Full Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1519-25 S.P.D.E.,1 Plaintiff-Respondent, v. J.E.E., Defendant-Appellant. _______________________ Argued October 27, 2026 โ€“ Decided November 16, 2026 Before Judges Natali and Jablonski. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Middlesex County, Docket No. FV-12-1078-26. Michael B. Roberts argued the cause for appellant (Roberts & Teeter, LLC, attorneys; Michael B. Roberts, on the brief). Respondent has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM 1 We use initials and titles to protect the confidentiality of the participants in these domestic violence proceedings. See R. 1:38-3(d)(10). Defendant J.E.E. appeals from a December 5, 2025, final restraining order (FRO) entered against him and in favor of plaintiff S.P.D.E. under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. Following a hearing at which both parties represented themselves, the trial court found defendant committed the predicate acts of stalking and harassment and also concluded an FRO was necessary to protect plaintiff from future acts of domestic violence. On appeal, defendant contends the evidence was insufficient to support the court's findings as to either predicate offense. He also argues he was deprived of a fair hearing because the court failed to advise him of the consequences attendant to the entry of an FRO and did not afford him a meaningful opportunity to obtain counsel. Having reviewed the record in light of the applicable legal principles, we conclude the evidence was insufficient to support the finding that defendant committed stalking. We are satisfied, however, the record amply supports the court's determination defendant committed harassment, and issuance of an FRO was necessary to protect plaintiff from further abuse. We further conclude defendant's due process arguments, reviewed under the plain error standard, lack merit. Accordingly, we affirm. A-1519-25 2 I. Plaintiff obtained a temporary restraining order after alleging defendant committed harassment, assault, and stalking, based principally on two incidents. Both parties appeared at the ensuing final hearing and elected to represent themselves. Before taking testimony, the trial court explained the nature of the FRO hearing and informed plaintiff that, to obtain an FRO, she was required to establish both the commission of a predicate act of domestic violence and the necessity of an FRO to protect against future abuse. The court further instructed the parties they each had the right to retain an attorney if they wished, though they were not entitled to appointed counsel. The court explained that, by not seeking to retain counsel, each party knowingly waived that right. Neither party objected, and the matter proceeded to a plenary hearing on the merits of plaintiff's application. Plaintiff testified on October 28, 2025, defendant demanded the keys to the Jeep she was driving and grabbed her by the arms when she attempted to leave. The ensuing struggle lasted approximately two minutes and caused one of her fingernails to be torn off. Plaintiff further testified when she later returned to retrieve the keys, defendant took a knife and cut his wrists in the presence of the parties' daughter. A-1519-25 3 Plaintiff also testified defendant placed a Global Positioning System (GPS) device on the Jeep to monitor her movements. She asserted that on November 3, defendant's mother and sister recorded her in a parking lot. Defendant admitted he directed them to the lot and later sent plaintiff the video they recorded. Plaintiff testified defendant subsequently threatened to harm her, damage the Jeep, use his dog against her, circulate the recording, and take their daughter. Plaintiff testified about prior acts of domestic violence. She stated, on another occasion, defendant while intoxicated, pushed her into a refrigerator . Defendant was consequently arrested. Plaintiff also described an earlier incident in which defendant, after drinking, searched for a machete and chased her. After plaintiff rested, defendant did not meaningfully cross-examine her. Defendant thereafter testified in response to the court's questions. He admitted grabbing plaintiff during the October 28 incident but asserted he did so to prevent her from leaving to see another man. He also admitted cutting his wrists. Defendant further admitted placing a GPS device on the Jeep and monitoring plaintiff's movements for approximately five months because he A-1519-25 4 suspected she was unfaithful. He also acknowledged directing his mother and sister to record plaintiff on November 3 and sending plaintiff the resulting video. He denied, however, threatening plaintiff that evening. Finally, defendant admitted a prior incident in which he pushed plaintiff into a refrigerator, although he disputed plaintiff's account of the surrounding circumstances. He denied plaintiff's allegation concerning the machete. The court found defendant committed the predicate acts of stalking and harassment, but made no findings as to assault. The stalking finding rested on defendant's use of GPS monitoring to track plaintiff's movements and his enlistment of family members to record her. The harassment finding was based on defendant's conduct during the October 28 incident, when he grabbed plaintiff by the arms. The court further concluded entry of an FRO was necessary to protect plaintiff from future abuse, relying on the parties' prior history, the October 28 incident, and defendant's monitoring of plaintiff's whereabouts. It therefore entered an FRO barring defendant from contacting or stalking plaintiff and imposed additional restraints. II. Our review of the entry of an FRO is generally limited. C.C. v. J.A.H., 463 N.J. Super. 419, 428 (App. Div. 2020). We defer to the trial court's A-1519-25 5 factual findings when they are supported by adequate, substantial, and credible evidence. Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 412 (1998). We owe no deference, however, to the court's legal conclusions, which we review de novo. C.C., 463 N.J. Super. at 428. We intervene only when the trial court's findings are "so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant, and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412 (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). In light of these principles, we part company with the trial court's determination defendant committed the predicate act of stalking. In our view, the evidence does not sufficiently establish the elements of that offense. We are satisfied, however, the record supports the court's finding defendant engaged in harassment. Accordingly, although the evidence is insufficient to sustain stalking as the predicate act, it is sufficient to establish harassment, which in turn supports the predicate-act requirement for entry of the FRO. A. In pertinent part, stalking requires proof a defendant "purposefully or knowingly" engaged in a "course of conduct directed at a specific person that would cause a reasonable person to fear for [their] safety or the safety of a A-1519-25 6 third person, or to suffer emotional distress." N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(b). A "course of conduct" includes repeatedly monitoring or surveilling a person, directly or through third parties. N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(a)(1). The reasonable- person inquiry considers a person in the victim's circumstances and with the victim's knowledge of defendant. State v. Gandhi, 201 N.J. 161, 186-87 (2010). The record supports the court's determination defendant engaged in a course of conduct. Defendant admitted he installed a GPS device on plaintiff's Jeep and monitored her whereabouts for five months because he suspected infidelity. He further admitted he directed his mother and sister to observe and record plaintiff, and then sent plaintiff the recording. The court found those acts constituted repeated surveillance and, therefore, stalking under N.J.S.A. 2C:12-10(b). The trial court, however, did not assess whether these actions would cause a reasonable person in plaintiff's circumstances to fear for her safety or to suffer emotional distress. Although the court recited that statutory element, it did not expressly apply the objective reasonable-person standard in concluding defendant committed stalking. To that extent, the court's stalking analysis is incomplete and cannot sustain a valid determination that stalking was established as a predicate act. A-1519-25 7 B. Harassment requires proof the defendant, with a "purpose to harass," strikes, kicks, shoves, or engages in "other offensive touching" or threatens to do so. N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(b). The required mens reaโ€”the "purpose to harass"โ€”may be inferred from the evidence, common sense, and experience. State v. H.E.S., 175 N.J. 309, 327 (2003); State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 577 (1997). The evidence must support the notion defendant's conscious object was to alarm or annoy. J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 487 (2011). Mere awareness a defendant's conduct might have that effect is insufficient. Ibid. We are satisfied the record contains sufficient credible evidence to support the trial court's finding, by a preponderance of the evidence, defendant committed harassment. Plaintiff testified defendant grabbed her upper arms and prevented her from leaving, notwithstanding her repeated demands to release her. Defendant acknowledged he grabbed plaintiff, though he maintained he did so only to prevent her departure and only for approximately thirty seconds. The court found, under either version of events, defendant subjected plaintiff to offensive touching. A-1519-25 8 The central question becomes defendant's intent. In resolving that issue, the court did not rely solely on the impact of defendant's conduct upon plaintiff. Rather, the court found defendant first demanded the keys to the Jeep in order to "exhibit control" and then physically restrained plaintiff when she attempted to leave. From those events, the court reasonably inferred defendant's conduct was not merely reactive, but was instead controlling in nature and undertaken with the purpose to alarm or seriously annoy plaintiff. See Tribuzio v. Roder, 356 N.J. Super. 590, 598-99 (App. Div. 2003) (sustaining a finding of harassment where the defendant, angered by the plaintiff's refusal to engage with him, prevented her from leaving and engaged in conduct intended to alarm or annoy). Although defendant offered a different explanation for his conduct, the court was not required to accept that account. The court reasonably found defendant's admitted physical restraint of plaintiff during a domestic dispute constituted offensive touching undertaken with a purpose to harass. The harassment finding is supported by sufficient credible evidence in the record and, standing alone, supports the entry of the FRO. A-1519-25 9 III. We disagree with defendant that a confluence of due process errors deprived him of a fair trial. Those include the purported failure of the trial court to advise him of the consequences of an FRO, which he claims deprived him of a meaningful opportunity to retain counsel and prejudiced his self- representation. Since these issues were not raised before the trial court, we review these points to assess whether plain error occurred. R. 2:10-2. The plain error standard requires a determination of whether an error occurred and whether that error was "clearly capable of producing an unjust result." R.G. v. R.G., 449 N.J. Super. 208, 220 (App. Div. 2017) (quoting State v. Green, 447 N.J. Super. 