Full Opinion

Board of Education for Wicomico County v. Rhonda B. Sturm, No. 54, September Term, 2025. COLLATERAL ORDER DOCTRINE – EFFECTIVELY UNREVIEWABLE – SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY Sovereign immunity is an immunity from suit, not merely liability, and only the General Assembly may waive it. If the State, or one of its instrumentalities or agencies, must litigate a claim to final judgment before obtaining review of an interlocutory order denying an assertion of complete sovereign immunity, it will have irretrievably lost an important aspect of that immunity. Because only the General Assembly may waive sovereign immunity, an order denying an assertion of complete sovereign immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine if the order presents a pure question of law and satisfies the other prongs of the doctrine. WAIVER OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY – APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS OR INDEPENDENT AUTHORITY TO RAISE FUNDS – CHILD VICTIMS ACT OF 2023 – COUNTY BOARDS OF EDUCATION – CLAIMS ARISING OUT OF PRE- JULY 1, 1971 CONDUCT An effective waiver of sovereign immunity requires both (1) specific legislative authorization subjecting the State to suit and (2) an appropriation of funds or authorization of an independent funding mechanism to pay judgments. The only mechanism the General Assembly has provided for county boards of education to satisfy tort judgments is by authorizing and requiring county boards to procure comprehensive liability insurance. The claim at issue arises from conduct occurring before July 1, 1971, when the General Assembly first authorized and required county boards of education to purchase comprehensive liability insurance to pay tort judgments. Assuming, without deciding, that, in enacting the Child Victims Act of 2023, the General Assembly specifically authorized suits against county boards of education based on conduct that occurred before July 1, 1971, the General Assembly has neither appropriated funding to pay judgments for such claims nor provided county boards with the authority to raise funds for that purpose. The Board of Education for Wicomico County thus retains sovereign immunity with respect to tort claims based on pre-July 1, 1971 conduct. Circuit Court for Wicomico County Case No. C-22-CV-25-000197 Argued: April 9, 2026 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF MARYLAND No. 54 September Term, 2025 ______________________________________ BOARD OF EDUCATION FOR WICOMICO COUNTY v. RHONDA B. STURM ______________________________________ Fader, C.J., Watts, Booth, Biran, Gould, Eaves, Killough, JJ. ______________________________________ Opinion by Fader, C.J. ______________________________________ Filed: June 23, 2026 Pursuant to the Maryland Uniform Electronic Legal Materials Act (§§ 10-1601 et seq. of the State Government Article) this document is authentic. 2026.06.23 13:37:36 -04'00' Gregory Hilton, Clerk The Child Victims Act of 2023 (“CVA”) removed all time limitations on bringing claims arising from child sexual abuse. Following passage of the CVA, the petitioner, Rhonda B. Sturm, brought tort claims against the Board of Education for Wicomico County for sexual abuse she alleges she suffered as a minor student between 1967 and June 1971. The Board moved to dismiss, claiming that it retains sovereign immunity for tort claims arising from conduct that occurred before July 1, 1971, the date on which the General Assembly first authorized it to obtain insurance that covered such claims. The Circuit Court for Wicomico County denied the Board’s motion, and the Board appealed. The Appellate Court of Maryland dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. We must now determine: (1) whether the Board’s interlocutory appeal of the circuit court’s order may proceed; and, if so, (2) whether the Board retains sovereign immunity as to tort claims arising before July 1, 1971. On the first issue, we hold that an order denying a motion to dismiss on the ground of complete sovereign immunity is immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. Sovereign immunity is an immunity from suit, not merely liability, that only the General Assembly may waive. If an arm of the State is forced to litigate a lawsuit to final judgment before obtaining review of an order denying its claim to sovereign immunity, the State will have lost the protection from suit that sovereign immunity provides in a manner that an appellate court cannot effectively remedy. Because a waiver of sovereign immunity is beyond the