Full Opinion

FIFTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________ Case No. 5D2026-0461 LT Case No. 2025-DP-000057 _____________________________ M.M., Father of E.M., J.M., and M.M., Jr., Children, Appellant, v. DEPARTMENT OF CHILDREN AND FAMILIES, Appellee. _____________________________ On appeal from the Circuit Court for Putnam County. Rose Marie K. Preddy, Judge. Natalie S. H. Kelley, of Law Office of Natalie S. Hall Kelley, Saint Augustine, for Appellant. Rachel Batten, of Children’s Legal Services, Brooksville, for Appellee. Sara Elizabeth Goldfarb, Statewide Director of Appeals, and Jaime Michelle Generazzo, Senior Attorney, Appellate Division,of Statewide Guardian ad Litem Office, Tallahassee, and Allison J. McCabe, of Defending Best Interests, Port Orange, for Guardian ad Litem o/b/o E.M., J.M., and M.M., Jr. August 26, 2026 PER CURIAM. M.M., the Father of E.M., J.M., and M.M., Jr., appeals the trial court’s order adjudging these three children dependent and placing them in foster care. We affirm. Sufficient for our purposes, the Department of Children and Families filed its verified petition for dependency arguing protection of the children was necessary in part because they had been abused, abandoned, or neglected as defined in section 39.01(15)(a), Florida Statutes (2025), and were at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect as contemplated by section 39.01(15)(f). In a thorough order, the trial court granted the petition, finding “[t]he children have been abused or are at substantial risk of imminent abuse.” As a result, the court adjudged the children dependent and placed them in the care of the Department for protective supervision in an out-of-home placement. This appeal followed. Our review presents a mixed question of law and fact. The trial court’s order will be sustained if the lower court applied the correct law and its ruling is supported by competent substantial evidence. See S.H. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 328 So. 3d 30, 31 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021). We have previously noted that a trial court’s discretion in cases regarding a child’s welfare is “very broad,” and we “[do] not conduct a de novo review of evidence or substitute [our] judgment for that of the trial court.” D.D. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 773 So. 2d 615, 617 (Fla. 5th DCA 2000). Here, Father argues reversal is required because the Department failed to present sufficient evidence to support an adjudication of dependency. We disagree. Sufficient evidence exists in the record to affirm the trial court’s decision. Following the serious domestic violence giving rise to the case before us, the children’s Mother resumed residing with the Father and initially did not disclose her or the children’s whereabouts when requested by the Department. After initially telling the Department that she and the children were residing in Texas, the Mother changed her story and indicated they would soon be moving to Texas. Ultimately, when investigators spoke to the children, the children told them that the Father and Mother “fight with their hands a lot,” including an incident that occurred “that morning.” These facts in the record before us are sufficient to support the trial 2 court’s findings and resulting adjudication of dependency. Thus, we affirm. AFFIRMED. MAKAR and SOUD, JJ., concur. MACIVER, J., dissents with opinion. _____________________________ Not final until disposition of any timely and authorized motion under Fla. R. App. P. 9.330 or 9.331. _____________________________ 3 Case No. 5D2026-0461 LT Case No. 54-2025-DP-57 MACIVER, J., dissenting with opinion. I cannot join the majority’s affirmance in this case; my dissent is based solely on sufficiency of the evidence. The majority accurately points to the existing record evidence and our highly deferential standard of review in dependency cases. Given that standard, it is hard to find fault in their reasoning. Additionally, it is worth noting that the domestic violence incident that initiated this case was particularly egregious. M.M. had pled no contest to criminal charges that included the allegation that he threatened the children’s mother (outside of their presence or knowledge) by placing a firearm in her mouth. Given the seriousness of the purported violence and the mother’s resistance to the intervention of the Department of Children and Families, the trial court was within its sound discretion to give significant weight to the Department’s evidence. With that said, the evidence is inarguably scant. To support its allegations that the children had been abused, abandoned, or neglected as defined in section 39.01(15)(a), Florida Statutes (2025), and were at substantial risk of imminent abuse, abandonment, or neglect as contemplated by section 39.01(15)(f), the Department provided (admittedly without objection) vague and unelaborated hearsay that the children said their parents fight a lot, with their hands, including on the morning of the interview. As noted above, given the seriousness of the initial criminal incident, the court below would certainly be expected to give significant weight to this evidence. But at the same time, that seriousness would suggest a motivation for the Department to present a solid case. Whatever factors might have counselled for not having testimony by the children (or some other supporting evidence), the result is that the court has nothing more than vague and unelaborated hearsay as evidence. Which child made the statements? More than one? Did the “fight with their hands” comment include the incident from that morning? Did any of the children make conflicting statements? To be sure, these are questions appropriately left for cross examination and are not 4 posed by this court—I mention them here only to highlight that such obvious questions still linger because of the dearth of evidence presented by the Department (who had the burden below). As noted above, a trial court’s order will be sustained if the lower court applied the correct law and its ruling is supported by competent substantial evidence. See S.H. v. Dep’t of Child. & Fams., 328 So. 3d 30, 31 (Fla. 5th DCA 2021). I cannot agree that the evidence presented here by the Department was substantial enough for the court below to make its ruling. 5