In the Interest of S.R., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 26-0417 Filed September 2, 2026 _______________ In the Interest of S.R., Minor Child, M.D., Mother, Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, The Honorable Brent Pattison, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Karen A. Taylor of Taylor Law Offices, P.C., Des Moines, attorney for appellant mother. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Natalie Hedberg, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee State. Nicole Garbis Nolan of Youth Law Center, Des Moines, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Langholz, JJ. Opinion by Ahlers, P.J. 1 AHLERS, Presiding Judge. The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of a mother and father to a child who was seven years old at the time of the termination hearings. Only the mother appeals. She challenges the statutory grounds for termination, argues termination is not in the child’s best interests, and requests additional time to work toward reunification or establishment of a guardianship as potential alternatives to termination. We review termination-of-parental-rights cases de novo. In re A.B., 957 N.W.2d 280, 293 (Iowa 2021). Although we are not bound by the juvenile court’s factual findings, we give them respectful consideration, especially when assessing the credibility of witnesses. Id. Our review follows a three-step process of determining whether statutory grounds for termination exist, whether termination is in the child’s best interests, and whether an exception should apply to prevent termination. Id. at 294. But we do not address any step in this process that is not challenged on appeal. In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). “After addressing any challenged steps of the three-step process, we then address any additional claims raised by a parent.” In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 532 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc). We begin with the statutory grounds for termination. The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(f ) (2025). That ground permits termination upon sufficient proof that (1) the child is four years of age or older; (2) the child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance; (3) the child has been removed from the physical custody of the parent for at least twelve of the last eighteen months; and (4) the child cannot be returned to the custody of the parent. Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(f ). 2  The mother limits her challenge to the last element—whether the child could have been safely returned to her custody at the time of the termination hearing. See In re R.M.-V., 13 N.W.3d 620, 626 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024) (interpreting “at the present time” as used in section 232.116(1)(f )(4) to mean “at the time of the termination hearing”). Following our review of the record, we agree with the juvenile court’s thoughtful and well-reasoned conclusion that the child could not be safely returned to the mother’s custody at the time of the termination hearing given the unique facts of this case. The child traveled to the United States with her father when she was two years old. The mother remained in their home country, though she did have telephone and video contact with the child. Meanwhile, the child lived with the father, who would beat her with a belt. And multiple individuals sexually abused the child.1 These acts of physical and sexual abuse prompted the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services to get involved with the family and remove the child from the father’s custody.2 Eventually, the mother also came to the United States on a travel visa to try to reunify with the child. But it had been several years since the child had spent any significant amount of time with the mother. Service providers explained to the mother that the child had unique mental and emotional needs to consider after all that had happened to her. But the mother failed to be sensitive and understanding of those needs. When reflecting on the department’s involvement with the family, she focused on how the department’s involvement impacted her rather than on the child’s well- being. And she questioned the child about who abused her. When the 1 The child tested positive for chlamydia following her removal from the father’s custody. 2 The father has since been deported. 3 mother learned of another person who abused the child, she instructed the child not to tell anyone because it could slow the case’s progression. At one point, the child discovered a video on the mother’s phone depicting the father engaged in a sex act involving a person who appeared to be a minor.3 This further traumatized the child because she felt she could not trust her mother. After that, she did not want to attend visits with the mother anymore. The child’s therapist agreed that visits with the mother would be detrimental to the child. Once the mother and child had video contact again, the mother included her older child 4 and permitted the older child to be verbally abusive to the child at issue. Later, the mother attempted to leave a voice message for the child in which the mother implicitly blamed the child for the lack of case progress and implied that she would leave the country to be with her older child. We are cognizant that the mother is not the person who physically or sexually abused the child. But juvenile law is not fault-based; rather, it is based on protecting children. In re Z.P., 948 N.W.2d 518, 523 (Iowa 2020) (per curiam). And this child suffered horrible traumas. The mother has shown that she cannot respond appropriately to the child’s needs following that abuse. So, we agree with the juvenile court that the child could not be safely returned to the mother’s custody at the time of the termination hearing, satisfying a statutory ground for termination. 