Bronstein v. Latin School of Chicago

2026 IL App (1st) 242271 No. 1-24-2271 Opinion filed September 30, 2026 Third Division ______________________________________________________________________________ IN THE APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS FIRST DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________ ) ROBERT BRONSTEIN, Individually and as Independent ) Appeal from the Administrator of the Estate of Nathan Bronstein, a Minor, ) Circuit Court of Deceased, and ROSELLENE BRONSTEIN, Individually ) Cook County. and as Next Friend of M.B. and S.B., Minors, ) ) Plaintiffs, ) ) v. ) No. 22 L 3763 ) LATIN SCHOOL OF CHICAGO, an Illinois Not-for- ) Profit Corporation, RANDALL DUNN, KRISTINE VON ) OGDEN, BRIDGET HENNESSY, JANE KNOCHE, ) ANNELIESE KRANZ, DAVID KOO, SHELLEY ) GREENWOOD, and THOMAS HAGERMAN, ) ) Defendants ) ) (Robert Bronstein, as Independent Administrator of the ) Estate of Nathan Bronstein, a Minor, Deceased, Plaintiff- ) Honorable Appellant, and Latin School of Chicago, an Illinois Not- ) Scott D. McKenna, for-Profit Corporation, Defendant-Appellee). ) Judge, presiding. ) JUSTICE LAMPKIN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Presiding Justice Quish and Justice Rochford concurred in the judgment and opinion. No. 1-24-2271 OPINION ¶1 Plaintiffs Robert Bronstein and Rosellene Bronstein enrolled their son, Nathan, in defendant Latin School of Chicago (Latin or Latin School) in the fall of 2021 for his 10th grade school year. Nathan struggled to make friends and felt isolated and ostracized. He eventually joined the junior varsity basketball team—an experience that ended with him being bullied by his teammates and other students. Plaintiffs were subsequently able to re-enroll Nathan at his previous school, Francis W. Parker School (Parker). In the intervening month between the end of his semester at Latin School and his re-enrollment at Parker for the spring semester, Nathan died by suicide. ¶2 Plaintiffs brought suit against defendant Latin School and a number of its employees alleging a variety of claims primarily based on accusations that Latin School did not do enough to investigate, prevent, and remediate the bullying that Nathan experienced. Most but not all of these claims were dismissed by the trial court. The trial court entered an order with a finding pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a), and this appeal followed. ¶3 For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the trial court. 1 ¶4 I. BACKGROUND ¶5 Plaintiffs’ son, Nathan Bronstein, was 15 years old on January 13, 2022, when he took his own life approximately 30 days after he voluntarily withdrew from defendant Latin School. In April 2022, plaintiffs Robert Bronstein, individually and as the administrator of his deceased son’s estate, and Rosellene Bronstein, individually and as next friend of her two other children, filed suit 1 In adherence with the requirements of Illinois Supreme Court Rule 352(a) (eff. July 1, 2018), this appeal has been resolved without oral argument upon the entry of a separate written order. -2- No. 1-24-2271 against Latin School and a number of its current or former employees, as well as five parents of minor children. Following unsuccessful attempts at mediation, defendants filed motions to dismiss the complaint and plaintiffs filed an amended complaint which added the former chair of the Latin School’s Board of Trustees and six additional parents of minor children as defendants. ¶6 Plaintiffs eventually dismissed all claims against the parents of the minor students and filed a second amended complaint that added additional defendants. Defendants moved to strike the second amended complaint, which the trial court granted. ¶7 Plaintiffs then filed their third amended complaint alleging ten separate counts which became the operative complaint that led to this appeal. The final list of defendants included Latin School, Randall Dunn, Latin’s former Head of School, Kristine Von Ogden, the former Upper School Director, Bridget Hennessy, the 10th Grade Dean of Students, two school counselors, Jane Knoche and Anneliese Kranz, 2 Andrew Sanchez, a teacher, David Koo, the Chair of Latin’s Board of Directors, Shelley Greenwood, Latin’s Assistant Head of School, and Thomas Hagerman, the current Head of School. While it would be impossible to summarize the entirety of plaintiffs’ 166- page third amended complaint and the hundreds of pages of exhibits attached to it, we briefly summarize the allegations and claims raised therein. ¶8 In March of 2021, Nathan was accepted to Latin School, a