Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FILED FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT NOV 19 2026 JAMES EDWARD SCOTT III, No. 25-6843 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS Plaintiff - Appellee, D.C. No. v. 3:23-cv-00231-ART-CLB MELISSA MICHELL; GAYLENE MEMORANDUM* FUKAGAWA; KELLEN NOMURA PROST; VANESSA TIMBREZA; LORENZO VILLEGAS, Defendants - Appellants, RN SHARON, Dismissed per ECF No. 5, WATERS, Dismissed per ECF No. 5, MALLORY ETCHISON, updated name ref. #28 Order, MEGHAN SULLIVAN, Dismissed per ECF No. 5, CINDY PERTNEY, Dismissed per ECF No. 5, JOHN WESTON, Dismissed per ECF No. 5, MIKE MINEV, Dismissed per ECF No. 5, JOHN KEASE, Dismissed per ECF No. 5, MCKENZIE, Dismissed per ECF No. 5, Sgt. KLEYMANN, Dismissed per ECF No. 5, Defendants. * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada Anne R. Traum, District Judge, Presiding Submitted November 17, 2026** San Francisco, California Before: S.R. THOMAS, FRIEDLAND, and BRESS, Circuit Judges. James Scott, a former inmate in the custody of the Nevada Department of Corrections (“NDOC”), sued a group of NDOC prison nurses (“Defendants”) under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging an Eighth Amendment violation. The district court denied summary judgment on qualified immunity grounds. Because the parties are familiar with the factual and procedural history of the case, we need not recount it here. We dismiss for lack of appellate jurisdiction. Orders denying qualified immunity are effectively final and are subject to appeal under the collateral order doctrine. Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 530 (1985). Interlocutory appellate jurisdiction over a district court’s denial of qualified immunity is proper only “to the extent that it turns on an issue of law.” Id. Whether we may exercise jurisdiction over an order denying qualified immunity thus “turns on the nature of the defendant’s argument on appeal.” Est. of Anderson v. Marsh, 985 F.3d 726, 731 (9th Cir. 2021). “A district court’s determination that the parties’ evidence presents genuine issues of material fact is categorically 2 unreviewable on interlocutory appeal.” Eng v. Cooley, 552 F.3d 1062, 1067 (9th Cir. 2009). Defendants dispute whether there was sufficient evidence for the district court to find that the delay in treatment was taken in conscious disregard of an excessive risk to Scott’s health. Our interlocutory appellate jurisdiction over a district court’s denial of qualified immunity is limited to “resolving a defendant’s purely legal contention that his or her conduct did not violate the Constitution and, in any event, did not violate clearly established law.” Est. of Anderson, 985 F.3d at 731 (citation modified). We cannot “accede to [Defendants’] request that we review [the district court’s] evidence-sufficiency determination on appeal.” Id. Although we would have jurisdiction to hear a purely legal argument, Defendants “have not advanced an argument as to why the law is not clearly established that takes the facts in the light most favorable to” Scott. George v. Morris, 736 F.3d 829, 837 (9th Cir. 2013). Defendants instead argue that, on their version of the facts, they did not violate clearly established law. Defendants’ efforts to characterize factual disputes as a legal argument do “not give rise to appellate jurisdiction.” Singh v. City of Phoenix, 124 F.4th 746, 756 (9th Cir. 2024) (emphasis omitted). 3 Moreover, many of Defendants’ arguments were not “raised sufficiently for the trial court to rule on [them].” In re E.R. Fegert, Inc., 887 F.2d 955, 957 (9th Cir. 1989). We decline to consider arguments raised for the first time on appeal, and not presented to the district court. See Villanueva v. California, 986 F.3d 1158, 1164 n.4 (9th Cir. 2021). These arguments include the contention that there was no deliberate indifference because Defendants lacked personal participation in Scott’s examination and had no control over Scott receiving a thrombectomy. DISMISSED. 4