requiring victims to resolve their claims in confidential arbitration, thereby “shield[ing] this misconduct from public scrutiny.” H.R. Rep. No. 117- 234, at 10–12 (2022). The EFAA is an amendment to the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”), creating an exception to the FAA’s general rule that arbitration agreements are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable.” 9 U.S.C. § 2. The EFAA’s operative provision, § 402(a), states: Notwithstanding any other provision of [the FAA], at the election of the person alleging conduct constituting a sexual harassment dispute or sexual assault dispute, or the named representative of a class or in a collective action alleging such conduct, no predispute arbitration agreement or predispute joint-action waiver shall be valid or enforceable with respect to a case which is filed under Federal, Tribal, or State law and relates to the sexual assault dispute or the sexual harassment dispute. 9 U.S.C. § 402(a). The other section of the EFAA, § 401, contains statutory definitions. Section 401(4) provides that “[t]he term ‘sexual harassment dispute’ means a dispute relating to conduct that is alleged to constitute sexual harassment under applicable Federal, Tribal, or State law.” Id. § 401(4).  HOLLAND-THIELEN V. SPACEX 7 In simple terms, the EFAA permits a person alleging a sexual harassment dispute to avoid an arbitration agreement that would otherwise sweep her case into arbitration under the FAA. And “[b]ecause the EFAA invalidates an arbitration agreement ‘with respect to a case’—rather than a claim—that ‘relates to’ a sexual harassment dispute,” a plaintiff who successfully invokes the statute (by alleging at least one claim that “relates to” a sexual harassment dispute) may avoid arbitration of her “entire case” even if not all of the individual claims in her case relate to sexual harassment. Ding v. Structure Therapeutics, Inc., 187 F.4th 1231, 1241 (9th Cir. 2026) (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 402(a)). II. A. SpaceX is a space technology company founded and led by Elon Musk. According to the Complaint, while Plaintiffs were employed at SpaceX, sexual banter, sexual harassment, and gender discrimination were commonplace. Plaintiffs allege that Musk normalized and encouraged such conduct, particularly through his posts on Twitter (now X). The Complaint avers that Musk “intentionally drew employee attention to his Twitter feed by frequently using the account to report out company news,” such as updates on rocket launches. But Plaintiffs say that he interspersed that news with sexually explicit posts, as well as some that demeaned women and LGBTQ persons. Plaintiffs point to numerous examples from Musk’s account, which include: • Announcing his “idea” to create a Texas university similar to MIT which he would call “TITS” and where “Ds [women’s bra size] would get degrees,” accompanied 8 HOLLAND-THIELEN V. SPACEX by an altered photo rendering a rocket to appear to be a giant penis; • Posting a skeletal x-ray of a person holding their lower back with the comment “My back after carrying my huge cock all day.” • Posting an angry face in response to LGBTQ icons, with the statement “June is almost here — here it comes!” (Referencing gay pride month); • Posting “Jack in the Box should do double duty as a sperm donor clinic — name is ” and replying to his own post with: “Wow, this mayo sure is salty!” Plaintiffs allege that Musk’s posts were widely shared among SpaceX employees such that they “permeated” the workplace. After several national news outlets reported on allegations of sexual harassment at SpaceX, and based on their own experiences, Plaintiffs drafted an “Open Letter” to SpaceX management. The letter raised concerns about SpaceX’s work environment and its processes for addressing alleged misconduct. Plaintiffs focused on Musk’s Twitter posts, asserting that the posts constituted “sexual harassment.” Plaintiffs sent the letter directly to SpaceX management and circulated it among their colleagues. Several Plaintiffs publicly identified themselves as authors of the Open Letter. The day after Plaintiffs circulated the letter, SpaceX terminated four Plaintiffs who were identified as authors.  