private high school with an annual tuition cost of $40,000, for the 2021-2022 school year. Latin School maintained a handbook that stated the school “will be an inclusive, welcoming school for all students” and that it would “strengthen support for new students.” The handbook additionally identified bullying as something 2 Throughout the briefing and the record, we note there are multiple spellings of Hennessey’s last name and Kranz’s first name. For consistency, we have adopted the spellings used in the complaint’s caption. -3- No. 1-24-2271 which diminished the entire community and compromised the ethical and educational quality of life at Latin School. The handbook further declared zero tolerance for bullying and cyberbullying, including when that conduct took place off campus and outside school hours. ¶9 The summer before Nathan’s enrollment was to start, he began expressing anxiety about the transition to Latin School. Nathan’s mother reached out to Hennessy, the 9th and 10th Grade Dean of Students. Hennessy stated that she would help Nathan connect with other students. Nathan’s anxiety did not improve once he began the school year. He complained to his parents that he felt ostracized by other students, including a neighbor that Nathan believed to be his friend. Nathan directed his anger and frustration at his parents. ¶ 10 In October 2021, Nathan’s parents reached out to the 10th Grade Parent Chairs to inquire as to whether social events could be planned so that Nathan and his sister, who was also enrolled at Latin School, could get to know other children better. The responses she received led her to understand that Latin School was not willing to fund any social events. ¶ 11 On October 8, 2021, Kranz reached out to Nathan, acknowledging that transitioning to a new school could be difficult and she wanted to offer him support. Nathan did not respond. Kranz then contacted Nathan’s mother to inquire as to whether she thought Nathan would meet with her. Nathan’s mother subsequently learned that Nathan had skipped school. During one email with Hennessy, Nathan’s mother stated that she felt Nathan was “thrown into school this year without enough proactive support” from Latin School. She also told Hennessy and Kranz that, although Nathan was sharing his difficulties at school, he did not want his mother to do anything about it and that Nathan was upset with her for “meddling.” -4- No. 1-24-2271 ¶ 12 On October 14, 2021, Nathan and his parents met with Kranz to discuss Nathan’s absence from school. Nathan expressed that he felt isolated and did not want to be at Latin School because he had no friends there. Several days later, Nathan’s mother emailed Kranz to tell her that Nathan was angry and uncomfortable about the questions he was getting from other students regarding the reasons for his departure from his previous school. She asked Kranz to work with Nathan “to come up with a response to avoid the judgment of his peers.” ¶ 13 On October 19, 2021, Nathan’s mother emailed Kranz and stated, “Things at home are horrific. Nate has gone crazy. Mr. Bronstein and I think we need to send Nate away, Nate is terrorizing us and sabotaging his school responsibilities.” Kranz responded that she was sorry Nathan was struggling and that she would talk to him. The same day, Mrs. Bronstein emailed Kranz again, stating, “I need a psychiatrist for Nate, Nate needs to be medicated. I’m afraid Nate is going to hurt himself or hurt me. Can you please refer me to one that is available ASAP?” Kranz recommended two separate facilities and Mrs. Bronstein followed up with both. ¶ 14 The same day, Kranz met with Nathan and assessed him for suicidal ideation, citing Mrs. Bronstein’s concerns. Nathan denied any suicidal ideation or safety concerns and called his mother a liar, claiming that nothing good comes from her involvement. During the assessment, Nathan was angry and irritable and displayed resentment toward his parents for transferring him to Latin School. Nathan rejected Kranz’s suggestion that he get more engaged at the school and stated the only solution was for him to return to his previous school. Nathan’s parents did not learn of this assessment until 2023, after Nathan’s death. ¶ 15 On October 20, 2021, Kranz emailed Mrs. Bronstein to see if Mrs. Bronstein had located a therapist for Nathan. Given the nature of Nathan’s struggles, she recommended they look into -5- No. 1-24-2271 family counseling. She further stated that, “Given Nate’s resistance to any support at Latin (and his refusal to be open to any alternatives other than returning to