authority of the judiciary, an order denying a claim of complete sovereign immunity must be immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine. We therefore recognize an exception to our holding in Dawkins v. Baltimore City Police Department, 376 Md. 53 (2003), for orders denying claims of complete sovereign immunity made by the State and its agencies and instrumentalities. On the second issue, we hold that the Board retains sovereign immunity with respect to tort claims based on conduct that occurred before July 1, 1971. A waiver of sovereign immunity requires both (1) specific authorization by the General Assembly to subject the State to suit and (2) an appropriation of funds or authorization of an independent funding mechanism to pay judgments. Here, assuming without deciding that the General Assembly, in enacting the CVA, specifically authorized suit against county boards of education based on conduct that occurred before July 1, 1971, it has neither appropriated funding to pay judgments for such claims nor authorized the county boards to raise funds for that purpose. Accordingly, we will reverse the Appellate Court’s order dismissing this appeal and remand the case to that court with instructions to remand to the circuit court with directions to grant the Board’s motion to dismiss without prejudice. BACKGROUND A. Legal Framework County boards of education “are State agencies for purposes of sovereign immunity.” Bennett v. Harford County, 485 Md. 461, 479 (2023); see also Beka Indus., Inc. v. Worcester County Bd. of Educ., 419 Md. 194, 210 (2011) (“We affirm that a county board of education[] is a State agency entitled to [sovereign] immunity.” (citation 2 modified)).1 In 1902, this Court held that county boards of education were not subject to tort suits because, although the General Assembly had provided that the boards may “sue and be sued,” it had not provided them with authority “to raise money for the purpose of paying damages” or “with means to pay a judgment against them.” Weddle v. Bd. of County Sch. Comm’rs of Frederick County, 94 Md. 334, 344 (1902). To the contrary, “[a]ll of their funds are appropriated by law to specific purposes[,] and they cannot be diverted by them.” Id. Effective July 1, 1971, the General Assembly required county boards of education to procure comprehensive liability insurance, with limits up to $100,000 per injury, as “an educational purpose and as a valid educational expense.” 1971 Md. Laws, Ch. 548. In the same act, the General Assembly provided that county boards could still “rais[e] the defense of sovereign immunity to any amount in excess of the limit of liability.” Id. In 2016, the General Assembly raised the minimum amount of insurance the county boards were required to procure from $100,000 per occurrence to $400,000 per occurrence. 2016 Md. Laws, Ch. 680; codified at Md. Code Ann., Educ. § 4-105 (2014 Repl.; 2016 Supp.). At the same time, it increased the minimum amount above which the county boards 1 Although the Court in Beka Industries referred on a few occasions to “governmental immunity,” see 419 Md. at 210, 218, which is more often used to describe the immunity afforded to local governments operating in their governmental capacity, see, e.g., Mayor & City Council of Baltimore v. Varghese, 493 Md. 1, 11-16 (2025), the Court was clearly referring to sovereign immunity. The Court determined that the General Assembly had waived the sovereign immunity of county boards of education as to contract actions through its general waiver of sovereign immunity for such actions in § 12-103 of the State Government Article. Beka Indus., 419 Md. at 203, 206. 3 were authorized to assert sovereign immunity by the same amount. 2016 Md. Laws, Ch. 680; codified at Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-518 (2020 Repl.). In 2023, the General Assembly passed the CVA. 2023 Md. Laws, Ch. 6. As we explained in Roman Catholic Archbishop of Washington v. Doe, 489 Md. 514, 524 (2025), the CVA enacted several changes in Maryland law concerning tort actions for child sexual abuse. Two of those changes are relevant here. First, the CVA eliminated all time limitations on the filing of actions for alleged child sexual abuse. Id. Second, the CVA established specific limits on damages awards available in child sexual abuse cases. Id. With respect to claims against county boards of education, the CVA amended § 5-518(b) of the Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article to provide that a county board of education “may raise the defense of sovereign immunity” in child sexual abuse cases to “any amount above $890,000 to a single claimant for claims arising from an incident or occurrence.” 