L.C., Father of L.M.C., P.A.W., Minor Children v. Department of Children and Families
CourtDistrict Court of Appeal of Florida
Date FiledSeptember 25, 2026
Docket1D2025-3337
StatusPublished
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Full Opinion
FIRST DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL
STATE OF FLORIDA
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No. 1D2025-3337
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L.C., Father of L.M.C., P.A.W.,
Minor Children,
Appellant,
v.
DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND
FAMILIES,
Appellee.
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On appeal from the Circuit Court for Escambia County.
Thomas H. Williams, Judge.
September 25, 2026
LONG, J.
L.C. (“Father”) appeals a final judgment terminating his
parental rights. We address only Father’s argument that
competent, substantial evidence does not support the trial court’s
finding that a ground for termination existed. On this issue and
the others, we affirm.
The Department of Children and Families (“DCF”) petitioned
the trial court to shelter L.M.C. and P.A.W., Father’s children,
after P.A.W. tested positive for several illegal drugs at birth. DCF
eventually petitioned the court to terminate Father’s and the
children’s mother’s parental rights.
At the termination hearing, two community-based care
agency case managers testified that a case plan was made for
Father with the goal of reunification. They said that Father, who
was incarcerated, had not completed any of his case plan tasks.
They also said that they provided Father with cards and envelopes
to send letters to the children but that he never sent the children
anything. Father testified that he had not spoken with L.M.C. in
fifteen months and that he did not know P.A.W.
The trial court entered a final judgment terminating Father’s
parental rights. It found that clear and convincing evidence
showed that Father had abandoned the children. It also found that
termination was in the manifest best interests of the children and
that termination was the least restrictive means of protecting the
children from harm. This appeal followed.
This Court’s review is “‘highly deferential’ and limited to
whether competent, substantial evidence supports the trial court’s
judgment and whether we ‘cannot say that no one could reasonably
find such evidence to be clear and convincing.’” K.D. v. Dep’t of
Child. & Fams., 242 So. 3d 522, 523 (Fla. 1st DCA 2018) (quoting
J.P. v. Fla. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 183 So. 3d 1198, 1203 (Fla. 1st
DCA 2016)). To terminate parental rights, a trial court must find,
among other things, that a ground for termination under section
39.806, Florida Statutes, exists. P.R. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams.,
337 So. 3d 456, 460 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022).
Father argues that the trial court’s finding that he abandoned
the children was not supported by competent, substantial
evidence. Section 39.806 lists the grounds for termination. Sub-
subsection (1)(b) states that abandonment “as defined by s.
39.01(1)” is grounds for termination of parental rights.
§ 39.806(1)(b), Fla. Stat. Section 39.01(1), Florida Statues, defines
“abandonment” as “a situation in which the parent or legal
custodian of a child . . . , while being able, has made no significant
contribution to the child’s care and maintenance or has failed to
establish or maintain a substantial and positive relationship with
the child, or both.” The statute continues:
For purposes of this subsection, “establish or maintain a
substantial and positive relationship” includes, but is not
limited to, frequent and regular contact with the child
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through frequent and regular visitation or frequent and
regular communication to or with the child, and the
exercise of parental rights and responsibilities. Marginal
efforts and incidental or token visits or communications
are not sufficient to establish or maintain a substantial
and positive relationship with a child. . . . The
incarceration, repeated incarceration, or extended
incarceration of a parent, legal custodian, or caregiver
responsible for a child’s welfare may support a finding of
abandonment.
§ 39.01(1), Fla. Stat.
The trial court found that clear and convincing evidence
showed that Father abandoned the children. The court’s finding
is supported by competent, substantial evidence. Father testified
that he never met P.A.W. He said that he had a relationship with
L.M.C. before he was incarcerated, but he also said that he had not
spoken with her since she was sheltered fifteen months before the
termination hearing. The case managers testified that Father was
given cards and envelopes to send letters to the children, but he
never sent them anything. This testimony is competent,
substantial evidence that supports the court’s finding. Thus, the
court did not err in finding by clear and convincing evidence that
Father abandoned the children.
AFFIRMED.
ROWE and BILBREY, JJ., concur.
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Not final until disposition of any timely and
authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or
9.331.
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Ilene F. Tuckfield of Ilene F. Tuckfield, P.A., Coral Gables, for
Appellant.
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Sarah J. Rumph, Appellate Counsel, Children’s Legal Services,
Tallahassee, for Appellee Department of Children and Families.
Sara E. Goldfarb, Statewide Director of Appeals; and Mercy
Almaguer, Senior Attorney, Appellate Division, Statewide
Guardian ad Litem Office, Tallahassee, o/b/o L.M.C. and P.A.W.
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