Ling v. City of Los Angeles
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledSeptember 24, 2026
Docket25-249
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
FOR PUBLICATION
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
United States of America ex rel. Ms. No. 25-249
MEI LING,
D.C. No.
2:11-cv-00974-
Plaintiff - Appellant,
JFW-JC
and
OPINION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA;
FAIR HOUSING COUNCIL OF
THE SAN FERNANDO VALLEY,
Plaintiffs - Appellees,
v.
CITY OF LOS ANGELES, a
municipal corporation,
Defendant - Appellee,
and
CALIFORNIA AND COMMUNITY
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF
THE CITY OF LOS ANGELES,
CRA - LA, a Designated Local
Authority, a public entity,
Defendants.
2 LING V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of California
Philip S. Gutierrez, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted April 23, 2026
Pasadena, California
Filed September 24, 2026
Before: Stephen A. Higginson, Jacqueline H. Nguyen, and
Daniel A. Bress, Circuit Judges. *
Opinion by Judge Nguyen
SUMMARY **
False Claims Act
The panel affirmed the district court’s order approving
the settlement of a qui tam action brought under the False
Claims Act (“FCA”) by relators Mei Ling and Fair Housing
Council of the San Fernando Valley against the City of Los
Angeles regarding misrepresentations by the City about its
compliance with federal housing accessibility laws.
The United States intervened and proceeded with the
suit. After years of litigation, the government, the Fair
*
The Honorable Stephen A. Higginson, United States Circuit Judge for
the Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.
**
This summary constitutes no part of the opinion of the court. It has
been prepared by court staff for the convenience of the reader.
LING V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 3
Housing Council, and the City agreed to settle the FCA
claims for $38,266,989, and the district court approved the
settlement as fair, adequate, and reasonable. Separately, the
City resolved a related investigation by the Department of
Housing and Urban Development into the City’s
noncompliance with federal housing accessibility laws
through a voluntary compliance agreement (“VCA”). Under
the VCA, the City would spend at least $200 million over
ten years to remediate or build accessible housing. The
VCA explicitly carved out any claims asserted in the FCA
action.
Relators such as Ling are entitled to a share of any
recovery in an FCA action if the government intervenes and
proceeds with the action. Ling’s entitlement to a share of the
FAC settlement was not in dispute.
Under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(5), relators are also entitled
to a share if the government “elects to pursue its claim
through any alternate remedy.” The panel held that the VCA
redressing the City’s violations of federal housing
accessibility laws was not an alternate remedy. Agreeing
with other circuits, the panel held that § 3730(c)(5) assumes
that an alternate remedy takes the place of the FCA suit. The
panel concluded that under the circumstances of this case,
the VCA did not take the place of the FCA suit or settlement,
and so the VCA was not an alternate remedy. The panel
therefore affirmed the district court’s approval of the FCA
settlement as fair, adequate, and reasonable.
The panel addressed additional issues in a
simultaneously-filed memorandum disposition.
4 LING V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
COUNSEL
Mick G. Harrison (argued), Attorney at Law, Bloomington,
Indiana; Bruce Leichty, Bruce Leichty APC, Temecula,
California; for Plaintiff–Appellant.
Steven A. Myers (argued), Michael S. Raab, Wesley J.
Heath, and Charles W. Scarborough, Attorneys, Appellate
Staff, Civil Division; Brett A. Shumate, Assistant Attorney
General; United States Department of Justice, Washington,
D.C.; Karen Paik, Assistant United States Attorney; Bilal A.
Essayli, United States Attorney; Office of the United States
Attorney, United States Department of Justice, Los Angeles,
California; Donald R. Warren (argued), Warren Benson Law
Group, San Diego, California; Phillip E. Benson, Warren
Benson Law Group, Newport Beach, California; David
Iyalomhe, Law Offices of Iyalomhe & Associates, Los
Angeles, California; for Plaintiffs-Appellees.
Shaun D. Jacobs, Supervising Assistant City Attorney;
Kathleen A. Kenealy, Chief Assistant City Attorney; Denise
C. Mills, Chief Deputy City Attorney; Hydee F. Soto, City
Attorney; Los Angeles City Attorney's Office, Los Angeles,
California; for Defendant–Appellee.