2023 Md. Laws, Ch. 6, § 1; see Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-518(b)(2) (2013 Repl.; 2023 Supp.). A new § 5-518(c)(2) provided that liability for such claims “may not exceed $890,000 to a single claimant for injuries arising from an incident or occurrence.” 2023 Md. Laws, Ch. 6, § 1; see Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 5-518(c)(2) (2013 Repl.; 2023 Supp.). Relatedly, the CVA amended § 4-105 of the Education Article to mandate minimum liability coverage of $890,000 for each occurrence for child sexual abuse claims, while maintaining the limit of $400,000 for each occurrence for all other claims. 2023 Md. Laws, Ch. 6; see Educ. § 4-105(b)(1) (2025 Repl.). 4 B. Factual and Procedural Background On May 28, 2025, Ms. Sturm filed a complaint against the Wicomico County Public Schools and the Wicomico County Board of Education in which she alleges that “Mr. Jones,” a physical education and sixth grade teacher at North Salisbury Elementary School in Wicomico County, sexually abused her while she was a student at the school between 1967 and 1971. She alleges that despite receiving an “overwhelming number of reports of . . . sexual misconduct and abuse, neither the School, nor the District, nor the Board took any action to discipline, separate, or terminate Mr. Jones.” According to the Board’s personnel records, the only male teacher with the last name Jones who taught at North Salisbury Elementary School during the relevant time taught there during the 1970-1971 school year. The Board accepted his resignation effective June 30, 1971. The Board moved to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment asserting “absolute sovereign immunity” from tort claims before July 1, 1971. The Board argued that the General Assembly had not waived that immunity in the CVA and that the Board lacked any funding source to pay tort judgments arising from pre-July 1, 1971 conduct. Ms. Sturm opposed the motion, arguing that the General Assembly had retroactively waived the Board’s sovereign immunity in the CVA and that the motion to dismiss was premature because there were genuine disputes regarding the Board’s insurance coverage. The circuit court denied the Board’s motion. 5 The Board appealed. In a supplemental jurisdictional statement filed with its Civil Appeal Information Report, the Board argued that the Appellate Court of Maryland could consider its interlocutory appeal under the collateral order doctrine. Ms. Sturm argued that the appeal was “premature and improper” and barred by this Court’s decision in Dawkins. The Appellate Court dismissed the appeal as “not allowed by law.” We granted certiorari to determine whether the Board can appeal the interlocutory order under the collateral order doctrine and, if so, whether the General Assembly retroactively waived the Board’s sovereign immunity as to child sexual abuse claims based on conduct occurring before July 1, 1971. Bd. of Educ. for Wicomico County v. Sturm, 493 Md. 62 (2026). DISCUSSION I. INTERLOCUTORY APPEALS FROM ORDERS REJECTING CLAIMS OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY We first address the threshold jurisdictional question of whether the circuit court’s interlocutory order denying the Board’s motion to dismiss was immediately appealable. The Board argues that the order was appealable because sovereign immunity grants immunity from suit, not merely from liability, and so an order denying it is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment. The Board, and the State of Maryland as amicus curiae, contend that we should either overrule prior caselaw rejecting immediate appeals from interlocutory orders denying sovereign immunity or, in the alternative, recognize an exception to that caselaw. Ms. Sturm disagrees, but argues that we should nonetheless address the merits of this appeal because it raises a substantially important 6 issue. Alternatively, she contends that any exception to prior caselaw should be “limited to appeals concerning immunity from suit under the CVA.” A. Standard of Review “Whether an interlocutory order is appealable ‘under the collateral order doctrine[] is a question of law that an appellate court reviews’ without deference.” State v. Houston, 493 Md. 279, 292 (2026) (quoting Monarch Acad. Baltimore Campus, Inc. v. Baltimore City Bd. of Sch. Comm’rs, 457 Md. 1, 40 (2017)). B. Collateral Order Doctrine We recently summarized the Appellate Court’s limited authority to review interlocutory orders: