Full Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0329-25 NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. D.I.P., 1 Defendant-Appellant, and L.R.M., Defendant. __________________________ IN THE MATTER OF L.O.P., a minor. __________________________ Submitted October 19, 2026 – Decided November 5, 2026 1 We use initials and pseudonyms to protect the identity of the family. R. 1:38- 3(d)(12). Before Judges Perez Friscia and Torregrossa-O'Connor. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Passaic County, Docket No. FN-16-0047-24. Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, attorney for appellant (Bruce P. Lee, Designated Counsel, on the briefs). Jennifer Davenport, Attorney General, attorney for respondent (Deborah E. Wassel, Assistant Attorney General, of counsel; Renee Greenberg, Deputy Attorney General, on the brief). Jennifer N. Sellitti, Public Defender, Law Guardian, attorney for minor L.O.P. (Meredith Alexis Pollock, Deputy Public Defender, of counsel; Jennifer M. Sullivan, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and on the brief). PER CURIAM Defendant D.I.P. ("Dawn") appeals from the January 22, 2025 Family Part order, which denied her motion for plaintiff the New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency ("Division") to adhere to the Americans with Disabilities Act ("ADA"), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101 to 12213, comply with Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act ("RHA") of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794, and provide further reunification services with her son, L.O.P. ("Lyle"). She also appeals from the trial court's August 19, 2025 order dismissing the Division's complaint under Title 9, N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21 to -8.73, and Title 30, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11 to - 2 A-0329-25 15.4. The Law Guardian for Lyle urges that we reject Dawn's arguments and affirm the court's orders. Having reviewed the record, parties' arguments, and applicable law, we affirm. I. We summarize the pertinent facts and procedural history adduced from the record. We also incorporate the relevant facts from our prior consolidated opinion, New Jersey Division of Child Protection and Permanency v. D.P., J.A.T.A., and F.S., Nos. A-1955-21 and A-2176-21 (App. Div. Mar. 28, 2023) (slip op. at 1-14), certif. denied, 256 N.J. 344 (2024) ("D.I.P. I"). After Dawn delivered Lyle in October 2023, the hospital contacted the Division based on safety concerns for his welfare. Lyle is Dawn's fifth child, and the Division has been involved with Dawn since 2018. Dawn has been diagnosed with cognitive and intellectual deficits. The Division has been involved with the placement of three of Dawn's older children. Dawn's oldest child, a daughter, resides in the Dominican Republic with her father and has not been subject to placement. In February 2022, the court terminated Dawn's parental rights to her second and third-born children, N.A.P. ("Nina") and J.A.P. ("Joey"), respectively. In March 2023, we affirmed the court's judgment of guardianship, terminating Dawn's parental 3 A-0329-25 rights to Nina and Joey based on Dawn's "impairments[,]" "cognitive deficits," inability to meet her "children's basic needs," and mental health limitations that prohibited her from providing a safe and stable home. D.I.P. I, slip op. at 19- 20. On January 22, 2025, Dawn consented to a kinship legal guardianship ("KLG"), N.J.S.A. 3B:12A-1 to -7, arrangement for her fourth child, F.P. ("Fiona"). Nina, Joey, and Fiona are all now in the care of P.J. ("Pam")—Nina and Joey's adoptive mother and Fiona's resource parent. On October 5, 2023, after Lyle was medically discharged, the Division removed him from his mother's care and placed him with his father, L.R.M. ("Luke"). On October 10, 2023, the Division filed a verified complaint and order to show cause ("OTSC"), seeking the continued custody, care, and supervision of Lyle. That same day the court conducted an OTSC hearing. The Division presented its concerns about Dawn's ability to "ensure [Lyle's] health, safety[,] and welfare" based on her cognitive deficits, lack of permanent housing, and employment instability. The court approved the emergency removal and custody application based on the Division's showing that Dawn was unable to "independently parent her newborn." On October 27, 2023, the return date of the OTSC, the court entered an order continuing the Division's care and supervision and Luke's physical custody 4 A-0329-25 of Lyle. Dawn was granted supervised parenting time, ordered to attend the Division's scheduled psychological evaluation, and directed to cooperate with the Division's offer of housing assistance. In November 2023, Frank J. Dyer, Ph.D., conducted a psychological evaluation of Dawn. On December 18, 2023, the court held a Title 30 summary hearing. The Division confirmed it had been providing Dawn services, including housing and therapy. The Division relayed that Luke had continued to maintain physical custody of Lyle. Dawn's counsel made an oral motion during the hearing for "the Division to explore compliance with Title 2 of the" ADA and with the RHA. The court found the "family continue[d] to be in need of services" and ordered Luke to continue with physical custody of Lyle and Dawn to have continued supervised parenting time. Additionally, the court ordered the Division to "explore if it[ wa]s complying with" the ADA and RHA. On February 28, 2024, at a status review hearing, 2 the Division moved for the court to relieve it of its statutory obligation to make reasonable efforts to 2 Pursuant to Directive #08-25 promulgated by the Administrative Office of the Courts, we use "status review" to refer to the court's review rather than "compliance review." Admin. Off. of the Cts., Admin. Directive #08-25, Family – Children in Court – Change in Terminology: Renaming "Compliance Review" to "Status Review" (Dec. 5, 2025). 