Full Opinion

2026 IL App (4th) 241539 FILED June 29, 2026 NO. 4-24-1539 Carla Bender 4th District Appellate IN THE APPELLATE COURT Court, IL OF ILLINOIS FOURTH DISTRICT FIRST UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, PEKIN, ) Appeal from the ILLINOIS, ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellee, ) Tazewell County v. ) No. 24MR38 THE DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE and DAVID ) HARRIS, in His Official Capacity as Director of the ) Honorable Department of Revenue, ) Steven A. Kouri, Defendants-Appellants. ) Judge Presiding. JUSTICE DOHERTY delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion. Justice Vancil concurred in the judgment and opinion. Justice DeArmond dissented, with opinion. OPINION ¶1 Plaintiff First United Methodist Church of Pekin, Illinois (Church), was gifted a single-family residence in Pekin, Illinois, to be used in a housing ministry. The Church sought a property tax exemption for the property for tax year 2021 under sections 15-40 (religious purpose) and 15-65 (charitable purpose) of the Property Tax Code (Tax Code) (35 ILCS 200/15-40, 15-65 (West 2020)). Defendant David Harris, the director of the Illinois Department of Revenue (Director), ultimately denied the request as to both exemptions, and plaintiff filed a complaint for administrative review in the circuit court. ¶2 The circuit court reversed the Director’s decision, finding that the home was exempt from taxation under section 15-65’s charitable purpose exemption. Defendants Director and the Illinois Department of Revenue (Department) now appeal from that order. ¶3 We reverse the Director’s decision and affirm the circuit court. ¶4 I. BACKGROUND ¶5 A. Charis Place ¶6 The subject property, which the Church named “Charis Place,” is a 1,070 square foot, two-bedroom family home with a basement located in Pekin, Illinois. The Church was gifted the property on May 7, 2021, “on the condition that is be used for a housing ministry to transform lives for Christ through a ministry with families in transition by providing housing, spiritual guidance, and other support as identified by each family together with the ministry team.” As part of the gift transfer, “[t]he church agreed that the home [would] be used in the ministry and not sold for general church purposes.” The Church ministry that supports Charis Place is called ROCHouse Ministry. ¶7 B. Application for Exemption ¶8 On May 20, 2021, plaintiff filed an application for a nonhomestead property tax exemption for tax year 2021 under section 15-40’s religious purposes exemption. Later in the proceedings, the Church also requested a charitable purposes exemption under section 15-65 of the Tax Code. Defendants stipulated that the additional exemption ground could be considered. ¶9 In its exemption application, the Church stated that “[t]he property will be used as transformational housing for families who are facing housing insecurity.” It further stated that, “[d]epending on the situation a family may be charged a fee as part of their program toward responsible home or apartment occupancy” and that at the time, a “standard lease [was] in the process of being prepared which will define the covenants and conditions of occupancy.” ¶ 10 C. Supporting Documentation ¶ 11 The Church filed several documents with its application, including the affidavit of -2- use prepared by Scott Ewing, the chair of the Church’s board of trustees; the March 11, 2021, of the ROCHouse leadership team (ROC Team) meeting minutes; the amended minutes of the Church’s April 20, 2021, trustees’ meeting; and the May 7, 2021, warranty deed. ¶ 12 Ewing’s affidavit stated that the Church had a twofold mission: a global mission to “ ‘make disciples of Jesus Christ for the transformation of the world’ ” and a local mission to “ ‘unite every one [sic] with the life giving power of Jesus.’ ” It further stated that, “[i]n light of both missions, [the Church] was called to serve and be in a ministry with its community.” The affidavit reiterated how the Church acquired the property, its intended use, that establishment of the ROCHouse Ministry was “approved on March 11, 2021[,] and the receipt of the gift of Charis Place was approved on April 21, 2021.” According to the affidavit, the Church was “in the process of re-roofing the house, purchasing and installing appliances and determining the extent of other furnishings that will be provided and obtaining the same.” At the time the affidavit was prepared, it was anticipated that the initial repair work would be completed by early summer 2021, applications for residency could be reviewed in July 2021, and a family could begin occupancy in August 2021. ¶ 13 According to its March 11, 2021, meeting minutes, the ROC Team was authorized to submit a grant application to the Church’s endowment committee “to request $10,000.00 to support the ROCHouse ministry.” A motion was also approved to accept a $1,000 donation to be used for the ROCHouse ministry. Finally, the minutes stated that “[a] temporary restricted fund [was] authorized for the ROCHouse ministry.” The