The Appellate Court’s power to decide appeals is derived from statute: “a party may appeal from a final judgment entered in a civil or criminal case by a circuit court.” Md. Code Ann., Cts. & Jud. Proc. § 12-301 (2020 Repl.). An order is generally not a final judgment unless it fully adjudicates all claims in the case by and against all parties to the case. An interlocutory order—any order that is not a final judgment— ordinarily is not appealable until there is a final judgment. The primary purpose of the final judgment rule is to prevent piecemeal appellate review of trial court decisions which do not terminate the litigation. By requiring litigants to consolidate all claims of error at the end of a lawsuit, the rule eliminates a succession of separate appeals which would repeatedly interrupt and delay lower court proceedings. We have recognized three “exceptions” to the final judgment rule: (1) appeals from interlocutory orders specifically allowed by statute; (2) immediate appeals permitted under Maryland Rule 2-602; and (3) the collateral order doctrine. The collateral order doctrine is not technically an exception to the final judgment rule; rather, it is a judicially created fiction, under which certain interlocutory orders are considered to be final judgments, even though such orders clearly are not final judgments. 7 Houston, 493 Md. at 292-93 (citation modified). The Board argues that the circuit court’s order denying its motion to dismiss is appealable under the collateral order doctrine. That “doctrine allows an immediate appeal to be taken from a ‘very limited’ class of non-final, interlocutory orders that are ‘offshoots of the principal litigation in which they are issued’ and that qualify, in effect, as ‘final judgments without regard to the posture of the case.’” Id. at 293 (citation modified) (quoting Stephens v. State, 420 Md. 495, 502 (2011)). “To be appealable under the collateral order doctrine, an order must (1) conclusively determine the disputed question, (2) resolve an important issue, (3) resolve an issue that is completely separate from the merits of the action, and (4) be effectively unreviewable if the appeal had to await the entry of a final judgment.” Houston, 493 Md. at 293 (quoting In re M.P., 487 Md. 53, 68 (2024) (citation modified)). “Courts ‘apply these elements very strictly in keeping with the narrow nature of the exception, which should apply only in extraordinary circumstances.’” Id. The Board asserts, and Ms. Sturm does not contest, that the first three prongs of the collateral order doctrine are satisfied. The circuit court’s order conclusively determined that the Board does not enjoy sovereign immunity from Ms. Sturm’s claim, the Board’s entitlement to sovereign immunity is an important issue, and it is completely separate from the merits. The point in dispute concerns the fourth prong, which is whether the circuit court’s order would “be effectively unreviewable if the appeal had to await the entry of a final judgment.” Id. 8 An interlocutory order is effectively unreviewable where a litigant’s interest would be “irretrievably lost” if the litigant were forced to wait for final judgment. Maryland Bd. of Physicians v. Geier, 451 Md. 526, 552 (2017) (allowing an interlocutory appeal for executive privilege claims because such a right would be “irretrievably lost” if opposing litigants gained access to private information). We have said as much in several cases. See Houston, 493 Md. at 301 (finding an order disqualifying the State’s Attorney in a criminal proceeding effectively unreviewable because if the government lost, double jeopardy would prohibit review, but if the government won, it would lack standing to appeal); In re M.P., 487 Md. at 78-79 (holding that if a juvenile has a right to avoid a delinquency proceeding due to their age, requiring the juvenile to “undergo adjudication and disposition in the juvenile justice system before an appeal is permitted[]” would be effectively unreviewable); In re O.P., 470 Md. 225, 251-52 (2020) (holding that because shelter care is “by definition [a] temporary” measure to immediately “deal with a serious risk to the child’s safety and welfare during that period[,]” an order “denying continued shelter care would be effectively unreviewable” if appeal was delayed until final judgment of the child in need of assistance case). The cases in which we have found the fourth prong of the collateral order doctrine satisfied each presented extraordinary circumstances. In most circumstances, Maryland appellate courts have found that interlocutory orders do not