Catelyn H. v. Boyd Gaming Corporation
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Date FiledNovember 17, 2026
Docket25-4555
StatusUnpublished
📰 News Coverage: Read the LAWS.com news report on this case
Full Opinion
NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 17 2026
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
CATELYN H., No. 25-4555
D.C. No.
Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:24-cv-00939-JCM-DJA
v.
MEMORANDUM*
BOYD GAMING CORPORATION;
VENETIAN LAS VEGAS GAMING, LLC;
THE MIRAGE CASINO - HOTEL, LLC,
Defendants - Appellees,
MGM RESORTS INTERNATIONAL, G6
HOSPITALITY, LLC, WYNDHAM
HOTELS & RESORTS, INC., HARD
ROCK INTERNATIONAL, INC., LAS
VEGAS SANDS CORP,
Defendants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding
Argued and Submitted September 15, 2026
Phoenix, Arizona
Before: M. SMITH and TUNG, Circuit Judges, and KANE, District Judge.**
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Yvette Kane, United States District Judge for the
Plaintiff Catelyn H. alleges that the defendants—the owners and operators of
Las Vegas casino-resorts known as the Mirage, the Palazzo, and the Cannery—are
liable under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA)1 as
perpetrators or beneficiaries of the sex trafficking she endured at their premises
between 2013 and 2014. She appeals the district court’s dismissal of her complaint
for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm.
We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss, see Doe v.
Grindr Inc., 128 F.4th 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2025), “tak[ing] the allegations in the
complaint as true and view[ing] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs,”
Does 1-6 v. Reddit, Inc., 51 F.4th 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2022). We may affirm “on
any ground supported by the record, even if it differs from the rationale of the
district court.” United States v. Perez-Garcia, 96 F.4th 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2024).
Plaintiff advances two theories of liability against the casinos: first, that they
directly perpetrated her sex trafficking by engaging in conduct proscribed by 18
U.S.C. § 1591(a); and second, that they were knowing beneficiaries from
participation in a venture that they knew or should have known engaged in sex
trafficking. With respect to her perpetrator theory of liability, Plaintiff contends
Middle District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.
1
18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (2008).
2 25-4555
(1) that the Cannery is liable because its employee, a casino dealer, “provided” her
to its hotel patrons in reckless disregard of the fact that she was coerced to engage
in commercial sex by her sex trafficker;2 and (2) that the Mirage and Palazzo are
liable for “harboring” her in reckless disregard of the fact that many sex workers
are subject to force, fraud, or coercion to engage in commercial sex.
A perpetrator of sex trafficking under the TVPRA knowingly “recruits,
entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, or maintains . . . a person
. . . knowing, or . . . in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of
force, fraud, coercion . . . or any combination of such means will be used to cause
the person to engage in a commercial sex act[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) (2008).3
1. Plaintiff’s allegations against the Cannery come the closest to implicating
any of the casinos in direct facilitatory conduct. According to Plaintiff, a Cannery
dealer who was well acquainted with both her and her trafficker—and aware of her
trafficker’s coercion over and abuse towards her—facilitated introductions
between Plaintiff and hotel guests interested in commercial sex with her.
However, to impute this conduct to the Cannery, Plaintiff must plead facts to
2
Plaintiff preserved this legal theory on appeal as it arises out of factual allegations
made within her complaint. See Crull v. GEM Ins. Co., 58 F.3d 1386, 1391 (9th
Cir. 1995).
3
The TVPRA provides that victims of sex trafficking “may bring a civil action
against the perpetrator” “of a violation of” § 1591. See 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a)
(2008).
3 25-4555
establish vicarious liability. Because her complaint is devoid of factual allegations
that the Cannery dealer’s involvement in her exploitation was motivated by service
to his employer, or that facilitating commercial sex transactions for guests was
within the scope of his employment, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim as to this
theory of liability under the TVPRA. See Oki Semiconductor Co. v. Wells Fargo
Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 298 F.3d 768, 775–76 (9th Cir. 2002).