amended minutes of April 20, 2021, revealed that an individual named “Denise” would “provide the new shingles for the roof” and have them “paid for prior to the closing.” We note that Denise Hocker is listed as a member of the ROC Team in the March 11, 2021, minutes. -3- ¶ 14 D. Initial Hearings ¶ 15 On July 1, 2021, the Department denied the request, finding that the property was “not in exempt use.” Plaintiff filed a protest and asked for an administrative hearing. The protest letter stated that the church believed the request for an exemption was denied “because the Church stated that it might receive income from its operation of a ministry at the property,” but it asserted that the “[p]rogram income from the operation of an exempt charity is not grounds for denial of [a] real estate tax exemption.” ¶ 16 1. Additional Evidence ¶ 17 At the request of the parties, the administrative law judge (ALJ) allowed the parties to submit a “Joint Stipulation of Facts and Waiver of Oral Hearing” in lieu of an administrative hearing. It stated, in part, as follows: “1. The [Church] has filed a property tax exemption application for First United Methodist Church Pekin, Illinois. 2. The [Church] has filed a timely written request, pursuant to 35 ILCS 200/8-35, for a formal hearing of the Department’s denial of its application, setting forth the [Church’s] arguments as to why the denial was incorrect and as to why the denial should be reconsidered and reversed. 3. The [Church] applicant has filed its appeal based on whether the taxpayer qualifies for an exemption as a charitable organization under Section 15-65 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/15-65 [(West 2020)]).” ¶ 18 The parties further stipulated to the submission of a joint exhibit containing additional documents, including the Department’s “documents, records, and/or memorandum” relating to its determination. The joint exhibit provided a copy of the lease agreement, a ministry -4- plan covenant, a copy of the gift agreement showing the transfer of Charis Place, and an affidavit of Kathy Simpson, a member of the Church and member of the ROC Team. Simpson’s affidavit stated that the Church board had voted unanimously to establish the ROC Team, that the first resident had moved into Charis Place in September 2021, and that an agreement (ministry covenant) had been worked out between the tenant and the ROC Team. According to the affidavit, “The church is subsidizing all the costs associated with the ministry with donations and grants from church related funds. While [the tenant’s] rent starts at zero and will increase over time it will not cover our programmatic costs.” The affidavit also stated that the Church was able to “gift [the tenant] with $100 each month for food to replace the state aid and help keep her on track with expenses.” ¶ 19 She added that the “goals outlined in the covenant” with the tenant were “that while living at Charis Place she will: “1. Become financially able to provide a permanent, safe, happy home to raise her children[; and] 2. Be able to reduce stress and find peace in her own living.” The affidavit further stated, “Through the ministry of Charis Place [the tenant] has the peace of mind of living in a safe neighborhood in a well-maintained, comfortable home for her and her family.” ¶ 20 The affidavit also explained why the ROC Team decided to utilize a written lease and why it adopted certain lease provisions. According to the affidavit, the ROC Team “consulted with several community organizations including Teen Challenge, Esther House, Salvation Army, and others who work with individuals and families in transition. One aspect pointed out by these programs was that if their residents did -5- not comply with program guidelines and rules, they could be immediately barred from the property.” Simpson’s affidavit then explained that the ROC Team “decided that though our ministry is programmatic like theirs, we would give our residents the added protection of a tenancy agreement.” She further stated, “We believe the agreement is one way to help our residents learn how to be good tenants/homeowners as they transition.” ¶ 21 The parties also introduced the Church’s ministry plan covenant, which noted the following facts pertinent to this appeal: (1) the Church offered Charis Place rent-free for the first 12 months and covered 50% of utility costs, with rent increasing to $100 in month 13 and an additional $25 per month thereafter until the end of 24 months (meaning that the final month’s rent was to be $375); (2) the tenant will pay 100% of utility costs for months 13 through 24; (3) the tenant will apply certain monies toward the payment of existing debts and thereafter will begin a savings program; (4) the Church will make a 50% charitable scholarship available to tenant to attend a Financial Peace University workshop at the Church; and (5) the Church will provide a spiritual mentor “to meet with [the tenant] on a regular schedule to introduce bible study and explore faith issues,” and the tenant “will meet with her mentor on a schedule agreed upon by