5 A-0329-25 provide services to Dawn pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11.3. The Division argued that it "shall not be required to provide reasonable efforts to reunify the child with a parent" after satisfying certain requirements. Dawn opposed the Division's application and moved for reunification. At the time, Lyle was still residing with Luke. The Division advised the court that Dawn was attending "weekly individual counseling at [a] [m]ental [h]ealth [c]linic" but had not complied with the Division's requests for documentation. The Division also expressed continued concerns regarding Dawn's housing and employment instability. Further, the Division highlighted that Dawn's parental rights to Nina and Joey had already been involuntarily terminated. The Law Guardian for Lyle supported the Division's motion to be relieved of providing Dawn with further reasonable efforts to reunify the family. During the hearing, Dawn addressed reunification with Lyle and the Division's request to be relieved from providing further reasonable efforts. She argued that her expert, Jonathan Slyker, Ph.D., supported "reunifying [her with] the child" and had "nine recommendations" "the Division should do" to address "her cognitive limitations." Dawn submitted Dr. Slyker's report for the court's consideration and requested it be moved into evidence for the court's evaluation of the issues. Dawn's counsel stipulated that "both" parties' experts' reports 6 A-0329-25 could "go[] into evidence." While the Division initially objected, it later agreed to the admission of both experts' reports. The court accepted the experts' reports into evidence and noted that at the best interests hearing, the experts would be called to testify. 3 At the hearing, Dawn acknowledged her "cognitive limitations," noting "[t]here[ was] nothing more [she] c[ould] do." However, she argued reunification with Lyle was possible if they resided with someone who had "a power of attorney [("POA")]." She maintained the person with a POA could make the necessary "decisions regarding the health, care[,] and education of" Lyle. The court determined the Division had established a basis for relief under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11.3(c), because Dawn's parental rights to Nina and Joey were recently involuntarily terminated, but it nevertheless denied the Division's motion to be relieved without prejudice. The court ordered the Division to continue "to provide [the] required reasonable efforts," have continued care and supervision of Lyle, and maintain Luke's physical custody. 3 We note the court referenced and considered Dr. Dyer's and Dr. Slyker's reports in its ultimate decision to dismiss the Division's complaint and deny Dawn's request for reunification. Dawn has provided neither expert report on appeal. See R. 2:6-1(a)(1)(I) (stating the appendix must contain parts of the record "essential to the proper consideration of the issues"). 7 A-0329-25 On April 29, 2024, a different judge presided over the matter and conducted another status review hearing. Dawn again raised the issue of the Division's purported noncompliance with the ADA and advocated to be provided "home hea[l]th aids," "nursing support," "social service support," and "part-time work," which the court expressed may be unfeasible. The court ordered the Division to confer with the Division of Developmental Disabilities ("DDD") to determine if Dawn was eligible for additional services. Further, Dawn was ordered to continue having supervised parenting time with Lyle and individualized mental health counseling. On June 12, 2024, the court presided over a Title 30 disposition hearing. The Division confirmed Dawn's DDD application for services was submitted. After emphasizing that Dr. Dyer's updated expert report provided that Dawn was "manifestly incapable of exercising the type of comprehension, judgment, attentiveness[,] and emotional stability to guarantee the safety of a child in her care," the Division recommended the "case be dismissed . . . with physical custody remaining with . . . [Luke] and joint-legal custody" ordered. Dawn requested further services, again raising the issue of the Division's alleged noncompliance with the ADA and RHA. The court noted the Division had been complying with providing Dawn services. Nevertheless, the court 8 A-0329-25 ordered the Division to "comply with all ADA[-]related provisions applicable to [Dawn]" and that the "status quo" be maintained pending a best interests