Full Opinion

RECORD IMPOUNDED NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3. SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-0172-25 A-0314-25 C.B.,1 Plaintiff-Respondent, v. K.W., Defendant-Appellant. _______________________ K.W., Plaintiff-Appellant, v. C.B., Defendant-Respondent. ________________________ Argued October 8, 2026 – Decided October 26, 2026 1 We use initials to protect the confidentiality of the victim in these proceedings. R. 1:38-3(d)(10). Before Judges Mawla and Chase. On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Chancery Division, Family Part, Burlington County, Docket Nos. FV-03-2336-23 and FV-03-2417-25. Melissa Rosenblum argued the cause for appellant (Melissa Rosenblum, LLC, attorney; Melissa Rosenblum, on the brief). Respondent has not filed a brief. PER CURIAM In this one-sided consolidated appeal, K.W. appeals from two orders under the Prevention of Domestic Violence Act (PDVA), N.J.S.A. 2C:25-17 to -35; a final restraining order (FRO) entered against her; and an order dismissing her domestic violence complaint against C.B. We affirm both orders. I. We glean the facts from the evidence produced at trial. K.W. and C.B. met in 2023 when K.W. took her car to the dealership where C.B. worked. The parties were thereafter involved in a sexual relationship. In June 2023, C.B. filed a temporary restraining order (TRO) against K.W. due to her allegedly punching him in the stomach with a closed fist. According to the TRO, she then threatened to "key his car, slash his tires, bash out his A-0172-25 2 windows, and expressed she would go to his place of residence or work to achieve these actions." C.B. stated he was afraid her threats would become real. K.W. was never served with this TRO. C.B. did not tell K.W. about the TRO being issued. Sometime thereafter, they resumed their relationship, but it was on and off again for two years. The relationship ended in the spring of 2025. On May 2, 2025, C.B. found approximately "nine or ten" nude images of himself exposing his genitalia physically posted outside of his workplace . C.B. testified K.W. had threatened to do this. He also stated he had only sent the nude image to K.W. C.B. further stated his phone number had been handwritten on the back of each nude photograph posted around the outside of his workplace. Because C.B. arrived at work approximately an hour before it opened, he was able to discover the pictures and remove them before the customers arrived. On May 3, 2025, C.B. found out the same image had been posted around a shopping plaza in Bordentown when he was notified by the Bordentown police. He stated the images were also posted at his wife's place of employment, a supermarket, and around a coffee shop. He alleged these incidents "traumatized" him. A-0172-25 3 On May 21, 2025, K.W. filed a TRO against C.B. for harassment after he allegedly called her eight times, to which she did not pick up the phone. C.B. also allegedly left flowers on her car, and a giftbag with a teddy bear and tickets on her doorstep. Because K.W. was never served with the 2023 TRO, she was served at this time. On June 19, 2025, C.B. amended his TRO from 2023. The predicate act section of his complaint remained the same. In addition to the allegations listed in the predicate act section, in the prior history section of his complaint, were the alleged May 2025 postings of his genitalia. On August 4, 2025, an FRO trial was held on both complaints. K.W. represented herself and C.B. was represented by counsel. Both parties testified. C.B. presented three exhibits including pictures of the nude pictures posted outside the dealership. K.W. admitted a picture allegedly showing a bruise caused by C.B. from a prior incident. At trial, C.B. testified to the 2023 incident. He stated they were having a conversation about their relationship when K.W. "started getting aggressive and angry. She struck me, and she tried to do it again, and I pushed her back." He clarified it was a closed fist punch to the area around the stomach. She then A-0172-25 4 threatened to go to his job or to his current girlfriend and he was going to lose one of them. K.W. admitted threatening to go to C.B.'s boss in 2023 but denied punching him. She also denied she posted the images at both the car dealership and the plaza in Bordentown and alleged her cousin had done it. She admitted to sharing the photograph with her cousin. K.W. also recounted that on May 21, after their relationship ended, C.B. called her eight times but she never picked up. She found the gift bags with stuffed animals outside her home and the flowers were found on her car. K.W. did not see who placed them there. K.W. testified there about two incidents of domestic violence in the past. The first one was when C.B. grabbed her and left a mark. She showed a photograph on her phone of a purported bruise. The second incident occurred when the parties were having consensual "rough sex" and she wanted to stop, but defendant continued and put his hands around her neck. The court found C.B. more credible than K.W. It concluded when K.W. punched C.B. in 2023, it constituted an "offensive touching." However, because the parties resumed their relationship for two years, there would have been no need to protect C.B. until the posting of the pictures in May 2025. A-0172-25 5 The court also concluded K.W. posted the pictures of C.B. genitals at various locations and this constituted the predicate act of harassment. It found "based upon the alarming conduct of what occurred on May 2nd and May 3rd, the [c]ourt does find that there is a need to issue a [FRO]." Regarding K.W.'s complaint against C.B., the court determined although she proved a prior history of domestic violence, she did not prove there was a recent predicate act of harassment. Accordingly, it denied K.W. an FRO and dismissed her complaint. II. Generally, "findings by a trial court are binding on appeal when supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence." Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015) (citing Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998)). We afford "substantial deference to Family Part judges, who routinely hear domestic violence cases and are 'specially trained to detect the difference between domestic violence and more ordinary differences that arise between couples. '" C.C. v. J.A.H., 463 N.J. Super. 419, 428 (App. Div. 2020) (quoting J.D. v. M.D.F., 207 N.J. 458, 482 (2011)). "[D]eference is especially appropriate 'when the evidence is largely testimonial and involves questions of credibility.'" MacKinnon v. MacKinnon, A-0172-25 6 191 N.J. 240, 254 (2007) (quoting Cesare, 154 N.J. at 394). Therefore, we will not disturb the trial court's factual findings unless "they are so manifestly unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 412 (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Invs. Ins. Co., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)) (internal quotation marks omitted). However, we do not accord such deference to the trial court's legal conclusions, which we review de novo. Thieme v. Aucoin-Thieme, 227 N.J. 269, 283 (2016). The purpose of the PDVA is to "assure the victims of domestic violence the maximum protection from abuse the law can provide." G.M. v. C.V., 453 N.J. Super. 1, 12 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting State v. Brown, 394 N.J. Super. 492, 504 (App. Div. 2007)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also N.J.S.A. 2C:25-18. Consequently, "[o]ur law is particularly solicitous of victims of domestic violence," J.D., 207 N.J. at 473 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Hoffman, 149 N.J. 564, 584 (1997)), and courts will "liberally construe[] [the PDVA] to achieve its salutary purposes." Cesare, 154 N.J. at 400. To determine whether the entry of an FRO is appropriate, the court must first "determine whether the plaintiff has proven, by a preponderance of the credible evidence, that one or more of the predicate acts set forth in N.J.S.A. A-0172-25 7 2C:25-19[(a)] has occurred." Silver v. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. 112, 125 (App. Div. 2006). If the court finds the defendant committed a predicate act of domestic violence, then the second inquiry "is whether the court should enter a restraining order that provides protection for the victim." Id. at 126. This prong is codified in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a). While the second inquiry "is most often perfunctory and self-evident, the guiding standard is whether a restraining order is necessary . . . to protect the victim from an immediate danger or to prevent further abuse[,]" based upon a court's evaluation of the factors set forth in N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1) to -29(a)(7). Id. at 127; see also J.D., 207 N.J. at 475- 76. To sustain the preponderance of the evidence burden, the evidence supporting the claim must weigh heavier and be more persuasive than the contrary evidence. Saks v. Ng, 383 N.J. Super. 76, 98 (App. Div. 2006). "It makes no difference if the heavier weight is small in amount[.]" Ibid. (citation omitted). If the evidence supporting the claim weighs more heavily, then the burden of proof has been satisfied and the party who has the burden is entitled to a favorable decision on that claim. Ibid. (citation omitted). A-0172-25 8 III. K.W. contends she did not commit a predicate act of domestic violence and "C.B. was not in need of a final restraining order" because "he did not articulate fear, apprehension or concern for his personal safety." We are not persuaded. Harassment occurs when a person, "[s]ubjects another to striking, kicking, shoving, or other offensive touching, or threatens to do so." N.J.S.A. 2C:33- 4(b). The court considered both parties' testimony and found C.B.'s claim that K.W. punched him in 2023 more credible than K.W.'s denial. The court then determined the punch occurred and constituted "offensive touching." On appeal, K.W. does not contend the punch was not an offensive touching. Rather, she contends she did not punch C.B. at all. Given the facts in the record and the deference we must accord to the court's credibility findings, we have no reason to second guess the court's finding the predicate act of harassment was established. After determining a predicate act has been established under the first prong of Silver, the court turned to the second prong to evaluate whether the plaintiff had shown the need for an FRO. Silver, 387 N.J. Super. at 127; N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a)(1) to -29(a)(7). Here too, the court based its finding on the A-0172-25 9 evidence in the record and its credibility findings, which showed that while C.B. did not require an FRO based on the 2023 punching incident, the posting of the photographs changed this calculus demonstrating he needed an FRO to protect him. C.B. made it clear from his testimony he feared for his wellbeing, as well as his wife's wellbeing, and for his job, because he was unsure what lengths K.W. would go to next. Although K.W. contends C.B. could not have felt fear, the act here of posting someone's nude photographs would certainly and objectively create fear and embarrassment in an individual. See Cesare, 154 N.J. at 413-414. The court articulated clear reasons why an FRO was necessary to protect C.B. from a future risk of harm. Ibid.; R. 1:7-4(a); see also T.B. v. I.W., 479 N.J. Super. 