In the Interest of H.S.I., Minor Child

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA _______________ No. 26-0846 Filed August 19, 2026 _______________ In the Interest of H.S.I., Minor Child, A.S., Mother, Appellant. _______________ Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Polk County, The Honorable Kimberly Ayotte, Judge. _______________ AFFIRMED _______________ Teresa M. Pope of Pope Law, PLLC, Des Moines, attorney for appellant mother. Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and Mackenzie Moran, Assistant Attorney General, attorneys for appellee State. Jeremy M. Evans of Carr Law Firm, P.L.C., Des Moines, attorney and guardian ad litem for minor child. _______________ Considered without oral argument by Greer, P.J., and Badding and Sandy, JJ. Opinion by Greer, P.J. 1 GREER, Presiding Judge. A mother1 appeals the termination of her parental rights to her child, born in 2023, under Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(h) (2025). Pointing to five issues, the mother asserts: (1) the State failed to prove the grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence, (2) it was not in the child’s best interests to terminate her parental rights, (3) the juvenile court erred by denying her request for additional time to work toward reunification, (4) the mother’s strong relationship with the child provides an exception to termination under Iowa Code section 232.116(3), and (5) the juvenile court should have entered a bridge order to preserve her parental rights. The State asserts that it proved grounds for termination of the mother’s rights because the child had been removed for almost two years and could not be returned to the mother’s custody at the time of the termination hearing, so it was in the best interests of the child to proceed with termination. According to the State, an extension of time would not change things, the mother did not prove an exception to termination was warranted, and a bridge order is not appropriate in this case. Based upon our de novo review, we affirm the juvenile court’s ruling. I. Background Facts and Proceedings. Initially, the Iowa Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) became aware of this mother in 2018 when there were concerns about her methamphetamine use and her care of an older child. HHS became involved again in 2023 when the mother delivered H.S.I., who tested positive for amphetamines and methamphetamine at birth. The mother admitted using 1 The petition to terminate parental rights was dismissed as to the father on the first day of the termination trial. 2 methamphetamine while she was pregnant. A safety plan was put in place to protect the child. During that safety plan, the mother continued to exhibit signs of substance use and admitted to using opioids. The child remained with the father; the mother was removed from the home and required to visit the child at the discretion of HHS. There were also allegations of domestic violence between the mother and father, but the mother’s version of events did not align with her injuries. In April 2024, the child was adjudicated a child in need of assistance (CINA). Additional allegations of domestic assault surfaced between these parents. Again, some details pointed to the mother as the instigator, but HHS changed the safety plan and placed the child with the maternal grandmother. In June, the child was placed back with the father. At a dispositional hearing held in July, although the mother had tested positive for methamphetamine and amphetamines in June, she reported she was participating in substance- use treatment and mental-health counseling. After the dispositional hearing, HHS received information from the mother’s counselor that the mother was not attending therapy and was not consistent with her visits because she said “there were days she ‘had to use’ and did not want her child[] to see her while she was using.” In July, the mother was arrested for operating while intoxicated and her urine screen came back positive for a number of illegal substances, including fentanyl. Although required to undergo drug testing, the mother did not consistently test and instead provided positive or tampered drug screens. Around this same time, as the mother continued testing positive for illegal substances, some at the highest levels she had ever tested, the substance-use counselor reported the mother failed to attend treatment from 3 mid-July to early September. At the dispositional review hearing in September, the mother continued to test positive for illegal substances and was not in treatment of any kind. In October, HHS learned that the parents were involved in another domestic-abuse incident. Although the father was arrested for assaulting the mother, the mother did not report the incident to the HHS social worker at the October 21 visit, and the worker did not see any visible injuries on the mother at that visit. A few days later, the juvenile court placed the child in HHS custody for relative care and the child returned to the care of the maternal grandmother. In November, the mother again tested positive for several illegal substances. The mother was admitted to inpatient treatment at the end of November and appeared to do well in that treatment program, showing progress until the end of January 2025 when the care team reported the mother was struggling to stay engaged, was often absent or inconsistent, and was otherwise not accountable for her actions. The treatment center put the mother on a behavioral contract. During this time, the mother was maintaining semi-supervised visits with the child. In February, the mother was admitted to family treatment court and engaged in the Safe Babies program. At the dispositional review hearing held in March, the juvenile court was informed that the mother was pregnant, although she was not certain who the father was. The juvenile court instructed the mother to complete her psychosocial evaluations, be actively engaged in treatment, and be “honest with her team.” At an April 2025 permanency hearing, the juvenile court stated that the mother had made progress and set out conditions that would need to be met so that the child could return home. The juvenile court granted the mother a six-month extension of time to participate in services 4 and reunite with the child. An HHS report noted that she had completed a parenting class and her psychosocial evaluation. At the follow-up permanency hearing in July, cracks in the mother’s progress appeared. Although she was still in inpatient treatment, the care team was concerned about her honesty and lack of accountability. There was also concern about the high dose of methadone she was taking and its impact on her treatment participation, as she was falling asleep during group therapy and recovery court. In the meantime, the juvenile court learned that the mother