hearing. The court also instructed Dawn to specifically explain how the Division was not reasonably complying with the ADA and RHA. In August 2024, the Division removed Lyle from Dawn's care after discovering Luke had unexpectedly moved to Guatemala, improperly leaving Lyle in Dawn's care on August 9, 2024. Dawn had taken physical custody of Lyle for less than two weeks before the Division's removal. On September 13, 2024, the court granted the Division's application to continue its custody, care, and supervision of Lyle. The Division placed Lyle with Pam, who had adopted Nina and Joey and cared for Fiona under a KLG arrangement with Dawn's consent. The Division again requested the court order it was relieved of making further reasonable efforts and offering services. The parties addressed the reports of the Division's expert, Dr. Dyer, and Dawn's expert, Dr. Slyker. Dr. Slyker's report undisputedly supported reunification on the condition that there was "somebody there to help [Dawn] and assist her." The Division argued it was not possible to abide by Dr. Slyker's report because there was no way "to impose a requirement of 24/7 supervision [of a parent] after someone is reunified." It also informed the court that DDD 9 A-0329-25 had approved Dawn's application, and the Division was "in the process of getting [Dawn] connected with services." The additional services approved included a "Mommy and Me" housing program, which Dawn refused. At the hearing, Dawn argued reliance on her cognitive impairment to prevent reunification was "a red herring" because the issue was "whether or not she ha[d] support[] which would facilitate safe parenting." Dawn acknowledged that her expert opined she should not be reunified with Lyle unless she was provided permanent assistance to help and oversee her parenting of Lyle. She argued the Division failed to pursue and offer services related to Dr. Slyker's "nine recommendations." Afterwards, the Law Guardian agreed with the Division, labeling the scenario a "catch-22" as the Division could not impose or guarantee restrictions after dismissal, so any service that allowed Dawn to reunify "would need to be lifted." In addressing the Division's motion, the court acknowledged it had to independently review the evidence in the case before it. The court noted it was undisputed the Division had established Dawn's parental rights were terminated to Nina and Joey, satisfying N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11.3(c). In evaluating the presented evidence, the court determined that Dawn showed no "reasonable prospect of [r]easonable [e]fforts" that would result in "an improvement of . . . [Dawn's] 10 A-0329-25 condition or circumstance." The court found the concerns regarding Dawn involve "organic issues that disable . . . [her] and create substantial concern regarding her ability to properly care for[,] . . . manage[,] and house this child." The court recognized it was balancing Dawn's rights and Lyle's "needs." In addressing Dawn's request to have "care and supervision . . . continue" with conditions, the court highlighted that her request for a POA and permanent home assistance based on her disability would place the Division in an interminable care and supervision role. The court therefore ordered the Division was relieved "of the obligation to make those [r]easonable [e]fforts." In October 2024, Dawn filed a motion to compel the Division to comply with the ADA and RHA. Dawn argued she had never "endangered" Lyle, the Division had never investigated providing her home aids to assist in raising Lyle, and the Division had not explored her learning style. She noted that Luke had abandoned Lyle and moved to "Guatemala for an indefinite amount of time" and Lyle was with "a non-relative resource parent." She maintained she was safely living with a friend who had her POA and was "authorized to make decisions regarding the health, care[,] and education of the minor child." Dawn argued the "Division should be ordered to accommodate . . . [her] disability." Specifically, Dawn asserted the Division had to "identify and provide 11 A-0329-25 accommodat[ing] services . . . either through Division-funded services or through referrals to outside agencies—public and private—that can provide the services." She posited the Division "failed to investigate babysitting services, parent aide services, home health aides, homemaker services, and hands-on and individualized instruction to a mother with an intellectual disability." Dawn averred that the Division "conflate[d] the issue of reasonable efforts with the obligations under the ADA." In November 2024, the Division filed opposition to Dawn's motion, maintaining it provided sufficient individualized services tailored to Dawn's disability. The "Division acknowledge[d] that it has an obligation to comply with the ADA" and RHA. It represented that Dawn was given an "extensive range of services and evaluations, including multiple psychological and psychiatric evaluations by a number of different providers." The Division argued Dawn had failed to: identify "any instance where . . . [she] was denied participation in a service," show any "individual need[] [that had not been taken] into account when determining the implementation