HOLLAND-THIELEN V. SPACEX 9 SpaceX’s stated reason for firing them was their role in “conceiving, writing, and distributing the Open Letter.” In the following weeks, SpaceX’s human resources department investigated employees suspected of assisting with the Open Letter, including the four remaining Plaintiffs. In the course of the investigations, each of those Plaintiffs admitted to participating in drafting the Open Letter. Soon after their admissions, SpaceX fired them too. B. Following their terminations, Plaintiffs sued SpaceX in state court, asserting various claims under California law relating to their employment conditions and terminations. Plaintiffs’ claims fall into five categories: hostile-work- environment sexual harassment created by Musk’s Twitter posts; sexual harassment by coworkers; failure to prevent discrimination, harassment, and retaliation; gender discrimination; and retaliatory termination for opposing alleged sexual harassment through the Open Letter. Some Plaintiffs assert only a subset of those claims—the sole claim common to all eight Plaintiffs is the retaliatory-termination claim. 1 SpaceX did not move to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims. Instead, SpaceX filed an Answer to the Complaint and then removed the case to federal court, arguing that there was diversity jurisdiction. Once in federal court, SpaceX 1 Only one Plaintiff, Claire Mallon, asserts sexual harassment by coworkers. SpaceX argues that Mallon’s claim is untimely under the EFAA, which applies to “any dispute or claim that arises or accrues on or after” March 3, 2022. 9 U.S.C. § 401 note. Because we conclude that the EFAA applies regardless of the timeliness of Mallon’s individual claim, we do not reach SpaceX’s argument. If appropriate, SpaceX may raise any timeliness defense at a later stage of the proceedings. 10 HOLLAND-THIELEN V. SPACEX asserted that all eight Plaintiffs had signed arbitration agreements as part of their employment contracts and moved to compel arbitration under the FAA. Anticipating that Plaintiffs would invoke the EFAA, SpaceX argued that the statute did not exempt Plaintiffs’ claims from arbitration. SpaceX asserted that the EFAA requires “adequately alleged” sexual harassment—by that, SpaceX meant allegations that state a claim that would survive a motion to dismiss under the federal pleading standard. According to SpaceX, adequately alleged sexual harassment is required regardless of whether the plaintiff is alleging a hostile work environment, quid pro quo harassment, or some other legal theory. Relying on that interpretation of the EFAA, SpaceX argued that Plaintiffs failed to adequately allege a hostile work environment caused by Musk’s Twitter posts because the posts were not severe or pervasive enough to affect the terms or conditions of Plaintiffs’ employment. See Meritor Sav. Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65, 67 (1986). And because Musk’s posts did not constitute sexual harassment, SpaceX reasoned, Plaintiffs could not “bootstrap” their way out of arbitration by alleging retaliation for opposing that conduct. Alternatively, SpaceX argued that Plaintiffs’ retaliation claims did not trigger the statute because they were not “harassment claims.” 2 2 SpaceX also argued in the district court and on appeal that the EFAA applies selectively to sexual harassment claims, not to a plaintiff’s entire case—such that even if sexual harassment claims could remain in federal court under the EFAA, any claims unrelated to sexual harassment had to be severed and sent to arbitration. While SpaceX’s appeal was pending, however, our court rejected that theory, holding that the EFAA exempts a plaintiff’s “entire case” from arbitration. Ding v. Structure Therapeutics, Inc., 187 F.4th 1231, 1241 (9th Cir. 2026).  HOLLAND-THIELEN V. SPACEX 11 The district court disagreed and denied SpaceX’s motion to compel arbitration. 3 SpaceX timely appealed that denial pursuant to 9 U.S.C. § 16(a)(1). III. We review the denial of a motion to compel arbitration de novo. Olson v. FCA US, LLC, 176 F.4th 612, 616 (9th Cir. 2026). “The construction or interpretation of a statute is a question of law also reviewed de novo.” Miranda v. Anchondo, 684 F.3d 844, 849 (9th Cir. 2012). IV. A. SpaceX first contends that Plaintiffs’ allegations do not satisfy the EFAA’s definition of “sexual harassment dispute” under § 401(4). To interpret that definition, “we begin by analyzing the statutory language, assuming that the ordinary meaning of that language accurately expresses the 3 The district court had subject matter jurisdiction over this case under the diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Moe v. GEICO Indem. Co., 73 F.4th 757, 761 (9th Cir. 2023) (“[T]he court of appeals has an independent duty to satisfy itself not only of its own jurisdiction, but also of that of the lower courts in a cause under review.” (citation modified)). All Plaintiffs are residents of California or Washington, and the only issue potentially in dispute for purposes of assessing diversity jurisdiction is whether SpaceX’s “principal place of business” is in Texas. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(c)(1). The district court found, among other things, that the three most senior officers at SpaceX are all based in Texas, and that those officers made the most “[c]ritical companywide decisions.” See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 80 (2010) (explaining that a corporation’s “principal place of business” is “where the corporation’s high level officers direct, control, and coordinate the corporation’s activities”). In light of those and other factual findings, which Plaintiffs failed to specifically challenge on appeal, the requirements for jurisdiction under § 1332 are satisfied. 12 HOLLAND-THIELEN V. SPACEX legislative purpose.” Hardt v. Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 560 U.S. 242, 251 (2010) (citation modified). Again, § 401(4) defines a “sexual harassment dispute” as “a dispute relating to conduct that is alleged to constitute sexual harassment under applicable Federal, Tribal, or State law.” 9 U.S.C. § 401(4). For a dispute to fall within the definition, there must be “conduct that is alleged to constitute” sexual harassment. Id. The ordinary meaning of “allege” is “[t]o assert to be true; affirm . . . [t]o assert prior to a final determination.” Allege, Am. Heritage Dictionary (5th ed. 2016); see also id. (defining “alleged” as “[r]epresented as existing or as being as described but not so proved; supposed”); Allege, Merriam-Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary (11th ed. 2020) (“to assert without proof or before proving”). The legal meaning of “allege” is the same: “To assert as true, esp. that someone has done something wrong, though no occasion for definitive proof has yet occurred.” Allege, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019); see Kemp v. United States, 596 U.S. 528, 534 (2022) (determining a word’s “legal meaning” using Black’s Law Dictionary). Thus, among lawyers and laypeople alike, to “allege” something means to assert it as true, although its truth remains to be determined. See Gwaltney of Smithfield, Ltd. v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 65 (1987) (acknowledging that a plaintiff’s “allegations of [a legal] violation” may turn out to be “untrue”). 4 And the meaning of “constitute” is “[t]o amount 4 Occasionally, “lay and legal dictionaries” will define the same word differently, indicating that the word has a special meaning in “legal usage.” Kemp v. United States, 596 U.S. 528, 534 (2022). When the choice is between ordinary and legal meanings, courts look to the word’s context to determine which meaning controls. See United States v. Hansen, 599 U.S. 762, 774–75 (2023) (using statutory context to  HOLLAND-THIELEN V. SPACEX 13 to; equal.” Constitute, Am. Heritage Dictionary (5th ed. 2016); see also Constitute, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (“To make up or form.”). Putting those definitions together, the phrase “conduct that is alleged to constitute sexual harassment” means “conduct that is asserted to amount to sexual harassment.” Because the word “allege” requires only an assertion, which may or may not eventually be proven meritorious, § 401(4)’s plain terms are not limited to conduct that certainly amounts to sexual harassment. 5 Rather, to decide if § 401(4)’s definition is satisfied, courts must determine whether the plaintiff’s complaint describes conduct asserted to be a basis for a sexual harassment claim. SpaceX, however, argues that § 401(4) demands more— in particular, allegations of sexual harassment that meet the federal pleading standard in the sense of being able to determine whether the words “encourages or induces” carried their “ordinary” meanings or their “specialized, criminal-law” meanings). But because there is no evidence that lay and legal dictionaries define “allege” differently, that issue is not present here. 5 The dissent posits that the definition of allege “emphatically does not include just any ‘assert[ion].’” Dissent at 34. For support, the dissent quotes from a dictionary’s instruction that “[a]llege should not be used as a synonym of assert, maintain, declare, or claim.” Bryan A. Garner, Garner’s Modern American Usage 34 (3d ed. 2009). Yet the full entry explains that the terms are distinct only because “[a]llege has peculiarly accusatory connotations,” not because it implies a higher standard of plausibility. Id. Black’s Law Dictionary also fails to support the notion that the dissent’s narrow definition is the correct one. Allegation, Black’s Law Dictionary (11th ed. 2019) (defining an allegation as “[s]omething declared or asserted as a matter of fact,” as the dissent notes, but also as “[a] declaration that something is true”). 