Full Opinion

NOT DESIGNATED FOR PUBLICATION No. 130,361 IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF KANSAS K.F., Appellee, v. W.N., Appellant. MEMORANDUM OPINION Appeal from Crawford District Court; M. JENNIFER BRUNETTI, judge. Submitted without oral argument. Opinion filed November 6, 2026. Affirmed in part and reversed in part. Dawson French, of Nodine Legal, LLC, of Parsons, for appellant. Amy M. Ross, of Columbus, for appellee. Before HURST, P.J., CLINE, J., and MARY E. CHRISTOPHER, Senior Judge. PER CURIAM: This is an appeal from a final protection from abuse (PFA) order issued under K.S.A. 60-3107. After a hearing, the district court found that Karen (a pseudonym for K.F.) established abuse by a preponderance of the evidence and entered a final PFA order against Wayne (a pseudonym for W.N.), extending protection to Karen and Wayne's minor child. Wayne timely appeals the order. After careful review, we conclude substantial competent evidence supports the district court's factual findings, judgment, and order of protection for Karen, but the 1 evidence was insufficient to establish abuse under K.S.A. 60-3102(a) as to their minor child. Accordingly, we affirm in part and reverse in part. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY Karen and Wayne share a minor child, age 6 at the time of the final hearing on Karen's request for a PFA order. Karen testified she left Wayne in May 2022, after Wayne was arrested on a domestic violence charge. Karen explained she had sole custody of their minor child, with supervised visitation granted to Wayne. On January 9, 2026, Wayne attempted to contact Karen through FaceTime. Karen declined the FaceTime call and responded to Wayne that she was at work. Wayne then responded, "[Y]ou are lying, I don't believe you. Where do you work at?" Shortly thereafter, one of Karen's coworkers received three telephone calls from a male caller asking whether Karen worked there. She testified that the caller became increasingly agitated, yelled and cursed, and stated that he would see the coworker on Sunday at 2 p.m. The coworker called the location where Karen was working to notify them someone was calling and looking for Karen and reported the calls to law enforcement. The coworker could not identify the caller's voice as Wayne. Karen understood the reference to Sunday at 2 p.m. to correspond with their child's basketball practice, which Wayne had previously attended. The next day, Karen filed for a PFA order for herself. Then on Sunday, Karen and Wayne's child had practice, Karen went to the facility, saw Wayne's vehicle, and decided not to enter because she was afraid. Karen explained she was scared because "[h]e has a history of being abusive towards me verbally and physically and I did not want to put myself or a child in a situation for something to happen." 2 During the hearing Karen presented evidence of prior conduct by Wayne, including a 2020 domestic violence incident and messages in which Wayne made statements concerning Karen's death. When asked if he had sent messages to Karen repeatedly over the last several years "making comments about hoping that she dies, hoping that she has a miserable death," Wayne agreed he had "in the past but the last time we was in Court, [the judge] made it pretty clear that he wanted all that stuff to stop." Asked if nevertheless he continued to send similar messages after that hearing which were then introduced into court, Wayne stated, "Yes, I guess. Yeah, I don't remember." Wayne also attempted to deny making the telephone calls and argues the coworker could not identify him as the caller. "Q. So you didn't heed the Court's warning in stopping threatening and making harassing statements to her; correct? "A. I have—I haven't been harassing or cussing at her like I used to, that is for sure. "Q. Okay. So it is better cussing? "A. It is—it used to be pretty bad, I will admit but it is— "Q. And you have now started calling and looking for her at potential employers; correct? "A. I just was trying to Facetime my son that night and she wasn't—she wasn't—I hadn't heard about him for several days. And the last time we was in Court, Judge made it clear that I needed to have more communication with my son." When asked about specific concerns for their child, Karen said, "[Wayne] has shown that he is not stable mentally, that he loses his cool very quickly," and "can't control himself. And I am scared for my child's safety." Karen also described an incident when their child was "about four years old," and Wayne had him in the front seat of a car driving down Pittsburg streets. She conceded, however, that Wayne had never threatened their child and had not had custody or contact with their child since August 2024. 