Full Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 24-0619 Filed November 4, 2026 _______________ Katherine Abigail Hill, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. City of Carroll, Iowa, Carroll Police Department, Jeffrey Nichols, Individually and in his Official Capacity as Officer for the Carroll Police Department, and John Doe, Defendants–Appellees. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Carroll County, The Honorable Adria Kester, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED _______________ Jack Bjornstad (argued) of Jack Bjornstad Law Office, Spirit Lake, attorney for appellant. Brett C. Redenbaugh (argued) of Law Offices of Redenbaugh & Mohr, P.C., Storm Lake, attorney for appellees. _______________ Heard at oral argument by Tabor, C.J., and Greer, Schumacher, Chicchelly, and Langholz, JJ. Opinion by Schumacher, J. 1 SCHUMACHER, Judge. Katherine Hill was handcuffed while she was naked during a law enforcement investigation. Hill sued the city of Carroll, the Carroll Police Department, and the officer involved in the incident. Hill alleged three constitutional violations and raised claims of negligence, assault, invasion of privacy, trespass on the case, and action on the bond. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, and Hill appeals. Upon our review, we affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for further proceedings. BACKGROUND FACTS AND PROCEEDINGS On the evening of December 29, 2020, Carroll Police Officer Jeffrey Nichols responded to an apartment on a report from a resident that he had discovered a bullet hole through the ceiling of his apartment and had located an errant bullet on a dresser within his apartment. Officer Nichols determined the bullet came from the neighboring apartment directly above. He was aware that D.V. rented the apartment above, and her son, Dustin Hill, resided with her. Several weeks prior, Officer Nichols and Officer Kenneback of the Carroll Police Department had attempted – unsuccessfully - to locate Dustin at D.V.’s apartment to serve a warrant, which remained active. Officer Nichols approached D.V.’s apartment with Officer Kenneback and his K-9. D.V. answered the door and allowed them to enter the apartment. D.V. stated that Dustin and his wife, Katherine Hill, were in the bedroom at the end of the hallway, and she turned on a light for the officers.1 The officers announced their presence and repeatedly ordered Dustin to exit the bedroom with his hands up. Receiving no response, the officers advised 1 We refer to Dustin by his first name and Katherine, the appellant, as Hill. 2 that they were going to release the K-9. After again receiving no response, Officer Kenneback released the K-9, which indicated on the bedroom door. Dustin then stated that he would come out if they leashed the K-9. After Officer Kenneback leashed the K-9, Dustin exited the bedroom, naked, with his hands above his head. He was placed in handcuffs and seated at the kitchen table. After Dustin was handcuffed, Hill was ordered out of the bedroom. Hill exited the bedroom, also naked. She was placed in handcuffs and seated at the table next to Dustin. After the officers determined there was no one else in the bedroom, Officer Kenneback returned the K-9 to his patrol car. Officer Nichols stayed with Dustin and Hill in the kitchen, and he told them that the officers would get them dressed when Officer Kenneback returned. When Officer Kenneback returned approximately one minute later, Officer Nichols went to the bedroom to find clothes. Officer Nichols helped Dustin with his clothes and offered to help Hill. Meanwhile, a female officer arrived on the scene. Hill asked for the female officer to help her, to which Officer Nichols responded, “absolutely, yeah.” Hill was fully clothed less than six minutes after she exited the bedroom. During most of that time, Officer Nichols was in and out of the bedroom and hallway area looking for clothing or focused on Dustin. Dustin consented to a search of the bedroom, during which the officers discovered methamphetamine, a scale, and paraphernalia. A firearm was also located. Dustin was arrested; Hill was not arrested. 