of services," and acknowledge "the numerous individual evaluations and services put into place by the Division." Further, the Division maintained Dawn's motion was moot because the court had previously ordered the Division was relieved of making 12 A-0329-25 further reasonable efforts and it had "provided the services that were recommended by [Dawn's] assessments[,] including referrals to DDD," which resulted in offered services that Dawn declined. On January 22, 2025, the court heard oral argument on the motion and held a permanency hearing. The same day, the court issued an order accompanied by an oral decision denying Dawn's motion. The court noted that its September 13, 2024 order had granted the Division's request to be relieved from providing reasonable services to Dawn. The court "found that no services would remedy the mother's inability to parent independently and there was no viable plan for implementing the needed support on a permanent basis," noting Dawn's undisputed lack of capacity was "expressed in the reports of the Division's expert and . . . [Dawn's] expert." The court further reasoned that the Division had made substantial reasonable efforts and Dawn did not show "a necessary service" that "the Division fail[ed] to . . . provide" her as "a disabled person." The court emphasized that Dawn's expert opined "that there [wa]s no possibility that she could ever independently parent" and determined the Division did not have to make further "reasonable efforts" because Dawn "lacked and could not be helped to have . . . [the] capacity to independently parent the child." The court noted 13 A-0329-25 Dawn established no reasonable available service that would permit her to safely parent Lyle alone. The court approved the permanency plan for Lyle and continued placement with Pam, permitting him to remain with his three siblings and noting the importance of the siblings remaining together. Luke consented to a KLG placement, but Dawn objected. On March 11, 2025, a different judge presided over a Title 30 summary hearing and Title 30 dispositional hearing. The Division requested that Title 30 jurisdiction continue as it intended to file an application for KLG. The court ordered the Division's continued custody, care, and supervision of Lyle. On May 21, 2025, the court held a permanency and status review hearing. The Division advised the court that Pam was no longer "willing to proceed with KLG and [wa]s only open to adopting" Lyle. Pam had detailed that Dawn would frequently cancel on short notice or appear late for scheduled parenting time visits, which was disruptive. "Accordingly, the Division . . . propos[ed] a new permanency goal for the minor . . . of termination of parental rights followed by adoption by the current caretaker." The Division also advised it was continuing to explore placement with the paternal relatives, including an out-of-state placement, and had filed an Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children 14 A-0329-25 inquiry with that state. Luke did not agree to Pam's adoption of Lyle and requested the court consider adoption by his brother and sister-in-law. The Division advised the court that Dawn was pregnant with her sixth child, due to give birth in September 2025, and the father was J.A.P.R.—the brother of Dawn's roommate with her POA. Regarding the Division's "[a]ction [p]lan" concerning the future child, it advised the court that Dawn was being referred for a mental health psychological evaluation, DDD had been notified to investigate "the possibility of receiving a home aide to assist her," and Dawn was in counseling and receiving medication monitoring. The court reserved its decision on permanency for another month to clarify Luke's KLG decision. On June 25, 2025, during a status review hearing and permanency hearing, the Division advised the court that Luke's family had decided "to not move forward with the adoption process." Given that decision, the court ordered the Division's continued custody, care, and supervision of Lyle, his placement with Pam, and that the Division present its final permanency plan at the next hearing. The court also granted the Division's request that Dawn attend a psychological evaluation, over her objection. At the July 9, 2025 permanency hearing, Luke's counsel advised the court she was unable to ascertain her client's position regarding Pam's adoption of 15 A-0329-25 Lyle. The court accepted the Division's "permanency plan of termination of parental rights followed by adoption with the current caretaker," finding the Division had established Dawn's inability to care for Lyle because her cognitive deficits impaired her ability to safely parent. Thereafter, on August 19, 2025, the court dismissed the Division's FN matter because a guardianship complaint had been filed. This appeal followed. On appeal, Dawn challenges the court's January 22, 2025 and August 19, 2025 orders. She contends reversal is warranted because: the court erroneously denied her reunification services, failing to recognize "the ADA and Section 504 [of the RHA] prohibit discriminatory State action"; the "court erred by treating its 'reasonable efforts order' as superseding the ADA and RHA"; the court failed to recognize that Dawn "would be excluded from services because of her disability," misapplying the ADA and RHA; the court abused its discretion by relying on Dawn's cognitive disability to deny her motion to compel the Division's compliance with the ADA and RHA; Dawn's counsel was ineffective for failing to properly argue the ADA and RHA, not raising Dawn's federal disability protections, not seeking reconsideration after the "statutory amendments to N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.58 became effective," and "waiving work-product privilege without strategic justification"; and the court effectively precluded 16 A-0329-25 reunification, rendering termination of parental rights a formality, by permitting the Division to withhold services. II. It is well established that "[a]ppellate courts defer to a trial court's factual findings when they are 'supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence.'" N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. B.P., 257 N.J. 361, 373 (2024) (quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)). Family courts "are presumed to have a 'specialized knowledge and experience in matters involving parental relationships and the best interests of children.'" N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. S.K., 456 N.J. Super. 245, 261 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 427 (2012)). The accorded deference, however, "is . . . tempered when the trial court did not hear testimony[] or make credibility determinations based on the demeanor of witnesses." Id. at 262 (quoting N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. J.D., 447 N.J. Super. 337, 350 (App. Div. 2016)). Further, we review a court's interpretation of legal issues de novo. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. J.R.-R., 248 N.J. 353, 368 (2021). "The Legislature charged the Division with the responsibility of protecting the health and welfare of the children of this state." N.J. Div. of 17 A-0329-25 Youth & Fam. Servs. v. G.M., 198 N.J. 382, 397 (2009); see N.J.S.A. 30:4C-4. The Division's procedures for accomplishing its obligations are set forth in Title 9 and Title 30. G.M., 198 N.J. at 397. After the Department of Children and Families receives an abuse or neglect referral, the Division conducts an "investigation . . . designed to assess and assure a child's health and safety" and "gathers evidence regarding the child's condition, obtains statements from the child, interviews alleged perpetrators or other witnesses, requests available police reports, and consults with medical and educational professionals." N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. V.E., 448 N.J. Super. 374, 386 (App. Div. 2017); see N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.11 (describing the Division's responsibility to investigate allegations and take immediate action as "necessary to ensure the safety of the child"); N.J.A.C. 3A:10-2.3, -3.1 to -3.3. "[T]he Division usually pleads Title 9 and Title 30 claims concurrently in order to facilitate the efficient processing of assistance to the family, particularly to the child who is the focus of the inquiry." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. I.S., 214 N.J. 8, 31 (2013); see also I.S., 214 N.J. at 37 (recognizing circumstances that Title 9 and Title 30 "operate independently from one another"). 18 A-0329-25 "[T]he Division can seek a court order [under Title 30] to intervene and require a [parent] to undergo treatment, or seek other relief, if the best interests of the child so require." N.J. Dep't of Child. & Families v. A.L., 213 N.J. 1, 31- 32 (2013) (citing N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12). Title 30 provides an "additional tool afforded [to] the Division to discern the most appropriate course of action for a child and his or her family in need of the Division's assistance." I.S., 214 N.J. at 33 (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. J.C., 423 N.J. Super. 259, 267-68 (App. Div. 2011)). Our Supreme Court has recognized, "N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12 provides the means for the Division to effectuate services to children in need when a parent does not consent to the Division's supervision, care, or custody." Ibid. In "Title 30 actions, the court must be satisfied when entering temporary relief under N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12 that the Division has proven by a preponderance of the evidence that it is in the best interests of the child to enter the relief requested." I.S., 214 N.J. at 38. "N.J.S.A. 30:4C-12 provides that any order entered by the court is effective for six months. If the Division believes services will be needed beyond that point, 'the Division may apply for an extension of that order, requesting a summary hearing and disposition on its request.'" N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. J.C., 257 N.J. 451, 464 (2024) (quoting I.S., 214 N.J. at 19 A-0329-25 37). The court "may extend the order provided that it is satisfied, by the preponderance of the credible evidence, that the best interests of the child require continuation of that order." Ibid. "In any case in which the [D]ivision accepts a child in care or custody, . . . [it] shall make reasonable efforts, prior to placement, to preserve the family in order to prevent the need for removing the child from his home." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11.1. Further, "[a]fter placement, the [D]ivision shall make reasonable efforts to make it possible for the child to safely return to his home." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11.1. However, N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11.3 provides exceptions to the Division's requirement to provide reasonable efforts to reunify a child with their parent. "[T]he [D]ivision shall not be required to provide reasonable efforts to reunify the child with a parent if a court of competent jurisdiction has determined that" the parent's "rights . . . to another of the parent's children have been involuntarily terminated." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11.3(c). Additionally, in considering the necessary reasonable efforts toward reunification, "the health and safety of the child and the child's need for permanency shall be of paramount concern to the court." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11.3. When the Division "determines that family reunification is in the child's best interests," it is not prohibited "from providing reasonable efforts to reunify the 20 A-0329-25 family." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11.3. "A permanency plan[, pursuant to N.J.S.A. 30:4C-61.2,] for the child may be established at the same hearing at which the court determines that reasonable efforts are not required to reunify the child with the parent . . . ." N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11.3. While parents' "rights are fundamentally important, they are not absolute, and 'must be balanced against the State's parens patriae responsibility to protect the welfare of children.'" G.M., 198 N.J. at 397 (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007)). "A court must ensure that the statutory and constitutional rights of the parent or guardian are scrupulously protected." Ibid. (citing In re Guardianship of J.C., 129 N.J. 1, 10 (1992)). III. A. Preemption. Dawn contends the court erroneously "permitted a state statutory framework to displace federal anti-discrimination mandates." She maintains the court allowed "state law to stand as an obstacle to Congress's objective of eliminating discrimination against individuals with disabilities." Dawn additionally argues reversal of the court's January 22, 2025 orders, which denied her "request for ADA and RHA compliance" and permitted the Division to discontinue reunification-related services, is warranted. 21 A-0329-25 We initially recognize that under Title II of the ADA, the Division qualifies as a "public entity," and its reunification plans constitute "services, programs, or activities." 42 U.S.C. §§ 12131(1), 12132. The ADA provides that "[n]othing in this Act shall be construed to invalidate or limit the remedies, rights, and procedures of any Federal law or law of any State . . . that provides greater or equal protection for the rights of individuals with disabilities than are afforded by this Act." 42 U.S.C. § 12201(b). Further, the ADA states that "no qualified individual with a disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be denied the benefits of the services . . . ." 42 U.S.C. § 12132. The RHA similarly mandates that a qualified disabled person shall not, "solely by reason of her or his disability, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving [f]ederal financial assistance . . . ." 29 U.S.C. § 794(a). Dawn asserts that the court improperly denied her motion seeking the Division's further "ADA and RHA compliance," failing to recognize "the Supremacy Clause requires state courts to apply federal anti-discrimination statutes where a conflict exists." It is undisputed that "under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. Const. art. VI, cl. 2, 'state laws 22 A-0329-25 that "interfere with, or are contrary to the laws of congress, made in pursuance of the constitution" are invalid.'" Hager v. M&K Constr., 246 N.J. 1, 28 (2021). "Conflict preemption requires an actual -- rather than hypothetical or speculative -- conflict between federal and state law." Id. at 29. "Absent explicit pre[]emptive language, [the United States Supreme Court has] . . . recognized at least two types of implied pre[]emption: field pre[]emption" and "conflict preemption." Gade v. Nat'l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass'n, 505 U.S. 88, 98 (1992). "[T]he party claiming preemption bears the burden of supporting that claim by 'clear and convincing evidence.'" Summit Plaza Assocs. v. Kolta, 462 N.J. Super. 