Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 26-0479 Filed Date of Filing _______________ In the Interest of G.M., P.C., O.M., and D.M., Minor Children, S.M., Mother, Appellant, G.M., Minor Child, Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Lee (South) County, The Honorable Jonathan Stensvaag, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS _______________ Ed Harvey (until withdrawal) of Ed Harvey Law Office, Fairfield, and Kimberly Ann Auge of the Auge Law Firm, Fort Madison, attorneys for appellant mother. Kendra M. Abfalter, Assistant Public Defender, Burlington, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor children G.M., D.M., and O.M. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee State. Kyler D. Massner of Cray Law Firm, PLC, Burlington, attorney for minor child P.C. 1 Travis Inghram of Inghram Law, PLLC, West Burlington, guardian ad litem for minor child P.C. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Langholz, JJ. Opinion by Chicchelly, J. 2 CHICCHELLY, Judge. A mother appeals the termination of her parental rights to four children, and one child separately appeals the termination of the mother’s rights to that child. We find clear and convincing evidence supports the grounds for termination and the finding that termination serves the children’s best interests. We decline to apply any of the provisions of section 232.116(3) to preserve the parent-child relationship, and we find no basis for granting the mother additional time to work toward reunification. Accordingly, we affirm on both appeals. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS This appeal involves four children who range in age from seventeen to four years old. The Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) became involved with the family after learning one child was a victim of sexual predation by a family member. Although the mother knew of the abuse, she did nothing to prevent it from occurring. Instead, she allowed the abuser unfettered access to the children by leaving them alone in his care at night.1 In 2024, the State charged the perpetrator with two counts of sexual abuse. The juvenile court adjudicated the children in need of assistance (CINA) and removed them from the mother’s custody. 1 The abuse perpetrated by the family member spanned generations, with the family member also abusing the mother when the mother was a child. The mother’s continued relationship with the abuser into adulthood normalized the behavior as the mother and perpetrator walked around the home naked and engaged in sexual acts in the children’s presence. 3 Despite the mother’s claims that she ended a relationship with the perpetrator of the abuse, HHS later learned that the two had what they considered to be a “marriage ceremony.” The mother got a tattoo commemorating the occasion and legally changed her name to take the perpetrator’s surname. Although the perpetrator was incarcerated, they continued communicating and referred to each other as husband and wife. The mother provided financial support to the perpetrator by depositing funds into his jail account. In December 2025, the State petitioned to terminate the mother’s parental rights. The termination hearing was held the next month. The juvenile court found the State proved the grounds for terminating the mother’s parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f ) (2025) as to the oldest three children and section 232.116(1)(h) as to the youngest child. The court also found that terminating the mother’s parental rights served the children’s best interests and that the parent-child relationship should not be preserved based on one of the circumstances listed in section 232.116(3). Both the mother and one of the children separately appeal the termination order. SCOPE OF REVIEW We review termination-of-parental-rights proceedings de novo. In re W.M., 957 N.W.2d 305, 312 (Iowa 2021). While not binding on us, we give weight to the juvenile court’s fact findings, “particularly with respect to credibility determinations.” Id. DISCUSSION Reviewing termination of parental rights involves a three-step analysis. In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa 2018). 4 First, we determine whether any ground for termination under section 232.116(1) has been established. If we determine that a ground for termination has been established, then we determine whether the best- interest framework as laid out in section 232.116(2) supports the termination of parental rights. Finally, if we conclude the statutory best- interest framework supports termination, we consider whether any exceptions in section 232.116(3) apply to preclude termination of parental rights. Id. at 472–73 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). We address only those steps challenged on appeal. See In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). I. Statutory Grounds. The mother challenges the evidence showing the grounds for termination under section 232.116(1)(f ) and (h). She contends that the State did not prove that at the time of the termination hearing, the children could not be returned to her custody without facing risk of harm that would justify a CINA adjudication. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f )(4), (h)(4); see also id. § 232.102(8) (stating that the court can return a child to the home if a preponderance of the evidence shows the child will not suffer harm that would lead to a CINA adjudication); In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010) (interpreting the term “at the present time” to mean “at the time of the termination hearing”). Clear and convincing evidence shows that if returned to the mother’s custody, the children will be at risk of harm that would justify a CINA adjudication. HHS provided voluntary services to the family in 2022, which ended after the mother signed a safety plan and claimed she had cut contact with the perpetrator of the abuse. But the mother resumed contact with the perpetrator once the case was closed. The mother not only lived with the perpetrator despite knowing that he abused one of the children but left the 5 children alone in his care while she worked overnight shifts. She also repeatedly denied or minimized the abuse of her child and pressured the child to recant. The concerns about the mother’s ability to protect her children are thoroughly outlined in the report of the mental-health evaluation performed in late 2024 by a Doctor of Psychology. The evaluator recommended that the mother not act as a primary or independent caretaker of minors because she has numerous areas of concern in terms of her lack of protecting or lack of acknowledging the reported sexual abuse that her daughter suffered . . . as well as providing an environment and household that supported/encouraged