both parties.” ¶ 22 As noted by the ALJ below, the lease of Charis Place resembles “a traditional residential lease agreement.” The exception to that characterization is the modest amount of monthly rent payments due to the Church, which begin at $0 for the first year and gradually work up to the sum of $375 in the twenty-fourth month. The lease provides that the Church is entitled to a security deposit, but it then states that the amount of the security deposit is “ZERO dollars.” The lease also sets forth the Church’s obligation to be “financially responsible” for all repairs to -6- the structure, as well as its responsibility to reimburse the tenant for half of all utility payments for the first 12 months of occupancy. ¶ 23 2. ALJ Recommendation for Disposition ¶ 24 The ALJ recommended the Department’s denial of the tax exemptions be upheld because Charis Place served neither a religious nor charitable purpose under the Tax Code. ¶ 25 a. Compliance With Korzen ¶ 26 Concerning the charitable purpose exemption, the ALJ observed that the Illinois Supreme Court in Methodist Old Peoples Home v. Korzen, 39 Ill. 2d 149, 156-57 (1968) (per curiam), set out the distinctive characteristics of a charitable institution: (1) it has no capital, capital stock, or shareholders; (2) it earns no profits or dividends, but derives its funds mainly from public and private charity and holds them in trust for the purposes designated in its charter; (3) it dispenses charity to all who need and apply for it; (4) it does not provide gain or profit in a private sense; and (5) it does not appear to place obstacles in the way of those who need and would avail themselves of the charitable benefits it dispenses. The Department stipulated that the Church had satisfied Korzen factors one and four; thus, the remaining disputed issues concerned Korzen factors two, three, and five. ¶ 27 i. Funds Derived From Private Charity Sources ¶ 28 The ALJ found that the Church had “failed to establish that its funds [were] derived mainly from public and private charity” and that “the funds are held in trust for the objects and purposes expressed in the charter of ministry.” According to the ALJ, “the record does not contain any documentation regarding the funding described in the meeting minutes and the affidavit.” The court stated, “While the [Church] makes assertions and statements regarding the funding, there is no documentary evidence to show that [its] funding is derived mainly from public and private -7- charity for the tax period at issue.” The ALJ further explained, “the [Church] did not provide any documentation to support the existence of the funding, such as when it was received and the source of the funding.” The ALJ noted that Simpson’s affidavit had stated that the Church was subsidizing the costs of the ministry with “donations and grants” from Church-related funds, “[y]et, the record does not contain any documentary evidence of the source of the donations, donor lists, or amounts of the donations.” The ALJ further stated, “Likewise, no grants were submitted into the record to determine the dollar amounts of the funding and the source of the grant funding.” ¶ 29 ii. Dispersal of Charity to All Who Need It ¶ 30 Concerning the third Korzen factor, the ALJ concluded that the Church failed to establish that it disperses charity to all who need and apply for it. According to the ALJ, “While the record did contain the application, interview questions and cover letter that was used by the [Church] to advertise Charis Place, the parcel at issue in this matter is a private single-family residence and only one family can be living at the residence at one time.” The ALJ found that “[t]his limiting factor does not support a finding that [the Church] dispenses charity to all who need or apply for it.” (Emphasis in original.) According to the ALJ, because Charis Place “can only house one family at time, it cannot be said that this private single-family residence benefits an indefinite number of persons.” ¶ 31 iii. Obstacles in the Way of Those Who Need Charity ¶ 32 The ALJ further concluded that the Church had failed to establish that it did not place obstacles in the way of those who needed and would avail themselves of the charitable benefits it dispenses. According to the ALJ, a review of the lease provisions shows it “contains additional strict and punitive provisions.” The ALJ cited provisions for a bookkeeping charge for dishonored checks, a locking fee for failure to return keys, and late fees of “$1.00 per day for rent -8- not received timely.” The ALJ further noted there was a crime-free housing addendum, a pet agreement requiring the tenant to pay for pet damage, and penalties for “repeated non-compliance with the Ministry Plan.” According to the ALJ, “reviewing the totality of the lease agreement, Charis [Place] [was] limited to people who adhere to the Ministry Plan and therefore not available to all who need or avail themselves of the benefits of Charis [Place].” Further, “the lease and addendum provisions resemble a traditional residential lease agreement rather than