3 The district court noted an order was already in place issued on December 19, 2025, requiring all supervised visits to occur at the Child Exchange and CEVC Center until further order of the court. The court found Karen and her coworker credible and determined that Karen established abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. The court entered a final PFA order protecting both Karen and their minor child from Wayne. The court found Karen and her coworker credible. It found the evidence showed it most likely it was Wayne telephoning on that date. The court stated, "Evidence of abuse dynamics are pretty clear to the Court based upon the admitted . . . text messages that were . . . provided to [Karen] and considering her testimony, the specific acts and threatened acts would cause a person a reasonable concern in the Court's opinion to be concerned and fearful." The court determined "[Wayne] represents a credible threat to the physical safety of [Karen] and, ergo, [child]." After finding Karen established abuse by a preponderance of the evidence, the court entered a final PFA order protecting both Karen and child from Wayne. It also ordered Wayne to submit to an evaluation and follow through with any and all recommendations regarding anger management abuse pursuant to K.S.A. 60-3107. Wayne timely appealed. ANALYSIS Wayne raises three arguments on appeal. First, he argues the evidence was insufficient to establish abuse of Karen under K.S.A. 60-3102. Second, he argues the district court improperly relied on hearsay and speculation in finding that he was responsible for the telephone calls to Karen's workplace. Wayne failed to preserve this argument for appeal. Third, he argues the district court erred in extending the PFA to 4 their child because sufficient evidence did not establish an independent basis for finding abuse of the child. When a party challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support a PFA order, an appellate court determines whether substantial competent evidence supports the district court's factual findings and whether those findings are sufficient to support its legal conclusions that they satisfy the statutory definition of abuse. J.B.B. v. J.L.B., 60 Kan. App. 2d 310, 317, 495 P.3d 1036 (2021); see Trolinger v. Trolinger, 30 Kan. App. 2d 192, 196, 42 P.3d 157 (2001). This court must, however, distinguish between deference to factual findings and the legal sufficiency of those findings. In J.B.B., this court explained that although it is reluctant to substitute its judgment for that of the district court in PFA proceedings, it is "equally committed to ensuring that individuals are not unjustly subjected to measures for which a firm evidentiary foundation is lacking." 60 Kan. App. 2d at 318. A. SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE SUPPORTED THE FINDING OF ABUSE AS TO KAREN The district court may approve a PFA under the Protection from Abuse Act, K.S.A. 60-3101 et seq., to "bring about a cessation of abuse of the plaintiff or minor children." K.S.A. 60-3107(a). The definition of "'abuse'" includes "[i]ntentionally attempting to cause bodily injury, or intentionally or recklessly causing bodily injury," or "[i]ntentionally placing, by physical threat, another in fear of imminent bodily injury." K.S.A. 60-3102(a)(1), (2). A petitioner seeking a PFA order must establish the allegation of abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. K.S.A. 60-3106(a). A district court's factual findings must be supported by substantial competent evidence, which is "legal and relevant evidence that a reasonable person could accept as adequate to support a conclusion." J.B.B., 60 Kan. App. 2d at 317. The appellate court does not reweigh the evidence or pass on the credibility of the witnesses and generally views the evidence in 5 the light most favorable to the party who prevailed below. Kerry G. v. Stacy C., 53 Kan. App. 2d 218, 221-22, 386 P.3d 921 (2016). The incident on January 9, 2026, began when Wayne attempted to contact Karen through FaceTime. Karen responded through the parties' AppClose co-parenting application that she was at work, but Wayne said he did not believe her and asked where she worked. Shortly after, Karen's coworker received three telephone calls from an unidentified male asking whether Karen worked there. The coworker testified that the caller became increasingly upset, yelled and cursed at her, and indicated that she should call the police because she was "'going to need them.'" The caller added that he would see the coworker on Sunday at 2 p.m. The timing and circumstances of those events are important. Karen testified that their child's basketball practice occurred every Sunday at 2 p.m. and that Wayne had attended those practices in the past. Karen