Eagleman v. Naphcare, Inc.
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 20, 2026
Docket24-5666
StatusUnpublished
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Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 20 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
SALLY EAGLEMAN, No. 24-5666
D.C. No.
Plaintiff - Appellant, 8:23-cv-00673-JWH-JDE
v.
MEMORANDUM*
NAPHCARE, INC., an Alabama Stock
Corporation,
Defendant - Appellee,
DOES, 1 through 10, inclusive,
Defendant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
John W. Holcomb, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted October 29, 2026
Pasadena, California
Before: PAEZ, OWENS, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges.
Sally Eagleman (“Eagleman”) appeals the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to NaphCare, Inc. (“NaphCare”) on Eagleman’s four claims under the
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”): disability discrimination,
failure to accommodate, retaliation, and failure to engage in the interactive process.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse and remand.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, viewing
the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to
the nonmoving party. Branch Banking & Tr. Co. v. D.M.S.I., LLC, 871 F.3d 751,
759 (9th Cir. 2017).
1. The district court erred in granting summary judgment to NaphCare on
Eagleman’s disability discrimination claim. To make a prima facie case for
disability discrimination under FEHA, Eagleman must show that she (1) suffered
from a disability, (2) was otherwise qualified to do her job, with or without
reasonable accommodation, and (3) was subjected to an adverse employment
action because of her disability. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a); Green v. State, 165
P.3d 118, 122–23 (Cal. 2007). Eagleman bears the burden of proving that she
could perform the essential duties of her job with or without reasonable
accommodation. Green, 165 P.3d at 123.
Because the parties agree that Eagleman is disabled, her discrimination
claim turns on whether she is a qualified individual under the statute. To be a
qualified individual, an employee must satisfy two criteria: first, she must possess
“the requisite skill, experience, education, and other job-related requirements”; and
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second, she must be able to perform the essential functions of the job, with or
without reasonable accommodation. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 11065(o). It is
undisputed that Eagleman satisfies the first requirement. Therefore, the central
question is whether she can perform the essential functions of her job, with or
without reasonable accommodation. Id.
Viewed in the light most favorable to Eagleman, the record evidence creates
a genuine dispute of material fact over whether she could have performed the
essential functions of her job with a reasonable accommodation. At the time
NaphCare terminated her, Eagleman had just exhausted the leave that NaphCare
designated under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) and had informed
NaphCare of her need for additional time off through two separate doctor’s notes:
first, through May 5, 2022, and second, through June 6, 2022. After forwarding
the second note to NaphCare, Eagleman emailed her supervisor stating that she had
attempted to call but nobody was available to speak with her.
NaphCare’s response to receiving the doctor’s note was to discuss internally
whether it was legally required to hold Eagleman’s position open, and then to
terminate her. The district court concluded that Eagleman was not a qualified
individual because she ultimately underwent wrist surgery post-termination and
was not cleared to return to work until January 2023. But, construing the evidence
in the light most favorable to Eagleman, neither party anticipated these events
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when NaphCare fired her. In fact, prior to her termination, Eagleman
demonstrated her eagerness to return by calling daily to check in on jail operations.
On this record, a reasonable jury could find that Eagleman could have performed
the essential functions of her position with the reasonable accommodation of
additional leave.
2. Eagleman’s failure-to-accommodate claim likewise presents triable issues of
fact. Section 12940(m)(1) makes it unlawful for an employer to fail to provide
reasonable accommodations for an employee’s known disability, unless the
employer shows that doing so would create undue hardship. Cal. Gov’t Code
§ 12940(m)(1). Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Eagleman, it
appears that at the time NaphCare terminated her, she had made a finite request for
additional time off: approximately one more month of non-FMLA leave, with a
scheduled return date of June 6, 2022. Whether that request should instead be
characterized as “indefinite,” as NaphCare argues it should because Eagleman had
previously requested a leave extension, is a disputed material factual question that
is properly resolved by a jury.