Parker), I think this issue needs to be addressed with professionals outside of school.” ¶ 16 The Bronsteins took Nathan to a mental health evaluation the following day during which Nathan stated his relationship with his parents was warm but conflictual. He stated he felt socially isolated at Latin School and identified his stressors as the change in schools and bullying. ¶ 17 Mrs. Bronstein eventually escalated her concerns and met with Von Ogden. During that meeting, she told Von Ogden that Nathan felt socially isolated and ostracized. She also told Von Ogden that Nathan felt singled out by his geometry teacher, Andrew Sanchez, and that Sanchez, in the context of discussing mathematical proofs, told Nathan “you’re going nowhere in life.” ¶ 18 In November 2021, Nathan met with Parker’s principal, and Parker ultimately agreed to a mid-year transfer, meaning Nathan would begin attending Parker at the start of the next semester on January 24, 2022. ¶ 19 Nathan continued to attend out-patient counseling sessions and eventually joined Latin School’s junior varsity basketball team. Although Nathan was injured and could not play, he still attended practices and games. The team maintained a group chat to communicate about games and practices. Following a game against Parker, Nathan responded with a “thumbs down” emoji to a derogatory post about Parker. ¶ 20 On December 10, 2021, Nathan attended a varsity basketball game between Latin School and Parker. During the game, Nathan’s phone was used to post a photo on social media of the scoreboard showing Parker in the lead with a “W” superimposed on the photo. Nathan denied making the post and claimed that someone else had used his phone. Following the game, members -6- No. 1-24-2271 of the group chat to which Nathan belonged began accusing Nathan of making the post. Multiple students sent texts such as, “f*** you nate,” “f*** you Bronstein,” and “snake ass n***.” Another student texted, “Bronstein is silent. He has nothing to say.” Nathan replied, “I’m in shambles.” As the group continued to text about the incident until midnight, Nathan responded, “I’m still on your mind in the dead of night.” ¶ 21 One of the Latin School varsity basketball players later heard of the image posted from Nathan’s phone and posted on the application Snapchat an image of himself holding up his middle finger with the text “F*** Bronstein.” This image propagated among students and was modified multiple times, including the words “Bronstein pack” and an emoji blowing smoke. Nathan understood that addition to mean smoking cigarettes laced with his ashes. Nathan thereafter reported the incident to Hennessy and communicated that he wanted the bullying to stop. Sometime between December 10, 2021, and his death, Nathan received a text message from a Latin School student encouraging him to kill himself. School staff eventually met with students involved, but did not discipline anyone and eventually labeled the cyberbullying as a “social media incident.” None of the alleged cyberbullying, whether it was the text messages or the Snapchat posts, was reported to Nathan’s parents. ¶ 22 On January 13, 2022, Nathan spent time with some friends, attended a math tutoring session and a counseling session during which he continued to blame his parents for his experience at Latin School. Later that day, Nathan hung himself from a showerhead and was pronounced dead at the hospital that evening. Plaintiffs subsequently learned that staff at Latin School knew of the alleged bullying that Nathan reported and that, at Nathan’s request, they chose not to report it to Nathan’s parents. -7- No. 1-24-2271 ¶ 23 Plaintiffs’ complaint alleged wrongful death (Count I), violation of Illinois’s Bullying Prevention statute (the Act) (Count II), willful and wanton breach of duty based on a voluntary undertaking (Count III), intentional infliction of emotional distress (Counts IV and VI 3), breach of fiduciary duty (Count V), violation of the Illinois Consumer Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act (Counts VII and VIII), counselor negligence (Count IX), and medical malpractice (Count X). ¶ 24 Each defendant filed a motion to dismiss which contained a combination of requests to dismiss counts pursuant to sections 2-615 and 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure. See 735 ILCS 5/2-615 and 735 ILCS 5/2-619 (West 2024). The trial court granted these motions in part and denied them in part. Counts I, II, IV, V, VI, VII, and VIII were dismissed in their entirety with prejudice, and Count III was dismissed with respect to defendants