understood the caller's reference to Sunday at 2 p.m. as a reference to the basketball practice. The next Sunday when their child had practice, Karen drove to the practice but observed Wayne's vehicle in the parking lot and decided not to enter because she was afraid. Wayne argues that these circumstances do not constitute a "physical threat" under K.S.A. 60-3102(a)(2). He emphasizes that Karen did not personally hear the telephone call and that she was told about the statement concerning Sunday at 2 p.m. He also points out that Karen admitted she had not been physically threatened by Wayne through text message and that the parties' prior communications did not contain a direct threat of bodily harm. The question on appeal is not whether this court would have reached the same factual conclusion as the district court. Rather, this court must determine whether a reasonable person could accept the evidence and reasonable inferences supporting the 6 district court's conclusion as adequate. Kerry G., 53 Kan. App. 2d at 221. Here, the district court had evidence of Wayne's communication with Karen immediately before the calls to the hospital, the caller's inquiry specifically concerning Karen, the caller's reference to a particular Sunday at 2 p.m., and Wayne's previous presence at basketball practice. The district court could reasonably view those events together rather than considering each event in isolation. The prior communications between the parties also support the district court's conclusion. Karen testified that Wayne had a history of verbal and physical abuse and introduced AppClose messages from August, September, and October 2025. Those messages were admitted without objection, and Wayne acknowledged sending them. Karen testified that the messages were representative of the communications she had received from Wayne and that she viewed the January 2026 conduct as an escalation of that prior behavior. Wayne also acknowledged that a prior court had instructed him to stop the messaging and harassing comments, yet his messages continued. Wayne relies on Barnett v. Barnett, 24 Kan. App. 2d 342, 348-49, 945 P.2d 870 (1997), for the proposition that subject fear alone is insufficient to establish abuse under K.S.A. 60-3102(a)(2). While that principle is sound, it does not resolve this case in Wayne's favor. Karen's fear was not based solely on a generalized belief that Wayne was unstable or unable to control his temper. Rather, her fear followed a specific series of events within a short period: Wayne asked where she worked, an individual then contacted a local hospital three times seeking her, the caller became increasingly hostile, and the caller identified a specific time when he would see her. Karen then encountered Wayne's vehicle at the precise location and time associated with that statement. Wayne's attendance at the basketball practice does not negate the inference of a threat. Wayne testified that he attended the practice to see his son and that he remained across the gymnasium until Karen approached him. In contrast, Karen testified that she 7 saw his vehicle and chose not to enter because she was afraid. The parties offered materially different accounts of what occurred at the practice. Resolving the credibility conflict is the district court's function, not the function of the appellate courts. Kerry G., 53 Kan. App. 2d at 221-22. The district court found Karen and her coworker credible. The court additionally noted an order was in place requiring Wayne to arrange all supervised visitation with his son through the Child Exchange and CEVC Center. Wayne does not identify any evidence tending to establish a valid reason why he would attempt to communicate with his son at Karen's place of work. The district court determined the evidence satisfied the preponderance of the evidence standard. The record contains substantial competent evidence supporting the district court's finding that Wayne intentionally placed Karen in fear of imminent bodily injury. The district court did not err in concluding sufficient evidence established the allegation of abuse by a preponderance of the evidence as to Karen. B. WAYNE'S HEARSAY AND SPECULATION ARGUMENT WAS NOT PRESERVED FOR APPELLATE REVIEW Wayne next argues that the district court improperly relied on hearsay and speculative evidence. He points to the fact that the coworker could not identify him as the caller, and because Karen learned the contents of the most threatening statement from the coworker rather than hearing it herself. Wayne's failure to preserve this issue is dispositive to the extent that Wayne challenges the admissibility of the evidence. Evidentiary claims must be preserved by contemporaneous and specific objection in order to be challenged on appeal. K.S.A. 60- 404. 