had given birth to another child in June. The mother was falling asleep at the hospital such that the nurses had to remove the baby to provide safe care. Immediately following the July hearing, the mother was unsuccessfully discharged from her inpatient treatment program. The staff found unapproved medication in the mother’s room and observed other suspicious drug-seeking activity. The mother later admitted not taking her methadone as prescribed. In August, the mother, no longer in inpatient treatment, relapsed on methamphetamine. She discussed other options with HHS, such as outpatient treatment, and signed an agreement with her treatment counselor related to her drug testing plan. In September, the mother was hospitalized for an alleged issue with a weight-loss drug, and after obtaining the medical report, HHS learned the diagnosis was “intentional bupropion overdose,” as she had reported she took twenty to thirty pills, which she later denied. The hospital medical professionals believed the mother’s symptoms were consistent with an overdose of an antidepressant. That same month, the child was removed from the maternal grandmother’s care due to the child sustaining a serious burn injury while in her care. The child’s care was transferred to a foster care family. 5  HHS also had concerns about the mother’s relationships and her use of suicide threats to manipulate the father. She was not honest about a new relationship with a drug user that she started in 2025. She initially claimed that she had broken it off, but then the mother admitted to maintaining that relationship until the termination hearing started. Now at the end of the six-month extension, HHS recommended termination of the mother’s parental rights based upon her lack of progress with her substance-use treatment, her lack of honesty with treatment providers, and her domestic-violence propensities. HHS stated, “Despite two years of services and an additional six months of time granted by this Court, it is unfortunate, yet evident, the concerns [that] brought this case to the attention of HHS . . . still exist today and [the mother] has not made enough progress to safely parent [the child].” The guardian ad litem agreed with the recommendation. The State petitioned for termination of the mother’s rights in November 2025. The termination hearing was held over three days, concluding on April 2, 2026. The juvenile court terminated the mother’s parental rights on April 28. The mother appeals. II. Standard of Review. “We review termination of parental rights proceedings de novo.” In re A.B., 956 N.W.2d 162, 168 (Iowa 2021) (citation omitted). “Our fundamental concern on review is the child’s best interests.” In re J.H., 952 N.W.2d 157, 166 (Iowa 2020) (cleaned up). 6  III. Analysis. A. Grounds for Termination. We typically use a three-step process to review the termination of a parent’s rights. See In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 472 (Iowa 2018). In the first step, we determine whether a ground for termination under section 232.116(1) has been established. See id. at 472–73. If a ground for termination has been established, the next step is to consider “whether the best-interest framework as laid out in section 232.116(2) supports the termination of parental rights.” Id. at 473 (citation omitted). Then as a final step, “we consider whether any exceptions in section 232.116(3) apply to preclude termination of parental rights.” Id. (citation omitted). The State has the burden to prove grounds for termination by clear and convincing evidence. See In re D.W., 791 N.W.2d 703, 707 (Iowa 2010). The State had to prove that termination was justified under section 232.116(1)(h), which allows for termination when: (1) The child is three years of age or younger. (2) The child has been adjudicated a child in need of assistance pursuant to section 232.96. (3) The child has been removed from the physical custody of the child’s parents for at least six months of the last twelve months, or for the last six consecutive months and any trial period at home has been less than thirty days. (4) There is clear and convincing evidence that the child cannot be returned to the custody of the child’s parents as provided in section 232.102 at the present time. Only subsection (4) is in dispute. “[A]t the present time” means “at the time of the termination hearing.” See D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 707. On our 7 review of the record, as described in the factual background section, the State proved this ground supporting termination of the mother’s parental rights. Although the mother’s progress involved some positive efforts, overall, she could not overcome her unresolved issues with her mental health and substance use. And when she has engaged, her dishonesty with the professionals has been a barrier to her recovery and treatment. At the time of the termination hearing ending in April 2026, the child was under the age of three and had not been in the mother’s custody since April 12, 2024. Thus, we find that the mother’s limited progress was not sufficient to allow her to resume custody at the time of the termination hearing. The juvenile court noted that there was also evidence related to the mother’s unhealthy manipulation of the father, her involvement in other unsafe relationships, and her failure to address her history of domestic violence. But the main focus was on the mother’s sobriety. The HHS social work case manager testified that the mother had missed drug screens and that the mother’s substance-use counselor reported to the HHS social worker that the mother was “struggling.” He summarized HHS’s position: [The barriers to a safe return have] been the same concerns throughout this case, which [are]: Meaningful participation in services, as well as, lack of accountability for positive drug screens, lack of meaningful participation in mental health services that have been a recommendation throughout this case, and I believe honesty and transparency have been an issue throughout this case as well. Further, the social work case manager opined that the mother’s behavior constituted a major safety concern that had existed since the inception of the case and that after two years of little progress, the child 8 deserved permanency. The mother testified about her recent work toward sobriety and her recognition of stressors that caused her to use illegal substances, and we commend her for starting that work. The trouble is it has come too late for this child, and we have no assurances that she will be successful in the future. See In re R.M.