Full Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-4011-24 M.E.B.,1 Plaintiff-Respondent, v. W.S., Defendant-Appellant. _________________________ Submitted October 14, 2026 – Decided October 27, 2026 Before Judges Rose and Jablonski. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Passaic County, Docket No. FV-16-2569-24. CG Song Law Firm LLC, attorneys for appellant (Lyan Hummell, on the briefs). Cappetta & Rucci, Attorneys at Law, attorneys for respondent (Stephen R. Cappetta, on the brief). PER CURIAM 1 We use initials to protect the confidentiality of the parties. R. 1:38-3(c)(12). Defendant W.S. appeals from a Family Part judge's order denying his motion to vacate a final restraining order (FRO) issued in favor of plaintiff M.B. by default under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. We affirm. I. As part of a consent order, the parties agreed to limit their contact with each other to communications concerning childcare and parenting time. Acting under those conditions, the parties attempted a custody exchange at the Wayne Police Department in June 2024, during which the incident that led to M.B.'s application for a temporary restraining order (TRO) occurred. M.B. alleged W.S. drove up, threw belongings toward her vehicle, and yelled derogatory remarks about her within earshot of the children. Based on that conduct, M.B. obtained a TRO which also granted temporary custody of the children to her. The Family Part judge also scheduled a final hearing. W.S. requested and received three adjournments of the FRO hearing. On each adjourned date, however, neither W.S. nor his counsel appeared. On November 6, 2024, the final scheduled hearing date, following W.S.'s and his attorney's nonappearance, the Family Part judge took M.B.'s testimony and entered an FRO against W.S. by default. The FRO prohibited W.S. from A-4011-24 2 contacting M.B. and her paramour and barred him from M.B.'s home, workplace, and other designated locations. The judge also awarded temporary custody of the parties' children to M.B. and suspended W.S.'s parenting time pending his completion of a batterers' intervention and anger-management program. The Family Part judge also ordered W.S. to be fingerprinted and fined him $250. On November 12, 2024, W.S. moved under Rule 4:50-1(a) and (f) to vacate the FRO. He argued conflicting court notices and his attorney's internal law-office miscommunications caused either his nonappearance or late appearance. The Family Part judge denied the motion. On April 8, 2025, W.S. filed a second post-judgment motion seeking dismissal or modification of the FRO. In that application, he asserted he had meritorious defenses to the TRO and requested restoration of his parenting time. Following a hearing on June 11, 2025, the Family Part judge denied that portion of the application concerning the FRO, initially concluding the application was procedurally infirm. Substantively, the judge reiterated W.S. failed to demonstrate either excusable neglect or a meritorious defense—both elements necessary to vacate a default judgment. Factually, the judge concluded W.S. had received notice of the November 6 hearing both from the A-4011-24 3 court and M.B.'s attorney; furthermore, the purported calendaring error that allegedly caused W.S. and his attorney not to appear reflected a lack of due diligence, rather than any neglect that might have been sufficient to vacate the FRO. The judge also indicated the issue of parenting time could be considered in a separate application. On appeal, W.S. argues the underlying facts do not support the issuance of an FRO, the judge did not consider the Carfagno 2 factors, and there was insufficient evidence to support the issuance of the FRO. We disagree. II. As a predicate matter, we note appellants are required to provide all "parts of the record . . . as are essential to the proper consideration of the issues." R. 2:6-1(a)(1)(H). The record on appeal must necessarily consist of "all papers on file in the [trial] court . . . , with all entries as to matters made on the records of such court[] . . . , [and] the stenographic transcript or statement of the proceedings therein." R. 2:5-4(a). W.S. failed to provide transcripts of the proceedings preceding entry of the FRO, the November 6, 2024 FRO hearing, and the proceedings resulting in the initial denial of his 2 When evaluating an application to dissolve an FRO, a Family Part judge must consider a nonexclusive list of factors established by Carfagno v. Cafagno, 288 N.J. Super. 424, 435 (Ch. Div. 1995). A-4011-24 4 motion to vacate that order. These omissions render the appellate record materially incomplete and impede our ability to conduct meaningful review . Johnson v. Schragger, Lavine, Nagy & Krasny, 340 N.J. Super. 84, 87 n.3 (App. Div. 2001). Therefore, given the limited record before us, we are unable to undertake a reasoned review of W.S.'s arguments challenging the sufficiency of the evidence supporting entry of the FRO or the denial of his requested modification. We therefore confine our review to the order denying his second motion to vacate the FRO that W.S. filed under Rule 4:50-1(a) and (f)—the only matter for which a complete record has been supplied. III. Rule 4:50-1 permits a trial court to relieve a party from a final judgment or order on limited grounds. R. 4:50-1(a) to (f). Whether such relief should be granted is committed to the trial court's sound discretion, guided by equitable principles. F.B. v. A.L.G., 176 N.J. 201, 207 (2003). "The Rule is designed to reconcile the strong interests in finality of judgments and judicial efficiency with the equitable notion that courts should have the authority to avoid an unjust result in any given case." Manning Eng'g, Inc. v. Hudson Cnty. Park Comm'n, 74 N.J. 113, 120 (1977). A-4011-24 5 Although Rule 4:50-1(a) does not expressly provide, our jurisprudence requires a defendant seeking relief based on "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect" to also demonstrate a meritorious defense. Marder v. Realty Constr. Co., 84 N.J. Super. 