LING V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 5
OPINION
NGUYEN, Circuit Judge:
Under the False Claims Act (“FCA”), private parties
may bring an action on behalf of the United States (a “qui
tam” action) against anyone who has defrauded the
government. Private litigants pursuing the government’s
interest in such an action—i.e., the “relators”—are entitled
to a share of any recovery in the action if the government
intervenes and proceeds with the action. 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(d). The relators are also entitled to a share if the
government “elect[s] to pursue its claim through any
alternate remedy.” Id. § 3730(c)(5).
Here, Mei Ling and Fair Housing Council of the San
Fernando Valley (“FHC”) brought a qui tam action against
the City of Los Angeles (the “City”) regarding
misrepresentations by the City about its compliance with
federal housing accessibility laws. The United States (the
“Government”) later intervened and proceeded with the suit.
After years of litigation, the Government, FHC, and the City
agreed to settle the FCA claims for $38,266,989. The district
court approved this settlement as fair, adequate, and
reasonable. Id. § 3730(c)(2)(B). Ling’s entitlement to a
share of this settlement is not in dispute.
Separately, the City resolved a related investigation by
the Department of Housing and Urban Development
(“HUD”) into the City’s noncompliance with federal
housing accessibility laws through a voluntary compliance
agreement (“VCA”). Under the VCA, the City would spend
at least $200 million over ten years to remediate or build
accessible housing. The VCA explicitly carved out any
claims asserted in this FCA action.
6 LING V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Ling appeals the approval of the settlement of the FCA
claims, and her appeal turns on the construction of the phrase
“pursue its claim through any alternate remedy.” Id.
§ 3730(c)(5). We address whether the VCA redressing the
City’s violations of federal housing accessibility laws
constitutes an alternate remedy under the FCA. We hold that
under these circumstances, the VCA was not an alternate
remedy. We affirm the district court’s approval of the FCA
settlement as fair, adequate, and reasonable. 1
I.
HUD cannot provide housing funds to a local
government until that local government certifies that it will
comply with certain civil rights laws, including Section 504
of the Rehabilitation Act, the Fair Housing Act, and Title II
of the Americans with Disabilities Act. These laws all
require accessible housing for people with disabilities. From
February 2005 to December 2018, the City received millions
of dollars in federal housing program grants from HUD.
The FCA imposes liability on anyone who “knowingly
presents, or causes to be presented, a false or fraudulent
claim” to the Government “for payment or approval.” 31
U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A). A private party, called a “relator,”
may bring a qui tam action on the Government’s behalf. See
id. § 3730(b)(1).
In February 2011, Ling and FHC filed the underlying
action against the City, alleging that the City violated the
1
Ling also appeals the denials of her 1) motion for an evidentiary
hearing and limited discovery and 2) motion to alter or amend the
judgment. We address these arguments, and Ling’s request for
sanctions, in a memorandum disposition filed simultaneously with this
opinion.
LING V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 7
FCA through its receipt of federal housing funds despite
repeated misrepresentations to HUD that the City was in
compliance with federal housing accessibility laws. 2 The
Government intervened in July 2017, and filed an amended
complaint in December 2018. See id. § 3730(b)(2) (“[T]he
Government may elect to intervene and proceed with the
action. . . .”).
A. HUD Investigation and the VCA
In 2011, HUD initiated a separate investigation into the
City’s noncompliance with housing accessibility
requirements in Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, Title
II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Fair
Housing Act. HUD’s review revealed “certain deficiencies
related to the physical accessibility of certain designated
accessible units and public and common areas of certain
developments that were surveyed, as well as certain
deficiencies in policies and procedures.” In January 2012,
HUD issued a Letter of Findings of non-compliance and
issued a Letter of Determination in February 2012.
In September 2016, the City’s officials sent a letter to the
HUD Secretary, stating they:
appreciate your offer to have our
representatives meet with your staff in
Washington to discuss the challenges with
the offset arrangement that was initially
proposed by the Government, and to examine
other options. As we discussed at our
meeting, the City is prepared to enter into a
2
Ling and FHC also sued the Community Redevelopment Agency of the
City of Los Angeles (“CRA”) but subsequently reached a separate
settlement agreement resolving all claims against CRA.