-V., 13 N.W.3d 620, 626 (Iowa Ct. App. 2024) (finding termination was proper when “[t]he mother ha[d] a long history of unresolved drug use”). Given the lack of progress and the existing concerns related to safety, the State proved by clear and convincing evidence that grounds under section 232.116(1)(h) existed to support the juvenile court’s decision to terminate the mother’s rights to H.S.I. B. Best Interests. When considering the best-interests framework, we “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). The “defining elements” are the child’s safety and “need for a permanent home.” In re H.S., 805 N.W.2d 737, 748 (Iowa 2011) (citation omitted). Here, we look at the long-term as well as the current needs and interests of the child. Because the safety concerns related to the mother that brought the family to HHS attention have not been resolved and continue to exist, it is not in the child’s best interests to return the child to the mother’s custody. The child needs permanency, and that includes a parent who can meet the child’s physical, mental, and emotional needs while providing a safe home. The mother still has unresolved issues that impact her ability to parent. Likewise, it is not in the child’s best interests to make the child stand by while the mother attempts to be successful, as the child “should not be 9 forced to wait for their parent to be able to care for them.” In re D.M., No. 21-1681, 2022 WL 951057, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 30, 2022) (citation omitted). We conclude termination is in the child’s best interests. C. Additional Time for Reunification. To grant an additional six months to work toward reunification, a juvenile court must list “the specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes which comprise the basis for the determination the need for removal of the child from the child’s home will no longer exist at the end of the additional six-month period.” In re M.R., No. 13-1190, 2013 WL 5498097, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 2, 2013) (quoting Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b)). We observe that the juvenile court granted an earlier six-month extension that did not resolve the concerns HHS identified. And since April 2024, the mother was given services to help with that resolution, yet little progress has been made. When asked about granting an additional six-month extension, the HHS social work case manager testified to no belief that additional time would change the circumstances “based off the lack of accountability for drug screens; which is, ultimately, the issue that brought this case to the attention of HHS and the Court.” Yet, while noting her current participation in services, the worker stated it was the mother’s lack of meaningful participation in services that was the concern. This history, which included addressing the mother’s methamphetamine use as far back as 2018, does not support a finding that, if given more time, the need for removal would no longer exist. Thus, we cannot apply an extension to avoid termination. D. Permissive Exception. A juvenile court need not terminate the relationship between the parent and child if the court finds “[t]here is clear and convincing evidence that the termination would be detrimental to the child at the time due to the closeness of the parent-child relationship.” Iowa 10 Code § 232.116(3)(c). “The factors weighing against termination in section 232.116(3) are permissive, not mandatory,” and the court may use its “discretion, based on the unique circumstances of each case and the best interests of the child, [to determine] whether to apply the factors in this section to save the parent-child relationship.” In re D.S., 806 N.W.2d 458, 474–75 (Iowa Ct. App. 2011). A parent resisting termination has the burden of proving that an exception applies. See A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 476. The mother asserts that she and the child share a “good relationship,” and so the juvenile court erred by not applying an exception to termination because of the closeness of their parent-child bond. But the mother did not meet her burden to show evidence that termination would harm the child. See In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 113 (Iowa 2014) (holding section 232.116(3)(c) did not apply because there was no evidence that termination would harm the young child who had a close bond with her relative caregivers). Here, the bond is limited because the child has not been in the care of the mother. The mother’s evidence did not support the claim that the closeness of the bond would justify applying an exception to termination. While the mother loves the child, our consideration remains what is in the best interests of the child. See D.W., 791 N.W.2d at 709 (noting our focus is not on whether a parent loves the child, but “on whether the child will be disadvantaged by termination”). The mother’s evidence and argument related to the bond do not convince us that termination would disadvantage the child. We find a permissive exception is not warranted under these facts. E. Bridge Order. Finally, the mother argues the juvenile court should have placed the child with the father and entered a bridge order to preserve her parental rights. The mother acknowledges the history of domestic 11 violence between her and the father but claims that she has engaged in services to address the concerns such that a bridge order would be successful. Iowa Code section 232.103A(1) permits the juvenile court to close a CINA case and transfer jurisdiction of the child’s custody to the district court under a bridge order when a child is placed with a parent and certain conditions have been met. As we have previously noted, “[e]ntry of a bridge order is not the preferred solution when there is long-standing discord between the parents.” In re K.J., No. 26-0373, 2026 WL 1162655, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 29, 2026) (citation omitted). At the termination hearing, the HHS social work case manager testified: “I believe that [the mother] would be extremely disruptive if a bridge order were to be put in place.” Citing the mother’s manipulation of the father, the social work case manager believed a bridge order would “be unsafe.” The juvenile court agreed, concluded a bridge order was not in the child’s best interests, and declined to enter a bridge order. Even if the mother could show that the criteria for a bridge order had been established, given her ongoing substance use, history of domestic violence, and manipulation of the father, a bridge order is not in the child’s best interests. We decline the mother’s request to impose such an order. IV. Conclusion. Based upon the reasons provided above, we find that termination was warranted because the State met its burden of proving a supporting ground, the termination was in the best interests of the child, a six-month extension would not resolve the mother’s unresolved issues, a permissive exception to 12 termination does not apply, and a bridge order is not appropriate. We affirm the juvenile court’s termination ruling. AFFIRMED. 13