14 HOLLAND-THIELEN V. SPACEX survive a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 6 But the statutory language makes no reference to the federal pleading standard. The federal pleading standard arises from Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8, which states that a complaint must provide a “short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). The Supreme Court has interpreted Rule 8 to require “adequate” allegations, meaning the complaint must contain sufficient “nonconclusory factual allegation[s]” to “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 670, 678–80 (2009) (quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). Yet the EFAA’s definition of “sexual harassment dispute” does not say that a plaintiff must “adequately allege” sexual harassment, “state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face,” or provide a “short and plain statement” showing entitlement to relief. SpaceX proposes that “allege” carries a specialized meaning when Congress uses it in a statute. SpaceX observes that, “[w]hen the EFAA was passed (and for decades before), it was firmly settled under federal law that a plaintiff ’s [complaint] needs ‘to provide the grounds of his entitlement to relief’” to survive a motion to dismiss. See 6 We have interpreted the EFAA in two prior cases, but neither resolved whether the statute requires allegations that meet the federal pleading standard. In Ding v. Structure Therapeutics, Inc., 187 F.4th 1231, 1239 (9th Cir. 2026), we assumed without deciding that the EFAA imposes that requirement. And in Combs v. Netflix, Inc., 180 F.4th 1201 (9th Cir. 2026), we held that a complaint that “allege[d] conduct constituting unlawful sexual harassment” “presumptively f[e]ll within the EFAA.” Id. at 1204. In treating the complaint there as sufficient to invoke the EFAA, Combs did not address what is necessary to bring a complaint within the statute’s reach.  HOLLAND-THIELEN V. SPACEX 15 Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 679; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. We do presume that Congress was aware of the federal pleading standard when it enacted the EFAA. Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221, 233 (2020); see also Progressive W. Ins. v. Preciado, 479 F.3d 1014, 1018 (9th Cir. 2007) (opining that the presumption that Congress knows the legal context in which it is legislating is “especially appropriate” where that context “features a longstanding, near-canonical rule” (citation omitted)). But when Congress wants to require allegations that meet the federal pleading standard, it has typically said so expressly. See, e.g., 2 U.S.C. § 1405(b) (“A hearing officer may dismiss any claim that the hearing officer finds to be frivolous or that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”); cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1867(d) (requiring a person challenging jury selection procedures to submit a “statement of facts which, if true, would constitute a substantial failure to comply with the provisions of this title”). Congress could have easily drafted the EFAA to require courts to send sexual harassment disputes to arbitration only when the complaint “fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted” or “fails to state facts which, if true, would constitute sexual harassment.” That Congress chose not to adopt those “readily available and apparent alternative[s]” is strong evidence that Congress did not intend to import the federal pleading standard into § 401(4). Knight v. Comm’r, 552 U.S. 181, 188 (2008). SpaceX correctly points out that, in certain circumstances, statutory terms can carry meanings that depart from their ordinary ones. Feliciano v. Dep’t of Transp., 605 U.S. 38, 45 (2025). “Congress may, for example, define a word or phrase in a specialized way or employ a term of art with long-encrusted connotations in a given field.” Id.; e.g., Corning Glass Works v. Brennan, 417 16 HOLLAND-THIELEN V. SPACEX U.S. 188, 