Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 17 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT CATELYN H., No. 25-4555 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 2:24-cv-00939-JCM-DJA v. MEMORANDUM* BOYD GAMING CORPORATION; VENETIAN LAS VEGAS GAMING, LLC; THE MIRAGE CASINO - HOTEL, LLC, Defendants - Appellees, MGM RESORTS INTERNATIONAL, G6 HOSPITALITY, LLC, WYNDHAM HOTELS & RESORTS, INC., HARD ROCK INTERNATIONAL, INC., LAS VEGAS SANDS CORP, Defendants. Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Nevada James C. Mahan, District Judge, Presiding Argued and Submitted September 15, 2026 Phoenix, Arizona Before: M. SMITH and TUNG, Circuit Judges, and KANE, District Judge.** * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The Honorable Yvette Kane, United States District Judge for the Plaintiff Catelyn H. alleges that the defendants—the owners and operators of Las Vegas casino-resorts known as the Mirage, the Palazzo, and the Cannery—are liable under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA)1 as perpetrators or beneficiaries of the sex trafficking she endured at their premises between 2013 and 2014. She appeals the district court’s dismissal of her complaint for failure to state a claim pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm. We review de novo a district court’s grant of a motion to dismiss, see Doe v. Grindr Inc., 128 F.4th 1148, 1152 (9th Cir. 2025), “tak[ing] the allegations in the complaint as true and view[ing] them in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs,” Does 1-6 v. Reddit, Inc., 51 F.4th 1137, 1140 (9th Cir. 2022). We may affirm “on any ground supported by the record, even if it differs from the rationale of the district court.” United States v. Perez-Garcia, 96 F.4th 1166, 1172 (9th Cir. 2024). Plaintiff advances two theories of liability against the casinos: first, that they directly perpetrated her sex trafficking by engaging in conduct proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a); and second, that they were knowing beneficiaries from participation in a venture that they knew or should have known engaged in sex trafficking. With respect to her perpetrator theory of liability, Plaintiff contends Middle District of Pennsylvania, sitting by designation. 1 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (2008). 2 25-4555 (1) that the Cannery is liable because its employee, a casino dealer, “provided” her to its hotel patrons in reckless disregard of the fact that she was coerced to engage in commercial sex by her sex trafficker;2 and (2) that the Mirage and Palazzo are liable for “harboring” her in reckless disregard of the fact that many sex workers are subject to force, fraud, or coercion to engage in commercial sex. A perpetrator of sex trafficking under the TVPRA knowingly “recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, or maintains . . . a person . . . knowing, or . . . in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion . . . or any combination of such means will be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act[.]” 18 U.S.C. § 1591(a)(1) (2008).3 1. Plaintiff’s allegations against the Cannery come the closest to implicating any of the casinos in direct facilitatory conduct. According to Plaintiff, a Cannery dealer who was well acquainted with both her and her trafficker—and aware of her trafficker’s coercion over and abuse towards her—facilitated introductions between Plaintiff and hotel guests interested in commercial sex with her. However, to impute this conduct to the Cannery, Plaintiff must plead facts to 2 Plaintiff preserved this legal theory on appeal as it arises out of factual allegations made within her complaint. See Crull v. GEM Ins. Co., 58 F.3d 1386, 1391 (9th Cir. 1995). 3 The TVPRA provides that victims of sex trafficking “may bring a civil action against the perpetrator” “of a violation of” § 1591. See 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a) (2008). 3 25-4555 establish vicarious liability. Because her complaint is devoid of factual allegations that the Cannery dealer’s involvement in her exploitation was motivated by service to his employer, or that facilitating commercial sex transactions for guests was within the scope of his employment, Plaintiff has failed to state a claim as to this theory of liability under the TVPRA. See Oki Semiconductor Co. v. Wells Fargo Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 298 F.3d 768, 775–76 (9th Cir. 2002). 