317, 325 (App. Div. 2016)). "Plain error has intentionally been created as a high bar for parties to meet in order to encourage litigants to raise any objections to evidence at the trial level where the court can best 'forestall or correct a potential error' in a timely manner." State v. Santamaria, 236 N.J. 390, 409 (2019) (quoting State v. Bueso, 225 N.J. 193, 203 (2016)). First, the court advised both parties of their right to retain private counsel, explained that proceeding that day would constitute a waiver of that right, outlined the basic hearing procedures, and informed defendant the entry A-1519-25 10 of an FRO carried significant consequences. Defendant was also afforded a full opportunity to be heard. He testified at length, denied plaintiff's allegations, explained his conduct, disputed plaintiff's account of events, and sought to introduce materials he contended supported his position. Defendant has not established any asserted deficiency in the court's advisements depriving him of a fair hearing. Second, defendants in domestic violence proceedings are not entitled to appointed counsel. They may, however, retain private counsel if they choose. See J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 481 (2011). When a defendant appears self- represented, the trial court must ensure defendant understands the right to retain counsel and is afforded a meaningful opportunity to exercise that right. D.N. v. K.M., 429 N.J. Super. 592, 606-07 (App. Div. 2013). Whether such an opportunity was meaningful depends upon the circumstances presented. Id. at 606. Applying those principles, defendant was afforded a meaningful opportunity to retain counsel. At the outset of the hearing, the court advised both parties that, although they were not entitled to appointed counsel, they had "the right to retain private counsel." The court further explained, by proceeding that day, the parties would waive that right and represent A-1519-25 11 themselves. The court also outlined the hearing procedure, including defendant's opportunity to cross-examine plaintiff and to testify on his own behalf. When asked whether he had any questions before the hearing began, defendant replied, "No." He did not request additional time to obtain counsel or otherwise seek an adjournment. This matter is distinguishable from A.A.R. v. J.R.C., 471 N.J. Super. 584, 588-89 (App. Div. 2022), where we reversed because the trial court failed to advise the self-represented defendant of his right to retain counsel. Here, by contrast, the court expressly advised defendant of that right, and defendant elected to proceed without objection. On this record, we discern no error. The trial court also adequately apprised defendant of the consequences of an FRO. Before proceeding, the court advised defendant if an FRO were entered, he would be fingerprinted, placed in the central domestic violence registry, assessed a mandatory civil penalty, and exposed to contempt sanctions, including incarceration, for any violation of the order. The FRO ultimately entered imposed additional restraints, including exclusion from the residence, suspension of parenting time, an obligation to pay rent, a prohibition on the possession of weapons, and submission to a psychiatric evaluation. A-1519-25 12 Our jurisprudence does not suggest a trial court must enumerate each and every consequence that may flow from an adverse determination on a domestic violence complaint. Rather, our review of the pertinent precedent indicates a defendant must be given sufficient notice that the entry of an FRO carries serious consequences and be afforded a meaningful opportunity to retain counsel before the matter proceeds. See D.N., 429 N.J. Super. at 606- 07; A.A.R., 471 N.J. Super. at 588-89. Measured against that standard, the court's pretrial colloquy with defendant was sufficient. Finally, we are unpersuaded by defendant's contention his difficulty in representing himself constituted plain error. Defendant was afforded a full opportunity to participate in the hearing and to present his defense. He testified at length and gave his account of the events in question. Defendant denied plaintiff's allegation he demanded the Jeep keys to humiliate her, asserting instead that plaintiff had been insulting him and his mother. He explained why he asked for the keys and why he believed plaintiff was involved with another man. Although he admitted grabbing plaintiff when she attempted to leave, he maintained he did so out of jealousy and released her after approximately thirty seconds. A-1519-25 13 Defendant also addressed the GPS and surveillance evidence. He acknowledged placing a GPS device on the Jeep and testified it had remained there for approximately five months because he suspected plaintiff had been unfaithful. He further admitted directing his mother and sister to the parking lot on November 3 and sending plaintiff the video they had recorded. At the same time, he denied threatening to destroy the vehicle, injure plaintiff, or instruct the dog to attack her. Defendant likewise disputed plaintiff's account of the parties' prior history, including the alleged machete incident. In addition, he testified concerning his depression, counseling, self-harm, and current living circumstances. Defendant attempted to offer additional material in support of his position. He sought to introduce a letter from his psychologist, which the court properly excluded as hearsay. He also attempted to present a video, and the court questioned him at length regarding its relevance before declining to consider it. Although defendant did not cross-examine plaintiff effectively, he was plainly afforded the opportunity to do so. In short, the record does not support defendant's claim that he was prevented from presenting a defense when he represented himself. Affirmed. A-1519-25 14