8 LING V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
Voluntary Compliance Agreement (“VCA”)
with HUD that would resolve allegations of
the City’s past non-compliance with [federal
housing accessibility laws]. To enter into a
VCA, the City must also settle the related
False Claims Act (“FCA”) action involving
the U.S. Department of Justice (“DOJ”).
The City noted that “until a few weeks ago, we thought we
were on the verge of a settlement agreement, under which
DOJ, through HUD, would allow $92 million of DOJ’s
calculated actual damages for the FCA claims to be used to
carry out the remediation of thousands of the City’s housing
units.”
Following HUD’s referral of the matter to the DOJ for
potential further enforcement in September 2017, the City
asked to restart settlement negotiations with HUD. The DOJ
deferred jurisdiction, and HUD issued a supplemental Letter
of Findings in April 2019 and a Letter of Determination
“sustaining the findings” in May 2019. In July 2019, HUD
notified the City that it intended to withhold approximately
$80 million in federal housing funds. The next month, the
City and HUD entered into a VCA to resolve the City’s civil
rights violations.
Under the VCA, the City agreed to “carry out a
program,” financed by both federal and nonfederal funds, to
remediate or build accessible housing “with a value that
averages a minimum of $20 million per year” for ten years.
Although the VCA resolved the City’s civil rights violations,
it specifically excluded the Government’s FCA claims:
This Agreement does not, and shall not be
construed to, resolve any claims that have
LING V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 9
been or could be asserted in United States ex
rel. Mei Ling, et al. v. City of Los Angeles, et
al., No. CV-11-00974-PSG-JC (CDCA filed
Feb. 1, 2011), or any other claims that the
Department of Housing and Urban
Development or the U.S. Department of
Justice has or may have under the Fa[lse]
Claims Act.
B. The Settlement of the FCA Claims
Litigation continued in this FCA action after the City and
HUD entered into the VCA. Specifically, the Government
and the City engaged in voluminous fact discovery until
November 2023, and on March 1, 2024, the City moved for
summary judgment.
At pre-trial mediation on March 5, 2024, the City offered
a settlement amount to the Government. Following
mediation, the parties negotiated and agreed on written terms
for a settlement, which multiple levels of DOJ and City
officials approved. In May 2024, the Government shared a
copy of the not-yet-signed settlement with Ling. In June
2024, the Government, FHC, and the City executed the
settlement for $38,266,989. The Government, FHC, and the
City subsequently moved for settlement approval, to which
Ling objected.
In August 2024, the district court held a fairness hearing
on the settlement, and approved the settlement. Pursuant to
the settlement, the district court dismissed all claims against
the City in October 2024, and recognized that Ling and FHC
would “receive at least 15 percent but not more than 25
percent” of the settlement’s proceeds. Ling timely appealed.
10 LING V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
II.
We review the district court’s interpretation of the FCA
de novo, United States ex rel. Mateski v. Raytheon Co., 816
F.3d 565, 568 (9th Cir. 2016), including “the proper
construction of the phrase ‘pursue[s] its claim through any
alternate remedy,’” United States ex rel. Barajas v. United
States, 258 F.3d 1004, 1006 (9th Cir. 2001) (quoting 31
U.S.C. § 3730(c)(5)) (alteration in original).
The FCA’s requirement “that the proposed settlement is
fair, adequate, and reasonable under all the circumstances”
mirrors the language in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23
governing class action settlements. Compare 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(c)(2)(B) with Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2) (“If the
proposal would bind class members, the court may approve
it . . . only on finding that it is fair, reasonable, and
adequate. . . .”). We review approval of class action
settlements for abuse of discretion. Briseño v. Henderson,
998 F.3d 1014, 1022 (9th Cir. 2021). Although “differences
exist between qui tam suits and class actions, we see no
reason to apply a different standard of appellate review to
the approval of [FCA] settlements. . . .” United States ex rel.
Robinson v. HealthNet Inc., 124 F.4th 511, 519 (7th Cir.
2024). We therefore review the district court’s approval of
an FCA settlement for abuse of discretion. 3
III.