2. Plaintiff’s factual allegations are likewise deficient to support a
perpetrator liability theory against the Mirage and the Palazzo. Plaintiff alleges
that these defendants “harbored” her because they allowed her to routinely “walk
the carpets” there and furnished hotel rooms to be used for commercial sex.
Even assuming the conduct alleged amounts to “harboring,” Plaintiff fails to
plead that the Mirage or Palazzo recklessly disregarded that she was a victim of
sex trafficking. Plaintiff alleges that the Mirage and the Palazzo were on notice
that commercial sex was occurring on their premises, citing certain arrest statistics.
She further asserts that they must have known that statistically most sex workers
are coerced. She therefore infers that, when they ignored indicia that she was
engaging in commercial sex work, the defendants recklessly disregarded a
substantial risk that she herself was a trafficking victim. But “[s]weeping
generalities” like statistics about the commercial sex industry “are too attenuated to
support an inference that [defendants] knew or should have known of []
4 25-4555
specifically alleged TVPRA violations[,]” Ratha v. Phatthana Seafood Co., 35
F.4th 1159, 1177 (9th Cir. 2022), and are likewise insufficient to plead reckless
disregard of a substantial risk that Plaintiff was a victim of sex trafficking here.
3. Plaintiff similarly fails to state a claim for beneficiary liability under
§ 1595(a) of the TVPRA. To state a claim for beneficiary liability, a plaintiff must
allege that a defendant knowingly benefited from participation in a venture that it
knew or should have known engaged in sex trafficking. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a).
Plaintiff claims that the defendants participated in a venture through their operation
of their respective casino-resorts, and that they knew or should have known that
sex trafficking was occurring based on the same facts and chain of reasoning that
Plaintiff relies on to support perpetrator liability.
The precise contours of what constitutes a “venture” under the TVPRA—
and thereby what is required to be a participant in one—are unsettled in our circuit
and the subject of a circuit split. See A.G. v. Northbrook Indus., Inc., 171 F.4th
1257, 1268 (11th Cir. 2026) (stating that “‘participation in a venture’ in § 1595
requires a showing that a defendant ‘took part in a common undertaking or
enterprise involving risk and potential profit’” (citations omitted)); Doe 1 v. Apple,
Inc., 96 F.4th 403, 415 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (similar) cf. G.G. v. Salesforce.com, Inc.,
76 F.4th 544, 558–59 (7th Cir. 2023) (finding that “culpable assistance” such as a
“continuous business relationship” and “a desire to promote the wrongful venture’s
5 25-4555
success” suffices for “participation in a venture” under § 1595). Despite the
“varying interpretations,” our sister circuits appear to agree that something more
than passive observation is necessary to constitute a “venture.” Northbrook, 171
F.4th at 1268–69 (analyzing Salesforce, 76 F.4th at 563–64).
We need not enter this debate. Even under the broadest interpretation of the
term, “the venture . . . must violate Section 1591.” Salesforce, 76 F.4th at 559.
Plaintiff does not plausibly allege that the defendants’ casinos had a “continuous
business relationship” with her trafficker such that we can infer a “tacit agreement”
between them. Id. On the contrary, Plaintiff makes no allegation that her
trafficker was a party to the defendants’ ventures. Therefore, we cannot impute to
the venture the acts of Plaintiff’s sex trafficker violative of § 1591. To the extent
that Plaintiff contends that the casinos’ conduct independently violated § 1591,
those allegations fail for the same reasons they could not support perpetrator
liability. In sum, even assuming Plaintiff plausibly alleges the existence of a
“venture,” she fails to plead that the defendants participated in a venture violating
§ 1591.
Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegations concerning the commercial sex work
“industry generally” are insufficient to plausibly allege that the defendants “knew
or should have known of the specifically alleged TVPRA violations at [defendants’
enterprises].” See Ratha, 35 F.4th at 1177 (emphasis in original).
6 25-4555
AFFIRMED.
7 25-4555