Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 12 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT RUSSELL JOHNSON; JENNY No. 26-1700 DONNELLY; HER VOICE MOVEMENT, D.C. No. INC., doing business as Tetelestai 2:25-cv-01874-BJR Ministries; ROBERT DONNELLY; ROSS JOHNSTON, MEMORANDUM* Plaintiffs - Appellants, v. CITY OF SEATTLE; BRUCE HARRELL, in his official capacity as Mayor of the City of Seattle, Washington; SHON BARNES, in his official capacity as Chief of Police for the Seattle Police Department, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington Barbara Jacobs Rothstein, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted October 26, 2026 Seattle, Washington Before: M. SMITH, CHRISTEN, and MILLER, Circuit Judges. Plaintiffs-Appellants Russell Johnson, Jenny Donnelly, Her Voice * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. Movement, Inc. d/b/a Tetelestai Ministries, Robert Donnelly, and Ross Johnston appeal the district court’s denial of their motion for a preliminary injunction. The district court held that Plaintiffs lacked Article III standing to enjoin Seattle’s permitting scheme because they failed to allege that the scheme would injure them in the future. Plaintiffs argue that they have standing because Seattle’s permitting scheme “vests unbridled discretion in the hands of governmental and non- governmental decision-makers.” We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1). Though we review the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction for abuse of discretion, we review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo. Calvary Chapel Dayton Valley v. Sisolak, 982 F.3d 1228, 1232 (9th Cir. 2020). We affirm. 1. “Article III of the Constitution confines the jurisdiction of federal courts to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Food & Drug Admin. v. All. for Hippocratic Med., 602 U.S. 367, 378 (2024). To satisfy the “case” or “controversy” requirement, a plaintiff must have standing to sue. Am. Encore v. Fontes, 152 F.4th 1097, 1109–10 (9th Cir. 2025). The “irreducible constitutional minimum” for standing requires injury-in-fact, causation, and a likelihood that the injury “will be redressed by a favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560–61 (1992) (cleaned up). To establish injury-in-fact, a plaintiff must demonstrate “an invasion of a legally protected interest that is concrete and particularized and actual or 2 26-1700 imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical.” Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 578 U.S. 330, 339 (2016) (cleaned up). “First Amendment cases raise unique standing considerations that tilt dramatically toward a finding of standing,” Lopez v. Candaele, 630 F.3d 775, 781 (9th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up), but “the mere existence of a proscriptive statute or a generalized threat of prosecution” does not “satisfy the case or controversy requirement,” Am. Encore, 152 F.4th at 1114 (cleaned up). Instead, “plaintiffs must still show an actual or imminent injury to a legally protected interest.” Lopez, 630 F.3d at 785. The district court correctly held that Plaintiffs lack standing to seek injunctive relief, a prospective remedy, because they have not alleged that Seattle’s permitting scheme will cause them future injury. See City of L.A. v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 110 (1983). Plaintiffs allege that they “will continue to suffer irreparable harm” and that scripture directs them to “do good,” “expose [unfruitful works of darkness],” and “open [their] mouth[s]” and “judge righteously.” But the complaint does not allege that Plaintiffs intend to seek another permit in Seattle or that they are otherwise censoring their actions in Seattle going forward. Though Plaintiffs alleged that they previously suffered harms from Seattle’s permitting scheme, “the past is relevant only insofar as it is a launching pad for a showing of imminent future injury.” Murthy v. Missouri, 603 U.S. 43, 59 (2024); see O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 495–96 (1974) (“Past exposure to illegal conduct does not in itself show a present 3 26-1700 case or controversy regarding injunctive relief . . . if unaccompanied by any continuing, present adverse effects.”). Accordingly, allegations of past injury do not compensate for the lack of any allegation that Seattle’s permitting scheme will harm Plaintiffs again in the future. 2. Plaintiffs argue that they have established standing for a facial challenge because they “need only allege the existence of . . . [a] permitting scheme that confers unbridled discretion . . . .” To be sure, “[t]he Supreme Court . . . has ‘long held that when a licensing statute allegedly vests unbridled discretion in a government official over whether to permit or deny expressive activity, one who is subject to the law may challenge it facially,’ even when that person has neither applied for nor been denied a license.” Seattle Affiliate of Oct. 22nd Coalition to Stop Police Brutality, Repression and Criminalization of a Generation v. City of Seattle, 550 F.3d 788, 794 (9th Cir. 2008) (quoting City of Lakewood v. Plain Dealer Publ’g Co., 486 U.S. 750, 755–56 (1988)). But litigants bringing facial challenges still must have a nexus to the challenged scheme because the first requirement “to bring a facial unbridled discretion challenge” is that “a plaintiff must satisfy the standing requirements of Article III by showing that the challenged provision or provisions apply to its conduct.” Kaahumanu v. Hawaii, 682 F.3d 789, 802 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). In pre-enforcement cases, a plaintiff meets constitutional standing requirements—regardless of whether the 4 26-1700 challenge is facial or as-applied—by “demonstrat[ing] a realistic danger of sustaining a direct injury as a result of the statute’s operation or enforcement.” Babbitt v. United Farm Workers Nat’l Union, 442 U.S. 289, 298 (1979). Plaintiffs have failed to do so here. Nor have Plaintiffs identified any case where the individuals bringing a facial challenge had standing despite their failure to show likelihood of imminent harm. Plaintiffs’ reliance on City of Lakewood is misplaced because, in that case, the plaintiff publisher of a daily local newspaper offered evidence at trial that it intended to place newsracks on city streets in violation of the challenged permitting scheme. See Plain Dealer Publ’g Co. v. City of Lakewood, 794 F.2d 1139, 1143 (6th Cir. 1986), aff’d, 486 U.S. 750. Plaintiffs’ reliance on Seattle Affiliate is likewise misplaced because the plaintiff there had held an annual protest several years consecutively on the exact same day and alleged that it would continue to do so, so there was no question it would be exposed in the future to the challenged parade ordinance. 550 F.3d at 791. Thus, without alleging a credible threat of injury, Plaintiffs lack standing to seek a preliminary injunction against Seattle’s permitting scheme under both their facial and as-applied challenges. See Long Beach Area Peace Network v. City of Long Beach, 574 F.3d 1011, 1020 (9th Cir. 2009). AFFIRMED. 5 26-1700