We first address Ling’s argument that the VCA was an
“alternate remedy” and then consider whether the district
court abused its discretion in approving the FCA settlement.
3
The parties also agree on abuse of discretion as the standard of review.
See Robinson, 124 F.4th at 519 (“[N]or has any party advocated for a
different standard.”).
LING V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 11
A. An “alternate remedy” takes the place of the FCA
suit.
Under the FCA, the relator is entitled to a share of the
monetary recovery in the suit. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d).
But:
the Government may elect to pursue its claim
through any alternate remedy available to the
Government, including any administrative
proceeding to determine a civil money
penalty. If any such alternate remedy is
pursued in another proceeding, the person
initiating the action shall have the same rights
in such proceedings as such person would
have had if the action had continued under
this section.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(5) (“alternate remedy provision”). By
stating that the relator has the same rights to alternate
remedies as they “would have had if the action had
continued under this section,” see id. (emphasis added), the
alternate remedy provision assumes an alternate remedy
takes the place of the FCA suit.
Our sister circuits have recognized as much. The Fifth
Circuit, analyzing the same provision, explained that
“[c]learly, this language protects the rights of the relators
once the Government elects to pursue an alternate remedy
and ‘assumes that the original qui tam action did not
continue.’” United States ex rel. Babalola v. Sharma, 746
F.3d 157, 161–62 (5th Cir. 2014) (quoting United States ex
rel. LaCorte v. Wagner, 185 F.3d 188, 192 (4th Cir. 1999)).
The Fourth Circuit similarly held that the alternate remedy
provision “preserves the rights of the original qui tam
12 LING V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
plaintiffs when the government resorts to an alternate
remedy in place of the original action.” LaCorte, 185 F.3d
at 191 (emphasis added). The court reasoned that the
statutory language “assumes that the original qui tam action
did not continue.” Id. at 192. Thus, the Fourth Circuit held
that a settlement in another qui tam action was not an
alternate remedy to relators’ separate qui tam action because
“Section 3730(c)(5) simply preserves the rights of the
original qui tam plaintiffs when the government resorts to an
alternate remedy in place of the original action.” Id. at 191.
There, the Government “intervened in the [relators’ qui tam]
action, prosecuted it, and settled it with the[ir] consent.” Id.
at 192. In Barajas, we similarly indicated that “the
government can, and sometimes does, seek a remedy in such
[an alternative] proceeding that effectively takes the place of
the FCA remedy.” 258 F.3d at 1011.
Because an alternate remedy takes the place of the FCA
suit, generally an alternate remedy involves another
proceeding in lieu of the FCA suit. That said, there may be
scenarios where the FCA suit proceeds by an alternate
remedy and “effectively takes the place of the FCA remedy,”
id., even where the FCA suit remains ongoing. Whether or
not a remedy takes the place of the FCA suit can therefore
involves a fact-intensive evaluation. Under some
circumstances, there could be issues of collusion or bad
faith, which are relevant to whether a remedy took the place
of the FCA suit.
LING V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 13
B. Under these circumstances, the VCA did not take
the place of the FCA suit or settlement so the VCA
is not an alternate remedy.
The district court was correct that the VCA here was not
an alternate remedy because it did not “take[] the place of
the FCA remedy.” See id. at 1011; 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(5).
Ling relies heavily on Barajas to argue that the VCA is
an alternate remedy, but Barajas is easily distinguishable
from this case. In Barajas, the relator filed two qui tam
actions. 258 F.3d at 1006. The first suit alleged that
defendant Northrop engaged in “falsified and incomplete
testing” of flight data transmitters. Id. at 1006–07. The
second suit alleged that the transmitters delivered to the
Government also suffered from defective damping fluid. Id.
at 1007–08. The Government intervened and settled the first
action, releasing Northrop from liability for “all FCA claims,
civil or administrative monetary actions or claims, and
actions or claims by the United States for restitution related
to the claims in that action.” Id. at 1008 (citation modified).
We affirmed the dismissal of the second suit as barred by
claim preclusion “because it arose out of the same
transactional nucleus” as the first, settled action. Id. at 1009
(citation modified ). Outside of either litigation, Northrop
and the Air Force entered into an agreement under which
Northrop would provide transmitters with nondefective
damping fluid to the Government and “cash payments” in
exchange for the AirForce not pursuing administrative
proceedings to suspend or disbar Northrop as a government
contractor. Id. at 1006, 1008.
