Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS NOV 3 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT MARCEL MONJI, No. 25-2146 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 1:19-cv-01526-JLT-CDB v. MEMORANDUM* COUNTY OF KERN, a public entity; KERN COUNTY SHERIFF'S DEPARTMENT, an agency of the County of Kern; BEHAVIORAL HEALTH AND RECOVERY SERVICES, an agency of the County of Kern; KERN COUNTY HOSPITAL AUTHORITY, a public entity; DONNY YOUNGBLOOD, Sheriff, a public employee; TYSON DAVIS, Deputy, a public employee; BILL WALKER, Defendants - Appellees. Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California Jennifer L. Thurston, District Judge, Presiding Submitted October 30, 2026** San Francisco, California * This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Before: BYBEE and SUNG, Circuit Judges, and LIN, District Judge.*** Marcel Monji, a pretrial detainee, appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the Kern County Hospital Authority, the County of Kern, the County of Kern Sheriff’s Department, and Behavioral Health and Recovery Services (collectively, the County Defendants) and Sheriff Donny Youngblood, Deputy Tyson Davis, and Bill Walker (collectively, the Individual Defendants). Monji brought a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging that he received inadequate medical and mental health care, that he was improperly placed into administrative segregation, that he stayed in unsanitary and unhealthy housing conditions, and that Defendants failed to protect him while he was incarcerated in Kern County jail facilities. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Desire, LLC v. Manna Textiles, Inc., 986 F.3d 1253, 1259 (9th Cir. 2021). We affirm. Monji argues that the district court incorrectly analyzed his deliberate indifference claims under a subjective standard. He also argues generally that the district court erred in finding no genuine dispute of material fact as to the County *** The Honorable Rita F. Lin, United States District Judge for the Northern District of California, sitting by designation. 2 25-2146 Defendants’ liability under Monell v. Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). 1 Neither argument provides a basis for reversal. As a pretrial detainee bringing Fourteenth Amendment claims, Monji’s claims must be evaluated under a purely objective standard, rather than the subjective standard applicable to convicted prisoners bringing Eighth Amendment claims. See Castro v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 833 F.3d 1060, 1070–71 (9th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (an officer’s conduct must be objectively unreasonable to violate pretrial detainees’ Fourteenth Amendment rights); Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 888 F.3d 1118, 1124–25 (9th Cir. 2018) (extending this objective deliberate indifference standard to pretrial detainees’ Fourteenth Amendment inadequate medical care claims). The district court properly analyzed Monji’s claims under this objective standard. Citing heavily to Castro and Gordon, the district court repeatedly described its application of the “objective deliberate indifference standard.” Though the district court also cited to an Eighth Amendment case describing the “purposeful act or failure to respond” requirement, it did not misapply the standard. See Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 1096 (9th Cir. 2006). 1 Monji does not contest that he failed to proffer evidence of personal participation by the Individual Defendants. Nor does he argue, or point to any evidence supporting, that the Individual Defendants should be subject to supervisory liability. See Rodriguez v. Cnty. of Los Angeles, 891 F.3d 776, 798 (9th Cir. 2018) (describing supervisory liability requirements). Summary judgment was properly granted in favor of the Individual Defendants. 3 25-2146 Claims under the Fourteenth Amendment require a showing that “the defendant made an intentional decision with respect to the conditions under which the plaintiff was confined,” which is consistent with the district court’s use of the “purposeful act or failure to respond” language from Jett. Gordon, 888 F.3d at 1125. The district court applied the correct legal standard to Monji’s deliberate indifference claims. The district court also correctly concluded that Monji failed to create a genuine dispute as to Monell liability. See Monell, 436 U.S. at 694. Monell liability may be based on “an expressly adopted official policy,” a “longstanding practice or custom,” or an action taken or ratified by “an official with final policy- making authority.” Hartzell v. Marana Unified Sch. Dist., 130 F.4th 722, 734 (9th Cir. 2025) (citations and quotation marks omitted). Monji argues that a reasonable jury could infer that the County Defendants maintain unconstitutional customs of (1) understaffing mental health workers, (2) using administrative segregation in a way that is medically indifferent to those with mental health conditions, and (3) subjecting inmates to unsafe and unsanitary jail conditions. 2 But Monji’s 2 On reply, Monji describes the Individual Defendants in passing as “policymakers” acting on behalf of the County Defendants. This argument is forfeited because it was not specifically raised in the opening brief. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009). And regardless, as noted previously, Monji has put forth no evidence showing any Individual Defendant either themselves participated in an unconstitutional action or knew and approved of a subordinate’s unconstitutional actions. See Lytle v. Carl, 382 F.3d 978, 987 4 25-2146 argument is based, at most, on two incidents in which only he was involved, and he fails to show that any other inmates faced similar challenges. Without more, these two incidents, involving only Monji, are insufficient to carry his burden of showing any of the alleged customs. See Trevino v. Gates, 99 F.3d 911, 918 (9th Cir. 1996) (“Liability for improper custom may not be predicated on isolated or sporadic incidents; it must be founded upon practices of sufficient duration, frequency and consistency that the conduct has become a traditional method of carrying out policy.”); see also Gordon v. Cnty. of Orange, 6 F.4th 961, 974 (9th Cir. 2021) (summary judgment appropriate where the record lacked “evidence of any other event involving similar conduct or constitutional violations”). Even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to Monji, these limited and sporadic incidents do not show any custom that is “so ‘persistent and widespread’ that it constitutes a ‘permanent and well settled [county] policy.’” Trevino, 99 F.3d at 918 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 691). No genuine dispute exists as to Monell liability. AFFIRMED. (9th Cir. 2004) (“The policymaker must have knowledge of the constitutional violation and actually approve of it. A mere failure to overrule a subordinate’s actions, without more, is insufficient to support a § 1983 claim.”). 5 25-2146