401, 410 (App. Div. 2020) (quoting Franklin Tower One v. N.M., 157 N.J. 602, 615 (1999)). We "first must consider the purposes of the federal law[] and then evaluate the effect of the state law on those purposes." Franklin Tower One, 157 N.J. at 616. "Preemptive purpose, express or implied, is found 'in the text and structure of the statute at issue.'" In re Alleged Failure of Altice USA, Inc., 253 N.J. 406, 417 (2023). After reviewing the federal and state statutes at issue, we discern no merit in Dawn's argument that a conflict exists. Dawn has not demonstrated there is an existing "battle between conflicting state law and federal law" requiring the "state law to yield." State Univ. of N.J. v. AFSCME Loc. 888 (In re Rutgers), 23 A-0329-25 262 N.J. 523, 543 (2026). As the court repeatedly recognized and the Division has acknowledged, the Division is mandated to comply with all ADA and RHA requirements. It is undisputed that family reunification is the goal and the Division "must monitor the services, change them as needs arise, and identify and strive to overcome barriers to service provision or service utilization." In re Guardianship of D.M.H., 161 N.J. 365, 387 (1999) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, the federal statutory mandates may be met without conflict. Here, the record demonstrates that the Division provided reasonable efforts to Dawn. The Division was involved with Dawn for several years, initially offering her services in 2018. The Division provided further services after assuming custody of Lyle. After the court denied the Division's first application to be relieved of providing services, it ordered her services to be continued. The court specifically recognized that both experts determined Dawn's cognitive deficiencies rendered her unable to independently care for Lyle safely. The court requested that Dawn show what other reasonable efforts and services could be rendered to accommodate her disability in seeking reunification. The Division undisputedly had provided therapy, housing assistance, mental health evaluations and medication compliance, and 24 A-0329-25 coordinated with the DDD regarding Dawn's cognitive deficiencies relative to Lyle. Notably, although the Division assisted with Dawn's DDD application, Dawn declined services. The Division's exemption from providing reasonable efforts contemplated those reasonable efforts in addition to the services previously rendered to her. See N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11.3(c). Relevantly, Dawn failed to substantiate any reasonable efforts or services that the Division failed to provide to accommodate her disability. The ADA requires "reasonable" accommodations, synonymous with Title 30's requirement of reasonable efforts. She has cited no authority in support of her suggestion that the ADA and RHA require the Division to provide her with continuous in- home services, including aides, to reunify her with Lyle, nor that such an option is reasonable. We have recognized that the Division must "accommodate [a parent's] disabilities, but those efforts [may] not bear fruit." N.J. Div. of Youth & Fam. Servs. v. A.G., 344 N.J. Super. 418, 442 (App. Div. 2001). While the ADA and RHA mandate reasonable accommodation, those rights based on her mental health disability do not conflict, but are in tandem with the court's obligation to also "determin[e] the best interests of the child." Ibid. "[T]o allow the provisions of the ADA to constitute a defense to a termination proceeding would improperly elevate the rights of the parent above 25 A-0329-25 those of the child." Ibid. While parents are to be afforded all reasonable accommodations, their "mental disabilities [may] render[] them unable to parent" and serve as sufficient grounds for termination. Id. at 439. Furthermore, "[k]eeping the child in limbo, hoping for some long-term unification plan, would be a misapplication of the law." A.G., 344 N.J. Super. at 438; see also In re Guardianship of D.N., 190 N.J. Super. 648, 654 (J. & D.R. Ct. 1983) (holding the Division did not have to provide the twenty-four-hour supervision necessary to help mentally disabled individuals parent their child). For these reasons, we conclude Dawn's argument that the court "excuse[d] compliance with the ADA and RHA" is without merit. B. Alleged Improper Reliance on Dawn's Disability to Deny Her Motion. Dawn next argues the court abused its discretion by relying on her cognitive disability to deny her motion to compel the Division to provide services under the ADA and RHA. She maintains the Division improperly denied "reunification-related services" based on her disability, the court erred in considering whether the September 2024 order granting the Division's motion rendered her motion moot, and the court failed to recognize its January 2025 permanency order mistakenly relied on her disability to relieve the Division of affording her services. After a review of the record, we disagree. 26 A-0329-25 Contrary to Dawn's assertion, the court's order denying her motion for the Division to comply with the ADA and RHA was not based on her having a cognitive disability alone. The court properly considered its prior ruling granting the Division's N.J.S.A. 30:4C-11.3 motion to be relieved of providing further services. The court noted that the Division's motion was granted because Dawn's parental rights to two of her other children had been terminated after reasonable efforts and services were given. Despite satisfying N.J.S.A. 30:4C- 11.3, the court nevertheless considered Dawn's motion on the merits. The court considered the Division's services provided to Dawn over several months. The court found Dawn was offered individualized reunification services. Further, as we have already addressed, the court hig