Full Opinion

Pursuant to Indiana Appellate Rule 65(E), the trial court and parties shall not take any action in reliance upon this memorandum decision until it is certified. MEMORANDUM DECISION Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), this Memorandum Decision is not binding precedent for any court and may be cited only for persuasive value or to establish res judicata, collateral estoppel, or law of the case. IN THE Court of Appeals of Indiana FILED C.R., Oct 23 2026, 9:42 am Appellant-Respondent CLERK Indiana Supreme Court Court of Appeals and Tax Court v. H.R., Appellee-Petitioner October 23, 2026 Court of Appeals Case No. 26A-PO-1114 Appeal from the Hendricks Superior Court The Honorable Kathryn M. Kuehn, Judge Trial Court Cause No. 32D01-2601-PO-000011 Memorandum Decision by Judge Felix Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-PO-1114 | October 23, 2026 Page 1 of 11 Judges Foley and DeBoer concur. Felix, Judge. Statement of the Case [1] During an argument between H.R. (“Wife”) and C.R. (“Husband”), Husband yelled at Wife and initially would not leave the room. Wife filed for a protective order against Husband, which the trial court granted. Husband appeals and raises one issue, which we restate as: Whether the trial court erred by granting the protective order. [2] We reverse. Facts and Procedural History [3] On January 7, 2026, Husband was upset after learning that Wife filed for divorce, so he went upstairs to the master bedroom and locked the door. Wife went upstairs and told Husband she wanted to go into the bedroom to “get [her] items to shower.” Tr. Vol. II at 5. Husband told Wife to “come back in fifteen minutes.” Id. Wife then went to the “bedroom office” with her and Husband’s eight-year-old daughter to study for an exam Wife had the next day. Id. at 6. [4] “[A] little bit later,” Husband went to the office, where he and Wife “began arguing.” Tr. Vol. II at 6. Wife told Husband it was “wrong . . . that he wouldn’t let [her] in” the bedroom, and Husband “said that he had something to do . . . and he would let [Wife] in when he was ready.” Id. Wife recorded Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-PO-1114 | October 23, 2026 Page 2 of 11 the argument on her phone; her voice was “more elevated” than Husband’s, id. at 23. During the argument, Husband “st[ood] in front of the door” and Wife “couldn’t walk out” without “brush[ing] past” Husband. Id. at 6. Husband is approximately 6 feet, 6 inches tall and weighs 340 pounds. Wife testified that she felt “afraid,” “trapped,” and “scared.” Id. at 7. After the argument, Husband left. [5] Approximately two and a half hours later, Husband came back to the office and “knock[ed]” on the door. Tr. Vol. II at 8. Wife told Husband she “was studying” and “could not answer him right now.” Id. Husband kept knocking and eventually entered the office. Wife testified that Husband “barged” in, which upon further elaboration meant that Husband “just opened the door and came in.” Id. at 9. Husband “started yelling” at Wife, and the two went “back and forth a little bit.” Id. Wife “asked [Husband] to leave,” and he “finally closed the door and left.” Id. Wife later testified that she felt “[v]ery unnerved,” “[v]ery afraid,” “[v]ery scared,” “trapped,” and that “once again[, Husband] was purposely trying to disturb [her] and emotionally abuse [her]” while she was studying for her exam. Id. at 9. [6] On the same day the incident occurred, Wife filed for a protective order against Husband. Wife alleged that she was the victim of “domestic or family violence,” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 25, and that Husband placed her “in fear of physical harm,” id. at 26. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-PO-1114 | October 23, 2026 Page 3 of 11 [7] During the hearing on Wife’s petition, Wife testified regarding other instances where Husband caused her “to be in fear [for her] safety.” Tr. Vol. II at 9. Wife alleged that in 2023, she and Husband were arguing in their vehicle when Husband “leaned into [her] face and taunt[ed]” her by saying, “you want to punch me[,] go ahead.” Id. at 10. Wife “did punch [Husband] and push[ed] him away from [her].” Id. Wife also alleged that between 2015 and 2020, Husband “punched holes in doors [and] walls,” “once threw [Wife’s] phone across the room,” “t[ook] . . . away” Wife’s keys, slammed