3 Two years later, in December 2022, Hill filed this civil suit raising “Godfrey claims”2 against the city of Carroll, the Carroll Police Department, and Officer Nichols individually and in his official capacity. Hill described her petition as “an action for damages arising out of the unreasonable seizure of, and deprivation of [her] liberty interests, without due process, and the Defendants’ negligence, resulting in the naked handcuffing of [her] and her exposure to residents and officers.” Hill raised the following claims: (1) violation of her right to be free from unreasonable seizure under article I, section 8 of the Iowa Constitution; (2) violation of her right to due process of law, privacy, bodily integrity, and dignity under article I, section 9 of the Iowa Constitution; (3) violation of her right to freedom, liberty, and happiness under article I, section 1 of the Iowa Constitution; and (4) negligence. The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing Hill’s claims were exempted because the officers “exercised ʻdue care’ or were performing a ʻdiscretionary function.’” See Iowa Code § 670.4(1)(c) (2022); see also id. § 670.12 (extending the claims exempted to protect individual officers and employees of the municipality). In May 2023, the supreme court decided Burnett v. Smith, 990 N.W.2d 289, 307 (Iowa 2023), which overruled Godfrey. In the wake of Burnett, Hill amended her petition to add three common law claims - trespass on the case, assault, and invasion of privacy. She also added a statutory claim - action on 2 See Godfrey v. State, 898 N.W.2d 844, 871–72 (Iowa 2017) (plurality opinion), overruled by Burnett v. Smith, 990 N.W.2d 289 (Iowa 2023); see also Sikora v. State, 23 N.W.3d 300, 303 (Iowa 2025) (referring to the petitioner’s similar claims under the Iowa constitution as “Godfrey claims”). 4 the bond - pursuant to Iowa Code section 64.18. Finally, Hill realleged her negligence and Godfrey claims.3 In August, the district court granted the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Hill’s Godfrey claims, reasoning that in Burnett, the supreme court ruled standalone causes of action for monetary damages under the Iowa Constitution would no longer be recognized unless authorized by common law, an Iowa Statute, or the express terms of a provision of the Iowa Constitution. . . . Plaintiff’s Counts I, II and III are all standalone causes of action for monetary damages under the Iowa Constitution and summary judgment is appropriate on all three Counts. The court further granted summary judgment to the defendants on Hill’s negligence claim, finding that because “the actions of the officers on scene were not objectively unreasonable, defendants are qualifiedly immune from liability to plaintiff’s petition.” The defendants then moved for summary judgment on Hill’s remaining claims as alleged in her amended petition. Following a hearing, the court granted the motion and dismissed Hill’s claims of trespass on the case, assault, invasion of privacy, and action on bond. On appeal, Hill challenges the court’s dismissal of those four claims.4 3 At oral arguments, defense counsel indicated in some respects that this case was like “whack-a-mole” due to the changes in the law after the filing of the petition. 4 Hill’s appellate brief makes no mention of her negligence claim. So, she has waived any challenge to the same. But Hill challenges the district court’s dismissal of her Godfrey claims, claiming “the Court should apply Burnett prospectively only.” The defendants counter that Hill failed to preserve error on her challenge because she did not appeal the court’s August 9, 2023, order dismissing her Godfrey claims. Indeed, Hill’s notice of appeal, filed April 12, 2024, states: “Notice is hereby given that the plaintiff, 5 Katherine Hill, appeals to the Supreme Court of Iowa from the ruling entered in this case on March 13, 2024.” Hill maintains that her notice of appeal was timely and preserved error “concerning every interlocutory order.” Although Hill is correct that she timely appealed the March 13, 2024 order that finally disposed of all the issues in the suit, see Iowa R. App. P. 6.101(1)(b) (providing a notice of appeal must be filed “within 30 days after the filing of the final order”), she failed to specify on her notice of appeal that she was also appealing from the court’s August 9, 2023 order or even more generically from all other “adverse rulings and orders inhering therein,” as required by rule 6.1401—Form 1: Notice of Appeal. Because Hill did not include that order in her notice of appeal, her Godfrey claims are not properly before us. But see O’Neal v. Alpine Ctr., L.C., Montgomery Kone, Inc., No. 99-838, 2001 WL 804185, at *2 n.1 (Iowa Ct. App. July 