202 (1974) (explaining that the statutory term “working conditions” carried a specialized meaning “in the language of industrial relations”). But “without strong proof of such a departure, commonly used terms should be given their common meaning.” Mullin v. Doe, 609 U.S. 324, 343 (2026); see Feliciano, 605 U.S. at 45 (“[T]hose whose lives are governed by law are entitled to rely on its ordinary meaning, not left to speculate about hidden messages.”). And given Congress’s presumed knowledge of the federal pleading standard and its express reference to that standard in other statutes, the absence of any language referencing the pleading standard, if anything, is proof Congress did not intend to incorporate it into § 401(4). SpaceX marshals no support for the idea that “allege” in § 401(4)’s definition departs from its usual meaning. The closest SpaceX comes is its reliance on the Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal, but those decisions did not purport to define the word “allege,” let alone indicate that the word means what SpaceX wants it to mean. Rather, Twombly and Iqbal themselves use “allege” in the usual way. Those cases both held that the complaints at issue did not state a claim, yet the Supreme Court used “allege” to describe their contents. The Court noted in Iqbal, for example, that “the complaint alleges that [the defendants] adopted an unconstitutional policy,” but the Court nonetheless concluded that the complaint was “insufficient” under the federal pleading standard. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 666 (emphasis added). Similarly, the Court in Twombly explained that “[t]he complaint alleges that the [defendants] conspired to restrain trade in two ways,” yet the Court concluded that it did not state a claim. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550, 570 (emphasis added). A lawmaker familiar with that legal backdrop would not assume that using “allege” in a  HOLLAND-THIELEN V. SPACEX 17 statute would mean that, for the statute to apply, the allegations must be legally sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. SpaceX nevertheless insists that “allege” must mean “adequately alleged” when read in context in § 401(4). SpaceX points out that the definition requires conduct “alleged to constitute sexual harassment under applicable Federal, Tribal, or State law.” SpaceX contends that the “under applicable law” clause “adds a legal dimension to the required allegation”—that is, it requires alleging that certain conduct violates the law. An allegation that conduct violates the law is a legal conclusion. SpaceX observes that, for a complaint to survive a motion to dismiss under the federal pleading standard, legal conclusions are not enough—they must be supported by sufficient factual allegations. See Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79. SpaceX then asserts that “Congress would not depart from the usual standards for assessing pleadings” in drafting this statute. Thus, SpaceX concludes, the inclusion of the “under applicable law” clause means that a complaint must contain adequate factual allegations to state a legal claim for sexual harassment as defined under applicable law. Again, SpaceX’s argument falters. SpaceX presumes that “Congress would not depart” from the federal pleading standard in drafting this statute, but, as we have explained, see supra at 15, Congress’s decision to expressly incorporate the federal pleading standard in other statutes suggests that the choice not to do so in § 401(4) was intentional. Further, just because legal conclusions alone are insufficient to survive a motion to dismiss, it does not follow that the word “alleged” necessarily means “adequately alleged” when the allegation is that certain conduct violates the law. To the contrary, courts frequently state that a plaintiff “alleged” a 18 HOLLAND-THIELEN V. SPACEX legal violation without implying that the allegations are sufficient to state a claim. See, e.g., Mauia v. Petrochem Insulation, Inc., 5 F.4th 1068, 1075 (9th Cir. 2021) (holding that a complaint that “alleged violations of California meal- and rest-break laws” failed to state a claim); Trim v. Reward Zone USA LLC, 76 F.4th 1157, 1158 (9th Cir. 2023) (affirming dismissal of a complaint that “alleged a violation of the [Telephone Consumer Protection Act]” for failure to state a claim); see also Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 666, 684 (noting that the complaint “alleged deprivations” of “various constitutional