In the Interest of J.T., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 26-1038 Filed September 2, 2026 _______________ In the Interest of J.T., Minor Child, M.H., Mother, Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Des Moines County, The Honorable Jennifer D. Slocum, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Kimberly A. Auge of The Auge Law Firm, Fort Madison, attorney for appellant mother. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Tamara Knight, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee State. Reyna L. Wilkens of Wilkens Law Office, Fort Madison, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Ahlers, P.J., and Chicchelly and Langholz, JJ. Opinion by Ahlers, P.J. 1 AHLERS, Presiding Judge. The juvenile court terminated the parental rights of the mother and all putative fathers of a child born in 2025. The mother appeals. Our review is de novo. In re L.A., 20 N.W.3d 529, 532 (Iowa Ct. App. 2025) (en banc). And we follow a three-step process of determining (1) whether the State established a statutory ground for termination; (2) whether the State established that termination of parental rights is in the child’s best interests; and (3) whether a permissive exception to termination should be applied. Id. To start, we note that the State contends the mother forfeited all issues on appeal due to failure to develop any substantive arguments in her petition on appeal. But we can discern two issues for which the mother makes enough substantive argument that we are able to address them, so we will decide those two issues on the merits.1 The issues are whether the State established a statutory ground for termination and whether termination of the mother’s rights is in the child’s best interests—the first two steps in the three-step process. As to statutory grounds, the juvenile court terminated the mother’s rights under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(g) and (h) (2026). The mother contends such grounds were not established. Her argument exclusively centers on whether the child could have been returned to her custody. The flaw in this argument is that, though the State is required to prove that the child could not be returned to the mother’s custody to establish a ground for termination under section 232.116(1)(h), such proof is not required to establish a ground for termination under section 232.116(1)(g). See In re J.R., 1 If the mother intended to raise any other issues, we deem them forfeited. See State v. Jackson, 4 N.W.3d 298, 311 (Iowa 2024) (finding forfeiture of an issue when a party fails to clearly identify it or make more than a perfunctory argument in support of it). 2 No. 23-1838, 2024 WL 261320, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Jan. 24, 2024). By failing to articulate any challenge to termination under section 232.116(1)(g), the mother has waived or forfeited her challenge on that ground. See id. And, because the court terminated on more than one ground and we may affirm on any individual statutory ground, we affirm on the ground not sufficiently challenged—in this case section 232.116(1)(g).2 See In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012) (holding we may affirm on any ground relied upon by the juvenile court when multiple grounds are found). The mother also contends that termination of her rights is not in the child’s best interests. She argues that termination will lead to “intolerable and irreparable harm.” But the record refutes this claim. The Iowa Department of Health and Human Services had already been involved with the mother regarding older half-siblings of this child for nearly a year when this child was born. Due to the mother’s lack of progress with her older children and a positive drug test shortly before this child’s birth, this child was removed from the mother’s custody the day after he was born. Since then, the mother has failed to address her substance use, failed to address her mental-health issues, continued to test positive for illegal drugs, and only sporadically participated with services to help her develop the skills needed to parent this child, who has significant developmental issues. The mother 2 Although our decision to affirm termination under section 232.116(1)(g) makes it unnecessary to address the mother’s challenge to termination under section 232.116(1)(h), we have conducted a de novo review of the record. Following that review, we agree with the juvenile court that the child could not be returned to the mother’s custody at the time of the termination hearing. The mother’s failure to address her substance-use and mental-health issues, her recent positive drug tests, and her failure to acknowledge any drug use despite positive drug tests all contribute to finding that the child could not be returned to her custody. As such, the mother’s challenge to termination under section 232.116(1)(h) also fails. 3 is nowhere near being able to obtain custody of the child. Considering the best placement for the child’s long-term nurturing and growth and what is best for his physical, mental, and emotional needs, we find terminating the mother’s parental rights to be in the child’s best interests.3 See Iowa Code § 232.116(2). AFFIRMED. 3 The mother’s notice of appeal included an appeal from the permanency order issued in the underlying child-in-need-of-assistance (CINA) file. Assuming without deciding that we have jurisdiction to address the appeal of that order, our decision to affirm termination of the mother’s parental rights makes it unnecessary to address the merits of the appeal of the CINA permanency order. For that reason, coupled with the mother’s failure to make any substantive arguments challenging the permanency order, we affirm the juvenile court’s permanency order in the CINA case. 4