3 The mother claimed she had the video to use as evidence in case the family returned to their home country and the father attempted to regain custody of the child. The mother admitted to having the video for nearly four years, but she never told any caseworkers about it until the child discovered it. 4 The older child remains in the family’s home country. He does not share a father with the child at issue and is currently in the care of a family member. 4  Next, the mother argues termination is not in the child’s best interests. When making a best-interests determination, we “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” P.L., 778 N.W.2d at 40 (quoting Iowa Code § 232.116(2)). It is apparent that the mother is ill-equipped to attend to the child’s mental and emotional conditions and needs now and in the future. Conversely, the child’s foster parent has provided the child with excellent care and has been cognizant of and attentive to the child’s particular needs.5 The foster parent is willing to adopt the child, and that is what the child desires. See Iowa Code § 232.116(2)(b) (permitting the court to consider “whether the foster family is able and willing to permanently integrate the child into the foster family” in determining the child’s best interests). We understand that process will take significantly longer given the child’s current immigration status. But termination is necessarily a part of that adoption process at some point. And the child’s therapist opined that termination of the child’s legal relationship with the mother would provide the child with needed stability. We conclude termination is in the child’s best interests. While the mother’s petition on appeal references our third step, permissive exceptions to termination, it does not develop any argument as to any potential permissive exception. So any argument about permissive exceptions is forfeited. See In re A.T., No. 25-0528, 2025 WL 1704442, at *1 n.2 (Iowa Ct. App. June 18, 2025). Moreover, the mother never argued for application of a permissive exception in the juvenile court, so the argument is not preserved for this court’s consideration. See L.A., 20 N.W.3d at 533 5 The mother even described the foster parent as “an excellent person to be with [her] daughter.” 5 (recognizing a parent must raise an issue before the juvenile court, and the court must rule on it to preserve error). The mother requests additional time to work toward reunification. This is a permissible option under the statute if termination is denied. See Iowa Code § 232.117(5) (permitting the court to enter a permanency order under section 232.104 if it decides not to terminate rights); see also id. § 232.104(2)(b) (providing a permanency option of giving a parent an additional six months to work toward reunification). But to exercise this option, the court must be able to “enumerate the specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes which comprise the basis for the determination that the need for removal of the child from the child’s home will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.” Id. § 232.104(2)(b). In support of her request for additional time, the mother cites the fact that she arrived in the United States after the underlying child-in-need-of- assistance proceedings had already begun. So she reasons she should get more time to work toward reunification. But this argument ignores the fact that our focus is on what is best for the child, not the parent. And the juvenile court already granted the mother an extension given her late arrival in the country. But at the end of that extension, the mother was no closer to reunification than she was at the start. Moreover, we do not see a path by which the mother and child would be reunified in six months. That is particularly true given that the mother has made statements suggesting she may return to her home country soon to be with her older child. So we do not grant her additional time to work toward reunification. Finally, we address the mother’s argument that the juvenile court should have established a guardianship for the child instead of terminating 6 the mother’s rights. She highlights the fact that the child will not be able to be adopted anytime soon due to immigration issues, so she reasons there is no reason not to preserve the parent-child legal relationship and simply establish a guardianship with the foster parent. But guardianships are not legally preferable to termination because the parent can challenge the guardianship at any time. See In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 477–78 (Iowa 2018). And this child has expressed a strong desire not to continue a relationship with the mother because she does not trust the mother. She is afraid the mother will try to take her back to their home country where the child believes she is not safe. The child’s fears are warranted. We agree with the juvenile court that it would not be in the child’s best interest to establish a guardianship as an alternative to termination. We affirm the juvenile court’s termination of the mother’s parental rights. AFFIRMED. 7