18, 2001) (finding an appeal of an earlier summary judgment ruling “could properly be made within the time permitted to appeal an order disposing of the rest of the case,” where “O’Neal filed notice of appeal of both summary judgment rulings”); see also Lukken v. Fleischer, 962 N.W.2d 71, 76 (Iowa 2021) (“Lukken appeals each of the district court’s summary judgment rulings.”). But even if we were to conclude that Hill’s notice of appeal substantially complied with the requirements to also appeal the August 9 order, our supreme court has repeatedly applied Burnett to cases in which the appeals were still pending at the time of the Burnett May 5, 2023 ruling and concluded those claims were barred. See Venckus v. City of Iowa City, 990 N.W.2d 800, 812 (Iowa 2023) (applying Burnett in opinion filed on May 19, 2023); White v. Harkider, 990 N.W.2d 647, 652 (Iowa 2023) (applying Burnett in opinion filed on May 12, 2023); Carter v. State, No. 21-0909, 2023 WL 3397451, at *2 (Iowa May 12, 2023) (applying Burnett in unpublished opinion filed on May 12, 2023). In deciding Venckus, White, and Carter, our supreme court adhered to the requirement that a new rule “applies to the case creating the standard as well as all pending cases.” State v. Hahn, 961 N.W.2d 370, 372 (Iowa 2021), superseded by statute on other grounds; accord State v. Johnson, 539 N.W.2d 160, 165 (Iowa 1995) (stating a new rule “applies to the present case, prospectively to cases pending at the time this decision is filed, and to cases in which the issue resolved herein was preserved”). Our court has followed, stating, these types of claims are no longer viable under our supreme court’s recent precedent. See Dishman v. State, No. 22-1491, 2023 WL 8068563, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Nov. 21, 2023) (observing “Iowa no longer recognizes Godfrey constitutional tort claims, whether on file before Burnett or not”). 6 STANDARD OF REVIEW We review the district court’s ruling on summary judgment for correction of errors at law. McClure v. E. I. du Pont de Nemours & Co., 23 N.W.3d 33, 40 (Iowa 2025). Summary judgment is appropriate only if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, admissions on file, and affidavits show that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. There is no fact issue if the only dispute concerns the legal consequences flowing from the undisputed facts. Ratcliff v. Graether, 697 N.W.2d 119, 123 (Iowa 2005) (citation omitted). To the extent Hill raises a constitutional claim, our review is de novo. See Burnett, 990 N.W.2d at 293. DISCUSSION On appeal, Hill “seeks to invoke the common law and Iowa’s own statutes to hold Officer Nichols and his employer responsible for his wrongful conduct.” We address her claims in turn. I. Assault and Invasion of Privacy Hill first challenges the district court’s finding that the defendants were entitled to immunity from liability for her assault and invasion-of- privacy claims. Specifically, Hill claims the court “impermissibly made a factual resolution that Officer Nichols’s actions were not ʻobjectively unreasonable,’ by weighing the evidence, then reaching factual inferences contrary to [Hill]’s competent evidence.” Hill maintains the court erred by rejecting her version of the incident based on Officer Nichols’s bodycam footage. According to Hill, a reasonable jury could have viewed the video evidence and found the following: 7 • Officer Nichols’s decision to cuff Hill naked when she was stark naked, obviously unarmed, and D.V. was free to roam, was assaultive and invaded Hill’s privacy. • Officer Nichols’s decision to cuff Hill naked behind the back, fully exposing Hill’s naked breasts, and preventing her from covering her naked breasts with her arms, was assaultive and invaded Hill’s privacy. • Officer Nichols’s decision not to cover Hill with a living room blanket, laying on the couch just feet away, unreasonably invaded Hill’s privacy. • Officer Nichols’s decision not to cover Hill with a bedroom blanket, even as he proceeded to search through drawers, unreasonably invaded Hill’s privacy. • Officer Nichols’s decision to direct Hill to come close while he put shorts on her, which would have required him to lean his face into her naked breasts as he placed the shorts under her feet, was assaultive and invaded Hill’s privacy. • Officer Nichols’s decision not to put Hill’s shirt on first, before her shorts, which would have avoided the situation where he