Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 20 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT SALLY EAGLEMAN, No. 24-5666 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 8:23-cv-00673-JWH-JDE v. MEMORANDUM* NAPHCARE, INC., an Alabama Stock Corporation, Defendant - Appellee, DOES, 1 through 10, inclusive, Defendant. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Central District of California John W. Holcomb, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted October 29, 2026 Pasadena, California Before: PAEZ, OWENS, and SANCHEZ, Circuit Judges. Sally Eagleman (“Eagleman”) appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to NaphCare, Inc. (“NaphCare”) on Eagleman’s four claims under the * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. California Fair Employment and Housing Act (“FEHA”): disability discrimination, failure to accommodate, retaliation, and failure to engage in the interactive process. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we reverse and remand. We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment, viewing the evidence and drawing all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Branch Banking & Tr. Co. v. D.M.S.I., LLC, 871 F.3d 751, 759 (9th Cir. 2017). 1. The district court erred in granting summary judgment to NaphCare on Eagleman’s disability discrimination claim. To make a prima facie case for disability discrimination under FEHA, Eagleman must show that she (1) suffered from a disability, (2) was otherwise qualified to do her job, with or without reasonable accommodation, and (3) was subjected to an adverse employment action because of her disability. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a); Green v. State, 165 P.3d 118, 122–23 (Cal. 2007). Eagleman bears the burden of proving that she could perform the essential duties of her job with or without reasonable accommodation. Green, 165 P.3d at 123. Because the parties agree that Eagleman is disabled, her discrimination claim turns on whether she is a qualified individual under the statute. To be a qualified individual, an employee must satisfy two criteria: first, she must possess “the requisite skill, experience, education, and other job-related requirements”; and 2 24-5666 second, she must be able to perform the essential functions of the job, with or without reasonable accommodation. Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 11065(o). It is undisputed that Eagleman satisfies the first requirement. Therefore, the central question is whether she can perform the essential functions of her job, with or without reasonable accommodation. Id. Viewed in the light most favorable to Eagleman, the record evidence creates a genuine dispute of material fact over whether she could have performed the essential functions of her job with a reasonable accommodation. At the time NaphCare terminated her, Eagleman had just exhausted the leave that NaphCare designated under the Family and Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) and had informed NaphCare of her need for additional time off through two separate doctor’s notes: first, through May 5, 2022, and second, through June 6, 2022. After forwarding the second note to NaphCare, Eagleman emailed her supervisor stating that she had attempted to call but nobody was available to speak with her. NaphCare’s response to receiving the doctor’s note was to discuss internally whether it was legally required to hold Eagleman’s position open, and then to terminate her. The district court concluded that Eagleman was not a qualified individual because she ultimately underwent wrist surgery post-termination and was not cleared to return to work until January 2023. But, construing the evidence in the light most favorable to Eagleman, neither party anticipated these events 3 24-5666 when NaphCare fired her. In fact, prior to her termination, Eagleman demonstrated her eagerness to return by calling daily to check in on jail operations. On this record, a reasonable jury could find that Eagleman could have performed the essential functions of her position with the reasonable accommodation of additional leave. 2. Eagleman’s failure-to-accommodate claim likewise presents triable issues of fact. Section 12940(m)(1) makes it unlawful for an employer to fail to provide reasonable accommodations for an employee’s known disability, unless the employer shows that doing so would create undue hardship. