Full Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-4125-24 P.B., Plaintiff-Respondent, v. W.G., Defendant-Appellant. _________________________ Submitted October 8, 2026 – Decided November 13, 2026 Before Judges Mawla and DeAlmeida. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Bergen County, Docket No. FV-02-1853-25. The Tormey Law Firm LLC, attorneys for appellant (Travis J. Tormey, of counsel; Jeffrey A. Skiendziul, on the brief). Faugno Weis Duarte Raso, LLC, attorneys for respondent (Robert M. Biagiotti, on the brief). PER CURIAM Defendant W.G.1 appeals from an August 7, 2025 final restraining order (FRO) entered against him by the Family Part pursuant to the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35. We affirm. I. Defendant and plaintiff P.B., who were never married, have one child who, at the times relevant to this appeal, was fifteen years old. On February 21, 2025, plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant seeking an FRO. Defendant did not include a copy of the complaint in his appendix. See R. 2:6-1(a)(1)(A) (requiring appellant's appendix include the pleadings in civil matters). We, therefore, do not have before us the precise allegations by plaintiff of predicate acts of domestic violence and the parties' history of domestic violence. At trial, plaintiff testified with respect to numerous acts of harassment by defendant, N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4. According to plaintiff, on several occasions in January and February 2025, defendant threatened to make and made baseless reports to the Division of Child Protection and Permanency (DCPP) that she medically neglected their child. In addition, she alleged defendant previously made a baseless report to DCPP that her fiancé verbally abused their daughter 1 We use initials to preserve the confidentiality of court records concerning domestic violence. R. 1:38-3(d)(9). A-4125-24 2 and repeatedly threatened to report plaintiff to the agency with respect to routine concerns about her parenting. The court entered a temporary restraining order (TRO) against defendant. In August 2025, the court held a trial at which the parties testified. The testimony established the following. The child has Type-1 diabetes, which requires regular medical appointments. Plaintiff has primary custody and lives with her fiancé and two other children. Pursuant to a parenting agreement, the child spends time with defendant every other weekend during the school year, and additional time during the summer months. Despite the agreement, because of the child's age, the parties allow her to choose when she spends time with each parent. Plaintiff testified defendant called DCPP in 2023, and reported the child told him plaintiff's fiancé verbally abused her. Representatives of the agency interviewed the child at defendant's home. Defendant waited until the interview was underway to inform plaintiff of the child's report and the agency's investigation. DCPP ultimately determined the claim was unfounded and closed the matter. Separately, the child received medical care at a Manhattan facility for six years. According to defendant, he scheduled and took the child to most of her A-4125-24 3 medical appointments. In 2024, plaintiff requested to change the child's medical provider to a physician in New Jersey. Defendant refused to consent to the change, believing the care provided in Manhattan was the best available for the child's condition. On December 17, 2024, defendant contacted plaintiff and asked her to schedule a medical appointment at the Manhattan facility. After not receiving a response the following day, defendant, without consulting plaintiff, scheduled an appointment for February 13, 2025, a day the child was likely to be with plaintiff. Defendant sent plaintiff a text message informing her of the appointment and stating she could reschedule if needed. Plaintiff responded, "You cannot make demands of me. Make the appointment on your time since you have nothing better to do with your pathetic life. If not, we can go back to the court and let them know . . . your insurance lapsed and [you] cannot provide for" the child.2 Defendant replied, "I have no idea when [the child] is going to be with me. If I make an appointment and she's with you, you're going to say I [made] an appointment on your time." 2 The court admitted text message exchanges between the parties into evidence. Defendant, however, did not include a copy of the text messages in his appendix. Because our record does not contain the text messages, we rely on the parties' testimony reciting the content of those messages. A-4125-24 4 On January 20, 2025, plaintiff sent defendant a text message accusing him of scheduling the appointment during her parenting time, which she alleged the judge had instructed him not to do. She demanded defendant reschedule the appointment during his parenting time. Defendant responded the physician did not work on weekends, when the child was most likely to be with him, and said: "If you're not willing to take [the child] to the doctor, I'll have to contact family services and go back to court so you can tell the judge why you won't take [her] to the doctor." On February 10, 2025, plaintiff notified defendant she had, with the physician's approval, converted the appointment to a virtual session. She also told defendant his health insurance did not cover virtual appointments. Defendant texted back to protest the conversion of the appointment to a virtual session and stated if plaintiff was "going to deny [the child's] medical care, because it saves . . . on tolls," he was going to "report[] it and file for a hearing." He claimed the appointment needed to be in person to upload information from a medical device and to perform a blood test. Defendant also stated the child needed a physical examination because it had been six months since she had last seen a doctor. A-4125-24 5 Plaintiff responded the child's device information could be uploaded from a home computer, and