satisfy the fourth prong because they can be effectively reviewed following a final judgment. For example, orders causing a party to incur extra legal and administrative expenses are effectively reviewable on appeal 9 from a final judgment because they result only in “costs that are associated with any legal proceeding.” Spivery-Jones v. Receivership Est. of Trans Healthcare, Inc., 438 Md. 330, 360-61 (2014). The Appellate Court has held that orders granting motions to enforce settlement agreements are effectively reviewable on appeal from a final judgment because they do not pose a “serious risk of loss” if “deferred until after the final judgment.” Pattison v. Pattison, 254 Md. App. 294, 311 (2022). And orders regarding motions to remove a case to another jurisdiction are effectively reviewable later because the defendant, if successful, would be entitled to a new trial. Parrott v. State, 301 Md. 411, 425-26 (1984). Similarly, ordinary discovery orders, St. Joseph Med. Ctr., Inc. v. Cardiac Surgery Assocs., P.A., 392 Md. 75, 87 (2006), and class certification orders, Ford Motor Co. v. Ferrell, 188 Md. App. 704, 715 (2009), have been determined to be effectively reviewable upon final judgment. In sum, as the Appellate Court has aptly explained, the test for determining whether an interlocutory order is effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment is whether a party would suffer “irreparable harm” because the reversal of that interlocutory order “cannot undo what will have already taken place[.]” In re Ferndale Volunteer Fire Co., 269 Md. App. 164, 198 n.8 (2026) (quoting Milburn v. Milburn, 142 Md. App. 518, 527 (2002)). 10 C. Sovereign Immunity The Board is entitled to sovereign immunity,2 Beka Indus., 419 Md. at 210, to the extent that the General Assembly has not waived the Board’s immunity, see Bd. of Educ. of Baltimore County v. Zimmer-Rubert, 409 Md. 200, 205-06 (2009) (collecting cases). Sovereign immunity is “one of the highest attributes of sovereignty[.]” Katz v. Washington Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 284 Md. 503, 512 (1979). The doctrine “prohibits suits against the State or its entities absent its consent.” Magnetti v. Univ. of Maryland, 402 Md. 548, 557 (2007). “[S]overeign immunity is firmly embedded in Maryland law, long recognized as applicable in actions—contract, tort, or otherwise— against the State of Maryland, its officers, and its units.” Id. at 556-57 (collecting cases). “Sovereign immunity is an absolute immunity, and one that may be waived only directly or by necessary implication.” Comptroller of Maryland v. Badlia Bros., LLC, 490 Md. 163, 171 (2025) (citation modified). We “construe legislative dilution of governmental immunity narrowly in order to avoid weakening the doctrine of sovereign immunity by judicial fiat.” Stern v. Bd. of Regents, Univ. Sys. of Maryland, 380 Md. 691, 720 (2004). 2 In the circuit court, the Board argued that it possessed sovereign immunity. On appeal before the Appellate Court and this Court, the Board has argued that it enjoys immunity that is “different” than “traditional sovereign immunity,” based on its inability to divert funds from educational purposes to the payment of court judgments. However, as this Court has previously recognized, county boards of education enjoy traditional sovereign immunity. Beka Indus., 419 Md. at 210. No party has raised any issue or argument that would cause us to revisit that determination here. 11 Accordingly, waivers of sovereign immunity “are strictly construed in favor of the State.” Brawner Builders, Inc. v. State Highway Admin., 476 Md. 15, 32 (2021). Sovereign immunity protects the State not just from liability, but “from suit[.]” See Katz, 284 Md. at 507. “[T]he State’s sovereign immunity not only protects the public treasury but also protects the State and its instrumentalities from standing trial.” State v. Hogg, 311 Md. 446, 455 (1988), overruled on other grounds by Dawkins v. Baltimore City Police Dep’t, 376 Md. 53, 64-65 (2003). Accordingly, we have consistently described sovereign immunity as encompassing the right to not have suits “maintained” against the sovereign. Stern, 380 Md. at 701 (“[W]hen a governmental agency or actor can, and does, avail itself of the doctrine of sovereign immunity, no contract or tort suit can be maintained thereafter against it unless the General Assembly has specifically waived the doctrine.”); see Magnetti, 402 Md. at 558 (“Without a statutory waiver of the University’s sovereign immunity, [the plaintiff] may not maintain his action against the University.”); Bd. of