characteristic of a charitable institution.” ¶ 33 b. Charitable Use ¶ 34 The ALJ then addressed the Church’s primary use of the property during the relevant tax year. The ALJ stated, “Here, the Charis [Place]’s primary use was a private single-family residence and there was no record evidence of any use of the property for a charitable purpose.” The ALJ concluded that even if the Church was operating as a charitable institution, there was “no evidence that the parcel itself [was] being primarily used to implement [the] goals” of ministry. The ALJ stated, “[T]here is no evidence of any meetings or other services being conducted on the premises of the parcel that would further the housing ministry’s programs and services.” According to the ALJ, the property’s use was solely as a private single-family residence. ¶ 35 For these reasons, the ALJ denied the claimed charitable purpose exemption. ¶ 36 c. Religious Exemption ¶ 37 Although the Department did not dispute that the Church was a religious organization, the ALJ denied the requested religious exemption, finding that Charis Place was not used primarily for religious purposes during the tax year in question, again relying on its logic that the housing was a private single-family residence. ¶ 38 The Church filed a timely appeal to the Director. -9- ¶ 39 E. Director’s Decision ¶ 40 On February 22, 2024, the Director accepted the ALJ’s recommendation of disposition without further comment. On March 21, 2024, the Church filed a timely complaint for administrative review in the circuit court. See 735 ILCS 5/3-103 (West 2024). As the Director adopted the ALJ’s recommendations in toto, we will from this point refer to the content of the ALJ’s report as the Director’s decision. ¶ 41 F. Circuit Court Administrative Review ¶ 42 In the circuit court, the Church again argued that the Charis Place property was exempt under sections 15-40 and 15-65 of the Tax Code. After taking the matter under advisement, the court issued a written order on November 8, 2024, stating as follows: “Upon consideration of Plaintiff’s Complaint for Administrative Review, the Court finds and orders as follows: 1. Plaintiff is a charitable institution under the Korzen factors. See Methodist Old Peoples Home v. Korzen, 39 Ill. 2d 149 (1968). Specifically, the Court places considerable weight on the primary use of the subject property for charitable purposes. In this regard, the Court finds that the terms of the lease were below fair market value (i.e., for example, no rent for the first 12 months). 2. The [Department] primarily argues that the church’s property does not qualify for charitable exception because the use does not serve an infinite number of people and is not dispensed to all who need and apply for it. This Court is not prepared to accept that narrow of an application of the Korzen factors. The Department of Revenue’s interpretation of the Korzen - 10 - factors under the circumstances presented herein would, in effect, prevent any single-family residence from ever being tax exempt. 3. The Court shares the concerns of the [D]epartment. The Court does not make a blanket ruling on the maximum duration of a lease for any given recipient. It is significant to the Court that in this particular case the duration was no more than two years. Based on the foregoing, the Court finds that the findings and conclusions by the [Director] are against the manifest weight of the evidence and are clearly erroneous. Therefore, the decision of the [Director] is reversed.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) ¶ 43 This appeal followed. ¶ 44 II. ANALYSIS ¶ 45 On appeal, defendants argue that the circuit court’s decision to award the charitable purpose exemption for the 2021 tax year should be reversed and the Director’s decision reinstated, thereby denying the requested exemption. Additionally, defendants argue that, if the charitable exemption does not apply, the religious exemption advanced by the Church in the alternative also cannot support exemption of the 2021 taxes. ¶ 46 A. Standard of Review ¶ 47 An appellate court reviews the final decision of the administrative agency and not the decision of the circuit court. XL Disposal Corp. v. Zehnder, 304 Ill. App. 3d 202, 207 (1999); Key Outdoor, Inc. v. Department of Transportation, 322 Ill. App. 3d 316, 320 (2001). Here, the final agency decision was rendered by the Director, who adopted the report of the ALJ. - 11 - ¶ 48 The degree of deference given to the Director’s decision depends on whether the issue presented is a question of fact, a question of law, or a mixed question of law and fact. Western Illinois University v. Illinois Educational Labor Relations Board, 2021 IL 126082, ¶ 30. “An administrative agency’s decisions on questions of fact are entitled to deference and are reversed only if against the manifest weight of the evidence.” Key Outdoor, Inc., 322 Ill. App. 3d at 320 (citing Abrahamson v. Illinois Department of Professional Regulation, 153 Ill. 2d 76, 88 (1992)). “Questions of law decided by such an agency are not entitled to deference and are reviewed