Full Opinion

THIRD DIVISION DILLARD, P. J., GOBEIL and PIPKIN, JJ. NOTICE: Motions for reconsideration must be received no later than 4:30 pm on the 10th day after the decision was issued to be deemed timely filed. https://www.gaappeals.gov/rules October 26, 2026 In the Court of Appeals of Georgia A26A1573. AUTREY et al. v. THE STATE OF GEORGIA. GOBEIL, Judge. Philip J. Autrey and others (the “appellants1“) filed a petition against the State of Georgia seeking declaratory and injunctive relief concerning the relocation of Confederate flags and proposed modifications to a museum located at Stone Mountain Memorial Park. The trial court granted the State’s motion to dismiss the petition, and on appeal, the appellants argue inter alia that the trial court erred by finding that their 1 The other appellants are John F. Muerlin, Timothy F. Pilgrim, and Barbara W. Smith. The Georgia Division of the Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., and the Confederate Memorial Camp #1432 of the Sons of Confederate Veterans were originally plaintiffs in the action as well, but they were dropped as party petitioners during the course of the litigation. suit was barred by sovereign immunity. For the reasons explained more fully below, we affirm. “On appeal from a motion to dismiss, we review a trial court’s grant of such a motion de novo. In doing so, we construe the pleadings and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmovants, resolving all doubts in their favor.” Williams v. Harvey, 366 Ga. App. 395, 395 (883 SE2d 145) (2023) (citation modified). We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds “de novo because it is a matter of law, but factual findings made by that court are sustained if there is evidence to support them[.]” Sons of Confederate Veterans v. Newton County Bd. of Comm’r, 368 Ga. App. 511, 512 (890 SE2d 468) (2023) (citation modified). So viewed, the record shows that in May 2025, the appellants filed a petition for a declaratory judgment and permanent and temporary injunction against the State of Georgia.2 The appellants challenge certain actions undertaken by the Stone Mountain Memorial Association (the “Association”), an instrumentality of the State created by 2 The appellants filed their first petition on May 22, 2025; they filed an amended petition on October 8, 2025. All references in this opinion to “the complaint” or “the petition” refer to the amended petition. 2 the General Assembly to preserve and manage Stone Mountain Park. See OCGA §§ 12-3-192(a); 12-3-192.1 (the purposes of the Association shall include preserving the natural areas situated within the Stone Mountain Park area; providing access to Stone Mountain for Georgia citizens; and maintaining “an appropriate and suitable memorial for the Confederacy”). Specifically, the petition centers on two primary issues: (1) the relocation of Confederate Flag Terrace and (2) proposed renovations to Memorial Hall (the “Museum”). In their petition, the appellants allege that they are citizens, residents, and taxpayers of the State. As such, they claim they have a public right to ensure the State does not spend taxpayer revenue in an unlawful or ultra vires manner. OCGA § 50-3-1(b)(2) provides in part that “[n]o officer or agency shall remove or conceal from display any such monument for the purpose of preventing the visible display of the same.” Pursuant to OCGA § 50-3-1(b)(3): No publicly owned monument erected, constructed, created, or maintained on the public property of this state or its agencies, departments, authorities, or instrumentalities or on real property owned by an agency or the State of Georgia shall be relocated, removed, concealed, obscured, or altered in any fashion by any officer or agency; provided, however, that appropriate measures for the preservation, 3 protection, and interpretation of such monument or memorial shall not be prohibited. “Monument” is defined under this statute as including a “flag, banner, structure name, display, or memorial” that is “[d]edicated to honors, or recounts the military service of any past or present military personnel of ... the Confederate States of America or the several states thereof.” OCGA § 50-3-1(b)(1)(B)(ii). The appellants allege that the Association has violated OCGA § 50-3-1(b)(3) by moving Confederate Flag Terrace to a less prominent area of Stone Mountain. They assert further that the Association’s proposed alterations to the Museum do not fulfill the Association’s purpose of maintaining Stone Mountain as a suitable and appropriate memorial to the Confederacy. The State filed a motion to dismiss the petition, which the trial court granted. In its order, the trial court first found that the appellants lack standing because they only alleged generalized harm, which is insufficient to sustain a cause of action against the State. The court examined whether the appellants’ status as taxpayers conferred community stakeholder standing on them, and it concluded that it did not. The court next found that the appellants had failed to state a claim for declaratory relief such that 4 they could not establish a waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity. This appeal followed. 