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(m)(1). Viewing the record in the light most favorable to Eagleman, it appears that at the time NaphCare terminated her, she had made a finite request for additional time off: approximately one more month of non-FMLA leave, with a scheduled return date of June 6, 2022. Whether that request should instead be characterized as “indefinite,” as NaphCare argues it should because Eagleman had previously requested a leave extension, is a disputed material factual question that is properly resolved by a jury. Moreover, by finding that “Eagleman did not present NaphCare with any possible accommodations other than continued leave,” the district court failed to recognize that continued leave can itself be a reasonable accommodation under FEHA, provided that it “is likely to be effective in allowing the employee to return 4 24-5666 to work at the end of the leave.” See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 11068(c). Eagleman presented evidence that she requested further leave as an accommodation, that she expected to return to work after a finite period of additional leave, and that NaphCare terminated her instead of meaningfully considering her request. A reasonable jury could therefore conclude that NaphCare failed to reasonably accommodate Eagleman. And with NaphCare’s general assertions that holding Eagleman’s position open was burdensome, there is an additional dispute of material fact on the question of undue hardship. 3. Eagleman’s retaliation claim also survives summary judgment. The district court erred by describing the elements of retaliation under section 12940(h) as “substantially the same” as the elements of a section 12940(a) discrimination claim. The district court used this characterization to carry over the “qualified individual” requirement from discrimination to retaliation and then to dispose of Eagleman’s retaliation claim on the same grounds that it denied her discrimination and failure-to-accommodate claims: that she is not a qualified individual. The district court’s reading conflates two distinct FEHA claims. While disability discrimination under section 12940(a) requires a disability, qualification, and an adverse action because of the disability, retaliation requires (1) a protected activity, (2) an adverse employment action, and (3) a causal link between them. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(a); Yanowitz v. L’Oreal USA, Inc., 116 P.3d 1123, 1130 5 24-5666 (Cal. 2005); see also Flores v. City of Westminster, 873 F.3d 739, 748 (9th Cir. 2017). Requesting an accommodation is a protected activity under FEHA “regardless of whether the request was granted.” Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(m)(2). There is record evidence that NaphCare began planning Eagleman’s termination before her FMLA-designated leave expired and after she requested an additional month of non-FMLA leave. Then, the day after her FMLA-designated leave expired, NaphCare officially terminated her. Viewed in Eagleman’s favor, the evidence and timing of NaphCare’s internal discussions create material triable issues of fact on causation and pretext. 4. Finally, the district court erred in granting summary judgment to NaphCare on Eagleman’s claim that NaphCare failed to engage in the interactive process. Section 12940(n) makes it unlawful for an employer “to engage in a timely, good faith, interactive process” in response to an employee’s accommodation request. Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(n); see also Wilson v. County of Orange, 87 Cal. Rptr. 3d 439, 445 (Ct. App. 2009). The employee bears the burden to initiate the interactive process, including to “specifically identify the disability and resulting limitations, and to suggest the reasonable accommodations,” “unless the disability and resulting limitations are obvious.” Scotch v. Art Inst., 93 Cal. Rptr. 3d 338, 360–61 (Ct. App. 2009); see also Kaur v. Foster Poultry Farms LLC, 299 Cal. Rptr. 3d 433, 453 (Ct. App. 2022) (“The employee must initiate the process unless his or 6 24-5666 her disability and the resulting limitations are obvious. Once initiated, the employer has a continuous obligation to engage in the interactive process in good faith.” (citation omitted)). As with retaliation, a failure-to-engage claim does not require the employee to be a qualified individual. Compare Cal. Gov’t Code § 12940(n), with id. subsec. (a). Whether Eagleman’s disability and resulting limitations were obvious is a disputed question of material fact. Regardless, Eagleman initiated the interactive process by informing NaphCare of her disability and suggesting an accommodation in the form of additional leave. NaphCare was therefore obligated to engage in a dialogue about possible accommodations once it knew Eagleman had a disability and had requested additional time off. See Cal. Code Regs. tit. 2, § 11068(c). Instead, NaphCare’s internal communications show that the company coordinated to terminate her the day after her designated FMLA leave ended. Because a reasonable jury could find that NaphCare failed to engage in a timely, good faith interactive process and that this failure caused harm to Eagleman, summary judgment on Eagleman’s failure-to-engage claim was improper. REVERSED and REMANDED.1 1 Eagleman’s claim for punitive damages and assertion of judicial estoppel remain for the district court to address on remand in the first instance. 7 24-5666