protections” by defendants who were not parties to the petition while “express[ing] no opinion concerning the sufficiency of [the] complaint” as to those defendants). By contrast, when analyzing whether allegations meet the pleading standard, courts typically have used the adverbs “adequately” or “plausibly” to clarify that they are not referring to mere allegations. See, e.g., PLS.com, LLC v. Nat’l Ass’n of Realtors, 32 F.4th 824, 833 (9th Cir. 2022) (“We consider first whether PLS has adequately alleged a Sherman Act violation.” (emphasis added)); see also Brownback v. King, 592 U.S. 209, 217–18 (2021) (“[A] plaintiff must plausibly allege all six [Federal Tort Claims Act] elements . . . to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” (emphasis added)). There is no reason to believe Congress used “allege” in a more technical sense than how courts typically use it. Accordingly, § 401(4)’s “under applicable Federal, Tribal, or State law” clause simply makes clear that a plaintiff must contend that there was a legal violation under an applicable part of one of those bodies of law (as opposed to, for example, under foreign law or a law unrelated to sexual harassment).  HOLLAND-THIELEN V. SPACEX 19 The dissent acknowledges that “two definitions [of allege] exist—one with a broader remit than the other.” Dissent at 43. The first is the ordinary meaning of allege: to assert as true, although its truth remains to be determined. Supra at 12. The second, which the dissent adopts in its reading of the EFAA, is “to state facts that, if true, would establish that an opposing party’s conduct constitutes a legal violation.” Dissent at 34. The dissent has found examples showing that “courts sometimes use the unadorned term ‘allege’ to refer to statements of fact and sometimes to include statements of law.” Dissent at 43. We agree that, in rare instances, “allege” has been used as shorthand for “adequately allege.” 7 Yet the dissent does not explain why the more restrictive meaning applies here. As explained above, interpreting the EFAA using the ordinary meaning of “alleged” points the other way. So does the statute’s context. See Smith v. United States, 508 U.S. 223, 229 (1993) (“[A] 7 That said, several of the cases the dissent marshals to support reading allege to mean “adequately allege,” see Dissent at 42–43, support both meanings. In Breininger v. Sheet Metal Workers International Ass’n Local Union No. 6, 493 U.S. 67 (1989), the Supreme Court used “allege” both to recount the fact that the petitioner had “alleged” certain facts in his complaint, id. at 72, as well as to conclude that the petitioner “ha[d] not alleged a violation” of a statute because he “did not allege acts by the union amounting to ‘discipline’ within the meaning of the statute,” id. at 94. And Moore v. United Kingdom, 384 F.3d 1079 (9th Cir. 2004), involved a particular statute, the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, which, unlike the EFAA, contained a merits standard written into the provision in question. See id. at 1090 (explaining that the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act provides that “‘[n]o judgment by default shall be entered by a court of the United States . . . against a foreign state . . . unless the claimant establishes his claim or right to relief by evidence satisfactory to the court’” (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1608(e)). Because the plaintiff had failed to satisfy that explicitly codified standard, we held there that he had “not adequately alleged” a claim. Id. 20 HOLLAND-THIELEN V. SPACEX word that appears ambiguous if viewed in isolation may become clear when the word is analyzed in light of the terms that surround it.”). Recall that the EFAA defines a “sexual harassment dispute” as “a dispute relating to conduct that is alleged to constitute sexual harassment under applicable Federal, Tribal, or State law.” 9 U.S.C. § 401(4). SpaceX’s and the dissent’s proposed interpretation would, ironically, make the inclusion of “alleged” superfluous. If SpaceX were correct that the definition required conduct that is adequately alleged to constitute sexual harassment, it would have been much simpler to define a sexual harassment dispute as “a dispute relating to conduct that constitutes sexual harassment under applicable Federal, Tribal, or State law.” Given the “cardinal principle of statutory construction” that statutes should be interpreted to avoid rendering any word “superfluous, void, or