We acknowledged that a suspension or debarment
proceeding “rarely will be” an alternate remedy under the
FCA. Id. at 1012. But under the circumstances of that case,
14 LING V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
we held the agreement with the AirForce was an alternate
remedy. Id. at 1012–13. We explained that “the government
pursued its suspension or debarment proceeding against
Northrop, ultimately obtaining the Air Force Agreement . . .
because claim preclusion was not a defense to [that]
proceeding . . . .” Id. at 1012. The Government was thus
“able to escape the consequence of its settlement of the first
action by pursuing that alternative.” Id. “The notable
consequence of this sequence [of events] is that the
government now hopes to avoid paying Barajas the relator’s
share to which he would have been entitled if his second
action had been permitted to go forward to a successful
conclusion.” Id. at 1012–13 (emphasis added).
Unlike Barajas, the Government and Ling were not
precluded from continuing this action because of the VCA.
Instead, this “action [was] permitted to go forward to a
successful conclusion”: a $38 million settlement. See id.
The parties also explicitly carved out the FCA claims in the
VCA, stating that it:
does not, and shall not be construed to,
resolve any claims that have been or could be
asserted in United States ex rel. Mei Ling, et
al. v. City of Los Angeles, et al., No. CV-11-
00974-PSG-JC (CDCA filed Feb. 1, 2011),
or any other claims that the Department of
Urban Development or the U.S. Department
of Justice has or may have under the Fal[se]
Claims Act.
This language is in stark contrast to the language of the
agreement in Barajas. There, the agreement with the Air
Force “appear[ed] to have explicitly taken into account the
LING V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 15
overlap with the remedy [the relator] sought in his second
action” by “specifically provid[ing] that it could be used by
Northrop ‘in any civil proceeding in which Northrop
attempts to obtain appropriate credit for funds paid or value
received pursuant to this Agreement.’” Barajas, 258 F.3d at
1011. “The obvious ‘civil proceeding’ in which Northrop
would have been able to receive ‘appropriate credit for funds
paid or value received’ was, of course, [the] second qui tam
action, in which [relator] sought a remedy for precisely the
same problem . . . for which the Agreement provided a
remedy.” Id. Whereas here, the VCA did not “overlap
with,” and instead carved out, the FCA claims and the
remedies sought through it. See id. at 1011.
Significantly, the purposes of the VCA and FCA
settlement were different. The VCA did not seek to remedy
the fraud against the Government. It sought relief for the
City’s underlying civil rights violations: failure to comply
with accessible housing requirements. In contrast, the FCA
settlement resolves the allegations that the City falsely
certified that it had complied with those obligations. The
alternate remedy provision states “the Government may
elect to pursue its claim through any alternate remedy
available,” and the “claim” referred to in the provision is the
false claim under the FCA. See 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(5); see
generally id. § 3730 (titled “Civil actions for false claims”).
As the D.C. Circuit explained, where “[t]he government’s
separate enforcement action” does “not involve the type of
claim cognizable under the False Claims Act,” the action
does not implicate the alternate remedy provision, so the
settlement of that action was not an alternate remedy. United
States ex rel. Kennedy v. Novo A/S, 5 F.4th 47, 49, 54 (D.C.
Cir. 2021). Even if “the underlying facts are similar to those
in the earlier-filed qui tam lawsuit,” “[t]he plain text of the
16 LING V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
False Claims Act confines qui tam plaintiffs to recoveries
only for claims seeking relief based on the type of fraud or
falsehoods covered by that statute.” Id. at 49. Similarly, the
VCA here resolves “a different legal claim altogether,
arising beyond the False Claims Act’s borders.” See id. at
56.