Dunn, Von Ogden, and Knoche. The trial court’s order left Count III intact as to Hennessy and Kranz and Latin School (by way of vicarious liability), and Counts IX and X entirely intact. ¶ 25 Plaintiffs sought reconsideration of the trial court’s ruling and sought permission to replead the dismissed counts. They also raised the possibility of amending their pleading to raise a negligence count based on the duties enumerated in the Act. The trial court denied the motion to reconsider and did not allow plaintiffs to file any further amended pleadings. ¶ 26 On October 18, 2024, the trial court entered an order pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a), finding that there was no just cause or reason for delay of enforcement or appeal of 3 Count IV alleged a survival action while Count VI involved plaintiffs in their individual capacities. -8- No. 1-24-2271 its orders related to defendants’ motions to dismiss and plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider. Plaintiff Robert Bronstein filed a notice of appeal on November 18, 2024. ¶ 27 II. ANALYSIS ¶ 28 On appeal, plaintiff Robert Bronstein challenges the trial court’s ruling dismissing with prejudice Counts I, II, IV, and V brought by Nathan’s Estate against Latin School, and the trial court’s ruling dismissing Count III brought by Nathan’s Estate asserting direct liability against Latin School. He also challenges the trial court’s ruling denying him the opportunity to file further amended pleadings. ¶ 29 A trial court’s dismissal order pursuant to sections 2-615 or 2-619 of the Code of Civil Procedure is reviewed de novo. Marshall v. Burger King Corp., 222 Ill. 2d 422, 429 (2006); In re Estate of Zivin, 2015 IL App (1st) 150606, ¶ 21. We address plaintiff’s contentions in turn. ¶ 30 A. Implied Right of Action under the Bullying Prevention Act—Count II ¶ 31 Plaintiff first argues that the trial court erred in dismissing Count II, which alleged a violation of the Act, on the basis that the Act did not provide for an implied private right of action. Whether the Act provides for a private right of action is a matter of first impression. ¶ 32 A private right of action may be implied from a statute when: (1) the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted; (2) the plaintiff’s injury is one the statute was designed to prevent; (3) a private right of action is consistent with the underlying purpose of the statute; and (4) implying a private right of action is necessary to provide an adequate remedy for violations of the statute. Pilotto v. Urban Outfitters West, L.L.C., 2017 IL App (1st) 160844, ¶ 22. “The standard that must be met for a court to imply a private right of action in a statute is quite high. We will take that extraordinary step only when it is clearly needed to advance the -9- No. 1-24-2271 statutory purpose and when the statute would ‘be ineffective, as a practical matter, unless a private right of action were implied.’ ” Channon v. Westward Management, 2022 IL 128040, ¶ 33 (quoting Abbasi ex rel. Abbasi v. Paraskevoulakos, 187 Ill. 2d 386, 395 (1999)). ¶ 33 “Although the courts have demonstrated a willingness to imply private causes of action where there exists a clear need to effectuate the purpose of an act [citation omitted], the judiciary by implying causes of action is assuming policy-making authority, a power more properly exercised by the legislature. The court should exercise such authority with due caution.” Galinski v. Kessler, 134 Ill. App. 3d 602, 606 (1985). ¶ 34 1. The Text of the Statute ¶ 35 Determining whether a statute contains an implied right of action requires us to perform statutory interpretation. When interpreting a statute our primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the legislature’s intent. People v. Jurisec, 199 Ill. 2d 108, 118 (2002). The Act was amended on June 9, 2023, approximately two and a half months before plaintiffs filed their third amended complaint, and plaintiffs alleged that this amendment was partly a result of their advocacy efforts. 