Trs. of Howard Cmty. Coll. v. John K. Ruff, Inc., 278 Md. 580, 590 (1976) (stating that “suits may not be maintained” unless sovereign immunity was waived and “money has been appropriated for the payment of such damages as may be awarded, or the agency itself is authorized to raise money for that purpose”); Univ. of Maryland v. Maas, 173 Md. 554, 558-59 (1938) (holding that sovereign immunity does not allow suits to be “maintained” against the State absent a specific waiver of the immunity). The United States Supreme Court recently explained the breadth of sovereign immunity as an immunity from suit at common law in Geo Group, Inc. v. Menocal: 12 Because an immunity applies irrespective of the merits, the protection it offers is not a simple finding of non-liability. Rather, the immunity ensures that the defendant need not answer for his conduct in court at all—that he avoids, in addition to liability, all the usual burdens of litigation, including a trial. And so we typically describe the protection in just that way: as an immunity from suit. 607 U.S. 438, 446 (2026) (citation modified). D. Legal Background Concerning Appealability of Interlocutory Orders Addressing Sovereign Immunity We first addressed whether a trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss based on sovereign immunity is immediately appealable in Hogg. After readily concluding that the first three collateral order doctrine prongs were met, we proceeded to consider whether the order denying sovereign immunity would be effectively unreviewable after a final judgment. Hogg, 311 Md. at 455. Recognizing that sovereign immunity is an immunity from suit, and comparing it in that respect to a double jeopardy claim, we determined that “an order improperly failing to recognize the bar of sovereign immunity to a claim would effectively escape review if the sovereign were forced to stand trial on that claim and await final judgment before obtaining appellate review.” Id. at 456-57. Accordingly, we held that “the collateral order doctrine permits immediate review . . . to determine whether the denial of [a] motion to dismiss . . . deprived the State . . . of the protection of sovereign immunity.” Id. at 457. A series of decisions following Hogg narrowed its reasoning and then its holding. In Bunting v. State, a case challenging a trial court’s denial of a motion to dismiss charges based on an alleged violation of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers, we expressed 13 hesitation at the idea that the collateral order doctrine should be invoked any time an appellant claims a “‘right’ to avoid the trial itself,” as it could effectively override the final judgment rule. 312 Md. 472, 479-82 (1988). Accordingly, we held that the Appellate Court was correct to dismiss that appeal. Then, in State v. Jett, we determined that the State could not take an immediate appeal from an order denying a motion to dismiss a suit brought under the Maryland Tort Claims Act where the underlying dispute was over whether a county deputy sheriff was State personnel for whose actions the State could be liable. 316 Md. 248, 250-51 (1989). Although the basis for the State’s motion to dismiss was its assertion that it had not waived sovereign immunity, we recognized a difference between that claim, which really raised a matter of agency law, and the assertion of “common law sovereign immunity in its full, unrestricted vigor” that had been at issue in Hogg. Id. at 255-57. Based on the breadth of the waiver in the Tort Claims Act, we observed that the focus had shifted from “protecting state officials and employees from disruption in the performance of their duties by defending against tort claims” to “protection of the public treasury by limiting the financial exposure” of the State. Id. at 257. And in Shoemaker v. Smith, we upheld the Appellate Court’s dismissal of an appeal from an interlocutory order denying a motion for summary judgment based on a claim of immunity under the Maryland Tort Claims Act. 353 Md. 143, 146 (1999). There, we reasoned that the underlying order failed to satisfy the third and fourth prongs of the 14 collateral order doctrine, because the issue was not a pure issue of law and because Tort Claims Act immunity did not present an “extraordinary situation.” Id. at 170. Finally, in Dawkins, the Court held that an order denying a motion to dismiss on the ground of sovereign immunity was not appealable under the collateral order doctrine, overruling Hogg. Dawkins, 376 Md. at 54. The Court reviewed the history of its decisions since Hogg, determined that Hogg