2. Plaintiff’s factual allegations are likewise deficient to support a perpetrator liability theory against the Mirage and the Palazzo. Plaintiff alleges that these defendants “harbored” her because they allowed her to routinely “walk the carpets” there and furnished hotel rooms to be used for commercial sex. Even assuming the conduct alleged amounts to “harboring,” Plaintiff fails to plead that the Mirage or Palazzo recklessly disregarded that she was a victim of sex trafficking. Plaintiff alleges that the Mirage and the Palazzo were on notice that commercial sex was occurring on their premises, citing certain arrest statistics. She further asserts that they must have known that statistically most sex workers are coerced. She therefore infers that, when they ignored indicia that she was engaging in commercial sex work, the defendants recklessly disregarded a substantial risk that she herself was a trafficking victim. But “[s]weeping generalities” like statistics about the commercial sex industry “are too attenuated to support an inference that [defendants] knew or should have known of [] 4 25-4555 specifically alleged TVPRA violations[,]” Ratha v. Phatthana Seafood Co., 35 F.4th 1159, 1177 (9th Cir. 2022), and are likewise insufficient to plead reckless disregard of a substantial risk that Plaintiff was a victim of sex trafficking here. 3. Plaintiff similarly fails to state a claim for beneficiary liability under § 1595(a) of the TVPRA. To state a claim for beneficiary liability, a plaintiff must allege that a defendant knowingly benefited from participation in a venture that it knew or should have known engaged in sex trafficking. 18 U.S.C. § 1595(a). Plaintiff claims that the defendants participated in a venture through their operation of their respective casino-resorts, and that they knew or should have known that sex trafficking was occurring based on the same facts and chain of reasoning that Plaintiff relies on to support perpetrator liability. The precise contours of what constitutes a “venture” under the TVPRA— and thereby what is required to be a participant in one—are unsettled in our circuit and the subject of a circuit split. See A.G. v. Northbrook Indus., Inc., 171 F.4th 1257, 1268 (11th Cir. 2026) (stating that “‘participation in a venture’ in § 1595 requires a showing that a defendant ‘took part in a common undertaking or enterprise involving risk and potential profit’” (citations omitted)); Doe 1 v. Apple, Inc., 96 F.4th 403, 415 (D.C. Cir. 2024) (similar) cf. G.G. v. Salesforce.com, Inc., 76 F.4th 544, 558–59 (7th Cir. 2023) (finding that “culpable assistance” such as a “continuous business relationship” and “a desire to promote the wrongful venture’s 5 25-4555 success” suffices for “participation in a venture” under § 1595). Despite the “varying interpretations,” our sister circuits appear to agree that something more than passive observation is necessary to constitute a “venture.” Northbrook, 171 F.4th at 1268–69 (analyzing Salesforce, 76 F.4th at 563–64). We need not enter this debate. Even under the broadest interpretation of the term, “the venture . . . must violate Section 1591.” Salesforce, 76 F.4th at 559. Plaintiff does not plausibly allege that the defendants’ casinos had a “continuous business relationship” with her trafficker such that we can infer a “tacit agreement” between them. Id. On the contrary, Plaintiff makes no allegation that her trafficker was a party to the defendants’ ventures. Therefore, we cannot impute to the venture the acts of Plaintiff’s sex trafficker violative of § 1591. To the extent that Plaintiff contends that the casinos’ conduct independently violated § 1591, those allegations fail for the same reasons they could not support perpetrator liability. In sum, even assuming Plaintiff plausibly alleges the existence of a “venture,” she fails to plead that the defendants participated in a venture violating § 1591. Moreover, Plaintiff’s allegations concerning the commercial sex work “industry generally” are insufficient to plausibly allege that the defendants “knew or should have known of the specifically alleged TVPRA violations at [defendants’ enterprises].” See Ratha, 35 F.4th at 1177 (emphasis in original). 6 25-4555 AFFIRMED. 7 25-4555