313, 318 (App. Div. 1964). Rule 4:50-1(f) is a catch-all provision, and, in exceptional cases, "its boundaries are as expansive as the need to achieve equity and justice." DEG, LLC v. Twp. of Fairfield, 198 N.J. 242, 270 (2009) (quoting Ct. Inv. Co. v. Perillo, 48 N.J. 334, 341 (1966)). Relief under subsection (f), however, is "available only when truly exceptional circumstances are present." Hous. Auth. of Morristown v. Little, 135 N.J. 274, 286 (1994) (quoting Baumann v. Marinaro, 95 N.J. 380, 395 (1984)). Thus, a movant must show not only the circumstances are exceptional, but also enforcement of the judgment or order would be unjust, oppressive, or inequitable. Johnson v. Johnson, 320 N.J. Super. 371, 378 (App. Div. 1999). Our review of an order denying relief under Rule 4:50-1 is deferential. See 257-261 29th Ave. Realty, LLC v. Roberto, 477 N.J. Super. 339, 366 (App. Div. 2023) (citing U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Guillaume, 209 N.J. 449, 467 (2012)). We will reverse a decision made under that Rule only upon a A-4011-24 6 clear showing that the trial court misapplied its discretion. Guillaume, 209 N.J. at 467. Applying those principles, we discern no misapplication of discretion in the trial judge's denial of W.S.'s second motion to vacate the FRO. The renewed application reasserted grounds the same judge already considered and rejected, and she again found defendant failed to demonstrate either excusable neglect or a meritorious defense warranting relief. W.S. sought to vacate the default FRO under Rule 4:50-1(a) and (f), relying on the same claims of scheduling confusion and law-office error advanced previously. He asserted conflicting court notices and internal office communications caused counsel to miss the hearing. But W.S.'s April 2025 motion identified no newly discovered evidence, no fraud, and no material change in circumstances. See G.M. v. C.V., 453 N.J. Super. 1 (App. Div. 2018) (holding a party seeking dissolution of an FRO must first make a prima facie showing of "substantial changes in the circumstances" existing at the time of the final hearing before the court undertakes a full review of the application). Instead, W.S. repeated the same contention that scheduling problems beyond his control deprived him of the opportunity to be heard. At A-4011-24 7 the June 2025 hearing, the judge expressly recognized she had already rejected that claim. That determination was reasonable and supported by the record. W.S. repackaged the same Rule 4:50-1 arguments in a second application. The judge was not required to entertain that renewed effort after denying the first motion and after the time to appeal had expired. See Calcaterra v. Calcaterra, 206 N.J. Super. 398, 403 (App. Div. 1986) (holding the reassertion of a previously rejected argument does not satisfy the rigorous standards of Rule 4:50-1). The trial judge therefore acted within her discretion in denying the renewed motion on that basis alone. Even if the trial judge reached the merits anew, W.S. still failed to establish any basis for relief from the default FRO. The record amply supported the judge's conclusion W.S.'s repeated failures to appear, despite notice, reflected a lack of diligence rather than excusable neglect. See U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n v. Curcio, 444 N.J. Super. 94, 112 (App. Div. 2016) (holding a defendant who received proper notice could not establish excusable neglect); cf. Rosenberg v. Bunce, 214 N.J. Super. 300, 304 (App. Div. 1986) (finding excusable neglect where the clerk failed to send a copy of the order). A-4011-24 8 The Family Part judge noted W.S.'s repeated nonappearances on August 16, October 31, and November 6, 2024. She also reviewed multiple notices and communications concerning the November 6 hearing, including the continuance order and email confirmations. Based on that record, the judge found there was no excusable neglect, but rather a lack of due diligence. That finding is supported by sufficient credible evidence and is entitled to deference. See Guillaume, 209 N.J. at 467. W.S. likewise failed to present a meritorious defense. A meritorious defense requires a party to contest the core factual allegations or legal elements of the underlying claim. It is not satisfied by collateral or procedural assertions. See Curcio, 444 N.J. Super. at 112-14. Here, W.S.'s April 2025 certification did not refute the factual allegations arising from the June 8, 2024, incident. Instead, it focused principally on his assertion that he had been deprived of an opportunity to be heard and the FRO had interfered with his parenting time. Although the claimed deprivation of an opportunity to be heard ostensibly raises a due process concern, it is nevertheless a procedural challenge, not a substantive defense to the underlying allegations of domestic violence. See A.A.R. v. J.R.C., 471 N.J. Super. 584, 587-90 (App. Div. 2022). A-4011-24 9 In summary, because W.S. failed to establish excusable neglect, a meritorious defense, or exceptional circumstances justifying relief, the trial court's denial of relief under Rule 4:50-1(a) and (f) did not constitute a misapplication of discretion. Affirmed. A-4011-24 10