insignificant,” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (citation modified), that result weighs heavily against SpaceX’s interpretation. The dissent acknowledges that the EFAA “is a minefield of redundancy,” Dissent at 36, but offers an interpretation that worsens redundancy; following the ordinary meaning of “allege,” by contrast, reduces it. 8 For similar reasons, SpaceX’s—and the dissent’s— argument that the word “constitute” in § 401(4) imposes the 8 For example, the dissent proposes reading “alleged” out of § 401(4) (defining a sexual harassment dispute) because § 401(3) does not use the word to define a sexual assault dispute. Dissent at 37–38. Doing so would render language that Congress chose to include “void” or “insignificant.” TRW Inc. v. Andrews, 534 U.S. 19, 31 (2001) (citation modified).  HOLLAND-THIELEN V. SPACEX 21 federal pleading standard is no more successful. 9 SpaceX begins by suggesting that “constitute” means “[t]o make up or form,” and a “sexual harassment dispute, specifically, must relate to conduct alleged to ‘constitute’ sexual harassment under applicable law.” See 9 U.S.C. § 401(4). But from there, SpaceX inexplicably concludes: “Given the normal meaning of ‘constitute,’ this requirement means the plaintiff [must] set forth allegations of conduct that would establish sexual harassment under applicable law.” That might be a reasonable conclusion if the statute defined a sexual harassment dispute as a dispute relating to “conduct that constitutes sexual harassment” under applicable law, but that is not the definition Congress provided. See id. (defining a “sexual harassment dispute” as “a dispute relating to conduct that is alleged to constitute sexual harassment under applicable Federal, Tribal, or State law” (emphasis added)). Changing tack, SpaceX contends that the special meaning of “allege” is “clear” when one examines § 4 of the FAA—another provision that uses the word “alleged.” Section 4 authorizes courts to issue orders compelling arbitration. See 9 U.S.C. § 4. It provides: “A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of 9 The dissent looks to § 402(b) to bolster its argument that the EFAA “leaves to the court whether the conduct at issue ‘constitutes a sexual harassment dispute,’” and thereby requires Plaintiffs to adequately allege such a dispute. Dissent at 37 (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 402(a)). But that subsection cannot bear the interpretive weight the dissent assigns it. It is purely an anti-delegation clause, ensuring that a court, not an arbitrator, will decide whether a case falls under the EFAA and thus should be litigated in court rather than in arbitration. Cf. Coinbase, Inc. v. Suski, 602 U.S. 143, 152 (2024) (holding that a court, rather than an arbitrator, must decide which of two contracts—one with a delegation clause and the other with a forum selection clause—controls). 22 HOLLAND-THIELEN V. SPACEX another to arbitrate . . . may petition” a court for an order compelling arbitration. Id. On SpaceX’s telling, “merely alleging the failure, neglect, or refusal is insufficient if the opposing party is not actually failing, neglecting, or refusing to arbitrate.” SpaceX urges us to interpret “alleged” consistently across § 4 and § 401(4). But interpreting “alleged” consistently across those provisions only bolsters our conclusion. SpaceX misapprehends § 4—as the text makes clear, to invoke the FAA in the first place and file a petition, a party must only assert that its adversary is improperly refusing to arbitrate. Id. (permitting “[a] party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate” to “petition any United States district court”). By contrast, to ultimately obtain an order compelling arbitration, the petitioner must prove that its adversary actually refused to arbitrate despite a valid arbitration agreement. See id. The court may not compel arbitration unless it is “satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue.” Id. And “[i]f the making of the arbitration agreement or the failure, neglect, or refusal to perform [is] in issue, the court shall proceed summarily to the trial thereof.” Id.; see also Jones v. Starz Ent., LLC, 129 F.4th 1176, 1181 (9th Cir. 2025) (“By its plain terms, the provision conditions a district court’s authority to compel arbitration upon a showing that a party has failed, neglected, or refused to arbitrate.” (emphasis added)). Looking at § 4 and § 401(4) together strengthens the inference that Congress did not intend to tie § 401(4) to any showing  HOLLAN