would have to lean his face toward her naked breasts as he placed the shorts under her feet, was assaultive and invaded Hill’s privacy. • Officer Nichols’s decision not to uncuff Hill to dress herself, which would have avoided the situation where he would have to lean his face into her naked breasts as he placed the shorts under her feet, was assaultive and invaded Hill’s privacy. • Officer Nichols’s decision not to put a female officer in charge of Hill, which would have avoided the situation where he would have to lean his face toward her naked breasts as he placed the shorts under her feet, was assaultive and invaded Hill’s privacy. • Officer Nichols’s decision to reposition, keep watching, and keep recording Hill’s naked breast while the female officer dressed her, was assaultive and invaded Hill’s privacy. • Officer Nichols’s decision to direct Hill to come close while he put shorts on her, which would have required him to lean his face toward 8 her naked breasts as he placed the shorts under her feet, which could have easily resulted in contact, was assaultive and invaded Hill’s privacy. • Officer Nichols’s decision to direct Hill to let him put shorts on her, which would have resulted in contact with her naked legs and body, was assaultive and invaded Hill’s privacy. • Officer Nichols’s decision to keep Hill handcuffed, naked, and exposed for an unreasonable amount of time, but immediately allowing her to be uncuffed after her breasts and body were covered by a female officer, was assaultive and invaded Hill’s privacy. (Cleaned up). Hill resisted the defendants’ claim of immunity under Iowa Code section 670.4(1)(c). Chapter 670, the Iowa Municipal Tort Claims Act (IMTCA), governs municipal tort claims. See Mormann v. City of Manchester, 27 N.W.3d 820, 831 (Iowa 2025). It applies both to claims against a municipality and municipal employees acting in their official capacity. See Iowa Code § 670.2 (“Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, every municipality is subject to liability for its torts and those of its officers and employees, acting within the scope of their employment or duties, whether arising out of a governmental or proprietary function.”). However, liability does not apply to any of the “claims exempted” set forth in section 670.4, including: Any claim based upon an act or omission of an officer or employee of the municipality, exercising due care, in the execution of a statute, ordinance, or regulation whether the statute, ordinance or regulation is valid, or based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise or perform a discretionary function or duty on the part of the municipality or an officer or employee of the municipality, whether or not the discretion is abused. Id. § 670.4(1)(c). 9 In essence, section 670.4(1)(c) exempts certain claims and provides a defense to defendants who exercised due care to execute a statute or perform a discretionary function. This due-care exemption is a freestanding statutory immunity, enacted as part of the IMTCA in 1967 - decades before Godfrey - and it operates independently of the constitutional-tort framework that Burnett eliminated.5 In addressing Hill’s claims, the district court began, “The question is a factual issue of the reasonableness of the officers’ actions.” (Citing Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989)). Weighing the evidence and relying on Baldwin, 915 N.W.2d at 280, the district court determined Hill “has failed to overcome Defendants’ claim of qualified immunity.” The court found: “Officer Nichols acted reasonably. Dustin and [Hill] posed an immediate threat to the responding officers. The officers held a reasonable belief that a 5 In Dickey v. Mahaska Health Partnership, 705 F. Supp. 3d 883, 893–94 (S.D. Iowa 2023), the court surmised that the legislature amended section 670.4A in 2021 “for, inter alia, the purpose of legislatively overruling the Baldwin decisions and establishing that federal pleading and qualified immunity standards would apply to state law tort claims against municipalities.” See id. at 894 (discussing the amendment to section 670.4A “[a]gainst the backdrop” of Baldwin v. City of Estherville, 915 N.W.2d 259 (Iowa 2018), and Baldwin v. City of Estherville (Baldwin II), 929 N.W.2d 691 (Iowa 2019)). Our supreme court has since clarified, however, that section 670.4A’s claims-exempted provision “does not apply to state common law claims.” See Doe v. W. Dubuque Cmty. Sch. Dist., 