doors, and yelled at Wife in front of their children. Id. at 13. Wife further testified regarding a text message Husband sent her apologizing for abusing her “emotionally.” Id. at 14. [8] In response to Wife’s testimony that Husband stood in the doorway and she felt that she could not leave, Husband testified that he was “not in a position where [Wife] should [have felt] afraid.” Tr. Vol. II at 30. According to Husband, he stood “by the edge of the door . . . against the doorframe.” Id. Wife was “standing in the middle” of the office, and there was “plenty of space” between her and Husband. Id. Husband did not tell Wife that she “can’t leave.” Id. at 31. There was no testimony that Wife ever told Husband she wanted to leave, nor that she ever asked Husband to move. [9] Regarding the second argument in the office, Husband claimed that he wanted to talk about his and Wife’s younger daughter’s doctor’s appointment that was scheduled the next day; Wife wanted to have that conversation the following morning, but Husband would not be home at that time. As for the 2023 incident in the vehicle, Husband testified that Wife punched him, not because Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-PO-1114 | October 23, 2026 Page 4 of 11 she was “fearful” but because she was “upset” during their argument. Tr. Vol. II at 32. [10] The trial court concluded that domestic or family violence representing a credible threat to Wife “occurred between Husband and Wife in the house where they resided together” and granted Wife’s petition for a protective order. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 9. This conclusion was not based on the first argument in the office. For that incident, the trial court found “no evidence Wife felt trapped, afraid or scared” because the recording showed “Husband’s voice was not raised, and his words were not threatening or argumentative,” id. at 7; “Husband made efforts to end the conversation, but Wife kept it going,” id.; “Wife’s voice was loud and aggressive, and she kept the conversation going and taunted Husband,” id. at 8; and “[a]t no point did Wife ask Husband to leave or make any statements showing fear or feeling trapped,” id. [11] The trial court’s domestic or family violence conclusion was instead based on the second argument in the office, for which it found that Husband “stood in the doorway refusing to leave,” which was “sufficient to place Wife in fear of her safety and unable to leave to deescalate the situation.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 10. The trial court also stated that “[o]ther incidents of fear reported by Wife” included “Husband punching holes in the walls, throwing her phone, taking her keys away, calling her names and leaning in close to her and saying, ‘you want to punch me.’” Id. at 8. Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-PO-1114 | October 23, 2026 Page 5 of 11 [12] The protective order (1) prohibited Husband “from committing, or threatening to commit, acts of domestic or family violence, stalking or sex offenses” against Wife; (2) ordered Husband not to enter the family residence and that while exchanging the children, he could only pull up to the “end of the driveway” and had to “stay in his vehicle at all times”; and (3) prohibited Husband from possessing a firearm or ammunition. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 12. This appeal ensued. Discussion and Decision The Trial Court Erred by Granting the Protective Order [13] Husband argues that the trial court erred by granting the protective order. Before addressing the merits, we note that Wife did not file an appellee’s brief, so we will reverse the trial court’s decision if Husband’s brief presents a case of prima facie error. See Salyer v. Washington Regular Baptist Church Cemetery, 141 N.E.3d 384, 386 (Ind. 2020) (quoting Front Row Motors, LLC v. Jones, 5 N.E.3d 753, 758 (Ind. 2014)). “Prima facie error in this context means ‘at first sight, on first appearance, or on the face of it.’” Id. (quoting Front Row Motors, 5 N.E.3d at 758). [14] “When, as here, a party appeals a trial court’s judgment entering a protective order, we apply a two-tiered standard of review—we consider whether the evidence supports the court’s findings and, if so, whether those findings support the judgment.” M.W. v. H.Y., 230 N.E.3d 359, 363 (Ind. Ct. App. 2024) (quoting S.D. v. G.D., 211 N.E.3d 494, 497 (Ind. 2023)); Ind. Trial Rule 52(A). Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-PO-1114 | October 23, 2026 Page 6 of 11 “In making these determinations, we neither reweigh the evidence nor determine the credibility of witnesses, and we consider only the evidence favorable to the trial court’s decision.” Id. (quoting S.D., 211 N.E.3d at 498). “In close cases, ‘the trial court is the one to make [the] call.’” Id. (quoting S.D., 211 N.E.3d at 498). “[O]ur trial courts are far better than appellate courts ‘at weighing evidence and assessing witness credibility.’” Id. (quoting S.D., 211 N.E.3d at 498). “[T]his is particularly true in protective order cases, where our trial judges see and hear the parties interact as they relay details about intensely personal, traumatic events.” Id. (quoting S.D., 211 N.E.3d at 498). [15] The protective order was based on the trial court’s conclusion that domestic or family violence representing a credible threat to Wife occurred during the second argument. See Ind. Code § 34-26-5-9(h). “Domestic or family violence” includes “[p]lacing a family or household member in fear of physical harm without legal justification.” I.C. § 31-9-2-42 (effective July 1, 2019, to June 30, 2026), recodified at I.C. § 31-9-2.1-84. [16] To prove the domestic or family violence was a credible threat, Wife had to “prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that there are reasonable grounds to believe” that Husband “presently intends to harm” her. H.R. v. M.R., 262 N.E.3d 915, 921 (Ind. Ct. App. 2025) (quoting L.R. ex rel. H.R. v. M.H. ex rel. N.H., 223 N.E.3d 675, 681 (Ind. Ct. App. 2023)), trans. not sought. Whether an act of domestic or family violence represents a credible threat is “viewed objectively.” S.D., 211 N.E.3d at 499. A victim who testifies regarding his or Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-PO-1114 | October 23, 2026 Page 7 of 11 her subjective feelings of fear must “link this testimony to . . . objective evidence” that would cause such feelings. H.R., 262 N.E.3d at 921. [17] Husband argues that Wife failed to prove that (a) she was placed in fear of physical harm and (b) Husband is a credible threat to her safety. We address each argument in turn. a. Fear of Physical Harm [18] The trial court found that during the second argument, “Husband refused to leave the doorway when asked to leave” and Wife “felt unnerved, scared and trapped.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 8; see also id. at 10. The evidence, however, showed that Husband stood in or near the doorway during only the first argument and came into the office during the second argument. Wife testified that during the first argument, Husband “st[ood] in front of the door,” Tr. Vol. II at 6, and during the second argument, Husband “just opened the door and came in,” id. at 9. During Wife’s cross-examination of Husband, Husband testified he was “leaning against the door frame” the “first time,” id. at 37, and agreed he “came into the office” the “second time,” id. at 38. Though Husband did stand in or near the doorway during the first argument, the trial court listened to the audio recording of that argument and found that it did not constitute domestic or family violence. [19] Nothing in the record demonstrates that during the second argument, Husband “refused to leave the doorway when asked to leave.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 8. The evidence thus does not support the trial court’s finding that Husband Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-PO-1114 | October 23, 2026 Page 8 of 11 did so. The trial court emphasized that Husband’s “presence at the doorway” during the second argument was important to its finding of domestic or family violence, Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 10, so the fact that the evidence does not support this finding is significant. [20] Even if we ignore the reference to the doorway from the trial court’s finding and construe it as a finding that Husband refused to leave the office in general, it would not be sufficient to support the trial court’s domestic or family violence conclusion. In Cruse v. C.C., the defendant engaged in several problematic interactions with his ex-wife, including (1) during one of the children’s kindergarten graduations, telling the ex-wife he would “make a scene” and later telling the children the ex-wife was “keeping” them from him, which made the ex-wife feel “intimidated”; (2) “pull[ing]” the ex-wife out of her place of work and making her boss feel “uncomfortable”; and (3) while holding a baseball bat at his knee during their son’s baseball game, getting “up in” the ex-wife’s male colleague’s “face and t[elling] him that he better not come around our kids again.” 