4 ¶ 36 The Act begins with a statement of its purpose: “The General Assembly finds that a safe and civil school environment is necessary for students to learn and achieve and that bullying causes physical, psychological, and emotional harm to students and interferes with students' ability to learn and participate 4 Effective August 15, 2025, this statute was renumbered to 105 ILCS 5/22-110 but its content did not change. It was further amended July 1, 2026, with changes that do not affect the substance of the arguments before this court. As such, we will confine our discussion to the version of the statute in effect at the time plaintiffs filed their complaint as that is the statute discussed by the parties. - 10 - No. 1-24-2271 in school activities. The General Assembly further finds that bullying has been linked to other forms of antisocial behavior, such as vandalism, shoplifting, skipping and dropping out of school, fighting, using drugs and alcohol, sexual harassment, and sexual violence. Because of the negative outcomes associated with bullying in schools, the General Assembly finds that school districts, charter schools, and non-public, non- sectarian elementary and secondary schools should educate students, parents, and school district, charter school, or non-public, non-sectarian elementary or secondary school personnel about what behaviors constitute prohibited bullying.” 105 ILCS 5/27- 23.7(a) (West 2024). ¶ 37 The Act prescribes that each school district, charter school, and non-public, non-sectarian elementary or secondary school shall create, maintain, and implement a policy on bullying which must be filed with the State Board of Education. Id. § 27-23.7(d). This policy must be based on a template provided by the State Board of Education and must include 13 criteria enumerated in subsection (b). Id. § 27-23.7(b), (d). One of those criteria requires instances of bullying to be reported to parents or legal guardians. Id. § 27-23.7(b). Bullying policies must also contain a process to investigate whether a reported act of bullying falls within the scope of the school’s or district’s jurisdiction. Id. § 27-23.7(d). Every two years, a school must review and revise its policy and submit it to the State Board of Education. Id. The State Board of Education must then review the policy to determine if the policy complies with the criteria set out in the statute. Id. If a school fails to file its policy even after being notified of its failure, the State Board of Education must publish on its website a notice of the school’s noncompliance. Id. - 11 - No. 1-24-2271 ¶ 38 The Act further requires schools to submit to the State Board of Education data on verified allegations of bullying and delegates to the State Board of Education the authority to adopt rules regarding the notification of schools or districts that fail to comply with the Act’s data submission requirements. Id. § 27-23.7(f). Schools must also, upon request by parents or guardians of enrolled children, provide non-identifiable data regarding bullying allegations in a given year, and the State Board of Education must adopt rules regarding the handling and sharing of that data and maintaining the privacy of students involved. Id. § 27-23.7(g). ¶ 39 Penultimately, the Act gives the State Superintendent of Education the authority to provide grants to schools to support their anti-bullying programming. Id. § 27-23.7(j). However, schools that are not in compliance with subsection (f) are not eligible for grants. Id. ¶ 40 Finally, the Act states that, “This Section shall not be interpreted to prevent a victim from seeking redress under any other available civil or criminal law.” Id. § 27-23.7(e). ¶ 41 2. Whether the Act Provides for an Implied Private Right of Action ¶ 42 Having outlined the purpose and strictures of the Act, we turn to whether the Act contains an implied private right of action. At the outset, plaintiff claims that this case is analogous to Dawkins v. Fitness International, LLC, but that case is distinguishable because the statutes in question contained language explicitly permitting a private right of action. There, the plaintiff sued when a fitness gym failed to use an automated external defibrillator (AED) on her husband, which resulted in his death. Dawkins v. Fitness International, LLC, 2022 IL 127561, ¶ 1. The case turned on whether the Facility Preparedness Act, which mandated that physical fitness facilities have a functioning AED and staff members trained in its use, and the AED Act gave rise to a private right of action when facility staff failed to use the AED in an emergency. Id. ¶¶ 25-31. The AED Act - 12 - No. 1-24-2271 maintained that, “An AED user is not liable for civil damages as a result of any act or omission involving the use of an AED in an emergency situation, except for willful or wanton misconduct, if the requirements of this Act are met.” Id. ¶ 32 (quoting 410 ILCS 4/30(d) (West 2012)). The supreme court concluded that, “The plain and unambiguous meaning of this phrase is that civil liability may attach to willful and wanton failures to use an AED. In other words, a right of action