20 N.W.3d 798, 807 (Iowa 2025). Accordingly, section 670.4A would not provide an independent basis for immunity here. Although Hill’s amended petition maintained that “the law is clearly established as to each of the violations claimed,” apparently in satisfaction of the heightened pleading requirement of section 670.4A(3), the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Hill’s assault and invasion-of-privacy claims invoked only the due- care exemption of section 670.4(1)(c). Therefore, unlike in Dickey, where the parties squarely disputed whether section 670.4A governed the claims at issue, section 670.4A was neither raised nor decided below as a basis for immunity on Hill’s assault and invasion-of-privacy claims. 10 loaded firearm was in the apartment.” The court further rejected Hill’s “claims that the officers on scene should have covered [Hill]’s body faster than the bodycam depicts,” noting those “arguments are the type of second- guessing unhelpful in these situations.” The court concluded “the actions of the officers on scene were not objectively unreasonable, [and therefore,] Defendants are qualifiedly immune from liability to [Hill]’s Petition.” Upon our review, we need not reach Hill’s claim that the district court improperly weighed the evidence because the court applied the wrong legal framework. Although the defendants raised statutory immunity under section 670.4(1)(c) and the district court quoted that statute, the court’s reasoning shows that it applied the Baldwin all-due-care immunity that was judicially created to apply to state constitutional torts recognized in Godfrey. See Baldwin, 915 N.W.2d at 280–81. Once Godfrey was overruled by Burnett, the Baldwin all-due-care immunity no longer has any applicability. See Burnett, 990 N.W.2d at 307 (overruling Godfrey and holding Iowa no longer recognizes a standalone cause of action for money damages under the Iowa Constitution). Accordingly, the court’s underlying reliance on Baldwin was mistaken. See 915 N.W.2d at 280, abrogated by Burnett, 990 N.W.2d at 307; see also Dickey, 705 F. Supp. 3d at 894. We take no position on whether summary judgment under the statutory due-care immunity under section 670.4(1)(c) or any theory may be meritorious.6 But because the district court did not analyze the claims under 6 We decline to consider how the statutory due-care immunity under section 670.4(1)(c) could apply here for the first time on appeal. We have no district court decision or briefing from the parties analyzing that issue. And especially given the limited precedent applying that provision, we are not inclined to wade into that analysis without the testing of adversarial briefing. See Kelley v. Story Cnty. Sheriff, 611 N.W.2d 475, 484 (Iowa 2000) (applying the due-care exemption after a small-claims bench trial). 11 any framework outside of Baldwin, we reverse the grant of summary judgment on the assault and invasion-of-privacy claims and remand for further proceedings. II. Trespass on the Case The district court dismissed Hill’s claim for trespass on the case upon determining the claim was not available as a common law cause of action. The court stated: Burnett provides that a standalone cause of action for money damages under the Iowa Constitution would not be allowed unless authorized by common law, statute, or the express terms of the Iowa Constitution. [990 N.W.2d at 307]. By characterizing the incident in [D.V.’s] apartment as trespass on the case, a violation of her state constitutional rights, [Hill] argues that a 1911 Iowa Supreme Court decision provides the common law authority outlined in Burnett, citing Lane v. Mitchell, 133 N.W.2d 381 (Iowa 1911).[7] The Defendants counter that trespass on the case refers to later consequences, not the immediate result of an act under Miranda v. Said, 836 N.W.2d 8 (Iowa 2013). The actions of the officer in this action are alleged to have directly produced harm. Defendants also assert that trespass on the case is not available as a common law cause of action. This court agrees. Trespass on the case is not available as a cause of action but is a form of action. .... Forms of action were eliminated under Brown v. Hendrickson, 27 N.W. 914, 915 (Iowa 1886). Our supreme court was recently presented with a similar purported trespass-on-the-case claim. See Sikora, 23 N.W.3d at 309. The court observed that “it’s not clear this is a valid claim in any context. Although our older cases mention ʻtrespass on the case,’ it appears to have been replaced by 7 The correct citation is Lane v. Mitchell, 133 N.W. 381 (Iowa 1911). 