her blood could be drawn locally after the visit with laboratory results sent to the physician. She also claimed defendant was responsible for any delay in the child's treatment because he did not have health coverage for her last appointment. Defendant replied by saying, "If you don't physically take her to the doctor's office, you can . . . justify why to the judge and family services." He then called DCPP, alleging plaintiff medically neglected the child. On February 13, 2025, defendant texted plaintiff to ask if she would be taking the child to the appointment in Manhattan. Plaintiff again stated she switched the appointment to a virtual session. She reiterated she had received the doctor's consent for the virtual appointment and had requested the doctor order bloodwork to be taken after the visit. Defendant responded by saying he would take the child to the appointment in person. Plaintiff gave her consent to defendant taking the child to the appointment. He replied: "I don't need [your] okay for something a judge told you to do. What kind of mother would not take her own child to the doctor? You can explain that to the judge and whoever family services sends to your door." Defendant then again reported plaintiff to DCPP, alleging medical neglect of the child. A-4125-24 6 On February 19, 2025, DCPP investigated plaintiff. The agency determined the allegations of medical neglect were unfounded and closed the case.3 Plaintiff testified defendant had previously sent her repeated text messages complaining about her parenting style and threatening to report her to DCPP over routine matters. She testified that as a result of defendant's behavior: I feel scared, every time . . . . Everything that I do with my children is questionable in my mind. We are in pain. We are hurting. And we don't know when it's going to end. It's unfair . . . [t]hat my parenting has been questioned when there is no reason for my parenting . . . to be questioned. My children are constantly in fear. They don't know when a stranger is going to show up and start questioning them and looking at their bodies and wanting to know if mommy and daddy are hurting them. They are in fear that they are going to be taken away from us and taken away from their home. I just want it [to] stop. I just want to be left alone. Defendant testified he "imagine[d] . . . it's not a good feeling" to be investigated by DCPP, and "no parent wants to have [DCPP] called against them." He conceded he was aware he could make an application to the court in 3 The parties did not submit evidence of DCPP's investigation at trial. However, plaintiff testified DCPP closed the case after determining defendant's allegations were unfounded. Defendant did not dispute plaintiff's testimony on this point. A-4125-24 7 the parties' pending non-dissolution matter with respect to any concerns he had about plaintiff's parenting. However, he testified he was "stressed out," "desperate," and felt he "had no options" but to report plaintiff to DCPP. With respect to the medical appointment, defendant testified, "I tried my best to not make this appointment on [plaintiff's] time. And my only intention was for our daughter to physically be at this doctor's appointment as soon as possible." Defendant claimed his intention when reporting plaintiff to DCPP was not "to bully her or make her do anything." The court issued an oral decision granting the FRO. It found plaintiff provided credible testimony, which was corroborated by documentary evidence, and defendant provided evasive and inconsistent testimony. The court concluded defendant acted with the purpose to annoy and alarm plaintiff when he repeatedly threatened to report her to DCPP and reported her to the agency alleging baseless claims of medical neglect. In addition, the court found defendant used the threat of reporting plaintiff to the agency as "a hammer" in a disturbing manner. The court found defendant acted with the purpose to annoy and alarm plaintiff when he reported her fiancé to DCPP for using coarse language in front of the child. These acts constituted harassment pursuant to N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4, and were predicate acts of domestic violence. A-4125-24 8 The court then undertook an analysis of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1) to (7), to determine if entry of an FRO was warranted. It found plaintiff established a history of domestic violence based on defendant's threats to report her to DCPP over a long period of time prior to carrying out those threats and reporting baseless claims of medical neglect. In addition, the court found defendant's reporting plaintiff's fiancé to DCPP was a component of the history of domestic violence. It concluded defendant posed an immediate danger to plaintiff and an FRO would be in the best interests of plaintiff and the child. After weighing the relevant statutory factors, the court found an FRO was necessary to protect plaintiff from future acts of domestic violence by defendant. On appeal, defendant argues the trial court's decision he committed predicate acts of domestic violence was against the weight of the evidence. In addition, he argues the court's conclusion an FRO was necessary to protect plaintiff from future acts of domestic violence is not supported by the record. II. "In our review of a trial court's order entered following trial in a domestic violence matter, we grant substantial deference to the trial court's findings of fact and legal conclusions based upon those findings." D.N. v. K.M., 429 N.J. Super. 592, 596 (App. Div. 2013) (citing Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411- A-4125-24 9 12 (1998)). We should not disturb the "'factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial judge unless [we are] convinced that they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.'" Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412 (alteration in original) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Inv'rs Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)). Deference is particularly appropriate when the evidence is testimonial and involves credibility issues because the judge who observes the witnesses and hears the testimony has a perspective the reviewing court does not enjoy. Pascale v. Pascale, 113 N.J. 20, 33 (1988) (citing Gallo v. Gallo, 66 N.J. Super. 1, 5 (App. Div. 1961)). The entry of an FRO requires the trial court to make certain findings. See Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 125-27 (App. Div. 2006). The court "must determine whether the plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25 - 19[(a)] has occurred." Id. at 125. It should make this determination "'in light of the previous history of violence between the parties.'" Ibid. (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 402). Next, the court must determine "whether a restraining order is necessary, upon an evaluation of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25 - 29[(a)](1) to -29[(a)]([7]), to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to A-4125-24 10 prevent further abuse." Id. at 127 (citing N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(b)); see also J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 476 (2011). This determination requires an evaluation of: (1) The previous history of domestic violence between the plaintiff and defendant, including threats, harassment and physical abuse; (2) The existence of immediate danger to person or property; (3) The financial circumstances of the plaintiff and defendant; (4) The best interests of the victim and any child; (5) In determining custody and parenting time the protection of the victim's safety; (6) The existence of a verifiable order of protection from another jurisdiction; and (7) Any pattern of coercive control against a person that in purpose or effect unreasonably interferes with, threatens, or exploits a person's liberty, freedom, bodily integrity, or human rights with the court specifically considering evidence of the need for protection from immediate danger or the prevention of further abuse. [N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a); see also Cesare, 154 N.J. at 401.] Here, the trial court determined defendant committed harassment, one of the predicate acts set forth in the PDVA. N.J.S.A. 2C:25-19(a)(13). A person commits harassment if, "with purpose to harass another," he or she: A-4125-24 11 (a) Makes, or causes to be made, one or more communications anonymously or at extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language, or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm; (b) Subjects another to striking, kicking, shoving, or other offensive touching, or threatens to do so; or (c) Engages in any other course of alarming conduct or of repeatedly committed acts with purpose to alarm or seriously annoy such other person. [N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4.] The actor must have the purpose to harass another. Corrente v. Corrente, 281 N.J. Super. 243, 249 (App. Div. 1995) (citing D.C. v. T.H., 269 N.J. Super. 458, 461-62 (App. Div. 1994); E.K. v. G.K., 241 N.J. Super. 567, 570 (App. Div. 1990)). Finding a party had the purpose to harass another must be supported by "some evidence that the actor's conscious object was to alarm or annoy; mere awareness that someone might be alarmed or annoyed is insufficient." J.D., 207 N.J. at 487 (citing State v. Fuchs, 230 N.J. Super. 420, 428 (App. Div. 1989)). A purpose to harass may be inferred from the evidence. State v. McDougald, 120 N.J. 523, 566-67 (1990). Common sense and experience may also inform a determination or finding of purpose. State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 577 (1997) (citing State v. Richards, 155 N.J. Super. 106, 118 (App. Div. 1978)). A-4125-24 12 We have reviewed the record and conclude it sufficiently supports the trial court's finding defendant acted with the purpose to harass plaintiff when he repeatedly threatened to report her to DCPP over routine parenting issues and made baseless claims to the agency she medically neglected their child. Defendant acknowledged he was aware he could make an application to the court in the parties' pending non-dissolution matter at any time with respect to plaintiff's parenting. He conceded he chose instead to repeatedly threaten to report plaintiff to DCPP and create the prospect of an investigation that threatened her parenting rights. Defendant also reported plaintiff's fiancé to DCPP for verbally abusing the child. He involved the agency, and subjected plaintiff to potentially serious consequences to her parenting rights, without first discussing the matter with her and based only on the child's hearsay report of the fiancé's use of coarse language. In addition, the evidence established the parties' disagreement with respect to the child's February 2025 medical appointment concerned scheduling, not medical neglect. Plaintiff did not refuse to take the child to medical treatment; she merely changed the format of a medical appointment with the physician's consent from in-person to virtual. Defendant admitted when he objected to the change in the appointment's format, plaintiff readily agreed to allow him to take A-4125-24 13 the child to Manhattan for an in-person session with the physician. There was no substantive basis for defendant to inform DCPP plaintiff refused to provide medical care to the child. We are not persuaded by defendant's argument the trial court erred with respect to the need for an FRO to protect plaintiff from future acts of domestic violence. The court weighed the appropriate statutory factors and found defendant's course of conduct posed an immediate and continuing threat to plaintiff, who credibly testified defendant's persistent threats caused her, the parties' child, and the children who live with plaintiff to be in constant fear a DCPP worker will appear and subject them to interviews, physical inspections, and removal from their home. Affirmed. A-4125-24 14