does exist for willful and wanton misconduct in connection with the non-use of an AED.” Id. ¶ 33. ¶ 43 Thus, we do not find Dawkins persuasive. The Act in question contains no explicit statement about the circumstances in which civil liability may or may not attach and Dawkins does not assist us in determining whether a private right of action may be implied. ¶ 44 The first element to consider is whether the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose benefit the statute was enacted. Pilotto, 2017 IL App (1st) 160844, ¶ 22. Nathan, as a fifteen-year- old high school student who was bullied, is indisputably a member of the class for whose benefit the Act was enacted. Defendant Latin School concedes this point. ¶ 45 However, assuming without deciding that suicide is one of the injuries the Act is intended to prevent, the remaining two elements do not support the existence of a private right of action. First, a private right of action is not consistent with the underlying purpose of the Act. Pilotto, 2017 IL App (1st) 160844, ¶ 22. In evaluating whether a private right of action is consistent with the underlying purpose of a statute, it is appropriate to consider whether the statute is remedial in nature. Davis v. Dunne, 189 Ill. App. 3d 739, 743 (1989). ¶ 46 In Davis, the plaintiff sued the president of the Board of Commissioners of Cook County, alleging that the promotion of another employee ahead of the plaintiff violated the Cook County Civil Service Commission Rules and a right of action could be implied from the Civil Service Act. - 13 - No. 1-24-2271 Id. at 741-42. The court observed that the Civil Service Act applied to the narrow realm of civil service employment, authorizing the election of commissioners and providing a framework for appointment, promotion, and removal of civil service employees, and that the statute enumerated that violations of the statute could be prosecuted by the Attorney General, the State’s Attorney, or the commission. Id. at 742-43. It further reasoned that simply because the statute served public policy did not imply a private right of action and it was proper to inquire as to whether the statute was remedial in nature. Id. at 743. Ultimately, the court held that the statute “prescribes procedures for appointment, promotion, removal of civil service employees, and prohibits certain discriminatory and politically based misconduct. The Act does not seek to redress wrongs, and therefore is not remedial in nature.” Id. It stated, “Although the Act protects, in its observance, civil service employees such as Davis, it does not, in its breach, provide a civil remedy for those employees.” Id. ¶ 47 Davis is instructive here. The Act is not remedial, but instead erects a regulatory framework for schools to follow to establish compliant anti-bullying policies, report data on bullying allegations, and receive grant money for anti-bullying programming. Similar to Davis, the Act prescribes policies and requirements for schools, but it is not aimed at righting any wrongs or providing redress for any grievances—for the government or private parties. While it is clear that the point of requiring schools to establish anti-bullying policies or permitting them to receive grants for anti-bullying programming is to protect children and facilitate their ability to learn, it does not necessarily follow that the Act provides a remedy for private individuals. ¶ 48 Indeed, the Act sets out obligations that schools have with respect to the State Board of Education, i.e. submitting and maintaining anti-bullying policies that comply with the strictures of - 14 - No. 1-24-2271 the Act. But the Act, as written, does not impose obligations on schools or districts with respect to parents or children. For example, a bullying policy must contain “procedures for promptly investigating and addressing reports of bullying,” and enumerates 4 areas that these procedures must address. 105 ILCS 5/27-23.7(5) (West 2024). But the required procedures are exceptionally broad. ¶ 49 One such requirement is that a bullying policy must contain procedures “consistent with federal and State laws and rules governing student privacy rights, [for] providing parents and guardians of the students who are parties to the investigation information about the investigation and an opportunity to meet with the principal or school administrator or his or her designee to discuss the investigation, the findings of the investigation, and the actions taken to address the reported incident of bullying.” 