de novo.” Id. (citing Envirite Corp. v. Illinois Environmental Protection Agency, 158 Ill. 2d 210, 214 (1994)). A mixed question of law and fact is reviewed for clear error. Western Illinois University, 2021 IL 126082, ¶ 30. ¶ 49 Where the resolution of the case requires determining the legal effect of a given set of facts, the agency’s determination should be affirmed unless clearly erroneous. Three Angels Broadcasting Network, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 381 Ill. App. 3d 679, 693 (2008). As was the case in Three Angels Broadcasting Network, Inc., the determinative facts here—that is, the actual uses to which the subject property was put—are not in dispute. Id. The issue is whether, given the undisputed facts presented, the Church is entitled to a property tax exemption on one of the bases it claims. Id. ¶ 50 An agency’s decision will be deemed clearly erroneous only where the reviewing court, on the entire record, is left with the definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been committed. American Academy of Pediatrics v. Department of Revenue, 2023 IL App (2d) 210718, ¶ 37 (citing Beggs v. Board of Education of Murphysboro Community Unit School District No. 186, 2016 IL 120236, ¶ 50). “While this standard is highly deferential, it does not relegate judicial - 12 - review to mere blind deference of an agency’s order.” Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois v. Illinois Labor Relations Board, 224 Ill. 2d 88, 98 (2007). ¶ 51 B. Jurisdiction ¶ 52 Although neither party has questioned our jurisdiction over the appeal, the dissent correctly notes that we have an independent duty to examine it. While the jurisdictional inquiry is an important one, our review leads us to a conclusion different from that reached by the dissent. ¶ 53 We agree that a final order disposing of fewer than all “claims” is not an appealable order absent an appropriate finding pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 304(a) (eff. Mar. 8, 2016). Marsh v. Evangelical Covenant Church of Hinsdale, 138 Ill. 2d 458, 464 (1990). However, even if this case had been brought in the circuit court as a court of original jurisdiction, our view is that there would still be only one claim presented: a claim to establish that the Church was entitled to an exemption on its 2021 property taxes. Here, the Church received all the relief it could have obtained when the circuit court ruled that the property was tax exempt. The fact that the circuit court did so on the basis of the charitable exemption, rather than the religious exemption, does not mean that there is a separate “claim” hanging in the wind and yet to be addressed. The only relief that could be obtained was obtained, so there was no concrete controversy presented by the abstract question of whether the same result could be reached under the religious exemption; doing so could not make the property more exempt. ¶ 54 The fact is, however, that this was not an action in the circuit court as a matter of original jurisdiction, but an action initiated with the Department and decided by the Director; it arrived in the circuit court only on judicial administrative review. The requirement for finality arises with respect to the Director’s decision. See Slepicka v. Illinois Department of Public Health, - 13 - 2014 IL 116927, ¶ 12 (noting the provision for “judicial review of a final administrative decision”). There is no issue here about the finality of the Director’s decision. ¶ 55 In the circuit court, there was only one action: a single-count complaint for administrative review asking that the administrative decision be reversed. The advancement of different bases for the same relief does not turn a single claim for administrative review into multiple claims. See Ikpoh v. Zollar, 321 Ill. App. 3d 41, 47 (2001) (stating the advancement of three separate bases for achieving restoration of the plaintiff’s medical license did not constitute three separate claims). On administrative review, “circuit courts act as the first-tier courts of review” (Cinkus v. Village of Stickney Municipal Officers Electoral Board, 228 Ill. 2d 200, 213 (2008)), and the circuit court’s relationship with the agency “is analogous to the relationship between a trial court in a nonadministrative review proceeding and an appellate court” (Ikpoh, 321 Ill. App. 3d at 47). “Courts of review *** ordinarily will not consider issues where they are not essential to the disposition of the cause or where the result will not be affected regardless of how the issues are decided.” Barth v. Reagan, 139 Ill. 2d 399, 419 (1990). The circuit court’s decision not to address the alternative grounds for tax exemption is entirely proper in its role as a reviewing court, and failing to address the charitable basis for exemption did not affect the finality of its decision granting the Church the entirety of the relief it requested. ¶ 56 Finally, we note that even if the circuit court had addressed the alternative religious ground for exemption, it would not affect our analysis of the case. “On appeal from an administrative case, we review the administrative agency’s decision and not the trial court’s determination.” City of East Peoria v. Melton, 2023 IL App (4th) 220281, ¶ 50. Consequently, the circuit court’s failure to review the alternative ground for an exemption has had no effect on our disposition of the case. - 14 - ¶ 57 For all the foregoing reasons, we conclude that we have jurisdiction over this appeal. ¶ 58 C. Exemptions ¶ 59 The Church sought a property tax exemption for Charis Place for the tax year 2021 under two different provisions of the Tax Code: section 15-40 (establishing the religious exemption) and section 15-65 (establishing the charitable exemption). 