8 The record shows Wayne did not object when the AppClose messages were admitted into evidence. The only objection identified in the record was made on cross- examination of Wayne as to his testimony on messages to Karen over the last several years hoping that she dies and hoping that she has a miserable death. Respondent's counsel objected to the question as "outside the scope," and the objection was overruled by the district court. The objection raised the question of whether the scope of Wayne's cross-examination exceeded the issues raised on direct examination. No objection to hearsay or speculation was made during the coworker's testimony. Evidentiary issues not raised before the district court cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. In re Care & Treatment of Miller, 289 Kan. 218, 224-25, 210 P.3d 625 (2009). Wayne did not preserve this issue, and he does not cite to any exceptions allowing us to address it on appeal. He cannot now obtain a reversal based on the alleged inadmissibility of that evidence. C. THE EVIDENCE OF ABUSE AS TO THEIR MINOR CHILD Wayne's final argument concerns the district court's extension of the PFA order to their minor child. Unlike the claim involving Karen, the evidence concerning the child presents a separate question because the statutory definition of abuse must be satisfied as to the person receiving protection. As stated previously, K.S.A. 60-3106(a) requires a petitioner to prove the allegation of abuse by a preponderance of the evidence. The court must have an evidentiary basis for concluding that the respondent's conduct falls within K.S.A. 60-3102 as to the individual being protected. K.S.A. 60-3106(a). Precedent supports treating the protection of a child as requiring an adequate evidentiary foundation. In Baker v. McCormick, 52 Kan. App. 2d 899, 913-14, 380 P.3d 706 (2016), this court considered whether evidence of domestic abuse was sufficient to support PFA protection for a child and emphasized the statutory requirement that the conduct satisfies the definition of abuse. Similarly, in T.M. v. B.M., No. 129,512, 2026 WL 709844, at *4 (Kan. App. 2026) (unpublished opinion), this court addressed a PFA 9 order protecting both an adult petitioner and her children and concluded that evidence supporting protection of the mother did not, without more, establish abuse of the children. The telephone calls were directed towards locating Karen, not threatening their minor child. Although the caller referenced the basketball practice, there is no evidence that Wayne threatened the child at practice or otherwise directed conduct toward him that placed him in fear of imminent bodily injury. Karen testified that Wayne had never threatened their child. When asked whether Wayne had hurt their child or put the child in harm's way, Karen identified the incident when Wayne drove around Pittsburg with the child in the front seat of the vehicle, presumably without proper restraint or a car seat. In her petition for PFA, Karen had alleged her son was present during a 2020 domestic violence incident which ended with Wayne's arrest. Karen did not present evidence as to the domestic violence incident, however. Karen further acknowledges that Wayne had not seen the child or exercised custody over the child since August 2024. Thus, the only specific incident identified as potentially endangering the child occurred more than three years before the PFA petition, and there was no evidence of a recent physical threat directed toward the child. Asked about specific concerns for the child, Karen responded that, "[Wayne] has shown that he is not stable mentally, that he loses his cool very quickly," and "can't control himself. And I am scared for my child's safety." She acknowledged, however, that Wayne had never threatened the child and had not had custody or contact with their child since August 2024. While Karen's fear for the child's safety is understandable, a parent's concern that a child may be harmed is not itself sufficient to establish that a respondent committed abuse as defined by K.S.A. 60-3102. Accordingly, although the evidence was sufficient to support the PFA as to Karen, the record does not contain substantial competent evidence that Wayne abused their child 10 under K.S.A. 60-3102(a). A district court has broad discretion in making a final order of protection but, under current law, the PFA should not have been extended to their child without further evidence of abuse by Wayne. We affirm the district court's judgment and PFA order as to Karen. However, we reverse the district court's judgment as to the minor child, vacating solely that portion of the PFA order concerning the child. Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 11