There was also no evidence of collusion or bad faith here
connected to any supposed effort to deprive the relator of the
fair share of her recovery. HUD and the City entered into
the VCA in August 2019, and litigation continued in this
case for five years after. The Government and City engaged
in voluminous fact discovery until November 2023, and the
City moved for summary judgment before the FCA
settlement was reached. Ultimately, the parties settled the
FCA claims only after years of extensive investigation and
negotiation. If the parties colluded and the VCA was
actually an alternate remedy effectively taking the place of
the remedy in this litigation, then we would have expected
the parties to settle the FCA claims shortly after entering the
VCA and for much less. But that was not the case here. The
active participation of an experienced mediator during the
settlement process further undermines any allegation of
collusion.
Ling is correct that an alternate remedy under the FCA
can involve nonmonetary value. We have held that because
the FCA does not define the term, “proceeds . . . need not
always consist of money or some tangible asset.” Barajas,
258 F.3d at 1013 (citation modified). We reasoned that “if
Northrop had not agreed to replace and repair the faulty
[transmitters] and replace the defective damping fluid, the
government would have had to pay to cure the problem. The
value of the ‘proceeds’ of the Air Force Agreement is
therefore the amount the government would have had to pay
LING V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 17
to Northrop . . . to cure the problem that Northrop agreed to
cure in the Agreement.” Id. at 1013.
The existence of such nonmonetary value, however, is
not sufficient to show an alternate remedy. The VCA’s
value here does not make it an alternate remedy. Under the
VCA, the City agreed to comply with its federal statutory
obligations by making accessible housing available. While
the City’s compliance with federal laws is a benefit to the
Government, this value redresses the City’s present
violations and prevents future violations of federal housing
accessibility laws. In contrast, the FCA settlement redresses
the City’s past fraud by misrepresenting compliance with
those laws and subsequently receiving federal funds. See
supra pp. 15–16. The agreement in Barajas is distinct
because it redressed the false claim at issue there: faulty
transmitters with defective damping fluid. See 258 F.3d at
1006–08. In that case, the defendant’s fraud was the delivery
of those transmitters to the Government, which was
redressed by the agreement to “replace and repair the faulty
[transmitters] and replace the defective damping fluid.” Id.
at 1013.
Relatedly, Ling contends that “[i]f the government
receives via the VCA the accessible housing it had bargained
for, at the expense of the City, neither the [G]overnment nor
the relators can expect to then proceed to recover in the FCA
case damages for that same government loss.” This
argument misconstrues the FCA claims’ purpose, which is
not to address the underlying accessible housing violations
but rather the City’s fraud in lying about those violations.
See supra pp. 15–16. As detailed in the operative complaint,
this action sought monetary damages and civil penalties for
FCA violations, monetary damages for the City’s negligent
misrepresentation to the Government, restitution for the
18 LING V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
City’s unjust enrichment, and monetary damages for the
Government’s payment by mistake. In contrast, the VCA
required remedial actions by the City to comply with federal
housing accessibility laws and ensure future housing
complied with those laws. The City’s remedial actions under
the VCA do not nullify the Government’s losses due to
misrepresentations, unjust enrichment, and payment by
mistake. Instead, the Government and relators recovered
those separate losses via the settlement.
Under these circumstances, the VCA did not take the
place of the FCA suit or FCA settlement. The VCA is
therefore not an alternate remedy.
C. The district court did not abuse its discretion
approving the FCA settlement because it is fair,
adequate, and reasonable.
“The Government may settle the [FCA] action with the
defendant notwithstanding the objections of the person
initiating the action if the court determines, after a hearing,
that the proposed settlement is fair, adequate, and reasonable
under all the circumstances.” 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(B).
Because “the injury [relators] assert is exclusively to the
Government,” the Government is afforded deference when
settling a qui tam case. See United States ex rel. Polansky v.
Exec. Health Res., Inc., 599 U.S. 419, 425 (2023); id. at 437–
48 (holding “the Government’s views are entitled to
substantial deference” in the context of dismissal because a
qui tam suit “is on behalf of and in the name of the
Government”).
Ling contends that the district court abused its discretion
by approving the settlement because it was a “significant
drop from the United States’ calculation of damages which
was more than $500 million” and “the City had previously
LING V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 19
offered the U.S. $100 million to settle.” But as the district
court noted in its order:
[T]he settlement arrives more than six years
later after extended litigation, expansive
discovery, and robust negotiations. The
previous offers, and the size of those offers,
were made in an entirely different context—
which explains the series of increased,
reduced, withdrawn, or amended offers. The
City’s willingness to vigorously defend this
case also provides insight into the
discrepancy in the amount and potential
strength of the City’s defense.