404, 413 (App. Div. 2024). Because the court found C.B.'s testimony credible and reliable, K.W. posed unknown and imminent harm to C.B. This finding was supported by adequate, substantial, credible evidence. Next, K.W. contends her due process rights were violated when the court found the predicate act of harassment based on the postings of C.W.'s genitalia because this allegation was situated in the prior acts section of the domestic violence complaint. We are unconvinced of the due process violation. A-0172-25 10 "[O]rdinary due process protections apply in the domestic violence context, notwithstanding the shortened time frames for conducting a final hearing[.]" J.D., 207 N.J. at 478. To "ensur[e] that defendants are not deprived of their due process rights requires our trial courts to recognize both what those rights are and how they can be protected consistent with the protective goals of the [PDVA]." Id. at 479. In this context, due process requires a defendant is given "a meaningful opportunity to defend . . . a complaint" against them. D.N. v. K.M., 429 N.J. Super. 592, 606 (App. Div. 2013). Although the court was mistaken in finding a predicate act occurred for posting the pictures, the error is harmless, because the court also found the predicate act of harassment for the punching incident. See R. 2:10-2 ("Any error or omission shall be disregarded by the appellate court unless it is of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of producing an unjust result[.]"). Only one predicate act needs to be found for the court to move to the second prong under Silver and N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a). There was no due process violation for the court to consider the postings to determine the second prong because K.W. was on notice for nearly two months C.B. would present this incident because the face of his amended complaint described the incident in detail. J.D., 207 N.J. at 478. Furthermore, A-0172-25 11 K.W. fully presented her testimony on all her allegations and in response to C.B.'s claims and did not argue that she lacked sufficient notice. IV. Finally, K.W. argues the court erred in denying her request for an FRO because she proved that C.B. committed a predicate act of harassment and her need for an FRO by a preponderance of the evidence. Specifically, K.W. claims the eight phone calls that went unanswered constituted harassment under N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a). The statute requires an individual, with the purpose to harass, "[m]akes, or causes to be made, one or more communications anonymously or at extremely inconvenient hours, or in offensively coarse language, or any other manner likely to cause annoyance or alarm." N.J.S.A. 2C:33-4(a). Although harassment is "one of the most frequently reported" predicate acts of domestic violence, it also "presents the greatest challenges to our courts." J.D., 207 N.J. at 475. A harassment claim can "confound[ the court's] ability to fix clear rules of application[]" between "acts that constitute harassment" and acts that are "ordinary domestic contretemps." L.M.F. v. J.A.F., Jr., 421 N.J. Super. 523, 534 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting J.D., 207 N.J. at 475). A-0172-25 12 To determine whether conduct constitutes harassment in the domestic violence context, a court must consider the parties' prior relationship. Cesare, 154 N.J. at 405. Only by considering the parties' prior relationship and the parties' conduct under the totality of the circumstances can a court determine whether a communication constituted harassment. Compare Pazienza v. Camarata, 381 N.J. Super. 173, 182-84 (App. Div. 2005) (finding, based on the defendant's repeated prior unwanted contact with the plaintiff, a single text message to the plaintiff about the show she was watching at the moment defendant sent the text message constituted harassment), with L.M.F., 421 N.J. Super. at 535-37 (holding an isolated incident of the defendant making a remark to the plaintiff when he was angry during their divorce was not harassment). The phone calls came from C.B.'s phone and were not anonymous. There was also no testimony the calls were made at inconvenient hours. Nor was there testimony the calls made the day after a break-up were made with the purpose to harass. The court considered the alleged predicate act in light of the parties ' history of violence, as well as their on and off relationship. Having considered the record and the applicable law, as well as the court's credibility determination, we conclude the record amply supports the court's finding no predicate act of A-0172-25 13 domestic violence occurred. Because there was no predicate act, the court did not need to consider the second prong under Silver and N.J.S.A. 2C:25-29(a). To the extent we have not addressed an argument raised on appeal, it is because it lacks sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). Affirmed. A-0172-25 14