105 ILCS 5/27-23.7(5)(D). Policies must also contain procedures for “making all reasonable efforts to complete the [bullying] investigation within 10 school days after the date the report of the incident of bullying was received.” 105 ILCS 5/27-23.7(5)(A). The exact specifics of these policies and procedures, however, are left to schools to formulate and the State Board of Education to approve. When broad discretion is given to an agency, it negates the implication that there was legislative intent to create a private right of action. Moore v. Lumpkin, 258 Ill. App. 3d 980, 996 (1994). ¶ 50 Furthermore, the Act concerns itself with incentivizing the creation and promulgation of anti-bullying policies and the consequences of not having such a policy. It does not, in any way, concern itself with possible consequences related to how a school enforces or effectuates that policy. Thus, we agree with the trial court that any conceivable private right of action under the Act would only permit a lawsuit against a school for failing to have an anti-bullying policy. But - 15 - No. 1-24-2271 that is not what Count II of plaintiffs’ complaint alleged; it instead alleged, in line with other counts, that defendant Latin School violated the Act by failing to properly investigate and failing to notify the Bronsteins or other parents of students involved. Permitting a lawsuit based on how a school chose to enforce its policy or respond to a particular instance of bullying would not only require us to imply a private right of action, it would require us to read into the Act words and sentences that do not exist. A fundamental principle of statutory interpretation is that we may not read into a statute exceptions, limitations, or conditions the legislature did not express. Dew-Becker v. Wu, 2020 IL 124472, ¶ 14. The fact that the Act is not intended to foreclose individuals from other civil or criminal remedies further indicates that the General Assembly did not intend to give private citizens a private right of action. 105 ILCS 5/27-23.7(e) (West 2024). ¶ 51 As to the fourth element, we also do not agree that a private right of action is necessary to provide an adequate remedy for violations of the statute. Pilotto, 2017 IL App (1st) 160844, ¶ 22. Plaintiff argues that without a private right of action, the sole consequence for failing to comply with the statute is placing the school on a list online, and that such a remedy is “toothless” and does nothing to make a victim whole. The difficulty there is that plaintiff began from the flawed premise that the Act is remedial in nature and therefore requires teeth or that the Act is concerned with compensating victims. We must also reiterate that the Act specifically states, “This Section shall not be interpreted to prevent a victim from seeking redress under any other available civil or criminal law.” 105 ILCS 5/27-23.7(e) (West 2024). If the legislature wished to give parents or students a private right of action, it would not have specifically included this subsection. And if victims of bullying may seek redress for bullying using other available civil or criminal laws, then a private right of action is not necessary to provide an adequate remedy for bullying victims. - 16 - No. 1-24-2271 ¶ 52 Given all these considerations, we conclude that the Act as written contains no implied right of action and the trial court did not err in dismissing this Count II of plaintiffs’ complaint with prejudice. ¶ 53 B. Repleading a Common Law Negligence Claim Based on the Act ¶ 54 Plaintiff next argues that the trial court erred by denying him the opportunity to plead a common law negligence claim based on the requirements of the Act after it concluded that the Act does not contain a private right of action. ¶ 55 “The law is clear in Illinois that the allowance of an amendment to pleadings rests within the sound discretion of the trial court.” Tishman Midwest Management Corp. v. Wayne Jarvis, Ltd., 146 Ill. App. 3d 684, 692 (1986). Before the trial court can be found to have abused its discretion in denying a party leave to amend, it must be clear from the record that reasons or facts were presented to the trial judge as a basis for requesting the favorable exercise of the trial court’s discretion. Id. ¶ 56 However, nothing in the record demonstrates that plaintiffs submitted a proposed amended complaint or otherwise made a record about what an amended complaint would contain that would justify being allowed leave to amend. Tishman, 146 Ill. App. 3d at 692. ¶ 57 Ordinarily, when determining whether an amendment to a complaint should be allowed, a court generally considers four