12 modern causes of action like negligence.” Id. (citation omitted). But the court did not have to resolve the question because that case was brought under the Iowa Tort Claims Act, which - unlike the IMTCA - bars claims that are the functional equivalent of wrongful imprisonment under Iowa Code section 669.14(4). We agree with the supreme court’s observation in Sikora and thus concur with the district court that trespass on the case is not available as a common law cause of action. See id. Upon our review, we find no error in the district court’s analysis. Accordingly, we affirm the grant of summary judgment on the trespass-on-the-case claim. III. Bond under Iowa Code chapter 64 Hill also claims the district court erred in failing to find that Iowa Code section 64.18 “gives a statutory ʻright of action’ on the official bond.” Section 64.18 provides: “All bonds of public officers shall run to the State, and be for the use and benefit of any corporation, public or private, or person injured or sustaining loss, with a right of action in the name of the State for its or the corporation’s or person’s use.” Before the district court, Hill supported her claim by pointing to bonds in construction lawsuits. She claimed: “Construction bond cases are not derivative of any other action, they sound in contract. This is the same type of suit. The difference here is the bond is a third-party beneficiary bond. Katherine Hill is the third-party beneficiary of Officer Nichols’ bond required under Chapter 64.” The district court denied this claim, finding, “Action on the Bond is not a separate cause of action. Under this code section, bond is ʻfor the purpose of indemnifying the obligee or any person suffering injury or loss by reason of official malfeasance, misfeasance or nonfeasance,’ (i.e., any judgment for Plaintiff on other claims would come out of the bond).” (quoting State ex rel. Switzer v. Overturff, 33 N.W.2d 405, 408 (Iowa 1948)). 13 Hill argues the district court “misreads” Switzer, maintaining the case “simply requires proof of damages before indemnification with the bond.” To support her claim, Hill points to cases in which actions on the bond were allowed based upon “oppression,” such as arrests made in excess of authority. According to Hill, “[t]he concepts of oppression, fear, or favor are broad enough to encompass all of Officer Nichols’ actions and all of [Hill’s] legal claims.” In Sikora, the court rejected the plaintiff’s “theory that section 64.18 permits a way around the ITCA,” noting the defendants “here are state officials” and “the ITCA specifically addresses wrongful imprisonment.” 23 N.W.3d at 305, 310. The court noted, however, that section 64.18 “suggests that there are at least some situations in which a private person could recover for some injuries caused by some public officers,” noting as example Scott v. Feilschmidt, 182 N.W. 382, 385 (Iowa 1921). Sikora, 23 N.W.3d at 310. In Scott, the defendant (a Sioux City police officer) arrested and detained the plaintiff (a minor under the age of eighteen) “for a period of about an hour on the streets of Sioux City before a large crowd of men.” 182 N.W. at 383. The Scott court concluded the officer conducted an “illegal arrest,” noting “[t]he record affords no justification of the policeman in arresting this girl. She had committed no offense.” Id. at 384–85. The court affirmed the plaintiff’s action on the bond for the established wrongdoing. Id. at 384 (“One suffering damage at the hands of one required to give bond by reason of the breach of the bond may bring action on the bond regardless of who is named obligee therein.”). Here, even assuming Hill could plead an action on the bond against local officials, section 64.18 does not create a freestanding cause of action, which the district court correctly found. Rather, it exists so that a judgment 14 on a substantive claim may be satisfied against it. We affirm the grant of summary judgment on the action-on-the-bond claim. CONCLUSION Having addressed the issues properly before us, we reverse the district court’s order granting summary judgment on the assault and invasion-of- privacy claims, we affirm the grant of summary judgment on the action-on- the-bond and trespass-on-the-case claims, and remand for further proceedings. AFFIRMED IN PART, REVERSED IN PART, AND REMANDED. 15