grooming and desensitization of nudity that could provide for additional forms of physical and sexual abuse to all the children. An environment of grooming, desensitization to abuse, and deceit was ongoing, modeled, and expected. In the year that passed between the time of the evaluation and the termination hearing, nothing changed. Because returning the children to the mother’s custody would place the children at risk of harm that would justify a CINA adjudication, we affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f ) and (h). II. Best Interests. We next turn to the children’s best interests. Both the mother and one of the children contend that termination is not in the children’s best interests. Iowa Code section 232.116(2) lays out the framework for the “best- interest test.” P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 37. In deciding whether termination is in a child’s best interest, we must “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). We also “look to the child’s 6 long-range as well as immediate interests, consider what the future holds for the child if returned to the parents, and weigh the child’s safety and need for a permanent home.” In re L.T., 924 N.W.2d 521, 529 (Iowa 2019) (cleaned up). The mother does not have the protective capacity to keep her children safe, and one child has already suffered serious harm in her custody. The mental-health evaluator’s report describes the long and difficult treatment path she must travel before she can change. The mother made no progress during the CINA proceeding, and she lacks an ability or desire to change. Weighing the mother’s past performance, the serious risk of harm posed to the children if returned to the mother’s custody, and the amount of improvement the mother must make, we agree that terminating her parental rights serves the children’s best interests. III. Statutory Exceptions. The mother and the child also contend that the mother’s parental rights should be preserved based on section 232.116(3), which describes situations when the court need not terminate parental rights. Those situations include when a relative has legal custody of the child, when a child over the age of ten objects to termination, and when clear and convincing evidence shows that termination would be detrimental to the child due to the closeness of the parent-child bond. See Iowa Code § 232.116(3)(a)–(c). Because the State has proved the grounds for termination, the mother and the child bear the burden of showing one of the circumstances applies. See A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 476. But even if one of the scenarios applies, the court has discretion in deciding whether to preserve the parent-child relationship based on the unique circumstances of the case and the child’s best interests. Id. at 475. 7 Because the child seeking application of a permissive exception is in her father’s custody, is over the age of ten, and objected to the court terminating the mother’s parental rights, section 232.116(3)(a) and (b) apply. As to section 232.116(3)(c), the question is not whether terminating parental rights will be detrimental to the child but whether terminating parental rights will make termination more detrimental to the child than not. See W.M., 957 N.W.2d at 315. In other words, we must decide whether terminating the mother’s parental rights will harm the child more than preserving the parent- child relationship. Clear and convincing evidence shows that the mother’s parental rights should not be preserved based on the harm that she poses to the child’s safety. As the juvenile court found, [The mother] has shown that she cannot protect [the child]. [The mother] has shown she is unable to make the choices and does not possess the protective capacity necessary to protect [the child]. She has prioritized [the child]’s abuser . . . during the HHS voluntary case and during this case. She has dismissed and not fully acknowledged the sexual abuse that [the child] has been victim to. She does not understand who should be allowed to be around [the child] unsupervised. [The mother] can’t even be around [the child] unsupervised at this time due to these concerns. In no way has [the mother] taken accountability or shown that she has learned from her mistakes. She has not shown that she can protect [the child] in the future . . . . “It’s folly to think the mother will stand sentinel to protect against a foe she doesn’t acknowledge exists.” In re D.D., 955 N.W.2d 186, 193 (Iowa 2021). We understand why the child opposes termination. Id. (“It’s unsurprising that child victims of abuse seek to return to living with their siblings and parents, and all the familiarity of the home life they previously knew, after a court orders their removal from the home.”). But the safety concerns posed by preserving the legal parent-child relationship are not outweighed by the 8 child’s desire to keep a connection to the mother. Chapter 232 mandates that we protect the child from harm even if the child does not want to be protected. Id. (noting that the expressed desire of children to return to a home where they were abused has no bearing on whether the purposes of chapter 232 have been carried out). The same concerns about the mother’s protective capacity applies to all four of her children. For that reason, we decline to apply section 232.116(3) to preserve her parental rights. IV. Extension. Finally, the mother asks for more time to work toward reunification. See Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b) (allowing the court to continue placement of the child for six more months). To grant a six-month extension, the court must “enumerate the specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes which comprise the basis for the determination that the need for removal of the child from the child’s home will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.” Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b). The record does not support finding the need for removal will no longer exist if permanency is delayed for six months. The mental-health evaluator reported that the mother would continue to pose a risk of harm to the children “without treatment and significant change being witnessed over a lengthy period of time.” The evaluator opined that the treatment process would “be long, enduring, arduous, and have expected reversals and difficulties.” Because the mother had not yet made any progress with treatment by the time of the termination hearing, there is no reasonable likelihood that granting her another six months to work toward reunification 9 would change the need for the children’s removal. We therefore affirm the termination of the mother’s parental rights to her children. AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS. 10