Moreover, by finding that “Eagleman did not present NaphCare with any
possible accommodations other than continued leave,” the district court failed to
recognize that continued leave can itself be a reasonable accommodation under
FEHA, provided that it “is likely to be effective in allowing the employee to return
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to work at the end of the leave.” See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 11068(c). Eagleman
presented evidence that she requested further leave as an accommodation, that she
expected to return to work after a finite period of additional leave, and that
NaphCare terminated her instead of meaningfully considering her request. A
reasonable jury could therefore conclude that NaphCare failed to reasonably
accommodate Eagleman. And with NaphCare’s general assertions that holding
Eagleman’s position open was burdensome, there is an additional dispute of
material fact on the question of undue hardship.
3. Eagleman’s retaliation claim also survives summary judgment. The district
court erred by describing the elements of retaliation under section 12940(h) as
“substantially the same” as the elements of a section 12940(a) discrimination
claim. The district court used this characterization to carry over the “qualified
individual” requirement from discrimination to retaliation and then to dispose of
Eagleman’s retaliation claim on the same grounds that it denied her discrimination
and failure-to-accommodate claims: that she is not a qualified individual.
The district court’s reading conflates two distinct FEHA claims. While
disability discrimination under section 12940(a) requires a disability, qualification,
and an adverse action because of the disability, retaliation requires (1) a protected
activity, (2) an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link between them.
Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a); Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 116 P.3d 1123, 1130
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(Cal. 2005); see also Flores v. City of Westminster, 873 F.3d 739, 748 (9th Cir.
2017). Requesting an accommodation is a protected activity under FEHA
“regardless of whether the request was granted.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(m)(2).
There is record evidence that NaphCare began planning Eagleman’s
termination before her FMLA-designated leave expired and after she requested an
additional month of non-FMLA leave. Then, the day after her FMLA-designated
leave expired, NaphCare officially terminated her. Viewed in Eagleman’s favor,
the evidence and timing of NaphCare’s internal discussions create material triable
issues of fact on causation and pretext.
4. Finally, the district court erred in granting summary judgment to NaphCare
on Eagleman’s claim that NaphCare failed to engage in the interactive process.
Section 12940(n) makes it unlawful for an employer “to engage in a timely, good
faith, interactive process” in response to an employee’s accommodation request.
Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(n); see also Wilson v. County of Orange, 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d
439, 445 (Ct. App. 2009). The employee bears the burden to initiate the interactive
process, including to “specifically identify the disability and resulting limitations,
and to suggest the reasonable accommodations,” “unless the disability and
resulting limitations are obvious.” Scotch v. Art Inst., 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 338, 360–61
(Ct. App. 2009); see also Kaur v. Foster Poultry Farms LLC, 299 Cal. Rptr. 3d
433, 453 (Ct. App. 2022) (“The employee must initiate the process unless his or
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her disability and the resulting limitations are obvious. Once initiated, the
employer has a continuous obligation to engage in the interactive process in good
faith.” (citation omitted)). As with retaliation, a failure-to-engage claim does not
require the employee to be a qualified individual. Compare Cal. Gov’t Code §
12940(n), with id. subsec. (a).
Whether Eagleman’s disability and resulting limitations were obvious is a
disputed question of material fact. Regardless, Eagleman initiated the interactive
process by informing NaphCare of her disability and suggesting an
accommodation in the form of additional leave. NaphCare was therefore obligated
to engage in a dialogue about possible accommodations once it knew Eagleman
had a disability and had requested additional time off. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, §
11068(c). Instead, NaphCare’s internal communications show that the company
coordinated to terminate her the day after her designated FMLA leave ended.
Because a reasonable jury could find that NaphCare failed to engage in a timely,
good faith interactive process and that this failure caused harm to Eagleman,
summary judgment on Eagleman’s failure-to-engage claim was improper.
REVERSED and REMANDED.1
1
Eagleman’s claim for punitive damages and assertion of judicial estoppel remain
for the district court to address on remand in the first instance.
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