Full Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-3917-24 STATE OF NEW JERSEY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. SYLVIA DIANE WILSON and CAMRYN EDWARDS, Defendants-Appellants. Argued September 29, 2026 – Decided October 20, 2026 Before Judges Vanek and Bergman. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Municipal Appeal Nos. 2025- 02 and 2025-03. Bennet D. Zurofsky argued the cause for appellants (Bennet D. Zurofsky, attorneys; Bennet D. Zurofsky and Susan J. Vercheak, on the briefs). Stephen A. Pogany, Assistant Prosecutor, argued the cause for respondent (Theodore N. Stephens, II, Essex A-3917-24 1 County Prosecutor, attorney; Stephen A. Pogany, on the brief). PER CURIAM Defendants Sylvia Diane Wilson and Camryn Edwards appeal from a June 27, 2025 Law Division order finding them guilty of defiant trespass, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3(b). We affirm. I. The charges against defendants stemmed from a protest on December 5, 2024 at Formosa Plastics' (Formosa) Livingston headquarters. The record reflects that Formosa, anticipating a protest by defendants, requested police assistance and instructed employees to work from home. On the day of the demonstration, Formosa informed police the protestors were not permitted on the property and, as a result, police established a cone line marking off the area the protestors were not permitted to cross. Police testimony at the hearing and body worn camera videos in evidence demonstrated the police repeatedly warned protestors, including defendants, if they crossed the cone line that it would constitute trespassing and result in their arrest. Despite these warnings, both defendants crossed the line and were arrested. After trial, the municipal court judge found both defendants guilty of defiant trespass, N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3(b)(1). On appeal, the Law Division A-3917-24 2 conducted a de novo review of the municipal court record and affirmed the convictions and sentences. The court concluded the police, acting in coordination with Formosa, were authorized to communicate Formosa's requests that no protestors were to cross the cone line, defendants knowingly crossed the line after police provided notice, and the restrictions imposed by Formosa did not violate the defendants' free-speech rights under the First Amendment of the New Jersey Constitution. On appeal, defendants raise the following points for our consideration: POINT I THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE PROPERTY OWNER GAVE NOTICE BY "ACTUAL COMMUNICATION." POINT II THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO PROVE BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT DEFENDANTS REMAINED ON THE PROPERTY "KNOWING [THEY WERE] NOT LICENSED OR PRIVILEGED" TO DO SO. POINT III THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO DISPROVE THE AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSES BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT. II. A-3917-24 3 On appeal, we "consider only the action of the Law Division and not that of the municipal court." State v. Oliveri, 336 N.J. Super. 244, 251 (App. Div. 2001) (citing State v. Joas, 34 N.J. 179, 184 (1961)). Under Rule 3:23-8(a)(2), the Law Division may make independent findings of fact and conclusions of law de novo, based on the record from the municipal court. We further review "whether the findings made could reasonably have been reached on sufficient credible evidence present in the record." State v. Locurto, 157 N.J. 463, 471 (1999). Our review of legal determinations is plenary. See State v. Handy, 206 N.J. 39, 45 (2011). A. Defendants' principal contention is the State failed to prove that they were provided actual notice beyond a reasonable doubt, an element of defiant trespass under N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3(b)(1). Defendants argue that for "actual communication" under the defiant trespass statute, the property owner—or someone with similar authority—must directly provide the notice. Defendants assert that because law enforcement, rather than a representative from Formosa management, informed them they would be trespassing if they crossed the coned line, the statute's notice requirement was not satisfied. We are not persuaded by this argument. A-3917-24 4 Under N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3(b)(1), "[a] person commits defiant trespass 'if, knowing that [s]he is not licensed or privileged to do so, [s]he enters or remains in any place as to which notice against trespass is given by . . . [a]ctual communication to the actor.'" In re Mullen, 253 N.J. 49, 59 (2022) (quoting N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3(b)(1)). N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3(b)(1) contains no language or other terms specifying that the owner of private property exclusively must provide the actual communication. In State v. Hamilton, we held that a conviction of defiant trespass was justified where police notified a group of protestors they could protest on one side of the road but not block the entrance to the municipal property. 368 N.J. Super. 151, 156 (App. Div. 2004). Although in Hamilton, the property owner was in some way directly involved in providing actual notice , we did not specifically hold that the property owner was required to provide such notice directly to the alleged trespassers. The record exhibits that Formosa specifically requested police presence to set a cone line to protect its private property rights and to ensure the demonstration was peaceful. Formosa informed the police that protesters were not permitted on its property and all communications should be provided through the police. The police informed defendants and repeatedly A-3917-24 5 communicated to them that they were not permitted on the property and crossing the coned property line would result in arrest for trespass. We conclude defendants' contention that repeated communication from law enforcement as authorized by the owner is insufficient notice of trespass to defendants under N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3(b)(1) lacks merit and is contrary to the clear terms of the statute. We conclude the police were permitted and authorized to provide the actual notice to defendants required by the trespass statute, and the record contains ample evidence supporting the trial court's finding that defendants were guilty of defiant trespass under N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3(b). Law enforcement repeatedly informed defendants that they were not permitted beyond the property boundary line. At trial, defendants not only acknowledged these multiple warnings, but purposefully failed to abide by them. Based on our de novo review, we conclude the evidence in the record clearly supports the findings of the trial court that defendants were provided actual notice of the potential trespass by direct communication. B. Next, defendants contend the State failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt they remained on the property "knowing [they were] not licensed or A-3917-24 6 privileged" to do so as required by N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3(b). Defendants contend the State did not actually prove this element beyond a reasonable doubt, and they believed they were licensed to enter the property for the following three reasons: (1) Wilson was previously permitted to walk into Formosa's Texas office uninvited to deliver correspondence or communicate with executives there; (2) Edwards alone scouted the property ahead of the protest and had been able to access the lobby of the property without obstacle; and (3) defendants' belief in the societal norm that in absence of a security checkpoint maintained by the landlord or tenant, visitors may freely approach and enter office buildings through unlocked doors. We conclude sufficient evidence exists in the record supporting the trial court's finding that defendants remained on the property "knowing [they were] not licensed or privileged" to do so. Defendants' arguments do not persuade us that Edwards was permitted to enter the lobby of Formosa's Livingston office. The separate and distinct events in Texas at a different office and Edwards' prior entry into the office on a different day did not provide them with a permission or valid license to enter Formosa's property in Livingston. As we previously determined, defendants were aware that they were not permitted to cross the boundary and enter Formosa's property. They were warned numerous times that A-3917-24 7 doing so would constitute trespass and lead to their arrest. Given the record clearly exhibits defendants were warned multiple times they would be committing trespass if they crossed the boundary, their "belief" they were permitted to enter the property based on prior events or that "societal norms" permitted legal entry lack any logical or reasonable basis. In this instance, there was sufficient, credible evidence supporting the trial court's conclusion the State established beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendants knew they had no right to enter Formosa's property and remained there without any license or privilege to do so. This evidence clearly supports defendants' convictions under N.J.S.A. 2C:18-3(b)(1). C. Defendants next contend their "free speech" rights under the First Amendment of the New Jersey Constitution permitted them to enter Formosa's property because they were attempting to "peacefully hand-deliver their letter." Based on the facts of record, we conclude this argument lacks merit. "New Jersey's Constitution guarantees individuals a broad, affirmative right to free speech." Mazdabrook Commons Homeowners' Ass'n v. Khan, 210 N.J. 482, 492 (2012). The Constitution provides: "[e]very person may freely speak, write and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the A-3917-24 8 abuse of that right." N.J. Const. art. I, ¶6. "New Jersey's Constitution's free speech provision is an affirmative right, broader than practically all others in the nation." Green Party v. Hartz Mt. Indus., 164 N.J. 127, 145 (2000). The Court explained that "the New Jersey Constitution bars the government from abridging free speech and protects 'against unreasonably restrictive or oppressive conduct on the part of private entities ' in certain circumstances." Dublirer v. 2000 Linwood Ave. Owners, Inc., 220 N.J. 71, 79 (2014) (citing State v. Schmid, 84 N.J. 535, 560 (1980)). However, "[e]ven if a visitor can satisfy the standard [for free speech rights on privately owned property,] the [Schmid] [c]ourt noted that property owners can 'fashion reasonable rules to control . . . expressional rights' of others on their property." Id. at 80 (citing Schmid, 84 N.J. at 563). "To assess the reasonableness of a restriction, courts look to whether 'convenient and feasible alternative means' of free speech exist, and whether the owner has reasonable standards in place to protect the legitimate interests of the parties." Ibid. (internal citations omitted). In N.J. Coalition Against War in the Middle E. v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 138 N.J. 326 (1994), the Court clarified that the Schmid test was designed to balance "'expressional rights and private property rights.'" Dublirer, 220 N.J. at 81 (citing Coalition, 138 N.J. at 362). In Coalition, the Court determined that A-3917-24 9 the balance favored the protestors' expressional rights to leaflet on the property over the private property's interest. 138 N.J. at 365. However, the private property owners were free to adopt reasonable time, place, and manner restrictions to regulate the leafletting. Id. at 362. Defendants argue that their right to free speech was violated by being denied the opportunity to personally deliver correspondence to Formosa executive employees. We are unconvinced. Turning to the record, Formosa requested police presence to maintain the peace while still allowing defendants to exercise their First Amendment rights. Through the police, Formosa set up an area where protesters could gather, which included the entire road, while prohibiting entry to their main building. Although Formosa employees refused to accept any personal correspondence, they permitted it to pass through the police for their safety and in order to maintain a peaceful demonstration. Applying the foregoing legal standards, we conclude private property owners such as Formosa are permitted to adopt reasonable restrictions to the time, place, and manner of the activities to regulate expressional rights such as protesting. In this instance, Formosa imposed reasonable restrictions on where protesters could gather while permitting communication to pass through law A-3917-24 10 enforcement. We determine defendants' activities were not reasonably restricted and their First Amendment rights were not violated. D. We next turn to the defendants' final argument contending the State failed to "disprove" the affirmative defenses asserted including (1) the property was open to the public at the time and that they had "complied with all lawful conditions imposed on access;" and (2) the defendants reasonably believed that the owner would have licensed them to enter or remain on the property. These arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). We add only, as previously determined, Formosa's private property was restricted by a police-enforced cone line at Formosa's request and was clearly not "open to the public" on that date. Further, defendants' subjective belief that the owner would have licensed them to remain on the property was illogical because the record demonstrates that the owner clearly took affirmative actions through law enforcement to communicate to the protesters they were prohibited from entering its property. To the extent we have not specifically addressed any of defendants' remaining legal arguments we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2). Affirmed. A-3917-24 11