58 N.E.3d 974, 976–77 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016). On prima facie error review, the majority held that there was “no evidence that [the defendant] attempted to, threatened to, or did cause any acts of physical harm” constituting domestic or family violence to the ex-wife. Id. at 978. The panel reversed the protective order issued by the trial court. Id. [21] As in Cruse, insufficient evidence supports the domestic or family violence conclusion here. In other words, insufficient evidence supports a conclusion that Husband placed Wife in fear of “physical harm without legal justification.” Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-PO-1114 | October 23, 2026 Page 9 of 11 I.C. § 31-9-2-42 (effective July 1, 2019, to June 30, 2026). Husband “yell[ed]” at Wife, the two went “back and forth a little bit,” and Husband eventually left the room at Wife’s request. Tr. Vol. II at 9. Husband’s conduct was far less belligerent than that in Cruse, and he did not “attempt[]” to, “threaten[]” to, or actually “cause any acts of physical harm” against Wife. See Cruse, 58 N.E.3d at 978. Nor was there any evidence that Husband prevented Wife from leaving the room or said anything to conjure fear for her safety. Wife testified that she felt “[v]ery unnerved,” “[v]ery afraid,” “[v]ery scared,” and “trapped,” Tr. Vol. II at 9, but Wife did not “link this testimony to any objective evidence” that would cause her to fear for her safety. See H.R., 262 N.E.3d at 921. The trial court erred by finding that Husband placed Wife in fear of physical harm such that domestic or family violence occurred. b. Credible Threat [22] Even if Husband’s conduct constituted domestic or family violence, nothing in the record indicates that he “presently intends to harm” Wife such that his conduct constitutes a credible threat. H.R., 262 N.E.3d at 921 (quoting L.R. ex rel. H.R., 223 N.E.3d at 681). There was no evidence that Husband physically harmed Wife or that she presently fears Husband will do so. [23] The trial court acknowledged that Wife reported other “incidents of fear”— which occurred several years prior—involving Husband punching holes in doors and walls, throwing her phone, taking her keys, calling her names and leaning in close to her and saying, “you want to punch me.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 8. The trial court, however, did not adopt Wife’s testimony as true or Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-PO-1114 | October 23, 2026 Page 10 of 11 otherwise indicate that it found this testimony credible. Findings of fact that “simply recount who testified and what they testified to” are insufficient. In re G.V., 274 N.E.3d 996, 1001 (Ind. Ct. App. 2026), trans. not sought. “Rather, findings ‘must indicate, not what someone said is true, but what is determined to be true.’” Id. (quoting Parks v. Delaware Cnty. Dep’t Child Servs., 862 N.E.2d 1275, 1279 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007)). [24] When a protective order case is “close . . . , ‘the trial court is the one to make [the] call.’” M.W., 230 N.E.3d at 363 (quoting S.D., 211 N.E.3d at 498). This case is not close. Husband and Wife’s mere verbal argument in a shared home is not the sort of conduct that warrants the “severe limitations on a restrained person’s liberty” that a protective order imposes. S.H. v. D.W., 139 N.E.3d 214, 217 (Ind. 2020). The trial court erred by finding that Husband presented a credible threat to Wife’s safety. [25] For the foregoing reasons, Husband has shown prima facie error in the trial court’s decision to grant the protective order. We thus reverse the trial court’s grant of that order. [26] Reversed. Foley, J., and DeBoer, J., concur. ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT Matthew E. Dumas Hostetter & Associates Brownsburg, Indiana Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 26A-PO-1114 | October 23, 2026 Page 11 of 11