factors: (1) whether the proposed amendment would cure a defect in the pleading; (2) whether the proposed amendment would surprise or prejudice the opposing party; (3) whether the proposed amendment was timely filed; and (4) whether the moving party had previous opportunities to amend the complaint. Sellers v. Rudert, 395 Ill. App. 3d 1041, 1054 (2009). “A plaintiff’s failure to tender a proposed complaint significantly diminishes a court’s - 17 - No. 1-24-2271 ability to analyze the appropriate factors for determining whether leave should be granted as the existence of a proposed amendment is implicit in the first three factors.” Id. at 1054-55. Indeed, the failure to tender a proposed amendment to the trial court forfeits review of the trial court’s decision. Id. at 1055. Plaintiff asks us to hold that the trial court abused the discretion that it was never given an opportunity to consider a proposed amendment. His extensive arguments about the law supporting a negligence claim based on the Act do not cure this problem—particularly when plaintiff’s view of the duties imposed by the Act is far broader than our interpretation, as discussed above. ¶ 58 In asking us to hold that the trial court should have allowed plaintiffs to file an amended complaint, we are required to speculate as to what that amended pleading would look like and what factual allegations would have been made to satisfy the various elements, including proximate cause, of a negligence claim. That, of course, we cannot do. ¶ 59 On this basis, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow any further amendments to the complaint. ¶ 60 C. Willful and Wanton Breach of Duty (Voluntary Undertaking)—Count III ¶ 61 Count III alleged that defendants voluntarily agreed to monitor for and address circumstances that would negatively impact Nathan’s safety, mental health, and well-being. However, after receiving reports of bullying against Nathan, they failed to exercise reasonable care and instead acted willfully and wantonly so as to increase the harm to Nathan. The trial court dismissed this count, with prejudice, as it pertained to defendants Dunn, Von Ogden, and Knoche, and left this count intact as to defendants Hennessy and Kranz. The trial court reasoned that the complaint did not adequately plead that defendants Dunn, Von Ogden, or Knoche undertook any - 18 - No. 1-24-2271 affirmative duties or steps to prevent Nathan’s bullying and that their interactions with Nathan were so remote as to render them incapable of voluntarily undertaking any efforts on Nathan’s behalf. ¶ 62 The trial court later clarified its ruling, stating that Count III remained intact with respect to defendants Hennessy and Kranz and defendant Latin School by way of vicarious liability. However, it dismissed this count as it pertained to the direct liability of Latin School. In denying plaintiffs’ motion to reconsider, the trial court reasoned that the complaint did not plead any affirmative undertaking other than the allegations related to Kranz and Hennessy, and that statements in handbooks, policies, promotional materials, and procedures could not qualify as affirmative actions that qualify as the undertaking of a duty. On appeal, plaintiff does not challenge the dismissal of defendants Dunn, Von Ogden, and Knoche. Instead, they only claim that the trial court erred in rejecting a claim of direct liability against Latin School. ¶ 63 Ordinarily, to prevail on a claim of negligence, the plaintiff must prove that the defendant owed a duty, that the defendant breached that duty, and that defendant’s breach was the proximate cause of injury to the plaintiff. Bell v. Hutsell, 2011 IL 110724, ¶ 11. 5 Under a voluntary undertaking theory of liability, the duty of care to be imposed upon a defendant is limited to the extent of the undertaking. Id. ¶ 12. This theory is narrowly construed. Id. ¶ 64 Plaintiff argues that two different theories for a voluntary undertaking apply here. Under the first voluntary undertaking theory, one who undertakes, gratuitously or for consideration, to 5 The trial court’s ruling on defendants’ motions to dismiss notes a dispute as to whether this count would need to be proved using an ordinary negligence standard or a willful and wanton standard. This dispute has not carried over to this appeal, nor does it have any bearing on the dispositive issues for this claim. - 19 - No. 1-24-2271 render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for the protection of the other’s person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking if: (1) his failure to exercise suc