itself “did not involve an extraordinary situation” to which the collateral order doctrine should apply, and overruled that decision. Id. at 64-65. The Court did not explain its conclusion that orders denying a defense of complete sovereign immunity do not satisfy the collateral order doctrine. Nonetheless, the Court concluded: As a general rule, interlocutory trial court orders rejecting defenses of common law sovereign immunity, governmental immunity, public official immunity, statutory immunity, or any other type of immunity, are not appealable under the Maryland collateral order doctrine. Whether, and under what circumstances, interlocutory orders overruling immunity defenses asserted by the Governor, Lieutenant Governor, Comptroller, Treasurer, Attorney General, Speaker of the House, President of the Senate, or judges as defined in Article IV, § 2, of the Maryland Constitution, are immediately appealable under the collateral order doctrine will have to be determined in any future cases that might arise. Interlocutory trial court orders overruling immunity claims by other government officials, employees, departments, agencies, entities, units, or subdivisions, or by private persons or entities, are not appealable under the doctrine. Id. at 65 (citation modified). The Court thus stated a broad “general rule” that could be tested in “future cases that might arise.” Id. 15 E. Analysis We now hold that appeals from orders denying motions to dismiss on the ground of complete sovereign immunity satisfy the fourth prong of the collateral order doctrine. Accordingly, assuming they satisfy the other prongs and present pure issues of law, such orders are immediately appealable under that doctrine. Two aspects of the defense of sovereign immunity together compel that conclusion. First, at least to the extent it has not been partially waived, sovereign immunity is an immunity from suit, not merely from liability. Hogg, 311 Md. at 455. As we explained in Hogg, that aspect of the State’s sovereign immunity would be irretrievably lost if the State could not obtain review of a decision denying it until entry of a final judgment. Id. at 455-57. No appellate decision at that point could restore the State’s right not to be subject to suit. Second, only the General Assembly can waive the State’s sovereign immunity. Katz, 284 Md. at 507-08. To the extent it is applied to orders rejecting claims of complete sovereign immunity, the rule in Dawkins amounts to a judicial abrogation of an important aspect of sovereign immunity. That is not within our power. ARA Health Servs., Inc. v. Dep’t of Pub. Safety & Corr. Servs., 344 Md. 85, 92 (1996) (“While the General Assembly may waive sovereign immunity either directly or by necessary implication, this Court has emphasized that dilution of the doctrine should not be accomplished by judicial fiat.” (citation modified)); Katz, 284 Md. at 512-13 (“We are mindful that courts should not hold that immunity from suit, one of the highest attributes of sovereignty, has been waived, 16 except in cases of positive consent given, or by necessary and compelling implication. Therefore, we have consistently refused to judicially abrogate sovereign immunity, and we have stated that any waiver of immunity must come from the legislature.” (citation modified)); Jekofsky v. State Roads Comm’n, 264 Md. 471, 474 (1972) (explaining that “it is desirable and in the public interest that any change in the doctrine of sovereign immunity should come from the legislative branch of the State Government rather than from the judicial branch” due to the “fiscal considerations, administrative difficulties[,] and other problems in balancing the rights of the State and its agencies” with the rights of “individual citizens”); Duncan v. Koustenis, 260 Md. 98, 104 (1970) (“Because the doctrine is so deeply ingrained in the law of Maryland, this Court has specifically declined to alter it without a legislative mandate.”). Before Dawkins, we had refused to judicially abrogate the immunity of a county board of education. In Weisner v. Board of Education of Montgomery County, parents of a child who had slipped on ice outside of an elementary school alleged that the Board of Education of Montgomery County failed to “meet its alleged duty to keep the sidewalk ‘free of ice and hazardous conditions.’” 237 Md. 391, 392 (1965). The parents asked our Court to find that the doctrine of sovereign immunity was “wanting in logic and reason and run[s] directly contrary to the basic concepts of tort liability.” Id. at 395. We refused, holding that any change in the sovereign immunity of county boards of education should not be “changed judicially,” but legislatively. Id. As explained above, the General Assembly ultimately did so just a few years later, in 1971. See 1971 Md. Laws, Ch. 548. 