35 ILCS 200/15-40, 15-65 (West 2020). ¶ 60 1. General Taxation Authority ¶ 61 “Article IX of the 1970 Illinois Constitution [(Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX)] generally subjects all real property to taxation.” Eden Retirement Center, Inc. v. Department of Revenue, 213 Ill. 2d 273, 285 (2004); Oswald v. Hamer, 2018 IL 122203, ¶ 12. “Under Illinois law, taxation is the rule. Tax exemption is the exception.” Provena Covenant Medical Center v. Department of Revenue, 236 Ill. 2d 368, 388 (2010). The constitution does, however, give the legislature the authority to exempt particular kinds of properties from taxation. Section 6 of article IX provides as follows: “The General Assembly by law may exempt from taxation only the property of the State, units of local government and school districts and property used exclusively for agricultural and horticultural societies, and for school, religious, cemetery and charitable purposes.” (Emphases added.) Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, § 6. “It is permissible, not mandatory, for the legislature to exercise” this constitutional authority to grant tax exemptions. Oswald, 2018 IL 122203, ¶ 13. “Where the legislature does choose to provide for an exemption, it must remain within constitutional limitations,” and it “cannot add to or broaden” the exemptions permitted under section 6. (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Id. ¶ 14. Statutory exemptions are construed narrowly and strictly in favor of taxation. Swank v. Department of Revenue, 336 Ill. App. 3d 851, - 15 - 855 (2003). “The party claiming an exemption carries the burden of proving clearly that the use of the subject property is within both the constitutional authorization and the terms of the statute under which the claim of exemption is made.” (Emphasis omitted.) Oswald, 2018 IL 122203, ¶ 18; Evangelical Hospitals Corp. v. Department of Revenue, 223 Ill. App. 3d 225, 231 (1991). ¶ 62 2. Charitable Use Exemption ¶ 63 One category of exemption that the legislature may constitutionally adopt is an exemption for property used for “charitable purposes.” See Evangelical Hospitals Corp., 223 Ill. App. 3d at 230-31. Consequently, regardless of what else the legislature may provide for, it is independently true that “[a]n applicant for a charitable-use property tax exemption must ‘comply unequivocally with the constitutional requirement of exclusive charitable use.’ ” Eden Retirement Center, 213 Ill. 2d at 287 (quoting Small v. Pangle, 60 Ill. 2d 510, 516 (1975)). A property owner seeking a charitable use exemption must satisfy both the particular statutory exemption relied upon as well as the constitutional limitation. Oswald, 2018 IL 122203, ¶ 39. ¶ 64 a. The Nature of the Korzen Factors ¶ 65 In Korzen, the supreme court listed six distinctive characteristics of a charitable institution: (1) the institution bestows benefits upon an indefinite number of persons for their general welfare, or the benefits in some way reduce the burdens on government; (2) it has no capital, capital stock, or shareholders, and the funds of the institution are derived mainly from private and public charity and are held in trust for the purposes expressed in the charter; (3) it dispenses charity to all who need and apply for it; (4) it does not provide gain or profit in a private sense to any person connected with it; (5) it puts no obstacles in the way of those seeking the charitable benefits; and (6) the primary use of the property is for charitable purposes. Korzen, 39 Ill. 2d at 157. - 16 - ¶ 66 This is where things get murky. Korzen purported to address the constitutional limitation on what could be made exempt by the legislature. However, the Illinois Constitution expresses that limitation in terms of the use to which the property is put, not the nature of the institution that owns the property. The constitution specifies that the legislature is authorized to exempt “property used exclusively for agricultural and horticultural societies, and for school, religious, cemetery and charitable purposes.” (Emphasis added.) Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, § 6. When the legislature decided to exercise its constitutional authority to exempt property “used exclusively for *** charitable purposes” (id.), it required not just that the property be “actually and exclusively used for charitable or beneficent purposes” but that it be owned by an “[i]nstitution[ ] of public charity” (35 ILCS 200/15-65(a) (West 2020)). ¶ 67 Therein lies the confusion. Korzen purports to define the constitutional boundaries of a use-based charitable exemption, yet it speaks in terms of the hallmarks of a charitable institution. The statute, on the other hand, adds a separate requirement that the property be owned by a charitable institution, but case law seems to look to Korzen’s constitutional use test to determine what constitutes a charitable institution. See Provena, 236 Ill. 2d at 390 (stating that the Korzen factors identify “the distinctive characteristics of a charitable institution”). ¶ 68 It may be a challenge to make pristine logical sense of the application of the Korzen factors, but it is possible to find clarity by following their application in subsequent supreme court cases. Practically speaking, the supreme court appears to have looked to the Korzen factors to examine both the statutory requirement that the organization be charitable in nature (see id.; Chicago Patrolmen’s Ass’n v. Department of Revenue, 171 Ill. 2d 263, 271 (1996) (stating a property owner “can qualify as a charitable organization only by satisfying the criteria set forth” in Korzen)) and the dual constitutional and statutory requirement that the use be charitable in nature - 17 - (Eden Retirement Center, 213 Ill. 2d at 287 (stating Korzen “articulated guidelines or criteria for resolving the constitutional question of charitable use”); Small, 60 Ill. 2d at 515 (“Korzen then furnished guidelines to determine if the uses to which property was being put were charitable.”)). ¶ 69 The fact that the Korzen factors have been utilized to test both the institution’s status as a charitable institution and the dual constitutional/statutory use requirement should not be surprising because the first five Korzen factors relate to the charitable nature of the organization, while the sixth focuses on the charitable nature of the use. As we have previously found, “the statutory ownership considerations embedded in section 15-86 inherently overlap with Korzen’s ownership factors.” The Carle Foundation v. Department of Revenue, 2023 IL App (4th) 200121, ¶ 148. ¶ 70 Consequently, we now examine application of the Korzen factors to the facts of this case. We note that the individual factors were laid out in Korzen in a narrative form, rather than in a numbered list; as noted above, the factors as laid out by the Department do not always correlate with the same numbered factors found in the caselaw. For clarity, we will utilize the enumeration of the factors as set forth in Provena. ¶ 71 b. Application of the Korzen Factors ¶ 72 As we held in Carle Foundation, the Korzen factors “are guidelines, not strict requirements, that courts consider and balance by examining the facts of each case.” Id. ¶ 146. Illinois courts have not applied a rigid formula to all factual scenarios in determining eligibility for a charitable real estate tax exemption. Du Page County Board of Review v. Joint Comm’n on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations, 274 Ill. App. 3d 461, 469 (1995). “Rather, courts consider and balance the guidelines by examining the facts of each case and focusing on whether and how the institution serves the public interest and lessens the State burden.” Id. - 18 - ¶ 73 i. No Capital, Stock, or Shareholders ¶ 74 The Department concedes that the Church has no capital, capital stock, or shareholders. Its structure is clearly more like that of a charitable institution and not a private business. ¶ 75 ii. No Profits and Funding Derived From Charity and Held in Trust ¶ 76 The Director found that the Church failed to establish that its funds were derived mainly from public and private charity and that “the funds [were] held in trust for the objects and purposes expressed in the charter or ministry.” Moreover, it concluded the record did not present any documentation to show where the funds came from. ¶ 77 As for the Church itself, the record reflects no other source of income beyond what one might expect for a church, i.e., the contributions made by its membership. As to the funds relating specifically to Charis Place, the record shows that the property itself was a gift to the Church for the purposes of establishing a “housing ministry to transform lives for Christ through a ministry with families in transition by providing housing, spiritual guidance, and other support as identified by each family together” with the ROC Team. The affidavit of use prepared by the chair of the Church’s board of trustees explained that the Church was “in the process of re-roofing the house, purchasing and installing new appliances and determining the extent of other furnishings that will be provided and obtaining the same.” The March 11 minutes of the ROC Team meeting state that authorization was given to submit a grant application to the Church’s endowment committee “to request $10,000.00 to support the ROCHouse Ministry.” A motion was also approved to accept a $1,000 donation to be used for the ROCHouse Ministry. ¶ 78 Additionally, the a