1. Taking the appellants’ claims out of order,3 we address their argument that the trial court erred by ruling that their claims sought only retrospective relief, which is not available in a declaratory judgment action. Accordingly, they failed to establish a waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity. The doctrine of sovereign immunity, also known as governmental immunity, protects all levels of governments from legal action unless they have waived their immunity from suit. Any suit against the State barred by sovereign immunity is subject to dismissal pursuant to OCGA § 9-11-12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. ... Sovereign immunity can only be waived by an Act of the General Assembly which specifically provides that sovereign immunity is thereby waived and the extent of such waiver. And any waiver of sovereign immunity must be established by the party seeking to benefit from that waiver. Conway v. Jones, 353 Ga. App. 110, 111-12(1) (836 SE2d 538) (2019) (citation modified). See also Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. IX(a). “[S]overeign immunity is a threshold determination because — like various other rules of 3 See Foster v. Morrison, 177 Ga. App. 250, 250(1) (339 SE2d 307) (1985) (“For convenience of discussion, we have taken the enumerated errors out of the order in which appellant has listed them[.]”). 5 jurisdiction and justiciability — it is concerned with the extent to which a case properly may come before a court at all.” Sons of Confederate Veterans, 368 Ga. App. at 513. Effective January 2021, the Georgia Constitution was amended to provide a limited waiver of sovereign immunity “for actions in the superior court seeking declaratory relief from acts of the state” or certain specified state agencies “outside the scope and lawful authority or in violation of the laws or Constitution of this state or the Constitution of the United States.” Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. V(b)(1). The State’s sovereign immunity is further waived “so that a court awarding declaratory relief pursuant to this Paragraph may, only after awarding declaratory relief, enjoin such acts to enforce its judgment.” Id. This waiver of sovereign immunity applies to “past, current, and prospective acts which occur on or after January 1, 2021.” Id. In the instant case, plaintiffs sought declaratory relief concerning whether the provisions of OCGA § 50-3-1 “currently and in the future apply to and govern” Stone Mountain and the Association. They also described that they faced uncertainty as to whether “the future expenditure of state taxpayer revenue to maintain an unlawful 6 and ultra vires act violates the public right not to have state taxpayer revenue expended to maintain unlawful and ultra vires acts.” The appellants sought a permanent injunction “to order the [Association] to re-locate the Confederate Flag Terrace to its original location, or to a place of similar prominence,” and to prevent the further expenditure of state taxpayer revenue on maintaining the relocation of the flags. As to the Museum, the appellants sought both a temporary and permanent injunction to prohibit future changes or expenditures of taxpayer funds that they contend undermine the Association’s purpose as honoring the Confederacy. Our Declaratory Judgment Act, OCGA § 9-4-2, provides that the superior courts may declare rights and other legal relations of any parties petitioning for declaratory relief in “cases of actual controversy,” or when “the ends of justice require that the declaration should be made.” The purpose of the Act is “to settle and afford relief from uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations.” OCGA § 9-4-1. The proper scope of declaratory judgment is to adjudge those rights among parties upon which their future conduct depends. SJN Props. v. Fulton County Bd. of Tax Assessors, 296 Ga. 793, 802(2)(b)(iii) (770 SE2d 832) (2015). Georgia courts have “repeatedly rejected claims for declaratory judgment when a declaration of rights would not direct the plaintiff’s future conduct or involved 7 only a determination of rights that had already accrued.” Cobb County v. Floam, 319 Ga. 89, 97-98(2) (901 SE2d 512) (2024) (citation modified). Here, the appellants’ petition is insufficient to support a claim for declaratory relief. To the extent the petition seeks redress for the Association’s alleged past violations of OCGA §§ 12-3-190 et seq. and 50-3-1, the Declaratory Judgment Act “is not meant to enforce accrued rights, as the Act does not replace existing remedies.” Republican Nat’l Comm. v. Eternal Vigilance Action, Inc., 321 Ga. 771, 790-91(4) (917 SE2d 125) (2025). In addition, the appellants’ petition does not seek guidance on their future conduct, nor does it allege that they face any present uncertainty as to their own rights that a declaration would resolve. Importantly, to the extent that the appellants’ petition could be construed as seeking to ensure certainty regarding the Association’s future actions, “declaratory relief is not a means to seek certainty about another party’s future actions, only [a]ppellants[‘].” Maat Concepts v. Fulton County, __ Ga. App. __, __(1) (932 SE2d 825) (2026) (emphasis supplied). See SJN Props., 296 Ga. at 802-03(2)(b)(iii) (taxpayer was not entitled to declaratory relief in challenging county board of assessors’ valuation methodology for certain leasehold estates because taxpayer faced 8 no uncertainty or insecurity as to any of its own future conduct and instead sought an adjudication of issues that would impact the future conduct of the board); Lewis v. City of Brunswick, 375 Ga. App. 56, 61(1)(b) (913 SE2d 755) (2025) (declaratory judgment action did not lie in organization’s action against city stemming from city’s removal of Confederate monument from public square because any declaration of rights would not direct the organization’s future conduct, and instead would impact only the future conduct of the city). And because they are not entitled to declaratory relief, it necessarily follows that they cannot avail themselves of injunctive relief. See Ga. Const. of 1983, Art. I, Sec. II, Par. V(b)(1). In sum, because the appellants have not established a waiver of the State’s sovereign immunity for their claims, we affirm the trial court’s dismissal of the appellants’ petition. 2. In light of the foregoing, we do not reach the appellants’ remaining claims of error. Judgment affirmed. Dillard, P. J., and Pipkin, J., concur. 9