Ling acknowledges that the district court “referenced some
of the litigation issues” but contends “those issues and the
risks regarding them were known at the time the City made
its $100 million offer in 2016.”
The parties dispute that there even was a separate $100
million offer, and the evidence of such an offer is limited.
Whether or not such an offer existed is irrelevant, however,
because the Government represented at the fairness hearing
that it analyzed the total settlement amount through a
“benefit-of-the-bargain approach” that compared the value
of the City’s existing affordable housing to the value of the
affordable and accessible housing the City would have
developed had it complied with federal housing accessibility
laws. The Government represented that because “most of
the defects that have been identified [in this case] related to
the mobility issues,” it focused on the federal requirement
that at least five percent of the multifamily housing be
accessible for mobile impairment. Based on that approach,
20 LING V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
the Government calculated damages of $26,800,000 and
included a multiplier sum of $11,466,989.
Although this amount differed from the damages the
Government previously identified, the Government
“reserv[ed] its right to reconsider the calculation of damages
and the consideration of other appropriate damages
methodologies.” Crucially, the City “repeatedly told the
United States that each dollar it paid in settlement is a dollar
that it must find in its budget and cannot otherwise spend on
affordable, accessible housing, reducing homelessness, and
other public goods.” These “public policy consequences”
were entirely reasonable factors for the Government to
consider because “unlike with private plaintiffs, the
government’s interests are not confined to maximizing
recovery against the defendant.” See United States v.
Everglades Coll., Inc., 855 F.3d 1279, 1288 (11th Cir. 2017),
abrogated on other grounds by United States v. Republic of
Honduras, 75 F.4th 1288, 1289 (11th Cir. 2023).
Ling also argues “the litigation position of the U.S. had
improved since [2016] (having defeated the City’s motion to
dismiss),” and “the other parties did not offer evidence . . .
to prove what if any material changes or events had occurred
since the $100 million offer.”
But the parties did offer evidence. Although the district
court denied the City’s motion to dismiss, it observed that
“did not mean that the Government has already proven its
case.” The City argued at summary judgment that its
certifications of compliance with federal housing
accessibility laws were not material to HUD and that the
Government would fail to prove scienter or causation.
Because those are necessary elements of the FCA claims, the
district court found that even if the Government’s claims
LING V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES 21
survived summary judgment, “the Government faces an
onerous task to establish the FCA claims at trial.” The
Government also acknowledged that “[p]roceeding with the
case would require the parties to engage in long, complex,
and hard-fought litigation” and that costs would likely
increase “without any guarantee of greater reward.”
Contrary to Ling’s assertions, those arguments were not
“known at the time the City made its [alleged] $100 million
offer in 2016” because the City moved for summary
judgment in March 2024.
Additionally, the district court found that the parties
reached the settlement amount “after extensive investigation
and negotiation over the course of nine years and two
mediations.” That the approved settlement was the result of
mediation and discovery concluded before that mediation
are material changes since the alleged $100 million offer.
The district court’s conclusion that “[t]he previous offers,
and the size of those offers, were made in an entirely
different context—which explains the series of increased,
reduced, withdrawn, or amended offers,” was thus not
“illogical, implausible, or without support in inferences that
may be drawn from the record.” See Schoenberg v. Fed.
Bureau of Investigation, 2 F.4th 1270, 1275 (9th Cir. 2021)
(citation omitted).
Because “the very essence of a settlement is
compromise, a yielding of absolutes and an abandoning of
highest hopes,” Officers for Just. v. Civ. Serv. Comm’n of
SF, 688 F.2d 615, 624 (9th Cir. 1982) (citation modified),
and the Government is afforded deference when settling a
qui tam case, see Polansky, 599 U.S. at 425, 437, the district
court did not abuse its discretion approving the settlement
amount as fair, adequate, and reasonable.
22 LING V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES
IV.
We affirm the district court’s holding that the VCA was
not an alternate remedy and its approval of the FCA
settlement as fair, adequate, and reasonable.
AFFIRMED.