17 Once again, we will not effectively abrogate any portion of the Board’s sovereign immunity via judicial fiat. Consequently, we now make an exception to the rule in Dawkins for claims of complete sovereign immunity that meet all four prongs of the collateral order doctrine and can be resolved as a pure matter of law.3 In adopting this exception, we join many other courts in recognizing that orders denying claims of sovereign immunity meet the criteria of the collateral order doctrine. See, e.g., Puerto Rico Aqueduct & Sewer Auth. v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc., 506 U.S. 139, 145 (1993) (holding that the benefits of immunities are lost if the litigation is allowed to “proceed[] past motion practice” and that state entities may pursue immediate appeals from orders denying them Eleventh Amendment immunity under the collateral order doctrine). The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania described the effects of litigating a denial of sovereign immunity to final judgment as follows: Because sovereign immunity protects government entities from a lawsuit itself, we conclude that a sovereign immunity defense is irreparably lost if appellate review of an adverse decision on sovereign immunity is postponed until after final judgment. Subjecting a governmental entity, which claims it is immune, to the legal process undermines the purposes of sovereign immunity. Engaging in litigation requires a governmental entity to expend 3 Our holding is limited to claims of complete sovereign immunity. As discussed above, the sovereign immunity of county boards has been partially waived, including generally for all claims up to $400,000. Educ. § 4-105(b)(1)(ii) (2025 Repl.; 2025 Supp.). County boards may assert sovereign immunity only for claims above that amount. Id. § 4-105(b)(2)(i). For claims that fall within the scope of the partial waiver, therefore, the sovereign immunity county boards may assert is not an immunity from suit. It is, rather, an immunity only from liability exceeding $400,000. Thus, an interlocutory ruling denying a county board the benefit of the $400,000 limitation on the waiver of sovereign immunity would not be immediately appealable because it could be effectively reviewed following a final judgment. 18 taxpayer dollars on its defense and to divert employees’ time from conducting government business. Further, forcing governmental entities to litigate claims from which they may be immune has a chilling effect on government policymaking. Brooks v. Ewing Cole, Inc., 259 A.3d 359, 373 (Pa. 2021) (citation modified). And the Supreme Court of Kentucky has found that immunity entitles the State to be free “from the burdens of defending the action, not merely . . . from liability,” Rowan County v. Sloas, 201 S.W.3d 469, 474 (Ky. 2006), so “[o]bviously such an entitlement [to sovereign immunity] cannot be vindicated following a final judgment for by then the party claiming immunity has already borne the costs and burdens of defending the action[,]” Breathitt County Bd. of Educ. v. Prater, 292 S.W.3d 883, 886-87 (Ky. 2009). The Supreme Court of New Mexico has stated that sovereign immunity “protects the important governmental interest of avoiding the burdens of a trial on the merits and that this interest will otherwise evade meaningful appellate review absent application of the collateral order doctrine.” Handmaker v. Henney, 992 P.2d 879, 884 (N.M. 1999); see also Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth. v. Nash-Flegler, 272 A.3d 1171, 1178 (D.C. 2022) (“[A] denial of sovereign immunity is effectively unreviewable if it cannot be reviewed until after trial.”); Anderson v. City of Hopkins, 393 N.W.2d 363, 364 (Minn. 1986) (holding that interlocutory orders are immediately appealable because an immunity from suit would be effectively lost if a government entity must erroneously litigate the case to final judgment). The order here was appealable. We now turn to the merits of the appeal. 19 II. THE BOARD’S SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY AND THE CVA The parties dispute whether the General Assembly retroactively waived the sovereign immunity of county boards of education in passing the CVA. Ms. Sturm argues that in enacting the CVA, the General Assembly retroactively waived the sovereign immunity of county boards of education up to $890,0